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Abstract 
The question of whether Nazi law was valid law has been at the background 
of jurisprudential discourse since the Hart-Fuller debate in the 1950s. The 
enduring focus of that discourse on the validity question  W the conditions of 
validity for law  W and the separability question  W the nature of the 
relationship between law and morality  W has consigned the Third Reich to a 
specific jurisprudential role as a limit case for positivism and natural law. This 
dissertation elucidates and interrogates that role, using recent empirical and 
theoretical historical research to challenge its basis and assert the substantive 
relevance of the Nazi past for present legal theoretical concerns. 
It argues that the jurisprudential representation of Nazi Germany is flawed. It 
relies on a hypothetical, superficial, evil straw man version of the Third Reich 
that bears little resemblance to its actual history. It also treats Nazi law as the 
paradigmatic, archetypal wicked legal system. This is informed by an 
underlying narrative of rupture between Nazi Germany, including its legal 
system, and the contemporary concept of law. The positivism/natural law 
dichotomy around which the discourse is structured is  consequently 
incapable of adequately explaining and incorporating Nazi law. This 
dissertation draws on the legal theoretical writing of David Fraser to examine 
how it might be reimagined to achieve this. 
The narrative of rupture that informs jurisprudence was constructed at 
Nuremberg and proliferated into historical understanding, public 
consciousness and, via the Hart-Fuller debate, jurisprudential discourse. Over 
recent decades it has been revised within historiography but its successor 
narratives have not made their way into jurisprudential discourse, which 
remains largely isolated from the historical discipline. This dissertation shows 
how the actual, historical case of Nazi law is not  W but ought to be  W part of 
the jurisprudential concept of law. 
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Chapter One: /ŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ? ‘the law under National Socialism is typically 
regarded as having constituted a complete break from modern legal norms 
ĂŶĚƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚƐ ?1 
I. The Problem with Nazi Law 
A Thesis, Aims and Approach 
Did Nazi Germany have law, a legal system to speak of?2 The answer to this 
question has often been taken to depend on the answer to some broader 
questions: what is law? How is it defined? How does it relate to morality? Is 
there a single, universal concept of law and, if so, what are its conditions of 
validity? The possibility of constructing one common, concept of law, and 
what that would consist of, has been an important concern for Anglo-
American jurisprudence3 since the Hart-Fuller debate of the 1950s, which 
originated in the aftermath of the defeat of the Nazi regime at the end of the 
Second World War.4 However, the preoccupation with the necessary 
conditions for legal validity (the validity question) and the relationship 
between law and morality (the separability question) within jurisprudential 
discourse is, I will argue, detrimental to our understanding of the role that 
law played in Nazi Germany. The structuring of this discourse around the 
debate between natural law and positivism has reduced the concept of Nazi 
law to a rhetorical status and subsumed it within the generic category of 
wicked legal systems albeit as the paradigmatic example. As such it is 
continually invoked both by those who see it as the ultimate legal outlier 
ǁŚŝĐŚ ? ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ ŽĨ ŝƚƐ ŵŝŶŝŵĂů  ‘ůĂǁĨƵů ? ĨŽƌŵ ? ĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ ůĂǁ ĂŶĚ
morality are fundamentally separable, and those who argue that a system 
                                                                 
1
 WĂƚƌŝĐŝĂ ^ǌŽďĂƌ ?  ‘dĞůůŝŶŐ ^ĞǆƵĂů ^ƚŽƌŝĞƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ EĂǌŝ ŽƵƌƚƐ ŽĨ >Ăǁ P ZĂĐĞ ĞĨŝůĞŵĞŶƚ ŝŶ
Germany, 1933- ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? ? )  ? ?Journal of the History of Sexuality 131, 133. All  italicised 
words in quotations throughout this dissertation are in the original text unless otherwise 
specified. This is also the case for Americanised spellings. 
2
 /ǁŝůů ƵƐĞƚĞƌŵƐƐƵĐŚĂƐ ‘EĂǌŝ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ? ? ‘dŚŝƌĚZĞŝĐŚ ? ? ‘EĂǌŝƌĞŐŝŵĞ ?ĂŶĚ ‘EĂǌŝƐŵ ?ƌĞĂƐŽŶĂďůǇ
interchangeably in this dissertation, to refer generally to the existence of a German state 
under the leadership of the NSDAP during the period 1933-1945, in its various shapes and 
ƐŝǌĞƐ ? dŚŝƐ ƵƐĂŐĞ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ƵƐĞ ŽĨ ƌĞůĂƚĞĚƚĞƌŵƐƐƵĐŚĂƐ ‘,ŽůŽĐĂƵƐƚ ?ŝƐĚĞĂůƚǁŝƚŚĨƵƌƚŚĞƌŝŶ
Section II of this Chapter.  
3
 Throughout this dissertation, except where the context otherwise dictates, I will  use the 
ƚĞƌŵ ‘ũƵƌŝƐƉƌƵĚĞŶĐĞ ?ƚŽƌĞĨĞƌƚŽƚŚĞƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶŽĨƉƌŝŵĂƌŝůǇĂŶĂůǇƚŝĐĂů ?ŶŐůŽ-American, English-
language, jurisprudential-theoretical writing within the legal discipline, of which H.L.A. Hart is 
usually considered the foremost proponent and leading figure. My definition of this concept 
ĂŶĚŝƚƐƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉƚŽƌĞůĂƚĞĚƚĞƌŵƐƐƵĐŚĂƐ ‘ůĞŐĂůƚŚĞŽƌǇ ? is outlined in more detail  in 
Section II of this chapter.  
4
 The Hart-&ƵůůĞƌĚĞďĂƚĞƉƌŝŵĂƌŝůǇĐŽŶƐŝƐƚĞĚŽĨ, ?> ? ?,Ăƌƚ ? ‘WŽƐŝƚŝǀŝƐŵĂŶĚƚŚĞ^ĞƉĂƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ
>Ăǁ ĂŶĚ DŽƌĂůƐ ?  ? ? ? ? ? )  ? ? ? ? )Harvard Law Review  ? ? ? ? ĂŶĚ >ŽŶ &ƵůůĞƌ ?  ‘WŽƐŝƚŝǀŝƐŵ ĂŶĚ
Fidelity to Law  ?  ZĞƉůǇƚŽWƌŽĨĞƐƐŽƌ,Ăƌƚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ? ? ? )Harvard Law Review 630. 
    
2 
 
ĐŽŶƚĂŝŶŝŶŐ ƐƵĐŚ ĞǆƚƌĞŵĞ ǁŝĐŬĞĚŶĞƐƐ ĐĂŶ ŽŶůǇ ďĞ  ‘ŶŽŶ-ůĂǁ ? ? ƐƵĐŚ ŝƐ ƚhe 
necessary connection between law and morality.  
Within this dialogue Nazi Germany exists predominantly at a superficial and 
symbolic level, as a hypothetical, simplistic, straw man version of itself, with 
almost no engagement with the rapidly evolving historiography of the Nazi 
state. Consequently, the historical reality of the nature and role of law within 
the state is largely overlooked. The disconnection between historical and 
legal constructions of Nazi Germany5 has left jurisprudential discourse reliant 
on the pre-existing, postwar narrative of a totalitarian, criminal state, a 
narrative constructed by and at the Nuremberg Trials,6 but which has been 
radically revised within historiography in recent years.7 The analytical and 
conceptual nature and relatively narrow focus of much English-language 
jurisprudence in the last half century means there has been little incentive 
from within for re-evaluating its current representation of Nazi law.8 This is 
exacerbated by the almost complete isolation from developments in 
understanding within the historical discipline which would lead this 
representation, and some of the jurisprudential theories tied to it, to be 
reconsidered. 
In this context the thesis of this dissertation is  that recent historical research 
reveals that jurisprudential discourse relies on a misrepresentation of Nazi 
Germany to support its theoretical paradigms, which require re-evaluation 
based on the historical Nazi experience of law. Its aim is therefore to use 
historical scholarship to challenge and reconstruct the jurisprudential 
representation of Nazi Germany and especially its legal system. I will use 
                                                                 
5
 Exceptions to this disconnection include the writing of David Fraser, whose scholarship is 
discussed periodically through this dissertation, and some of which is given particular 
attention in Chapter Four. 
6
 A detailed examination of the representation of Nazi Germany within the Nuremberg NMT 
and IMT proceedings is beyond the scope of this dissertation, which focuses on academic 
legal scholarship (this focus is fleshed out in Section II). However, the impact of the 
Nuremberg trials in constructing narratives about Nazi Germany on academic historical and 
legal discourse is discussed in Chapter Six. For recent accounts of the construction of this 
narrative see Kim C. Priemel and Alexa Stil ler (eds), Reassessing the Nuremberg Military 
Tribunals: Transitional Justice, Trial Narratives, and Historiography  (Berghahn Books, 2012).  
7
 The application of the conclusions of recent historical research into Nazi Germany, dating 
back to the 1990s, to juri sprudence and other areas of legal scholarship is central to this 
dissertation and is considered at various points. In particular, Chapter Five outlines case 
studies of two areas of this research, revealing its significant findings and their potential 
impact on the current treatment of Nazi Germany within jurisprudential discourse. 
8
 Some scholars writing within the legal academy have suggested such a re-evaluation ought 
to take place. These include in particular David Fraser and Kristen Rundle, and their l argely 
conflicting accounts of the relevance of Nazi law to jurisprudence are discussed in detail  in 
Chapter Four. 
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historical research to show that the actual experience of law in Nazi Germany 
undermines some important jurisprudential claims and is highly relevant for 
jurisprudential issues. This research reveals the need to reassess key 
jurisprudential questions as they apply to Nazi Germany, because 
concentrating on whether a hypothetical version of Nazi law does or does not 
ĐŽŵƉůǇ ǁŝƚŚ ĂŶ ĂďƐƚƌĂĐƚ ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ  ‘ůĂǁ ?, tied to a conceptual model of 
the connection between law and morality, distorts rather than advances 
academic understanding of it. 
The atrocities perpetrated by Nazism are urgently in need of closer 
examinĂƚŝŽŶ ďǇ ůĞŐĂů ƐĐŚŽůĂƌƐ ? ŶŽƚ ƐŽ ƚŚĞǇ ĐĂŶ ďĞ ůĂďĞůůĞĚ ĂƐ  ‘ůĂǁĨƵů ? Žƌ
 ‘ƵŶůĂǁĨƵů ? Žƌ ƐŽ ƚŚĞǇ ĐĂŶ ďĞ ƵƐĞĚƚŽƚĞƐƚƚŚĞďŽƵŶĚĂƌŝĞƐŽĨƚŚĞĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶŽĨ
 ‘ůĂǁ ? ?or because they somehow prove that law and morality are or are not 
linked. Rather it is for what they reveal about how an ostensibly modern, 
civilised Rechtsstaat at the heart of the western world was able to accomplish 
such things as the Holocaust with the acquiescence and often approval of 
much of its population, using law to do so. The role played by law in the 
various stages of this process can tell us much about both the history of Nazi 
Germany and the theoretical nature and empirical application of law. It is not 
Ă ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ǁŚĞƚŚĞƌ ŝƚ ŝƐ  ‘ůĂǁ ? ? ŝƚ ŝƐ ƌĂƚŚĞƌ ǁŚĞƚ Ğƌ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƐ ĂŶĚ
theories used to understand law within jurisprudence help us understand 
Nazi law and whether the Nazi experience of law impacts on those concepts 
and theories. 
Highlighting the possibility of continuities and similarities between Nazi law 
and other modern legal systems, and the relevance of Nazi law for some 
pressing jurisprudential issues, while improving our understanding of the role 
of law in Nazi Germany, is a necessary undertaking to enable us to 
understand better what law amounts to in times of dramatic social and 
political change. These are not merely historic and historical concerns. This 
dissertation opens up the potential for comparison by using historical 
research into Nazi Germany to highlight its relevance for certain legal issues 
and unlock a circumscribed jurisprudential discourse to create space to allow 
the theoretical implications of Nazi Germany to be incorporated. It un-
alienates Nazi Germany from contemporary jurisprudence, and similarly 
historical research from areas of legal scholarship from which i t is currently 
divorced. I do not intend to indict the whole of jurisprudential discourse, and 
I recognise that positivism and natural law in their various forms are highly 
developed theoretical constructs which are not without merit for our 
understanding of law. Nevertheless, a deeper and more wide-reaching 
jurisprudential concept of law beyond an extremely thin analytical version or 
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a morally based normative model requires examining the historical 
experience of law in regimes such as the Third Reich in more detail. 
This dissertation is a contribution to the small but emerging body of legal 
theoretical writing that challenges the influence of a misrepresentation and 
under-theorisation of Nazi law within academic legal renderings of the Nazi 
state.9 As such I concentrate on issues that are not particularly emphasised 
currently. These include presenting an extensive account of the treatment of 
Nazi Germany within jurisprudential discourse now and how this treatment 
and the structure of the discourse are related to the legacy of the Hart-Fuller 
debate. I describe its reliance on and propagation of an implicit, underlying 
narrative of rupture and discontinuity between the Third Reich and the 
contemporary concept of law ?ŶŽƚǁŝƚŚƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐƉŽƐŝƚŝǀŝƐŵ ?ƐŚŽůůŽǁŝŶƐŝƐƚĞnce 
that Nazi law was in fact law.10 I give explicit consideration to the importance 
of the conclusions of recent historical research for re-evaluating this legal 
scholarship, combined with an attempt to make connections between the 
two disciplines, along with the sub-discipline of legal history, in certain, 
specific ways so they do not continue to remain for all intents and purposes 
distinct and separate in their engagement with Nazi law. This will reveal the 
significance of the history of Nazi Germany for jurisprudence, in a way that 
suggests other areas of legal scholarship that also engage in a misconception 
of Nazi Germany may also benefit from re-evaluation that takes into account 
an historical perspective. 
The following sections of this chapter will be used to introduce some 
important themes, explain the precise scope of the thesis and its use of 
terminology, and outline how the following chapters will take it forward. In 
                                                                 
9
 Some aspects of this emerging scholarship are considered in more detail  in Section III, 
below. 
10
 dŚŝƐ ŝŶƐŝƐƚĞŶĐĞŝƐ  ‘ŚŽůůŽǁ ?ďĞĐĂƵƐĞŝƚƐsubstantive implications for the legal theoretical 
analysis of the Nazi legal system are virtually non-existent. The fact that it is considered to be 
 ‘ůĂǁ ? ŝƐ ƚŚĞ ƌĞƐƵůƚ ŽĨ ƐƵĐŚ Ă ŵŝŶŝŵĂů ƐĞƚ ŽĨ ĐŽŵŵŽŶ ĐƌŝƚĞƌŝĂ ƚŚĂƚ EĂǌŝ ůĂǁ ŝƐĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚ
sufficiently different from other forms of law as to be legitimately excluded from relevance in 
jurisprudential debate beyond establishing the possibil ity that such a wicked regime can, in 
ĨĂĐƚ ?ďĞ ‘ůĂǁ ? ?/ƚŝƐĂůƐŽŚŽůůŽǁďĞĐĂƵƐĞŝƚŝƐŶŽƚďĂƐĞĚŽŶĂŶǇĚĞƚĂŝůĞĚĞǆĂŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶof the Nazi 
legal system, but rather some outdated preconceptions about the nature of Nazi law and 
therefore wicked legal systems generally. This narrative persists in the background and rests 
on the failure within the discourse to explore properly the his torical nature of Nazi law, 
which results in it being treated inaccurately as a certain type of legal system that exists 
ĨĂĐƚƵĂůůǇ ĂƐ  ‘ůĂǁ ? ďƵƚ ŚĂƐ ŶŽ ŶŽƌŵĂƚŝǀĞ ĐŽƌƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶĐĞ ƚŽ ŽƚŚĞƌ ůĞŐĂů ƐǇƐƚĞŵƐ ? dŚĞ
misrepresentation of the Nazi legal system this engenders helps support a general consensus 
that Nazi law is not relevant law, whether it is law in mere form or not. While technically 
 ‘ůĂǁ ?ĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽƉŽƐŝƚŝǀŝƐƚĂĐĐŽƵŶƚƐ ?ƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ?ƚŚĞEĂǌŝƐǇƐƚĞŵŝƐƐƵďƐƚĂŶƚŝǀĞůǇ irrelevant 
from a legal theoretical perspective. Some of these points are explored in more detail  in 
chapters Two and Three. 
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the remainder of Section I, I will introduce the perception that the Anglo-
ŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ  ‘ůĞŐĂů ĂĐĂĚĞŵǇ ? ŚĂƐ ĨĂŝůĞĚ ƚŽ ƚĂŬĞ EĂǌŝ 'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ Žƌ EĂǌŝ ůĂǁ
seriously as a subject for research, one starting point for my critique of 
jurisprudential discourse. In Section II I will unpack and explain my method 
and approach. I will discuss and define some of the important legal and 
historical concepts and terminology to be used throughout. Section III will 
introduce some important literature, briefly outlining important aspects of 
the development of the historical understanding of Nazi law, and highlighting 
some areas where the legal academy has encountered the Nazi past. Section 
IV will conclude with a brief summary of how my approach will take my thesis 
forward in the following chapters. This chapter will therefore provide an 
understanding of the scope and methodology of the thesis, its key 
underpinning scholarship, and how it will be progressed through this 
dissertation. 
B Challenging the Legal Academy with the Nazi Past
11
 
Writing in 2002 about race defilement in Nazi Germany, Patricia Szobar 
commented: 
In the past several decades, an influential stream of scholarship has laid 
claim to the notion that the Nazi era cannot be understood purely as an 
aberration in modern history but needs to be interpreted within the 
framework of a larger German and European trajectory. However, this 
has not been the case for the historiography of law in National Socialist 
Germany, which remains largely wedded to traditional methodological 
and theoretical approaches. Though scholars have pointed to elements 
of continuity with law in Wilhelmine and Weimar Germany, and a few 
have made glancing comparisons to the legal systems of other 
authoritarian or totalitarian regimes, the law under National Socialism is 
typically regarded as having constituted a complete break from modern 
legal norms and standards.
12
 
Notwithstanding the huge gains in historiographical understanding of the 
Nazi period generally in recent years, Anglo-American, academic legal 
understanding specifically of Nazi law has not undergone a parallel 
transformation and historical research is only now beginning to. While a great 
deal has been written about the functioning of the Nazi state and the 
implementation of the Holocaust, comparatively little attention has been 
paid to the specific role of law within that enterprise. As a consequence, with 
some recent exceptions, historians often remain reliant for their systemic 
                                                                 
11
 dŚĞ ƚĞƌŵ  ‘EĂǌŝ ƉĂƐƚ ? ŝƐ ŝŶƚĞŶĚĞĚ ƚŽ ƌĞĨĞƌ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ĞŶĚƵƌŝŶŐ ƚƌĂƵŵĂ ĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚĞĚ ǁŝƚŚ EĂǌŝ
Germany, and its ongoing cultural significance in many countries, which makes it a past that 
is constantly breaking into the present. This term is described in more detail  in Section II  of 
this chapter.  
12
 ^ǌŽďĂƌ ? ‘dĞůůŝŶŐ^ĞǆƵĂů^ƚŽƌŝĞƐ ? ?Ŷ1) 133. 
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theorisation of Nazi law on the competing models advanced during 1940s by 
Ernst Fraenkel and Franz Neumann.13 The ability to reconstruct the Nazi legal 
system in light of developments in other areas of the history of Nazi Germany 
in the decades since those analyses relies on an engagement between legal 
theorists and general and legal historians all of which in their Anglo-American 
manifestations have largely overlooked Nazi law for the bulk of that period. 
Similarly, it is possible to connect the paucity of English-language legal 
historical research about Nazi Germany with the lack of focus on Nazi law as a 
subject of philosophical interest within jurisprudence. The necessary 
developments in legal historical understanding have not generally been 
present to spur greater interest from legal theorists as to the historical nature 
of the wicked legal system upon which they construct certain theoretical 
claims about the nature of law generally.14 Consequently a collective, multi-
disciplinary imperative to generate further research and revised 
interpretations has not materialised outside of certain, specific pockets of 
attention. The embryonic upswing of interest in this area from Anglo-
American historians has been triggered by the translation of legal historical 
texts about Nazi law from German in particular, and Anglo-American 
historians remain heavily reliant on the continent for revising and updating 
their understanding of the Nazi legal system. Alongside Patricia Szobar, 
historians working within the Anglo-American legal academy have noticed 
the lack of research and interpretive evolution in the legal history of Nazi 
Germany, but translated texts (supplemented by the occasional English 
original) now exist as a basis for further exploration of Nazi law by both 
historians and lawyers. This has the potential to contribute to and enhance 
the more sophisticated understanding of the nature and operation of the 
Nazi state that has been constructed since the 1990s within historiography.15 
A problem with the relationship between the legal academy and Nazi 
Germany, which runs alongside the lack of legal historical research about Nazi 
law mentioned above, has been identified in general terms by a handful of 
legal scholars in recent years. Those who have raised theoretical questions of 
the legal academy have often done so in quite general terms, both in the field 
of legal scholarship they have challenged and the aspect of Nazism to which 
                                                                 
13
 Ernst Fraenkel , The Dual State: A Contribution to the Theory of Dictatorship (E.A. Shils tr, 
Octagon Books, New York, 1969); Franz Neumann, Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of 
National Socialism 1933-1944 (2
nd
 edn, Frank Cass & Co, 1967). 
14
 ^ĞĞŐĞŶĞƌĂůůǇDŽƌƚŽŶ,Žƌǁŝƚǌ ? ‘tŚǇŝƐŶŐůŽ-ŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ:ƵƌŝƐƉƌƵĚĞŶĐĞhŶŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂů ? ? ? ? ? ? )
17 OJLS 551. 
15
 Certain aspects of this are discussed in Chapter Five, below, specifically in relation to 
recent research into the Nazi concentration camp system. 
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they are referring.16 Frederick DeCoste has been at the forefront of such 
claims over recent decades, asserting in 1999 ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ƚŚĞ ŶŐůŝƐŚ-speaking 
academy has been especially resistant to exploring the moral, ethical, and 
political significance of events iŶ ƵƌŽƉĞ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ  ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚ ? ? ? ? ? ?17 A year 
later DeCoste referred to  ‘ƚŚĞ  ?ůĞŐĂů ? ĂĐĂĚĞŵǇ ?Ɛ ĚŝƐĚĂŝŶ ĨŽƌ ŚŝƐƚŽƌǇ ? ŝƚƐ
obstinate refusal to accord to the Holocaust the special reckoning for which 
the murder of so many ŝŶĐŽŶƐĐŝĞŶĐĞĐĂůůƐ ? ?18 Again, in 2007, he remarked on 
ƚŚĞ  ‘ĂďƐƵƌĚůǇ ƚŚŝŶ ? ĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƉŽƐƚ-war production of Anglo-American 
academic lawyers on law and the Holocaust.19 Others have expressed similar 
sentiments in slightly different ways. Laurence Lustgarten directs his 
comments to the barbarisation of Nazi law,20 Pietro Costa to the need for 
legal scholars to take account of historiography,21 Martti Koskenniemi to the 
ƌĞůƵĐƚĂŶĐĞ ŽĨ  ‘ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ ůĂǁ ? ƚŽ ĐŽŶĨƌŽŶƚ ŝƚƐŽǁŶƉĂƐƚ ?22 and David Fraser to 
the failure ǁŝƚŚŝŶ  ‘ůĞŐĂůĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞĂŶĚƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƐ ?ƚŽƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚƚŚĞ,ŽůŽĐĂƵƐƚ
and Nazi law as historical phenomena.23  
It is telling that many of these observations come from review essays. This 
indicates both that some new literature has begun to address the relationship 
between law and Nazi Germany, but also that, with the exception of David 
Fraser and occasional other works, many of those making the observations 
are not primarily engaged in remedying the problem they identify.24 
                                                                 
16
 The various scholars discussed here target different fields or aspects of law depending on 
their perspective and interests, but they do not always define precisely to what they are 
referring. I, therefore, raise them with a l ittle caution and in order to suggest that there is an 
emerging albeit fragmented sense that the role of Nazi Germany in legal scholarshi p is 
coming onto the agenda, and to highlight some relevant themes from this. My own focus is 
much more specifically on certain aspects of Anglo-American legal scholarship, and 
particularly jurisprudential discourse. 
17
 &ƌĞĚĞƌŝĐŬĞŽƐƚĞ ? ‘>Ăǁ ?,ŽůŽĐĂƵƐƚ ?ĐĂĚĞŵǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? Modern Law Review 792, 800. 
18
 &ƌĞĚĞƌŝĐŬ ĞŽƐƚĞ ?  ‘/ŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ? ŝŶ &ƌĞĚĞƌŝĐŬ ĞŽƐƚĞ ĂŶĚ ĞƌŶĂƌĚ ^ĐŚǁĂƌǌ  ?ĞĚƐ ) ?The 
,ŽůŽĐĂƵƐƚ ?Ɛ 'ŚŽƐƚ P tƌŝƚŝŶŐ ŽŶ ƌƚ ? WŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ? >Ăǁ ĂŶĚ ĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶ  (University of Alberta Press, 
2000) xvi. 
19
 Frederick Decoste,  ‘ZĞǀŝĞǁŽĨĂǀŝĚ&ƌĂƐĞƌ ?>ĂǁĨƚĞƌƵƐĐŚǁŝƚǌ ?(2007) <ŝŶŐ ?ƐŽůůĞŐĞ>Ăǁ
Journal 179, 180 (fn 2). 
20
 >ĂƵƌĞŶĐĞ>ƵƐƚŐĂƌƚĞŶ ? ‘dĂŬŝŶŐEĂǌŝ>Ăǁ^ĞƌŝŽƵƐůǇ ? ? ? ?   ) ? ?Modern Law Review 128. 
21
 WŝĞƚƌŽŽƐƚĂ ? ‘>ĂǁǇĞƌƐĂŶĚƚŚĞsŝƚĂůZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞWĂƐƚĂŶĚƚŚĞWƌĞƐĞŶƚ ? ? ? ? ? ? )
7 German Law Journal 87. 
22
 DĂƌƚƚŝ <ŽƐŬĞŶŶŝĞŵŝ ?  ‘ “Ǉ dŚĞŝƌ ĐƚƐ zŽƵ ^ŚĂůů  <ŶŽǁdŚĞŵ ? ? ? ?  ?ŶĚ EŽƚ ďǇ dŚĞŝƌ >ĞŐĂů
dŚĞŽƌŝĞƐ ) ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ?German Law Journal 155, 155. 
23
 David Fraser, Law After Auschwitz: Towards a Jurisprudence of the Holocaust (Carolina 
Academic Press, 2005). 
24
 /Ŷ  ? ? ? ? ĞŽƐƚĞ ǁĂƐ ƌĞǀŝĞǁŝŶŐ ůĞŐĂů ƐĐŚŽůĂƌ ZŝĐŚĂƌĚ tĞŝƐďĞƌŐ ?ƐVichy Law and the 
Holocaust in France (EĞǁ zŽƌŬ hŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇ WƌĞƐƐ ?  ? ? ? ? ) ĂŶĚ ŝŶ  ? ? ? ? ? &ƌĂƐĞƌ ?ƐLaw After 
Auschwitz  ?ŝďŝĚ ) ? >ƵƐƚŐĂƌƚĞŶ ǁĂƐ ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŶŐ DŝĐŚĂĞů ^ƚŽůůĞŝƐ ? The Law Under the Swastika: 
Studies on Legal History in Nazi Germany (University of Chicago Press, 1998). Pietro Costa 
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Therefore, while some of those involved express a certain degree of optimism 
about the potential for academic legal engagement with Nazi Germany,25 
progress has been extremely slow and the situation is perhaps best summed 
ƵƉ ďǇ ƚŚĞ ƵŶĐŚĂŶŐŝŶŐ ŵŽŽĚ ŽĨ ĞŽƐƚĞ ?Ɛ ĐŽŵŵĞŶƚƐ ŽǀĞƌ Ă ƉĞƌŝod of 13 
years. In 2012, he reflected that  ‘ QƐƵƌĞůǇƌĞŵĂƌŬĂďůǇ ?ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚĞƌƐŚĂǀĞŚĂĚ
more to say about the matter [of the Holocaust] than have academic lawyers 
who have with very rare exception stood mute since the Hart-Fuller debate of 
ƚŚĞůĂƚĞ ? ? ? ?Ɛ ? ?26 
These remarks about the state of law in relation to Nazi Germany are 
somewhat disparate, but they do indicate a sporadic, emergent desire to 
challenge the current perception of the relevance of the history of that 
period for the legal discipline. Some of the characteristics highlighted include 
the marginalisation of Nazi Germany as a subject of inquiry, a failure to 
recognise the significance of historical research in this area, and a feeling that 
Nazism, whether manifested by its legal system or the Holocaust, is an 
ƵŶƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĂďůĞ ‘ŽƚŚĞƌ ? ?ďĞĐĂƵƐĞŽĨŝƚƐƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞĚďĂƌ ĂƌŝĐ ?ůĂǁůĞƐƐŶĂƚƵƌĞ ? This 
ůĂƐƚĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐƚŝĐĐŽŵƉƌŝƐĞƐƚŚĞ  ‘ƌƵƉƚƵƌĞƚŚĞƐŝƐ ? ?ƚŚĞ ŝĚĞĂƚŚĂƚEĂǌŝ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ
represented a gross departure from normal historical and legal development 
 W an aberration  W such that there on no substantive points of continuity 
between now and then worthy of examination. ĞŽƐƚĞ ?Ɛ ƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ
1950s Hart-Fuller debate is telling because of the way the legacy of that 
debate has exacerbated some of these features of the discourse within 
jurisprudence today.27 In this dissertation I will use these remarks as a point 
of departure to exploit the emerging sense that Nazi Germany has more to 
ĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚĞ ƚŽ  ‘ůĂǁ ? ƚŚĂŶ ŚĂƐ ŚŝƚŚĞƌƚŽ ďĞĞŶ ƚŚŽƵŐŚƚďǇ ƚŚĞ ŵĂũŽƌŝƚǇ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ
legal academy. I wish to apply the themes identified to a concrete case in a 
specific context, particularly jurisprudence as one strand of legal theory 
                                                                                                                                                                          
and Martti  Koskenniemi were considering Christian Joerges and Navraj Singh Ghaleigh (eds), 
Darker Legacies of Law in Europe: The Shadow of National Socialism and Fascism Over Europe 
and Its Legal Traditions (Hart Publishing Ltd, 2003). 
25
 Koskenniemi, for example, describes Darker Legacies of Law in Europe ĂƐ  ‘ƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ
hopefully at the outset of a widespread and intensive new research agenda for European 
ůĂǁ ? ?<ŽƐŬĞŶŶŝĞŵŝ ‘ǇdŚĞŝƌĐƚƐ ? ?Ŷ22) 156. 
26
 &ƌĞĚĞƌŝĐŬ ?ĞŽƐƚĞ ? ‘,ŝƚůĞƌ ?ƐŽŶƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ?ZĞĚĞŵƉƚŝǀĞWŽůŝƚŝĐĂůŵŽƚŝŽŶƐ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞWŽůŝƚŝĐƐ
ŽĨ &ĞĂƌ ?  ? ? ? ? ? )  ? ? ? ? ?Jurisprudence & Legal Philosophy eJournal 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2180059> accessed 5 December 
2012, 4, fn 5. Fraser, too, would certainly agree that some of the problems he has highlighted 
persist to this day within legal scholarship; see, for example, his recent articles  ‘^ŚĂĚŽǁƐŽĨ
>Ăǁ ?^ŚĂĚŽǁƐŽĨƚŚĞ^ŚŽĂŚ PdŽǁĂƌĚƐĂ>ĞŐĂů,ŝƐƚŽƌǇŽĨ ƚŚĞEĂǌŝ<ŝů ů ŝŶŐDĂĐŚŝŶĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ? ? ? )
OJLS  ? ? ? ? ĂŶĚ  ‘ǀŝů  >Ăǁ ? ǀŝů  >ĂǁǇĞƌƐ ? &ƌŽŵ ƚŚĞJustice ĂƐĞƚŽƚŚĞdŽƌƚƵƌĞDĞŵŽƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? )
3(2) Jurisprudence 391. 
27
 The legacy of the Hart-Fuller debate in this respect is discussed further in Chapter Three. 
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within the Anglo-American legal academy, to show that their criticisms are 
fundamentally valid when applied to this case.  
II. Legal and Historical Concepts: Defining the Scope 
A Legal Categories 
In this section I will define the scope of this thesis and explain how key terms 
ƐƵĐŚ ĂƐ  ‘ũƵƌŝƐƉƌƵĚĞŶĐĞ ? ĂƌĞ ĞŵƉůŽǇĞĚ ƚŚĞƌĞŝŶ ? / ǁŝůů ďĞŐŝŶ ƚŚŝƐ ƐĞĐƚŝŽŶ ďǇ
explaining some of the terms I use to differentiate fields within the Anglo-
American legal discipline. I will then give reasons for the choices I make in 
terms of those areas focussed on, first generally for Anglo-American legal 
scholarship and then specifically for jurisprudence and ICL scholarship.28 I will 
conclude this section by outlining some areas this dissertation is not intended 
to cover and why I have excluded these from its scope. I noted at the 
beginning of this Chapter that I use jurisprudence to mean the strand of  
primarily analytical, Anglo-American, English-language jurisprudential 
discourse within the legal discipline.29 It comprises the tradition of text-
based, state-centred, doctrinal and conceptual legal theory in the Anglo-
American tradition, which is concerned with issues such as the validity of law, 
the connection between law and morality and judicial interpretation, and 
much of which represents the direct or indirect legacy of the Hart-Fuller 
debate. 
/ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞƚŚŝƐĨŝĞůĚĂƐ ‘ƉƌŝŵĂƌŝůǇ ĂŶĂůǇƚŝĐĂů ?ĐĂƵƚŝŽƵƐůǇďĞĐĂƵƐĞŝƚŝƐĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚƚŽ
completely isolate the analytical branch from the normative branch. 
Analytical jurisprudence is often described as   ‘ĂŶ ĞŶƚĞƌƉƌŝƐĞ ŽĨ  “ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂů
ĐůĂƌŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? /ƚƐ ĐůĂŝŵ ƚŽ Ă ŵŽƌĂůůǇ ŶĞƵƚƌĂů ? ĚĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝǀĞ ? status suggests a 
concern with the preliminary clarification of ideas, rather than an attempt 
directly to address fundamental queƐƚŝŽŶƐ ŽĨ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ? ?30 
Normative jurisprudence, by contrast, is primarily thought of as evaluative; it 
 ‘ǁŽƌŬƐ ǁŝƚŚthe already determined concept of law, and asks what the law 
ƐŚŽƵůĚ ďĞ ? ?31 However, it is more accurate and useful to follow William 
dǁŝŶŝŶŐ ?Ɛ ǀŝĞǁ ƚŚĂƚ ? ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ŽŶĞ ĚŝǀŝĚĞƐ ƵƉ ŶŐůŽ-American jurisprudence, 
 ‘ŵŽƐƚ ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĂů ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐ ĂďŽƵƚ ůĂǁ ŝŶǀŽůǀĞ Ă ĐŽŵďination of analytical, 
                                                                 
28
 The term ICL scholarship refers to international criminal law scholarship and is explained 
further in Part B of this section. 
29
 See fn 3 above. 
30
 Nigel E Simmonds, Central Issues in Jurisprudence: Justice, Law and Rights (4th edn, Sweet 
& Maxwell, 2013) 180. 
31
 ƌƚŚƵƌ ZŝƉƐƚĞŝŶ ?  ‘EŽƌŵĂƚŝǀĞ ĂŶĚ ŶĂůǇƚŝĐ :ƵƌŝƐƉƌƵĚĞŶĐĞ ? IVR Encyclopaedia of 
Jurisprudence, Legal Theory and Philosophy of Law, http://ivr-
enc.info/index.php?title=Normative_and_Analytic_Jurisprudence, accessed 31 October 2013. 
This rigid version of the distinction is taken to be Austinian in origin and is challenged in a 
number of ways elsewhere in the piece. 
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ĞŵƉŝƌŝĐĂů ? ĂŶĚ ŶŽƌŵĂƚŝǀĞ ĞůĞŵĞŶƚƐ ? ? ǁŝƚŚ ŶŽ ĐůĞĂƌ ĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ
them.32 Nevertheless, it is impossible to ignore the huge influence of H.L.A 
Hart in the Anglo-American legal academy, on setting out the main tenets of 
what he considered to be an analytical form of legal positivism, and on 
determining the main issues at stake within the discourse.33 
/ƚƌĞĂƚ ũƵƌŝƐƉƌƵĚĞŶĐĞĂƐŽŶĞĨŝĞůĚŽĨ  ‘ůĞŐĂůƚŚĞŽƌǇ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚƌĞĨĞƌƐƚŽĂǁŝĚĞƌƐĞƚ
of those writing academically about the theoretical aspects of law.34 By this I 
mean the general and philosophical part of legal scholarship that deals with 
theoretical questions of an ontological or epistemological sort, most 
generally about the nature of law. I limit the term to Anglo-American legal 
scholarƐŚŝƉ ƐŽ ŝƚ ĚŽĞƐŶŽƚƌĞĨĞƌƚŽ ?ĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ĐŽŶƚŝŶĞŶƚĂůƚŚĞŽƌŝƐƚƐ ?  ‘>ĞŐĂů
ƐĐŚŽůĂƌƐŚŝƉ ?ƌĞĨĞƌƐƚŽ English language academic research and writing within 
the Anglo-American legal discipline and not limited to legal theory. It 
excludes academic writing from outside of the Anglo-American tradition as 
well as legal practice generally. We cannot completely isolate practice from 
theory in a legal context, and they naturally overlap and influence one 
another. However, I aim to include the latter and exclude the former as far as 
possible because of my concern with how Nazi law is theorised and the 
implications of this for philosophical academic discourses. It means, for 
example, that I do not directly address what Anglo-American court judgments 
might have had to say about Nazi law but they may become relevant 
inasmuch as they contribute to theoretical academic writing about the 
subject.35 
Legal practice has of course formed a broad set of responses to Nazi 
Germany. This is most clearly apparent in areas such as the post-1949 
constitutional development of Germany, the existence of the Council of 
Europe and European Union and the burgeoning of universal human rights 
norms, the proliferation of hate crimes and Holocaust denial legislation and 
the development of international criminal law (ICL). These areas are 
surrounded by academic legal discourse and my focus is on specific 
theoretical parts of this discourse. dŚĞ  ‘ůĞŐĂů ĂĐĂĚĞŵǇ ? ŝƐ ƚŚĞ  ?ŶŐůŽ-
ŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ ) ďŽĚǇ ǁŝƚŚŝŶ ǁŚŝĐŚ ůĞŐĂů ƐĐŚŽůĂƌƐŚŝƉ ƚĂŬĞƐ ƉůĂĐĞ ? / ĚĞĨŝŶĞ  ‘ůĞŐĂů
ŚŝƐƚŽƌǇ ? ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶƚĞǆƚŽĨEĂǌŝ ůĂǁĂƐƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚŝŶƚŽ ůĞŐĂůĂƐƉĞĐƚƐŽĨƚŚĞEĂǌŝ
                                                                 
32
 Will iam Twining, General Jurisprudence: Understanding Law from a Global Perspective 
(Cambridge University Press, 2009) 13. 
33
 On the influence ŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐǁƌŝƚŝŶŐĂŶĚŽĨƚŚĞ,Ăƌƚ-Fuller debate specifically on the direction 
of jurisprudential discourse, see Chapter Three. 
34
 Including, for example, feminist legal theory, critical legal theory, postmodern theory and 
so on. 
35
 For example, David Fraser ?  ‘ “dŚŝƐ ŝƐEŽƚů ŝŬĞĂŶǇŽƚŚĞƌ>ĞŐĂůYƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ ? PĂƌŝĞĨ,ŝƐƚŽƌǇŽĨ
EĂǌŝ>ĂǁďĞĨŽƌĞh<ĂŶĚh^ŽƵƌƚƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ?Connecticut Journal of International Law 59. 
    
11 
 
state or Nazi war crimes trials as a sub-discipline of history, but potentially 
involving scholars both historically and legally trained.36 
/ ƵƐĞ ƚŚĞ ƚĞƌŵ  ‘ůĂǁ ? ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞthat it is conceptually tricky in the 
context of this field of study but nevertheless cannot be avoided. Its 
construction is inevitably entwined with jurisprudential discourse. The 
ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ǁŚĂƚ  ‘ůĂǁ ?ŝƐconceptually lies at the heart of the jurisprudential 
discourse subject to ƚŚŝƐ ĚŝƐƐĞƌƚĂƚŝŽŶ ?Ɛ ĐƌŝƚŝƋƵĞ. It is at this level highly 
contested. Furthermore, it is particularly contestable in the case of Nazi 
Germany, where the question of whether law can ever be so wicked as to be 
no longer law is deemed to meet its paradigmatic case, an assertion also 
problematized by the arguments in this dissertation.37 Even in a general sense 
ƚŚĞƚĞƌŵ  ‘ůĂǁ ?ŝƐĂŵďŝŐƵŽƵƐ as to whether it means legal practice, substantive 
law, a legal system and/or legal writing and in what context. If it is not used 
specifically in the context of debates about its nature, or its status within Nazi 
Germany, then it is usually intended broadly to mean all of those things that 
come within the discipline of law and sometimes specifically to mean the set 
of rules and norms that make up a section of the substantive law.38 It will be 
apparent from the context which. 
B Exploring Jurisprudence and ICL Scholarship 
This thesis concentrates on scholarship in the Anglo-American tradition as it 
is a deliberate attempt to address how Nazi Germany is treated within Anglo-
American legal academia, and especially certain parts of legal theory. 
Jurisprudence is extremely influential in the legal academy, taught almost 
universally on law degrees and comprising the subject-matter of many 
                                                                 
36
 While the use of specific laws to implement Nazi policy in the Third Reich is amply 
attended to in texts about the Nazi state, Nazi law receives very l ittle separate attention from 
generalist historians and the Nazi legal system is understandably not thought of as an 
existential issue within Anglo-American historiography. There is a paucity of speci fically legal 
historical research into Nazi Germany stemming from the Anglo-American historical 
academy, with most of the English language contributions originating from German scholars. 
The relationship between the historical and legal theoretical aspects  of this research is much 
closer in the German tradition (for example, in the work of Michael Stolleis) than in the 
Anglo-American scholarship. This is discus sed in more detail  in Section III  below and its 
implications in Chapter Five. 
37
 The employment of EĂǌŝ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇĂƐĂ  ‘ůŝŵŝƚĐĂƐĞ ?ĨŽƌ ůĂǁĂŐĂŝŶƐƚǁŚŝĐŚďŽƚŚƉŽƐŝƚŝǀŝƐƚƐ
and natural lawyers can test their theories is undermined by the actual historical nature of 
ůĂǁŝŶƚŚĞdŚŝƌĚZĞŝĐŚ ?ǁŚŝĐŚŝƐŝŶŵĂŶǇǁĂǇƐƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĂďůĞĂƐ ‘ůĂǁ ?ĂŶĚŝŶŵĂŶǇŽƚŚĞƌƐƋƵŝƚĞ
different to legal systems founded on liberal principles of legality. Both the similarities and 
the differences as they actually existed challenge its status a paradigmatically marginal legal 
system. 
38
 Subject always to the aforementioned question about what actually constitutes valid law. 
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textbooks,39 and the Hart-Fuller debate is a canonical reference point within 
this discourse. I argue, especially given the construction of current 
jurisprudential discourse in the aftermath of the demise of the Third Reich, 
that if we are to search anywhere for the reason the legal academy often 
neglects Nazi Germany this is an important place to look. Legal scholarship is 
the reference frame for this dissertation because how academic lawyers 
write about Nazi Germany reflects and reinforces our cultural understanding 
of its associated events and feeds back into other areas of legal scholarship.  
My focus means continental scholarship is excluded because different parts 
of the European continent have very specific and quite different relationships 
to the Nazi past to the Anglo-American world.40 While these issues are not 
completely unrelated to collective memory in Anglo-American nations, the 
postwar life-world of victorious and unoccupied allied powers inevitably 
raises some different legal and historical issues. It is difficult to avoid 
altogether the influence of continental legal scholarship, and particularly 
theory, on Anglo-American legal theory but the two systems are sufficiently 
separated, not least by language, to mean it is not entirely futile to focus on 
one and not the other. The Anglo-American focus provides the opportunity to 
explore the potential enduring impact on aspects of legal scholarship of the 
self-understanding of opposition with Nazi Germany that comes with such a 
stark historical conflict of values occurring within living memory. 
How jurisprudence engages with Nazi Germany is important because of its 
connection to the postwar period through the Hart-Fuller debate, the 
influence its ideas and those of its pre-eminent scholars (especially H.L.A 
Hart) have within legal academia, and because it represents the foremost 
academic method of understanding the nature, norms and rules of Anglo-
American, state-centred legal systems. While there are other related matters 
of jurisprudential interest, the central concept of law is generally tackled in 
connection with the validity question and the separability question, those 
aspects also being where Nazi Germany has played its most prominent role. 
There is a causal thread, pursuant to which jurisprudence was permeated by 
a certain postwar political, historical, cultural and legal consensus about the 
totalitarian and criminal nature of the Nazi state in part through its offhanded 
treatment in the Hart-Fuller debate. Jurisprudence cannot account for all of 
ƚŚĞ ƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞĚ ŐĂƉƐ ŝŶ ĂŶĚ ĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚŝĞƐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ ůĞŐĂůĂĐĂĚĞŵǇ ?ƐĞŶŐĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ
                                                                 
39
 For example, Twining, General Jurisprudence (n 32); Simmonds, Central Issues in 
Jurisprudence (n 30); and many more. 
40
 For example, the politics of national identity and collective memory plays a stark role in the 
postwar development of many continental states, and there has often been a great deal of 
ambivalence about how to respond to the past, especially in Germany itself. See fn 50, 
below. 
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with Nazi Germany highlighted in Section I, but it is a significant piece in the 
puzzle. It is one worth investigating to try to understand the extent to which 
these gaps and difficulties exist, why they came about, and how best to deal 
with them. Its current discursive structures embody a major obstacle to 
ŽǀĞƌĐŽŵŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ĞŶƚƌĞŶĐŚĞĚ ŽƉƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ  ‘ŽƵƌ ?ŶŐůŽ-American 
ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ůĂǁ ĂŶĚ  ‘ƚŚĞŝƌ ? EĂǌŝ Đriminality, which prevents Nazi law from 
being a serious, substantive part of the jurisprudential conversation about 
the nature of law. 
I turn later to consider aspects of legal and historical scholarship about Nazi 
war crimes trials.41 The particular facet of legal scholarship I will address is 
ƚĞƌŵĞĚ  ‘/> ƐĐŚŽůĂƌƐŚŝƉ ? ? dŚŝƐ ƌĞĨĞƌƐ ƚŽ ĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐ ǁƌŝƚŝŶŐ ǁŝƚŚŝŶ ƚŚĞ
disciplinary area of international criminal law (ICL), in particular that which 
explicitly examines Nazi war crimes trials. Like jurisprudence, this is a fairly 
clear-cut body of scholarship. It is defined predominantly by its focus on the 
development, doctrines and procedures of international criminal law and 
more specifically by its engagement with the trials themselves. In practice, 
most of the academic legal writing about these proceedings is focused on the 
Nuremberg International Military Tribunal (IMT), with some attention paid to 
the Nuremberg Subsequent Military Proceedings (NMT). ICL scholarship has a 
direct legal and historical connection to Nazi Germany through the 
Nuremberg trials and other Nazi war crimes trials and provides an 
enlightening comparison for jurisprudence from the legal academy in terms 
of how it represents the Third Reich, because of the important role of 
Nuremberg in constructing enduring narratives of it. 
The focus on jurisprudence and ICL scholarship to support my thesis leaves 
some potentially relevant areas of the legal discipline largely untouched, in 
particular international human rights law (IHRL) and international 
humanitarian law (IHL). There is also an emerging literature on criminology 
and genocide studies, which falls outside of the scope of this dissertation.42 
There is a potential overlap between ICL scholarship and IHL and IHRL 
because of the shared role played by Nuremberg in particular in their 
development. There is a considerable amount of academic and theoretical 
scholarship about these subjects some of which at least makes reference to 
                                                                 
41
 ^ĞĞŚĂƉƚĞƌ^ŝǆ ?dŚĞƚĞƌŵ  ‘EĂǌŝǁĂƌĐƌŝŵĞƐƚƌŝĂůƐ ?ƌĞĨĞƌƐŝŶĂŐĞŶĞƌĂůƐĞŶƐĞƚŽdomestic and 
international efforts to use the criminal law to prosecute those involved in acts executed 
during the Nazi period and conceived of by the Nazi regime in association with its policies of 
persecution, extermination and aggressive expansion, whether as members of the Nazi party, 
officials of the Nazi regime or collaborators from other states . 
42
 &ŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ZŽƐƐDĂƚƐƵĞĚĂ ? ‘dŽǁĂƌĚƐĂEĞǁƌŝŵŝŶŽůŽŐǇŽĨ'ĞŶŽĐŝĚĞ: Theory, Method, 
ĂŶĚWŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ? ? ? )Theoretical Criminology 495; and John Hagan and Wenona Rymond-
Richmond, Darfur and the Crime of Genocide (Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
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Nazi Germany even if only as part of a moral/historical introduction to its 
origins and imperative.43 The practice of both areas is surrounded by a 
substantial academic discourse with the potential for theoretical paradigms 
to be influenced heavily by practice developments and vice versa. Nazi 
Germany has impacted this with whole systems of norms and institutions 
almost constructed from the ruins of the regime. However, I do not tackle 
scholarship in these areas in any detail for a number of reasons. Primarily, 
while I suspect that some of the same observations about jurisprudence can 
be made about academic discourse in these areas, they touch on a number of 
other aspects beyond the theoretical analysis of the concept of law that 
exercises this dissertation, all significant comparisons to which can be made 
using ICL scholarship. 
While legitimate questions may be asked about whether IHRL discourse 
theorises Nazi law any more successfully than jurisprudence, human rights 
scholarship raises different issues that fall outside of the scope of this 
dissertation. There are examples of texts that crossover between the fields of 
ICL and human rights law and incorporate some reflection on Nazi Germany, 
ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐ ĨŽƌ ĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ĂǀŝĚ ,ŝƌƐŚ ?Ɛ Law Against Genocide.44 Hirsh uses the 
concept of a cosmopolitan criminal law to bring together various aspects of 
IHRL and IHL as well as a number of international criminal and other trials, 
and raises cosmopolitan law as part of the concrete legal response to 
ŐĞŶŽĐŝĚĞ ?,ŝƌƐŚ ?ƐƚĞǆƚ includes some very interesting discussions in relation to 
Nazi Germany, including chapters on the development of individual 
responsibility and crimes against humanity with reference to the Nuremberg 
IMT and a brief analysis of some historical and sociological literature about 
Nazi Germany.  
dŚĞƐĐŽƉĞŽĨ,ŝƌƐŚ ?s work and some of the things it excludes highlights why I 
am tackling certain issues within this dissertation. Hirsh attempts to show 
that the notion of cosmopolitan criminal law from Nuremberg onwards is not 
merely either a wholly utopian, unattainable dream or a mask for exercise of 
pure power by nation states, but rather an actual and occasionally successful, 
if flawed and incomplete attempt to tackle the problems of genocide and 
totalitarianism. It is in that sense an enlightening work. However, despite the 
consideration of research by Zygmunt Baumann and Christopher Browning45 
in the context of the concept of individual responsibility, it does not seek to 
fundamentally address how Nazi law is theorised and understood or what the 
                                                                 
43
 See, for example, David Hirsh, Law Against Genocide: Cosmopolitan Trials (Routledge-
Cavendish, 2007). 
44
 Ibid. 
45
 ibid 24-37. 
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philosophical implications of Nazi Germany are for how law is conceptualised 
within academic discourse. It instead looks at a number of cases, some of 
which pertain to the Third Reich, to see how and when they are successful as 
examples of cosmopolitan criminal law. It is also unusual in its broad 
interdisciplinary analysis, across ICL, IHRL and IHL, and its application of 
relevant historical research. A comprehensive examination of human rights 
literature in relation to Nazi Germany and the Holocaust in particular would 
raise a number of additional issues and levels of complexity that do not fall 
within the scope of my thesis in this dissertation. 
C Historical Terminology 
I have noted that terms such as  ‘EĂǌŝ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ? ? ‘EĂǌŝƐƚĂƚĞ ?ĂŶĚ ‘EĂǌŝƌĞŐŝŵĞ ?
can be used interchangeably and have quite a general meaning.46 However, 
some of the terms are much more contested than others (e.g.  ‘Holocaust ?). 
Their precise meaning is more significant because of the sensitive nature of 
the use of terminology surrounding the Holocaust and because how I 
conceptualise the Nazi state and its legal system is vital to the evaluation of a 
branch of legal scholarship, jurisprudence, which pays close attention to what 
ŝƐ ĂŶĚ ŝƐ ŶŽƚ ůĞŐŝƚŝŵĂƚĞĂƐ  ‘ůĂǁ ? ?dĞƌŵƐƐƵĐŚĂƐ  ‘EĂǌŝ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ?ŽƌƚŚĞ  ‘dŚŝƌĚ
ZĞŝĐŚ ? ĚŽ ŶŽƚ ŵĂŬĞ ĐůĞĂƌ ƚŚĞ ƐƉĂƚŝĂůŽƌƚĞŵƉŽƌĂů ůŝŵŝƚƐƚŚĞǇĂƌĞ ŝŶƚĞŶĚĞĚƚŽ
indicate.47 The extent of the state and its annexed and dependent territories 
altered radically over a relatively short period of time, as did the quality of 
Nazi rule. I am not concerned for the purposes of my thesis with the specific 
extent and classification of the Reich at any one time so adopt a fairly simple 
and generalised usage, with context and specific language indicating more 
detailed points of reference. Therefore, unless clearly stated or the context 
otherwise makes clear, the starting point for terms such aƐ  ‘EĂǌŝ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ? ?
 ‘EĂǌŝ^ƚĂƚĞ ? ?  ‘EĂǌŝƌĞŐŝŵĞ ?ĂŶĚŽƚŚĞƌƐŝŵŝůĂƌƚĞƌŵƐŝƐƚŚĞŝƌůŝƚĞƌĂůŵĞĂŶŝŶŐ PƚŚĞ
entity governed by the Nazi party from 1933 to 1945 in its various forms, or 
the regime comprising that government. The term  ‘dŚŝƌĚ ZĞŝĐŚ ? will also be 
used interchangeably with these, although it implies a more precise 
geographical limitation as the area directly governed by the regime.48  
                                                                 
46
 See fn 2, above. 
47
 Each or all  of these might refer only to areas of National Socialist direct rule, or to this 
greater Germany as well as various occupied territories, such as the General Gouvernement, 
the Reichskommissariat territories and occupied France; or it might further incorporate 
unoccupied Vichy France and other dependent states in parts of Eastern Europe. Then there 
is the question of whether and how to include the transitory eas tern front boundary in the 
period during the Second World War. 
48
 See Mark Mazower, ,ŝƚůĞƌ ?ƐŵƉŝƌĞ PEĂǌŝZƵůĞŝŶKĐĐƵƉŝĞĚƵƌŽƉĞ (Penguin, 2008) for some 
useful maps of Nazi rule, and particularly the map of Europe in 1942 on pp. xvii i -xix. 
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dŚĞ ƚĞƌŵ  ‘ƚŚĞ EĂǌŝ ƉĂƐƚ ? ŝƐ ŝŶƚĞŶĚĞĚ ƚŽ ƌĞĨĞƌ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ƉĞƌŝŽĚ ŽĨ EĂǌŝ ƌƵůĞ ĂŶĚ
some of its wider and subsequent implications for individual and collective 
memory and national identity. It indicates the melding of the past into the 
present that is observable in the case of a traumatic set of historical events 
which have left so many political, cultural and psychological marks on 
western society.49 While the ƚĞƌŵ ‘EĂǌŝƉĂƐƚ ?ĂƉƉĞĂƌƐƐŽŵĞǁŚĂƚĂŵďŝŐƵŽƵƐ ?
it is helpful in attempting capture the enduring significance of Nazism for 
many, which makes it a past that is continually breaking into the present and 
whose status contributes to some of the academic historical and legal 
challenges with integrating it into conventional disciplinary schemas.50 The 
term incorporates the phenomenon of the Holocaust, which has its own 
ǁŝĚĞƌ ŝŵƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? / ǁŝůů ŐĞŶĞƌĂůůǇ ƵƐĞ  ‘ƚŚĞ ,ŽůŽĐĂƵƐƚ ? ƚŽ ƌĞĨĞƌ ƚŽ the 
historical event of the systematic and partly industrialised killing of the 
European Jewish population across the territory under Nazi influence, 
ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐ ŝŶ ĐŽŶĐĞŶƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ ĚĞĂƚŚ ĐĂŵƉƐ ĂŶĚ ŽŶ ƚŚĞĞĂƐƚĞƌŶĨƌŽŶƚ ?  ‘&ŝŶĂů
^ŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ? ?  ‘ĞǆƚĞƌŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ :ĞǁƐ ? ĂŶĚ  ‘Shoah ? ŵĂǇ ĂůƐŽ ďĞ ƵƐĞĚ ŝŶ ƚŚŝƐ
sense, but I will default to the term  ‘,ŽůŽĐĂƵƐƚ ?ĨŽƌĞĂƐĞĂŶĚĐŽŶƐŝƐƚĞŶĐǇ ?51
 ‘,ŽůŽĐĂƵƐƚ ?ĂŶĚƚĞƌŵƐƐƵĐŚĂƐ ‘ƵƐĐŚǁŝƚǌ ?ĐĂŶĂůƐŽƐŝŐŶŝĨǇƚŚĞ,ŽůŽĐĂƵƐƚĂƐĂn 
enduring philosophical phenomenon, which carries with it different 
contemporary meanings for different people beyond the merely 
descriptive.52 Context will make it clear which of these significations is 
intended. This dissertation is not about the semantics of how we refer to 
either the Nazi state or the Holocaust. These issues are dealt with 
elsewhere,53 and I intend here to employ generally accepted terms in their 
generally accepted usage as straightforwardly as possible, in awareness of 
                                                                 
49
 See, as a small sample of this highly varied, multidisciplinary l iterature, for example Peter 
Novick, The Holocaust in American Life (Houghton Miffl in, 2000); Katka Reszke, Return of the 
Jew: Identity Narratives of the Third post-Holocaust Generation of Jews in Poland (Academic 
Studies Press, 2013); Ronald J. Berger, The Holocaust, Religion, and the Politics of Collective 
Memory: Beyond Sociology (Transaction Publishers, 2013); Richard Crownshaw, The Afterlife 
of Holocaust Memory in Contemporary Literature and Culture (Palgrave 2010); Alvin H. 
Rosenfeld, The End of the Holocaust (Indiana University Press, 2011). 
50
 &Žƌ ƐŽŵĞ ĞǆĂŵƉůĞƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƵƐĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƚĞƌŵ  ‘EĂǌŝ ƉĂƐƚ ? ŝŶ ĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐ ů ŝƚĞƌĂƚƵƌĞ ? ƐĞĞ ůĂŶ
Steinweis, Phil ipp Gassert, Coping with the Nazi Past: West German Debates on Nazism and 
Generational Conflict, 1955-1975 (Berghahn Books, 2006); Michael Burleigh (ed), Confronting 
the Nazi Past: New Debates on Modern German History  ?^ƚ ?DĂƌƚŝŶ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? ) ?ŝů ů EŝǀĞŶ ?Facing 
the Nazi Past: United Germany and the Legacy of the Third Reich (Routledge, 2002). 
51
 &ŽƌĂĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ ‘,ŽůŽĐĂƵƐƚ ? ?ƐĞĞ ‘ĞĨŝŶŝŶŐƚŚĞ,ŽůŽĐĂƵƐƚ ?ŝŶŽŶĂůĚEŝĞǁǇŬ ?&ƌĂŶĐŝƐ
Nicosia, The Columbia Guide to the Holocaust (Columbia University Press, 2000). 
52
 See some of the l iterature in fn 49 as an i l lustration of this. Also, Fraser, Law After 
Auschwitz (n 23) ĨŽƌĂŶĞǆĂŵƉůĞŽĨƚŚĞƵƐĞŽĨ ‘ƵƐĐŚǁŝƚǌ ? ?
53
 ^ĞĞ ? ĨŽƌ ĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ? Ğǀ 'ĂƌďĞƌ ? ƌƵĐĞ ƵĐŬĞƌŵĂŶ ?  ‘tŚǇ ĚŽ ǁĞ Ăůů  dŚĞ ,ŽůŽĐĂƵƐƚ  “dŚĞ
,ŽůŽĐĂƵƐƚ ? ? PŶ/ŶƋƵŝƌǇŝŶƚŽƚŚĞWƐǇĐŚŽůŽŐǇŽĨ>ĂďĞůƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ? ? )Modern Judaism 197. 
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but not unduly encumbered by the controversy that sometimes surrounds 
them. 
When referring to the Holocaust,54 I do not intend to imply that it is a 
phenomenon of enduring significance independent from the Nazi regime as a 
whole, or is somehow exceptional or unique (beyond its intrinsic historical 
specificity). This position is  not uncontroversial,55 but I make this position 
clear here because I do not at any point engage extensively with debates 
about the nature of the Holocaust. However, it is important to my argument 
about Nazi law to recognise the Holocaust as essentially sharing the 
ĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐƚŝĐƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŵŽƌĞ  ‘ŽƌĚŝŶĂƌǇ ? ĂƐƉĞĐƚƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ EĂǌŝ ƐƚĂƚĞ ? ďĞŝŶŐ Ă
grotesque but natural - although not necessarily inevitable - consequence of 
these rather than a distinct phenomenon. Recent detailed historical studies 
of the implementation of the Holocaust, which there is not scope to survey 
here,56 make clear the degree of complexity and interaction in the 
relationship between the ordinary aspects of the state and those involved in 
carrying out the Final Solution. The Holocaust is a vitally important event for 
modernity in various ways57 and it offers a substantial amount of material for 
research, but it is not historically or theoretically justifiable in my view, to 
treat it as distinctive in character from the wider context of the Nazi state in 
which it is firmly rooted and the ideology and aims of which it is an extension. 
Beyond the above, this dissertation is in no way an attempt to redeem Nazi 
law, justify Nazi ideology or underplay the wickedness or immorality of the 
Nazi regime and the atrocities perpetrated by it. It is not a case of saying that 
 ‘ůŝďĞƌĂů ?ůĂǁŝƐĂƐďĂĚĂƐEĂǌŝůĂǁ ?ĂƐŝƚŝƐƌĞĂĚŝůǇĂƉƉĂƌĞŶƚƚŚĂƚĂĨƵůůǇƌĞĂůŝƐĞĚ
Nazi state would not be a desirable outcome whether or not it was 
considered legal. It is not a legal history of Nazi Germany or an attempt to 
provide a comprehensive theorisation of Nazi law. I refer to historical 
scholarship throughout this dissertation but do not do so in order to provide 
                                                                 
54
 Particularly in Chapter Four. 
55
 See for perspectives on the question of uniqueness, Alan Rosenbaum (ed), Is the Holocaust 
Unique? Perspectives on Comparative Genocide (Westview Press, 2008). 
56
 Although see the Nazi Concentration Camp System research discussed in Chapter Five for  
the complex overlapping functions of camp institutions between political/ideological, 
ĐƌŝŵŝŶĂů ůĂǁ ? ƉĞƌƐĞĐƵƚŽƌǇ ĂŶĚ ŐĞŶŽĐŝĚĂů ƌŽůĞƐ ? ĂƐ ǁĞůů ĂƐ ƚŚĞ  ‘ŽƌĚŝŶĂƌǇ ? ŶĂƚƵƌĞ ŽĨ ƚŚŽƐĞ
involved in the perpetration of the Holocaust in the camps. See also Raul Hilber g, The 
Destruction of the European Jews (3
rd
 edn, Yale University Press, 2003) as well as the 
contributions to Dan Stone (ed), The Historiography of the Holocaust (Palgrave Macmillan, 
 ? ? ? ? )ĂŶĚ ‘WĂƌƚs PĂƐĞĂŶĚŽŶƚĞǆƚ PdŚĞ,ŽůŽĐĂƵƐƚĂŶĚtŽƌůĚtĂƌ// ?ŝŶĂǀŝĚĂŶŬŝĞƌ ?ĂŶ
Michman (eds), Holocaust Historiography in Context: Emergence, Challenges, Polemics and 
Achievements (Yad Vashem, 2008) for examples of this. 
57
 On its impact on historical theory, for example, see the publications of historian and 
theorist Dan Stone, some of which are considered in more detail  in Chapter Four. 
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a detailed legal map of the Nazi state, nor do I engage much directly with 
primary historical sources. This section has outlined what the areas I intend 
to focus on are and why I do so, as well as how I will use certain terminology 
to facilitate the communication of my argument. I will now provide a brief 
review of the current status of aspects of the legal historical literature by way 
of background to the research used in later chapters to challenge the 
jurisprudential representation of Nazi Germany. 
III. A Selective Review of the Development of the Legal History of Nazi 
Germany 
A The Development of the Anglo-American Understanding of Nazi Law 
In setting the context for the remainder of this dissertation, this section will  
provide a background to the emerging Anglo-American understanding of Nazi 
law, and highlight some of the key literature in this area that constructs a 
different version of Nazi law to the one that currently prevails within 
jurisprudential discourse. This research demonstrates that Nazi Germany 
occupies a peculiar place in some parts of the legal academy, in that for 
jurisprudence it is very often present in some form or another, but is rarely 
represented as its actual historical self. Nazi law also occupies a strange place 
in the wider historiography of Nazi Germany in that, for all the detailed 
analyses of different aspects of the Nazi state, and all of the recent narrative 
accounts of Nazi war crimes trials, historians in the Anglo-American academy 
do not appear to have spent much time at all thinking or writing about the 
general nature or function of the Nazi legal system.  
&Žƌ ĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ? ŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĂŶ :ĂŶĞ ĂƉůĂŶ ǁĂƐ ƌŝŐŚƚ ŝŶ  ? ? ? ?ƚŽƉŽŝŶƚŽƵƚƚŚĂƚ  ‘EĂǌŝ
political theory has not been ǁŝĚĞůǇ ƐƚƵĚŝĞĚ ? ?58 Her citation of a noteworthy 
exception in the German-language legal history of Michael Stolleis, among 
others, is telling in that it reveals how legal theory (more usually 
constitutional theory59) is generally treated as an aspect of political theory in 
the historiography.60 This is a not untypical example. The many English 
language narrative histories of the Nazi state and historiographical collections 
of key themes that have been published over the years, while often 
recounting the significance of particular Nazi legislation such as the Enabling 
Act or the Nuremberg laws, rarely dwell on Nazi law as a distinctive feature of 
                                                                 
58
 :ĂŶĞĂƉůĂŶ ? ‘EĂƚŝŽŶĂů^ŽĐŝĂůŝƐŵĂŶĚƚŚĞdŚĞŽƌǇŽĨƚŚĞ^ƚĂƚĞ ?ŝŶdŚŽŵĂƐŚŝůĚĞƌƐĂŶĚ:ane 
Caplan, Reevaluating the Third Reich (Holmes & Meier, 1993) 98. 
59
 Law as such is rarely addressed in the English-language legal history of Nazi Germany, 
ǁŚĞƌĞĂƐƚŚĞƐƚĂƚĞ ?ƐĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůŶĂƚƵƌĞŝƐĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚŵŽƌĞŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŝŶŐĂŶĚƉĞƌƚŝŶĞŶƚ ? 
60
 ĂƉůĂŶ ? ‘EĂƚŝŽŶĂů^ŽĐŝĂůŝƐŵ ? ?Ŷ58) 98-113, 98 and endnote 2 (p 109). 
    
19 
 
the regime (although the role of legal officials is sometimes touched upon).61 
Where it does come up it has been reliant on German language studies of the 
subject for further input.62 
It is only very recently that translated texts from German scholars have 
encouraged new specialist English-language academic research interest in law 
in Nazi Germany, suggesting that the subject is coming onto the agenda. At 
ƚŚĞ ĨŽƌĞĨƌŽŶƚ ŽĨ ƚŚŝƐ ŝƐ DŝĐŚĂĞů ^ƚŽůůĞŝƐ ? ƚƌĂŶƐůĂƚĞĚ ĂŶĚ ŽƌŝŐŝŶĂů ŵĂƚĞƌŝĂů ?
including his The Law Under the Swastika.63 One or two other examples have 
ĂůƐŽ ĨŽůůŽǁĞĚ /ŶŐŽ DƺůůĞƌ ?Ɛ ƉŽƉƵůĂƌ  ?ĂůƐŽ ƚƌĂŶƐůĂƚĞĚ )  ? ? ? ? ǀŽůƵŵĞ,ŝƚůĞƌ ?Ɛ
Justice,
64 including Diemut DĂũĞƌ ?Ɛ “EŽŶ-'ĞƌŵĂŶƐ ?hŶĚĞƌƚŚĞdŚŝƌĚZĞŝĐŚ.65 
Very little on this subject has stemmed directly from the Anglo-American 
academy.66 Most recently in 2013, however, Alan Steinweis and Robert 
ZĂĐŚůŝŶ ?Ɛ ĞĚŝƚĞĚ ĐŽůůĞĐƚŝŽŶThe Law in Nazi Germany67 was published with 
contributions from lawyers and historians from both North America and 
ƵƌŽƉĞ ? /Ŷ ƚŚĞ /ŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ƚŚĞ ĞĚŝƚŽƌƐ ƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĞ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ƚhe legal history of 
Nazi Germany has not attracted a great deal of attention from scholars  ?ĂŶĚ
 ‘much of the important scholarship that does exist in this area has not been 
translated from German into English ? ?68 One reason for this, they note, is that 
 ‘ƐĐŚŽůĂƌƐŚŝƉ ŵĂǇ ŚĂǀĞ ƐƵĨĨĞƌĞĚ ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĞ ĞƌƌŽŶĞŽƵƐ ƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ůĂǁ
                                                                 
61
 DĂƌƚŝŶ ƌŽƐǌĂƚ ?Ɛ ?The Hitler State: The Foundation and Development of the Internal 
Structure of the Third Reich  ?>ŽŶŐŵĂŶ ? ? ? ? ? ) ŝƐƵŶƵƐƵĂů ŝŶ ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐĂĐŚĂƉƚĞƌĞŶƚŝƚů Ě ‘>Ăǁ
ĂŶĚ :ƵƐƚŝĐĞ ?  ?ƉƉ ? ? ? ?-345), which is almost certainly a result of Broszat being a German 
historian, the book having initially been published in the German language (Martin Broszat, 
Der Staat Hitlers (Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1969)). This is much less common in English 
language publications. See, for example, Tim Kirk, Nazi Germany (Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); 
Christian Leitz (ed), The Third Reich: The Essential Readings (Blackwell, 1999); Jane Caplan 
(ed), Nazi Germany (OUP, 2008); and Detlev Peukert, Inside Nazi Germany: Conformity, 
Opposition and Racism in Everyday Life (Penguin, 1987). 
62
 Many of these are referred to in and noted at the end of Michael Stolleis,  ‘>Ăǁ ĂŶĚ
>ĂǁǇĞƌƐWƌĞƉĂƌŝŶŐƚŚĞ,ŽůŽĐĂƵƐƚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ?Annual Review of Law and Social Science 213. 
63
 As well as ibid, there is Stolleis, The Law Under the Swastika (n 24); Michael Stolleis, A 
History of Public Law in Germany 1914-1945  (OUP, 2004); and Michael Stolleis, History of 
Social Law in Germany  ?^ƉƌŝŶŐĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? ) ?Śs/ŽĨǁŚŝĐŚĐŽǀĞƌƐ ‘dŚĞEĂǌŝ^ƚĂƚĞ ? ? 
64
 Ingo Müller, ,ŝƚůĞƌ ?Ɛ:ƵƐƚŝĐĞ P dŚĞŽƵƌƚƐ of the Third Reich (Harvard University Press, 1991). 
65
 Diemut Majer,  “EŽŶ-'ĞƌŵĂŶƐ ?hŶĚĞƌdŚĞdŚŝƌĚZĞŝĐŚ PdŚĞEĂǌŝ:ƵĚŝĐŝĂůĂŶĚĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝǀĞ
System in Germany and Occupied Eastern Europe, with Special Regard to Occupied Poland, 
1939 W1945 (John Hopkins University Press, 2003). 
66
 Apart from the occasional volume of legal history written by lawyers such as Weisberg, 
Vichy Law (n 24). 
67
 Alan Steinweis and Robert Rachlin (eds), The Law in Nazi Germany: Ideology, Opportunism, 
and the Perversion of Justice (Berghahn Books, 2013). 
68
 ůĂŶ ^ƚĞŝŶǁĞŝƐ ĂŶĚ ZŽďĞƌƚ ZĂĐŚůŝŶ ?  ‘/ŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ P dŚĞ >Ăǁ ŝŶ EĂǌŝ 'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ
,ŽůŽĐĂƵƐƚ ?ŝŶ/ďŝĚ ? ? 
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ĚŝĚ ŶŽƚ ŵĂƚƚĞƌ ŝŶ 'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ĚƵƌŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ EĂǌŝ ƉĞƌŝŽĚ ?.69 This perception is 
significant for the legal academy because if law is not relevant in Nazi 
Germany, then Nazi Germany is not relevant for law.  
Steinweis and Rachlin simultaneously revise and reinforce an understanding 
of Nazi law that has permeated historical research for many years, often 
indirectly through studies of the state apparatus. They emphasise the role 
and importance of law while simultaneously assuming the juxtaposition of 
order and terror, chaos and control, arbitrariness and certainty, normality 
and genocide. The theme of a lawless Nazi regime gradually eating away 
parasitically at the pre-existing  legal state, with increasing power going to 
the SS over the bureaucracy, the party over the state, Führer decrees over 
Reichstag legislation and special courts over the established judiciary, has 
prevailed in historical understanding of how the government functioned in 
ƚŚĞdŚŝƌĚZĞŝĐŚ ?/ƚƐŝŶƐƉŝƌĂƚŝŽŶĐŽŵĞƐƉĂƌƚůǇĨƌŽŵƌŶƐƚ&ƌĂĞŶŬĞů ?ƐƐƚŝůůƉŽƉƵůĂƌ
1941 account of the normative and prerogative states in The Dual State.70 
According to this view, the normative state,  ‘ĂŶĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝǀĞďŽĚǇĞŶĚŽǁĞĚ
with elaborate powers for safeguarding the legal order as expressed in 
ƐƚĂƚƵƚĞƐ ?ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐŽĨƚŚĞĐŽƵƌƚƐ ?ĂŶĚĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐŽĨ ƚŚĞĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝǀĞĂŐĞŶĐŝĞƐ ?
co-existed with the prerogative state ?  ‘ƚŚĂƚ ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚĂů ƐǇƐƚĞŵ ǁŚŝĐŚ
exercises unlimited arbitrariness and violence unchecked by any legal 
ŐƵĂƌĂŶƚĞĞƐ ? ?71 ŝŶ Ă ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ ĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐĞĚ ďǇ  ‘ĐŽŶƐƚĂŶƚ ĨƌŝĐƚŝŽŶ ? ?72 
Therefore, the Nazi legal system is exemplified by the presence of both forms 
of the state at the same time. 
Fraenkel did not claim that the prerogative state necessarily eroded the 
normative state to the point of destruction.73 dŚĞ ŵŽĚĞů ŽĨ ƚŚĞ  ‘ĚƵĂů ƐƚĂƚĞ ?
does, however, suggest two quite distinct spheres of jurisdiction that co-exist 
but ĚŽŶŽƚŽǀĞƌůĂƉŽƌ ŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚĞǁŝƚŚŽŶĞĂŶŽƚŚĞƌ ?dŚĞ ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞŽĨ&ƌĂĞŶŬĞů ?Ɛ
construction of the prerogative state within historiography was, 
paradoxically, reinforced by the competing model put forward by Franz 
NeumaŶŶ ?ƐBehemoth, initially published in 1942.74 EĞƵŵĂŶŶ ?ƐǁĂƐůĞƐƐŽĨĂŶ
investigation into the Nazi legal system and more of a structural analysis of 
ƚŚĞ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ƐǇƐƚĞŵ ? /Ŷ ŝƚŚĞĞǆƉƌĞƐƐůǇƌĞũĞĐƚĞĚ&ƌĂĞŶŬĞů ?Ɛ ŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚ
with it any concept of law in Nazi Germany.75 EĞƵŵĂŶŶ ?ƐĂůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞǁĂƐƚŚƵƐ
a totalitarian state of separate, competing spheres of power within Nazi 
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Germany (party, state, army, industry, bureaucracy, and so on). Both of these 
interpretations have been extremely influential in historiography, and were 
important forerunners to the structuralist school of thought which was vital 
from the 1960s for counter-ďĂůĂŶĐŝŶŐ  ‘ŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵ ? ?76 EĞƵŵĂŶŶ ?Ɛ
ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ?ǁŚŝĐŚ  ‘drew a clear line between the National Socialist 
Party, including the SS, and the other pillars of the Nazi state ? ?77 also found its 
way into postwar historiography and public memory as it helped to underpin 
ƚŚĞ ĂůůŝĞƐ ?ƉƌŽƐĞĐƵƚŽƌŝĂůĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚŝŶƚŚĞEƵƌĞŵďĞƌŐ/DdĂŶĚĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůůǇEDd
proceedings.78 These latter proceedings, in terms of the narratives resulting 
from the prosecution and defence construction of the Nazi state,  ‘ƐĞƌǀĞĚĂƐ
multipliers for empirical flaws, analytical shortcomings, and interpretative 
dead-ĞŶĚƐ ? within the historiography.79  
This brief overview begins to reveal the entrenched view of the Nazi legal 
system within historiography that has often depended on narratives of 
rupture and opposition from and within law as it was manifested in the Third 
Reich. It also shows how law as such in Nazi Germany has not been a key 
concern for historical scholarship until recently, under heavy influence from 
translated German scholarship. It is questionable whether Anglo-American 
legal theorists with their natural and specific focus on law ought to have paid 
more attention to its Nazi manifestation when English language historians 
were not writing much about it. However, even translated scholarship can 
now be used to address the misconceptions and theoretical lacunae within 
jurisprudence about Nazi Germany. As the most developed set of 
interpretations about Nazi law come from this scholarship, I refer to it in 
support of my arguments in this dissertation. It is also in line with the general 
history of Nazism coming out of the English academy, which rarely pinpoints 
Nazi law but does understand the regime in a way that makes Nazi law 
intelligible as a complex and continuous system across time and space. 
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B Encounters between the Academic Legal Discipline and the Nazi Past  
Research into Nazi Germany within other parts of the legal academy does 
merit some brief attention both to contextualise the current level and nature 
of engagement with Nazi Germany and because I will refer to some of this 
scholarship and the arguments it contains where relevant throughout this 
dissertation ĂƐ ƉĂƌƚ ŽĨ ŵǇ ĐƌŝƚŝƋƵĞ ŽĨ ũƵƌŝƐƉƌƵĚĞŶĐĞ ? ĂǀŝĚ &ƌĂƐĞƌ ?Ɛ ǁŽƌŬis 
virtually unique in its legal theoretical focus on the role of law in Nazi 
Germany and in incorporating legal, historical and philosophical aspects.80 
While almost all of the scholarship about Nazi law I have referred to has 
generally addressed itself to law in the German state itself,81 Fraser is also 
one of the only legal or historical scholars writing in the English language to 
tackle the role of Nazi law in implementing the Holocaust in territories 
outside of but under the influence or occupation of the Reich.82 He also 
straddles philosophical boundaries in his writing, between continental and 
Anglo-American legal theory, and his arguments often attend to 
ĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚEĂǌŝ ůĂǁǁĂƐŝŶĨĂĐƚ ‘ůĂǁ ?ĨŽƌĂůůŝŶƚĞŶƚƐĂŶĚƉƵƌƉŽƐĞƐĂŶĚ
ŝŶƚŚĞĞǇĞƐŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚŝǀĞ ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ? ŽĨĐŽŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇ ůĞŐĂůŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐ ?83 
It is generally the influence of continental and critical theory in the English 
language legal academy that has brought certain aspects of Nazi Germany to 
legal attention among interdisciplinary legal and social  theorists.84 I do not 
intend to review this line of research in detail, not least because it largely 
focuses on specific aspects of the Holocaust whereas I wish to address the 
implications of the Nazi state and legal system as a whole, of which the 
Holocaust is but one aspect. There are, however, pockets of scholarship 
dealing with the implications of other facets of Nazi Germany. This includes, 
for example, instances where references to Nazism and the Holocaust appear 
                                                                 
80
 See, for example, Fraser, Law After Auschwitz (n 23); David Fraser, ĂǀŝďŽƌƐŚĐŚ ?Ɛ Ăƌƚ P
Narrating the Holocaust in Australian War Crimes Trials (University of Nebraska Press, 2010); 
The Fragility of Law: Constitutional Patriotism and the Jews of Belgium, 1940 -1945 
(Routledge-Cavendish, 2009); The Jews of the Channel Islands and the Rule of Law, 1940-
 ? ? ? ? P “YƵŝƚĞŽŶƚƌĂƌǇƚŽƚŚĞWƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐ ŽĨƌŝƚŝƐŚ:ƵƐƚŝĐĞ ? (Sussex Academic Press, 2000). 
81
 With the exception of Majer,  “EŽŶ-'ĞƌŵĂŶƐ ?hŶĚĞƌdŚĞdŚŝƌĚZĞŝĐŚ(n 65); and Weisberg, 
Vichy Law (n 24). 
82
 In Belgium and the Channel Islands, for example. See fn 80 above. 
83
 Fraser,  ‘ǀŝů >Ăǁ ?ǀŝů >ĂǁǇĞƌƐ ? ? ?Ŷ26). 
84
 Especially in recent years through the theoretical writing of Giorgio Agamben on homo 
sacer ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ůĞŐĂů ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶĐĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĐĂŵƉƐ ? ^ĞĞ ŝŶ ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ ŐĂŵďĞŶ ?ƐHomo Sacer: 
Sovereign Power and Bare Life (D. heller-Roazen tr, Stanford University Press, 1998); 
Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive (D. heller-Roazen tr, Zone Books, 1999); 
and State of Exception (K. Attell  tr, University of Chicago Press, 2005). See also David Fraser, 
 ‘ĞĂĚ DĂŶ tĂůŬŝŶŐ P >Ăǁ ĂŶĚ ƚŚŝĐƐ ĨƚĞƌ 'ŝŽƌŐŝŽ ŐĂŵďĞŶ ?Ɛ ƵƐĐŚǁŝƚǌ ?  ? ? ? ? ? )  ? ?
International Journal for the Semiotics of Law 397. 
    
23 
 
in judicial decisions even though they are not a central issue at stake in the 
case.85 This subject has made its way into the Anglo-American legal academy 
in the writing of scholars such as Vivian Grosswald Curran, who has 
challenged the claim that the influence of formalism on jurists in the Nazi 
state caused the acquiescence of the legal profession to its barbarism.86 This 
feeds into her related claim about the fundamental limits of the power of law 
and legal theory in the face of such barbarism.87 
The wider question of the relationship between law and evil in the light of 
Nazi Germany has been the subject of some research in the legal academy in 
recent years.88 David Seymour has also written about the Holocaust and anti-
Semitism from an interdisciplinary, critical theory perspective.89 While this 
scholarship shows that some legal theoretical engagement with Nazi 
Germany has taken place, this exists almost entirely outside of jurisprudential 
discourse and has not altered its fundamental structure or direction. As such, 
while their arguments and findings often have implications for areas of 
scholarship like jurisprudence, and sometimes these are explicitly stated, 
they appear to have had very little impact on the discourse within this field. It 
is also often the case that scholars addressing issues suĐŚ ĂƐ ZĂĚďƌƵĐŚ ?Ɛ
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postwar assertions about the ability of natural law to resolve the problems 
brought to light by Nazi law remain wedded to one side of the opposition 
between natural law and positivism rather than questioning the terms of the 
debate altogether,90 which is the argument I put forward in this dissertation. 
IV. Conclusion: Taking the Thesis Forward                                                                                                                             
I will establish my thesis that recent historical research reveals that 
jurisprudential discourse relies on a misrepresentation of Nazi Germany to 
support its theoretical paradigms, which require re-evaluation in light of the 
Nazi experience of law, by adopting a three stage approach through the 
remaining chapters. The first stage will involve analysing jurisprudential 
discourse itself and its representation of Nazi Germany, and evaluating some 
of the problems with it. The second stage will involve critiquing that 
representation in more detail using examples from historical scholarship, and 
addressing the implications of reconstructing the Third Reich within 
jurisprudence in a more historically accurate form. The third stage will 
examine Nuremberg to highlight its role in constructing narratives of rupture 
and make connections between the representation of the Third Reich in 
jurisprudence and ICL scholarship. This will achieve my aim to use historical 
scholarship to challenge and reconstruct the jurisprudential representation of 
Nazi Germany and especially its legal system. I will provide a little bit more 
detail of how the arguments in each chapter will advance my thesis. 
In Chapter Two I will show how Nazi Germany and its legal system are 
represented in current jurisprudential discourse by analysing references to 
Nazi Germany in the literature over the last fifteen years. The picture of Nazi 
Germany as a whole that emerges from jurisprudence is a generalised and 
superficial one of an evil, hypothetical straw man state. In this sense, it is not 
ƚŚĞ  ‘ƌĞĂů ?- and certainly not the historically documented - Nazi Germany that 
iƐ ďĞŝŶŐ ĂůůƵĚĞĚ ƚŽ ? /ŶƐƚĞĂĚ ƚŚĞ  ‘EĂǌŝ 'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ? ĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚĞĚ ǁŝƚŚŝŶ ƚŚĞƐĞ
debates represents a legal outlier, most conveniently called  ‘EĂǌŝ ?, which can 
be used in turn to trump and support different positivist and natural law 
conceptions of legal validity. Rather than an explicit claim of Nazi lawlessness, 
this (mis)representation appears founded on an implicit consensus that the 
actual Nazi state and legal system has no relevance for jurisprudence beyond 
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this two dimensional portrayal of the ultimate evil, reinforced by an 
underlying narrative of rupture.  
In Chapter Three I will complete the analysis of jurisprudence by examining 
the representation of Nazi law in the Hart-Fuller debate and connecting it to 
contemporary jurisprudence, including the evaluation of two recent 
collections commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of the debate.91 The huge 
influence of the Hart-Fuller debate on the major issues, methodological 
approach and discursive structures of jurisprudence means how it referred to 
Nazi Germany is crucial to establishing how the regime would come to be 
treated subsequently. I will argue that neither Hart nor Fuller, while explicitly 
claiming to address Nazi law, advanced far beyond the wicked reputation of 
Nazism to explore its historical reality and philosophical nature in any depth.  
In Chapter Four, I will offer a strong critique of the state of jurisprudence 
using both legal theoretical and historiographical scholarship. I will evaluate 
the competing alternative approaches to Nazi law offered recently by Kristen 
Rundle and David Fraser, in light of the Holocaust historiography of theorist 
and historian Dan Stone, who has written extensively about the dual 
character of the Holocaust as both ordinary historical event and existential 
challenge to the narrative and epistemological conventions of the historical 
discipline. This will demonstrate how applying the history of the Holocaust to 
jurisprudential issues has the potential to alter the conventional 
understanding of those issues promoted by the discourse. It also shows that 
jurisprudential unfamiliarity with the reality of Nazi state and law has had 
profound consequences for its understanding of the nature of law and its role 
in the Third Reich. I will argue that it is necessary to deconstruct the terms of 
the debate in order to incorporate the Nazi legal system into jurisprudence in 
a meaningful way. 
In Chapter Five I will complete my critique of jurisprudence by using two case 
studies of historical research to challenge how Nazi Germany is 
conventionally understood and consider the jurisprudential implications of 
the historical analysis of law in Nazi Germany.92 The first case study examines 
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recent developments in the legal historical understanding of the legal system, 
influenced by translated continental scholarship particularly with regard to 
the role of ideology in Nazi law. The second case study is of new historical 
research into the concentration camp system. Both sets of research will 
expose how attempts to construct a jurisprudential understanding of the Nazi 
ƐƚĂƚĞďĂƐĞĚŽŶĂ  ‘ƌƵƉƚƵƌĞ ?ĨƌŽŵ ‘ŶŽƌŵĂů ?ůĞŐĂůĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚare unsustainable 
when confronted with the actual experience of Nazi law. Consequently, a 
rethink of the implications of Nazi Germany for the concept of law is 
required. 
In Chapter Six the discursive role of the Nuremberg trials, both IMT and NMT 
will be considered. I will first argue that Nuremberg provides important 
connections between different aspects of this thesis. I will use recent 
scholarship to show that Nuremberg both constructed narratives of rupture 
about Nazi Germany and its legal system and itself acted as a moment of legal 
rupture through the opposition of its own law with Nazi law. Consequently, 
the narrative of rupture that prevails within jurisprudential representation of 
the Third Reich is traceable back to Nuremberg. Second, I will compare 
current ICL scholarship with historical research into Nazi war crimes tribunals 
to demonstrate their key differences in approach and expose the similarities 
between how ICL scholarship and jurisprudence treat the Third Reich. This is 
again connected to Nuremberg and illustrates that difficulties with 
representation of the Nazi past within the legal academy go beyond 
jurisprudence and are contingent on the way the discourse developed 
through and after Nuremberg.  
In the concluding Chapter Seven, I will summarise the key arguments of the 
dissertation in the context of viewing Nazi law as presenting a challenge to 
the jurisprudential status quo. I will highlight the key contributions and 
limitations of this thesis and address the current state of research in the area 
of law and Nazi Germany. This will help to see how it is progressing as new 
research is published and draw attention to opportunities for potential future 
research. This outline shows that the dissertation will marshal disparate legal 
                                                                                                                                                                          
ĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝǀĞ>Ăǁ ? ? ? ? ? ?-2009) 122 Harvard Law Review 1095; Michael Salter, Carl Schmitt: 
Law as Politics, Ideology and Strategic Myth  (Routledge-Cavendish, 2012); cf. Amanda 
>ŽƵŵĂŶƐŬǇ ?  ‘ƌŝƚŝĐĂů >ĞŐĂů dŚĞŽƌǇ ?Ɛ dƵƌŶ ƚŽ^ĐŚŵŝƚƚ PEŽƚtĂǀŝŶŐďƵƚƌŽǁŶŝŶŐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? )  ? ?
Liverpool Law Review 1).  
However, it falls outside the scope of this dissertation, which instead focuses on the analysis 
of current scholarship in particular areas of Anglo-American jurisprudence and aspects of 
current research within the historical academy, in order to critique the jurisprudential 
representation of Nazi Germany and highlight the relationship between the discourses. It 
does not visit primary historical sources in its consideration of the nature of the Nazi past. 
Such sources and the secondary l iterature they have generated would form the part of 
further research into the nature of Nazi legal ideology, an important offshoot of the work in 
this dissertation (see Chapter Seven on future research). 
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and historical scholarship relevant to Nazi law together as a body that can be 
used to critique the way the Third Reich is represented primarily in 
jurisprudential discourse. This includes examples from the legal academy that 
exist outside of jurisprudence, general historical scholarship that reveals 
some important aspects of the nature of Nazi Germany, and recent legal 
history from inside and outside of the English academy that is beginning to 
shift its focus towards Nazi law as a coherent system and away from 
narratives of rupture and discontinuity.  
Chapter One has outlined the aims and key aspects of the argument of this 
dissertation. It has explained how its primary thesis  will be advanced in the 
following chapters. It has summarised the approach I will adopt, the specific 
terminology I will use and some of the most important qualifications and 
caveats in respect of its scope and content. Finally it has introduced the 
perceived problem with the treatment of Nazi law within the legal academy 
and some of the key literature that will be used to challenge the hegemony of 
jurisprudential discourse over the dominant narrative surrounding the Nazi 
legal system. This has included introducing the difficulties inherent in a 
community of historians which has only recently begun to take Nazi law 
seriously, and integrate it within a broader historical framework already 
focused on the complexities and continuities of the Nazi state. The rupture 
thesis, especially in relation to Nazi law, has worked through Nuremberg, the 
Hart-Fuller debate, jurisprudential discourse, postwar historiography and ICL 
scholarship, distancing each of them from the history of the Third Reich and 
preventing a true jurisprudential account of its legal system being realised. 
Historical research is now available to challenge this account and this 
dissertation furthers this process. 
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Chapter Two: (Mis)Representing Nazi Germany in Jurisprudential Discourse: 
 ‘especially resistant to exploring the moral, ethical, and political significance 
ŽĨĞǀĞŶƚƐŝŶƵƌŽƉĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚ ? ? ? ? ?93 
I. Introduction 
A Jurisprudence Rejecting the Nazi Past 
This chapter is focused on analysing the representation of Nazi Germany 
within jurisprudential discourse.94 It will evaluate the role played by the Third 
Reich and its legal system in the literature and show how this representation 
is entrenched by the way the discourse is structured and its approach to 
wicked legal systems as a category of law. It will demonstrate that the Third 
Reich is represented by a hypothetical, superficial, wicked straw man 
facsimile rather than its actual historical self. It will show that, to the extent 
that Nazi law appears, it does so as an archetypal wicked legal system. In 
almost all cases the representation is divorced from historical reality and 
isolated from historical research. In Chapter One I began to make the case 
that jurisprudential discourse does not take the Nazi legal system for what it 
actually was, historically. The one-dimensional, evil state that is represented 
in its place consigns Nazi Germany to substantive irrelevance in terms of 
major jurisprudential debates, over the conditions of validity for law and the 
conceptual connection between law and morality, the validity question and 
the separability question.  
What is more, the narrowing of jurisprudential analysis of the concept of law 
to these questions and its structuring around the twin theoretical pillars of 
positivism and natural law obscures other ways in which the experience of 
law in Nazi Germany is relevant to the concept of law beyond mere validity. 
This reinforces and reproduces an implicit, underlying narrative of rupture  W 
from both legal and historical development - within the discursive treatment 
of the Third Reich, which originated in the postwar period where it revealed 
itself in the Nuremberg Trials and the Hart-Fuller debate.95 The predominant 
jurisprudential focus on abstract and analytical considerations in subsequent 
decades has operated in conjunction with a disciplinary disinclination to 
engage with developments in historical research that have fundamentally 
revised the way the Nazi state is interpreted and understood in the 
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 ĞŽƐƚĞ ?  ‘>Ăǁ ?,ŽůŽĐĂƵƐƚ ?ĐĂĚĞŵǇ ? ?Ŷ17) 800. 
94
 For an explanation of how the terms  ‘ũƵƌŝƐƉƌƵĚĞŶĐĞ ? ? ‘EĂǌŝ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ?ĂŶĚƐŽŽŶ refer to, 
see Section II of Chapter One. 
95
 The impact of the legacy of the Hart-Fuller debate on current jurisprudential discourse in 
this area is addressed in Chapter Three. On the entrenchment of rupture narratives in 
historiographical and popular discourse through the Nuremberg Trials see generally Priemel 
and Stil ler, Reassessing the Nuremberg Military Tribunals (n 6), discussed in Chapter Six. 
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intervening period. Consequently there has been little reason within 
jurisprudence to re-evaluate how it treats Nazi law, whereas in actuality the 
most recent historical research challenges some aspects of the jurisprudential 
paradigm of how the concept of law is understood, especially if law in Nazi 
Germany is taken to form part of that overarching concept. Therefore, while 
it is hard to find scholars today who explicitly endorse an avowedly lawless, 
 ‘ĐƌŝŵŝŶĂůƐƚĂƚĞ ?ƌĞĂĚŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞdŚŝƌĚZĞŝĐŚ ?EĂǌŝ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇŝƐŶŽƚƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚŝŶ
any historically accurate or legally meaningful sense within jurisprudential 
discourse.  
The jurisprudential attention on the separability question and the validity 
question, and its structuring around the twin paradigms of positivism and 
natural law only requires for its purposes a straw-man of the Nazi past: a 
hypothetical representative of the worst case scenario of a legal system 
against which to test the limits of a particular concept of law, or which can be 
invoked to illustrate a point.  This allows the Nazi legal system to be 
subsumed within a wider category of limit-case wicked legal systems, albeit 
as the paradigmatic example. This broader classification is bestowed with 
certain characteristics that in-turn facilitate the reproduction of the debates 
within the discourse around the same issues, while bearing little if any 
resemblance to Nazi law. Meanwhile, references to Nazi Germany that do not 
specify its legal system are frequent but similarly instrumental and 
unsubstantiated. 
B Analysing Jurisprudential Discourse 
This chapter involves analysing some of the major themes of jurisprudential 
discourse to establish both how Nazi Germany is predominantly represented 
therein, and how common discursive structures and tropes ensure the 
maintenance and reproduction of this representation, particularly with 
respect to Nazi law. To establish the jurisprudential representation of Nazi 
Germany I will refer to a wide range of examples from the literature to 
construct a set of characteristics to which the discourse in general adheres. I 
will illustrate these characteristics first with a single, representative example 
that shows up many of them. This example is an exchange between Scott 
Shapiro and Dimitrios Kyritsis.96 It is not comprehensively illustrative, as no 
single example can be, but it makes it possible to focus on one set of 
scholarship to draw out a number of points. I will then address the key 
characteristics, using number of examples from the literature to substantiate 
the presence and implications of these. I will finally explore the 
representation of Nazi law in particular, which comprises a reasonably small 
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 ŝŵŝƚƌŝŽƐ<ǇƌŝƚƐŝƐ ?  ‘tŚĂƚŝƐ'ŽŽĚďŽƵƚ>ĞŐĂůŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ? ? ? )Legal Theory 
 ? ? ? ?^ĐŽƚƚ^ŚĂƉŝƌŽ ? ‘>Ăǁ ?WůĂŶƐ ?ĂŶĚWƌĂĐƚŝĐĂůZĞĂƐŽŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ? ? )Legal Theory 387. 
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subset of the references to Nazi Germany within the literature surveyed, but 
is significant in how it helps to construct the category of wicked legal systems 
within the discourse. 
The scope of this dissertation means that it is not possible to consider all 
references to Nazi Germany within jurisprudential discourse. However, it is 
imperative in order to provide a full sense of the nature of its representation, 
to incorporate minor and ancillary instances of Nazi Germany figuring within 
the scholarship. Indeed, the most common examples of Nazi reference have 
been of this sort. The method used to uncover references to Nazi Germany 
and from which I construct my understanding of the role played by Nazism 
within the discourse has conditional limitations of time and form of 
scholarship. My primary approach involved searching for specific terms 
relating to Nazi Germany in articles within jurisprudential journals over the 
period from the late 1990s to 2013.97 I am concerned with the representation 
of Nazi Germany within current jurisprudential discourse, so limited my 
search to the past 15 years, in order to represent the currently evolving state 
of the scholarship, allowing it the opportunity to take account of the major 
revision in understanding of the Nazi state that has been taking place in 
historiography since around the early 1990s.98 I used mainly journal articles 
because they are the most easily and comprehensively searchable form of 
scholarship and a principal method of publishing new and original material. 
The examples I use have been selected as indicative of the representational 
narrative of Nazi Germany advanced within the discourse, but are not 
intended to be exhaustive. 
These elements will be set up by two important preliminary discussions. The 
first will place the observations highlighted in Chapter One about the legal 
ĂĐĂĚĞŵǇ ?Ɛ ŶĞŐůĞĐƚ ŽĨƚŚĞEĂǌŝƉĂƐƚ in the context of the countervailing view 
of Stephen Riley. Riley argues ďŽƚŚ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ  ‘ĚŝƐĐŽŶƚŝŶƵŝƚǇ ƚŚĞƐŝƐ ? ŝƐ ŶŽƚ
prevalent within jurisprudence and that Nazi law should not in any case be 
integral to its discourse.99 I refer to Riley here because he is one of the only 
theorists to have responded directly to the claim that a discontinuity thesis 
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 dŚĞ ƐĞĂƌĐŚ ƚĞƌŵƐ / ĞŵƉůŽǇĞĚ ǁĞƌĞ  ‘EĂǌŝ ? ?  ‘dŚŝƌĚ ZĞŝĐŚ ? ?  ‘EĂƚŝŽŶĂů ^ŽĐŝĂůŝƐƚ ? ?  ‘EĂƚŝŽŶĂů
^ŽĐŝĂůŝƐŵ ? ? ‘,ŽůŽĐĂƵƐƚ ?ĂŶĚ ‘^ŚŽĂŚ ? ?ďƵƚďǇĨĂƌƚŚĞŵŽƐƚƉƌŽůŝĨŝĐĂůůǇŽĐĐƵƌƌŝŶŐǁĂƐ ‘EĂǌŝ ? ?dŚĞ
journals I searched were Legal theory, American Journal of Jurisprudence, Canadian Journal 
of Law and Jurisprudence, Ratio Juris, Law and Philosophy, Legal Studies, Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies and Journal Jurisprudence (since 2008). 
98
 Which included at its genesis texts such as Christopher Browning, Ordinary Men: Reserve 
Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland  (HarperCollins, 1992); and Robert 
Gellately, The Gestapo and German Society: Enforcing Racial Policy 1933-45 (OUP, 1990). 
99
 ^ƚĞƉŚĞŶ ZŝůĞǇ ? ‘ZĞǀŝĞǁ ƐƐĂǇ PŽŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇŝĂůŽŐƵĞƐǁŝƚŚ&ĂƐĐŝƐƚ>ĂǁĂŶĚ:ƵƌŝƐƉƌƵĚĞŶĐĞ ?
(2007) 2(4) International Journal of Law in Context 409. 
    
31 
 
persists within jurisprudence. dŚĞĂƐƐĞƌƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚEĂǌŝ ‘ůĂǁ ?ŚĂƐďĞĞŶƐĞĞŶĂƐĂ
ďƌĞĂŬ ĨƌŽŵ  ‘ŽƌĚŝŶĂƌǇ ? ůĂǁ ĂŶĚ ƐŚŽƵůĚ ŝŶƐƚĞĂĚ ďĞ ĞǆĂŵŝŶĞĚ ĂƐ Ă  ‘ŶŽƌŵĂů ?
manifestation of law is a key one. It supports the distinction between an 
explicit endorsement of rupture and an underlying narrative based on the 
dominant theories and historical treatment of Nazi Germany within the 
discourse. Riley does not take account of the implicit narrative of 
discontinuity that informs jurisprudential treatment of Nazi Germany and, 
indeed, exhibits some of the same problematic characteristics in his own 
analysis. The second will show that positivism and natural law are widely 
accepted as the main theoretical paradigms within jurisprudence, and that 
the validity question and the separability question are two of the main issues 
at stake in the debate around the concept of law. This is necessary to 
establish that the representation of Nazi Germany gets to the heart of the 
discourse, so that the challenge the actual historical case of Nazi Germany 
presents to them can be understood as impacting at a fundamental level.  
II. Jurisprudence and the Nazi Past 
A Preconceptions about Jurisprudential Engagement with Nazi 
Germany 
Chapter One highlighted some recent remarks from legal scholars and 
historians about the degree and nature of engagement between the legal 
academy and Nazi Germany.100 Two themes that emerged from these 
ĐŽŵŵĞŶƚƐ ǁĞƌĞ ƚŚĞ ǀŝĞǁ ŽĨ EĂǌŝ ůĂǁ ĂƐ  ‘ƵŶƌĞŵŝƚƚŝŶŐĂŶĚ ŵŝŶĚůĞƐƐ
ďĂƌďĂƌŝƐŵ ?,101  ‘ĂĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞďƌĞĂŬĨƌŽŵŵŽderŶůĞŐĂůŶŽƌŵƐĂŶĚƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚƐ ?102 
and a failure of engagement, particularly with and through relevant historical 
research.103 However, these claims do not go completely unopposed. 
^ƚĞƉŚĞŶ ZŝůĞǇ ŚĂƐ ĂƌŐƵĞĚ ďŽƚŚ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ  ‘ĚŝƐĐŽŶƚŝŶƵŝƚǇ ƚŚĞƐŝƐ ? ǁŝƚŚ ƌĞŐĂƌĚƚŽ
Nazi law is not prevalent in the legal academy and that the assumption that 
Nazi law ought to be considered relevant or useful for how contemporary law 
is understood may be misguided.104 While Riley concedes that law did exist in 
Nazi Germany and played a role in preparing for the Holocaust,105 he denies 
ĂǀŝĚ&ƌĂƐĞƌ ?ƐĐůĂŝŵƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ,ŽůŽĐĂƵƐƚǁĂƐ ‘ĨƵůůŽĨ ůĂǁ ? ?106 Instead he argues 
ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ƚŚĞ  “ĨŝŶĂů ƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ? ǁĂƐ ŶŽƚ Ă ƉƵďůŝĐ ůĞŐĂů Ğǀ Ŷƚ ďƵƚ ƌĂƚŚĞƌ Ă ƋƵĂƐŝ -
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 See Section I of Chapter One. 
101
 >ƵƐƚŐĂƌƚĞŶ ? ‘dĂŬŝŶŐEĂǌŝ>Ăǁ^ĞƌŝŽƵƐůǇ ? ?Ŷ20) 128. 
102
 ^ǌŽďĂƌ ? ‘dĞůůŝŶŐ^ĞǆƵĂů^ƚŽƌŝĞƐ ? ?Ŷ1) 133. 
103
 In the comments of Pietro Costa, David Fraser and Frederick DeCoste. See Chapter One, 
Section I and footnotes 17-23. 
104
 ZŝůĞǇ ? ‘ZĞǀŝĞǁƐƐĂǇ ? ?Ŷ99). 
105
  ‘ĚŵŝƚƚĞĚůǇƚŚĞ ŐƌŽƵŶĚǁŽƌŬŽĨƚŚĞ “ĨŝŶĂůƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŽƚŚĞ:ĞǁŝƐŚƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶǁĂƐĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞĚ
ƵƐŝŶŐƐŽŵĞůĞŐĂůŵĞĂƐƵƌĞƐ ? ?ŝďŝĚ ? ? ? ? 
106
  ‘EŽ ?ŝƚǁĂƐĂŶŝ ů ů ŝĐŝƚĚĞĂƚŚĨĂĐƚŽƌǇĨƵůů ŽĨĂƐŚŝĨƚ ŶŐǁĞďŽĨĂƌďŝƚƌĂƌǇƌƵůĞƐ ? ?ŝďŝĚ ? 
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military exercise shrouded in military convention and Nazi double-ƐƉĞĂŬ ?.107 
The transformation from racist legislation to death camps involved decisions 
which ƚŽŽŬƚŚĞ,ŽůŽĐĂƵƐƚŽƵƚƐŝĚĞŽĨ  ‘ůĂǁ ?, with the consequence that such a 
transformation is not an inherent part of the continuity between Nazi law and 
contemporary law.108 
ZŝůĞǇ ?ƐĐŽŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƐĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞŽĨƚŚĞ ůĞŐĂůĂĐĂĚĞŵǇƚŽǁĂƌĚƐEĂǌŝůĂǁ
comprise not a denial that there has been a lack of engagement,109 but an 
assertion that a lack of engagement with Nazi law including within 
jurisprudence cannot be assumed to imply adherence to a discontinuity/non-
law thesis about the Third Reich.110 /ŶĚĞĞĚ ?ZŝůĞǇĂƌŐƵĞƐ ? ‘there is not a great 
deal of evidence to suggest that there exists a group of scholars or lawyers 
ĚĞĨĞŶĚŝŶŐƚŚŝƐƉƵƌĞ ?ƵŶĂůůŽǇĞĚ ?  “ĚŝƐĐŽŶƚŝŶƵŝƚǇ ?ƚŚĞƐŝƐ ? ?111 He also refutes the 
claim that this narrative lay at the heart of the Nuremberg trials.112 ZŝůĞǇ ?Ɛ
explanation for the perceived lack of academic legal engagement with the 
Nazi past is that Nazi Germany does not represent an instance of a legal 
system with which we necessarily need to have an urgent dialogue: 
To treat the concentration and death camps of the Second World War as 
somehow persisting in or animating contemporary law is poor history 
and even worse philosophy. The essence of human action  W and the 
condition of politics and sovereign law-making  W is beginning, being able 
to begin anew at any time. This is the lesson that should be learnt from 
totalitarianism: that law-making which hinges on an unchangeable 
destiny or an unerring progress can, and has, led to the worst inhuman 
depravity. It means a death camp is not around us (though we cannot 
ĨŽƌŐĞƚ ƚŚĞŵ )  Q dŚĞƌĞ ĂƌĞ ƵŶĚŽƵďƚĞĚůǇ resonances between fascist law 
ĂŶĚ ĐŽŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇ ůĂǁ  Q ďƵƚ ? Ă ĨŽƌƚŝŽƌŝ ? ǁĞ ĂƌĞ ŶŽƚĞŶĐŚĂŝŶĞĚ ƚŽ
them.
113
 
The extent to which aspects of Nazi law should be seen as inherent in 
 ‘ĐŽŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇ ůĂǁ ? ŝƐ ĐĞƌƚĂŝŶůǇ ǁŽƌthy of rigorous examination. However, 
even allowŝŶŐĨŽƌƚŚĞĨĂĐƚƚŚĂƚZŝůĞǇ ?ƐĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚƐĂƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚŝŶƚŚĞĨŽƌŵŽĨ
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 Ibid. 
109
  ‘dŚĂƚƐĐŚŽůĂƌƐĂŶĚƐĐŚŽůĂƌƐŚŝƉŚĂǀĞƉĂƐƐĞĚŽǀĞƌƚŚĞŵ ?ƚŚŽƐĞŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚŝŶEĂǌŝůĂǁ ?ŝŶĂ
 “ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚŝǀĞƐŝůĞŶĐĞ ?ŝƐĞŵďĂƌƌĂƐƐŝŶŐĨŽƌƚŚŽƐĞĐůŽƐĞƚŽƚŚĞŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐŝŶƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶďƵƚŝƐ
not a damning failure on the part of the contemporary intell igentsia to dispel post-war 
ŝĚĞŽůŽŐǇ ? ?ŝďŝĚ ? ? ? ? 
110
  ‘&ƌĂƐĞƌ ?ƐŝŶƚŝŵĂƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚǁŝĚĞƐƉƌĞĂĚƐƵďƐĐƌŝƉƚŝŽŶƚŽ ŚĞĚŝƐĐŽŶƚŝŶƵŝƚǇǀŝĞǁĐĂŶďĞŝŶĨĞƌƌĞĚ
from the absence of Nazi -era German legal debates in contemporary jurisprudence ĐůĂƐƐĞƐ Q
ƐĞĞŵƐƚŽŵĞĂƉŽŽƌŝŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ? ?ŝďŝĚ ? ? ? ? 
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 Ibid. 
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  ‘dŚĞƌĞ ŝƐŶŽĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐ ?ĚŝƐĐŽŶƚŝŶƵŝƚǇƚŚĞƐŝƐ ?ƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶǁĂƐƐǇƐƚĞŵĂƚŝĐĂůůǇƉƵƌƐƵĞĚ
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a review essay,114 they exhibit some of the characteristics in their 
engagement with Nazism that have been observed about the legal academy 
generally, and which are prevalent within jurisprudential discourse.  
First, his many historical assertions about the nature of law in Nazi Germany 
are very sparsely sourced. There are minimal references to historical 
research, primary sources, or legal scholarship about Nazi Germany outside 
of the reviewed texts to support his claims about the nature of Nazi law, the 
extent of its involvement in the Holocaust, and the absence of the 
discontinuity thesis both at Nuremberg and in the current literature. As will 
be shown in Section III of this chapter, jurisprudential literature rarely relies 
on any historical sources or scholarship about the Nazi state or legal system 
to support its assertions in that respect. 
Second, Riley is close to conforming to a narrative of rupture in his own 
interpretation of Nazi law, especially in relation to the Holocaust, which runs 
counter to historical research. The fact that he does not present any evidence 
ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ƚƌĂŶƐĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ĨƌŽŵ ůĂǁ ƚŽ ,ŽůŽĐĂƵƐƚ ŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚ Ă ƐŚŝĨƚ ƚŽ  ‘ŶŽŶ-ůĂǁ ?
that distinguishes it from contemporary law leaves this argument potentially 
reliant on preconceptions about the relationship between law and genocide. 
The concession that legal measures were used against the Jews to lay the 
groundwork of the later genocide nevertheless relies on a point when law 
was overcome by non-law, and locates the Holocaust in the latter space.115 
^ŝŵŝůĂƌůǇ ?ZŝůĞǇ ?ƐƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞĂƌĞƐŽŵĞ ‘ƌĞƐŽŶĂŶĐĞƐ ?ďĞƚǁĞĞŶĨĂƐĐŝƐƚ
and contemporary law does not prevent him from positing a sharp distinction 
between the non-law of the Holocaust and the lawfulness of contemporary 
law. The only appropriate response to this would not, as Riley suggests, be to 
accept that we are doomed to repeat the Nazi past. Rather these positions 
appear grounded in a view of Nazi history that overlooks the important roles 
of continuity and normality in the ƌĞŐŝŵĞ ?Ɛevolution from movement to 
power to genocide in favour of points of rupture. This is not to deny the use 
ŽĨ  ‘ĚŽƵďůĞ-ƐƉĞĂŬ ? ĂŶĚ ƐĞĐƌĞĐǇ ŽƌƚŚĞŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĞůĞŵĞŶƚ ŝŶƚŚĞ ŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶ
of the Holocaust, but it questions the prioritisation of these over other 
elements as those things that define the relationship between the Holocaust 
and the concept of law. 
In addition, as is discernible in his own arguments, by apparently taking legal 
scholarship at face value Riley may be underestimating the role of an implicit 
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 Riley is reviewing Fraser, Law After Auschwitz (n 23) and Joerges and Ghaleigh, Darker 
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narrative of discontinuity and lawlessness in its treatment of the Third Reich. 
The analysis of jurisprudential references to Nazi Germany in this Chapter 
supports the argument that few jurisprudential scholars expressly advance 
the discontinuity thesis, and in fact the majority of references to Nazism are 
not specifically addressed to Nazi law at all. However, they do share common 
characteristics that bespeak an implicit narrative of rupture that is 
unsupported by historical scholarship, and is traceable back to the Hart-Fuller 
debate and more generally the postwar era of the Nuremberg trials.116 Once 
this is established, the question of the contemporary value of investigating 
further the legal aspects of Nazi Germany becomes paramount, and is 
partially to be found in the implications of a jurisprudence structured to treat 
the Third Reich as a legal outsider rather than an insider, making it appear 
philosophically irrelevant. We are not doomed to repeat the Nazi past, but it 
is necessary to examine Nazi law as a form of law in order to establish where 
the continuities lie. 
B The Structure of Jurisprudential Discourse 
The reason that there is an implicit rather than explicit narrative of rupture in 
jurisprudential discourse is a consequence of the way the discourse is 
structured, and the role Nazi Germany has played within the discourse. By 
the structure of the discourse, I refer to a combination of the major 
theoretical paradigms within the debate, which are positivism and natural 
law and their various sub-versions, and the main issues at stake in the 
argument, two of which are the validity question and the separability 
question. It also refers to how these help determine the nature of the debate 
rhetoric. In this Section I will establish the structure of the discourse by 
describing and explaining these elements in more detail, including how the 
major debates have been increasingly broken down into a plethora of sub-
debates about specific, narrow issues and between scholars advocating 
particular versions of positivism and/or natural law. 
In its concern with the nature of the concept of law jurisprudential discourse 
is preoccupied with the minutiae of arguments between and within 
increasingly complex, nuanced and disparate versions of positivism and 
natural law. The skeleton of the opposition between the two contrasting 
approaches to the concept of law adopted in the Hart-Fuller debate, and 
some of the fundamental tenets of each of those positions as elucidated 
therein, continue to resonate in the structure of the debate today.117 It is 
widely accepted that the two theoretical paradigms have dominated the 
                                                                 
116
 See chapters Three and Six respectively. 
117
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discourse, ' a long-running battle between two schools of thought: the rival 
camps ŽĨ  “ŶĂƚƵƌĂů ůĂǁ ?ĂŶĚ “ůĞŐĂůƉŽƐŝƚŝǀŝƐŵ ? ? ?118 Ian McLeod differentiates 
these theories as follows: 
The terms natural law and positivism each embrace a variety of different 
legal theories. Reduced to its simplest, the distinction between them is 
that natural law theories argue that the status of law depends not simply 
on the fact that it has been laid down in whatever way or ways are 
recognized by the legal system of which it is part, but also on some 
additional factors external to that system. Positivist theor ies, on the 
other hand, argue that the status of law attaches to anything which has 
been laid down (or posited) as law in whatever way or ways is or are 
recognized by the legal system in question.
119
  
In broad terms, therefore, positivists claim that law is a social fact dependent 
for its status on how it has been posited, and is conceptually distinct from 
morality. Natural lawyers argue that other, often moral, factors are central to 
its status as law. The debate between and within these competing positions is 
deeply entrenched and oppositional:  ‘ƚhat the current jurisprudential scene is 
deeply fractioned would be no news to anyone even remotely familiar with 
contemporary analytical legal philosophy'.120 
The issues at stake between the different factions are part of the general 
interrogation of the concept of law which jurisprudence often engages in. 
Within this, ƚŚĞŵĂŝŶƉĂƌĂŵĞƚĞƌƐŽĨƚŚĞĚĞďĂƚĞŚĂǀĞďĞĐŽŵĞ ‘ĂĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶŽĨ
the validity of the law; of the relation between validity and obedience; of 
whether the law consists of rules only or of moral principles as well; of 
ǁŚĞƚŚĞƌ Ă ŶĂƚƵƌĂů ĐŽŶŶĞĐƚŝŽŶ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ůĂǁ ĂŶĚ ŵŽƌĂůŝƚǇ ĞǆŝƐƚƐ ? ĞƚĐ ? ?121 i.e. 
the validity issue and the separability issue. On the second of these, whereas 
natural law generally claims a necessary connection between law and 
morality, positivism usually asserts that the two concepts are certainly 
separable and distinct if not necessarily and always separate in legal practice. 
However, it is no longer possible to describe the debate as simply one 
between fixed camps within positivism and natural law, because of the 
development of a number of highly technical strands within each of these 
theories. In recent years the division has incorporated various versions of 
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 Simmonds, Central Issues in Jurisprudence (n 30) 141. Jurisprudence textbooks are 
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positivism and natural law and the debates between them. 
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 Ian McLeod, Legal Theory (6
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 edn, Palgrave Macmillan, 2012) 17.  
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 <ǇƌŝƚƐŝƐ ? ‘tŚĂƚŝƐ'ŽŽĚ ? ?Ŷ96) 135. 
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 dŚŽŵĂƐDĞƌƚĞŶƐ ? ‘ZĞǀŝĞǁ ƐƐĂǇ W Continuity or Discontinuity of Law?  W ĂǀŝĚ&ƌĂƐĞƌ ?ƐLaw 
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 ‘ŚĂƌĚ ? ĂŶĚ  ‘ƐŽĨƚ ? ƉŽƐŝƚŝǀŝƐŵ122 ĂŶĚ  ‘ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝǀĞ ? ĂŶĚ  ‘ĞǀĂůƵĂƚŝǀĞ ?ŶĂƚƵƌĂů ůĂǁ
(according to one classification123), the differences between which have 
become increasingly abstract, narrow and complex. 
In current jurisprudential discourse, and particularly within the positivist 
camp, heated debate is as likely to take place between staunch advocates of 
different strands of the same overarching theory as between positivists and 
natural lawyers. It is not uncommon to hear that  ‘ƚŽŽ ŵƵĐŚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĚĞďĂƚĞ
within and about legal positivism has become almost ƐĐŚŽůĂƐƚŝĐ ? ?124 The 
questions within and between the factions and sub-factions have narrowed 
and multiplied to become about whether it is possible for morality to be 
incorporated into law and whether judges appealing to moral principles are 
going beyond or rĞŵĂŝŶŝŶŐ ǁŝƚŚŝŶ ƚŚĞ  ‘ůĂǁ ? ?KƌǁŚĞƚŚĞƌ ůĂǁŵƵƐƚĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞ
non-legal, moral factors or whether they need only be used to evaluate the 
social fact of law which can exist independently from them. Consequently, it 
is well recognised that contemporary legal theŽƌŝƐƚƐ ĞŶŐĂŐĞ ŝŶ  ‘ŝŶƚƌĂŵƵƌĂů
ƐƋƵĂďďůĞƐ ĂŵŽŶŐ ƉŽƐŝƚŝǀŝƐƚƐ ? ĂŶĚ  ‘ƵŶĞŶĚŝŶŐ ĚŝƐƉƵƚĞƐ ŽǀĞƌ ǁŚĞƚŚĞƌ Žƌ ŶŽƚ
moral principles that are "incorporated" into the law should count as "legal" 
ƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐ ? ?125 
This potential for wrangling  within the positivist camp has been exacerbated 
by the relative dominance of that theory over natural law in the decades 
ƐŝŶĐĞ ,ĞƌďĞƌƚ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ŐĞŶĞƌĂůůǇ ĂĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞĚ  ‘ǀŝĐƚŽƌǇ ? ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ,Ăƌƚ-Fuller 
debate. Part of this has been down to the (sometimes wilful) confusion 
between the analytical and normative aspects and aims of the two 
perspectives,126 which means they have as often as not debated past rather 
than to one another. This has made it easy to lodge common-sense 
objections against both sides. Anti-positivists can argue that  ‘ƚŚĞ ůĂǁ ?Ɛ
reasonable claim to be obeyed means that measures which are morally 
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 Alternative categorisations of legal positivism within the discourse include, for example, a 
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ĂďŚŽƌƌĞŶƚ  Q ŽƵŐŚƚ ŶŽƚ ƚŽ ďĞ ŐƌĂŶƚĞĚ ƚŚĞ ƐƚĂƚƵƐŽĨ ůĂǁŝŶƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚƉůĂĐĞ ? ?127 
Meanwhile anti-naturalists can contend ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ƚŽƐĂǇƚŚĂƚĂůůŽĨƚŚĞƉĞŽƉůĞ ŝŶ
some society are mistaken about what the law in that society is seems almost 
as bizarre as to say that all of the English speakers are mistaken about what 
ƚŚĞ ŶŐůŝƐŚ ǁŽƌĚ  “ďůƵĞ ? ŵĞĂŶƐ ? ?128 The former relies at its core on a moral 
evaluation of the law whereas the latter depends on the internal perspective 
of participants in a legal system, while neither directly challenges the 
underlying assumptions of the other. 
Positivism was not, until relatively recently, under a great deal of threat from 
natural law as the dominant theory within jurisprudence. Despite its relative 
ĂŐĞ ? ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ďƌĂŶĚ ŽĨ ƉŽƐŝƚŝǀŝƐŵ  ‘ƌĞŵĂŝŶƐ Ă ǁŝĚĞůǇ ĂĨĨŝƌŵĞĚ ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ
ŶĂƚƵƌĞ ŽĨ ůĂǁ ? ?129 His influence is apparent in that different forms of 
positivism remain at the forefront of the discourse and  ‘ĨŽƌŵ ďǇ ĨĂƌ ƚŚĞ
biggest camp ǁŝƚŚŝŶ ůĞŐĂů ƚŚĞŽƌǇ ? ?130 By contrast,  ‘ƚŚĞ ĐůĂƐƐŝĐĂů ǀŝĞǁ ƚŚĂƚ
official directives must meet minimum moral requirements to count as "law" 
ŚĂƐ ůĂƌŐĞůǇďĞĞŶŝŐŶŽƌĞĚŝŶƌĞĐĞŶƚũƵƌŝƐƉƌƵĚĞŶĐĞ ? ?131 However, there has been 
Ă ƌĞƐƵƌŐĞŶĐĞ ŽĨ ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚ ŝŶ >ŽŶ &ƵůůĞƌ ?Ɛ ƚŚĞory132 and natural law generally. 
There has arguably been a concomitant movement of some proponents of 
soft positivism towards some elements of the natural law programme and 
according to natural lawyer David Dyzenhaus,  ‘ǁŚĞƌĞƉŽƐŝƚŝǀŝƐƚƐƚŽĚĂǇĚŝĨĨĞƌ
from their critics is only in that they will deny that any particular vision of 
justice is ŝŶŚĞƌĞŶƚŝŶƚŚĞůĂǁ ? ?133 
While there is potential for recent criticism of the direction of jurisprudential 
debate and the beginnings of a resurgence of natural law theory to alter its 
terms somewhat, the structure of the discourse remains fairly stable and 
wedded to its central tenets, and this applies equally to its representation of 
Nazi Germany. Nevertheless, this criticism is there. William Twining has 
observed that  ‘ƐŽŵĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĚĞďĂƚĞƐ ĂďŽƵƚ ƉŽƐŝƚŝǀŝƐŵ  Q have recently 
ĚĞƐĐĞŶĚĞĚ ŝŶƚŽ ƵŶƐĞĞŵůǇ ǁƌĂŶŐůŝŶŐ ? ?134 Twining cites recent criticisms of 
analytical positivism ďǇ  ‘ĞŵƉŝƌŝĐĂůůǇ-ŵŝŶĚĞĚ ũƵƌŝƐƚƐ ? ǁŚŽ  ‘ĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐĞd the 
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 McLeod, Legal Theory (n 119) 22. I will  overlook for the time being the significance of the 
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ĂďƐƚƌĂĐƚŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ ůĂĐŬ ŽĨ  “ƌĞĂůŝƐŵ ? ŽĨa priori ĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ŽĨ ůĞŐĂůĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƐ ?ĂŶĚ
ƉŽƐƚŵŽĚĞƌŶŝƐƚƐ ?ǁŚŽ ‘ĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞĚƚŚĞĂůůĞŐĞĚŶĞƵƚƌĂůŝƚǇŽĨĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂůĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ
and the assumptions about the relative determinacy of language exemplified 
ďǇ ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐŽĨĂďƐƚƌĂĐƚƚĞƌŵƐŝŶƚĞƌŵƐŽĨĐŽƌĞĂŶĚƉĞŶƵŵďƌĂ ? ?135 Such 
ĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŵƐ ?ŚĞĂƌŐƵĞƐ ? ‘ĐĂŶďĞŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĞĚĂƐƐǇŵƉƚŽŵĂƚŝĐŽĨĂŐƌŽǁŝŶŐĨĞĞůŝŶŐ
that some enclaves of legal philosophy have got into a rut and there is a need 
ƚŽďƌĂŶĐŚŽƵƚ ŝŶŶĞǁĚŝƌĞĐƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?136  
The preference for abstract and a priori conceptual analysis, the supposed 
neutrality and determinacy of such a methodological approach and the 
limited and recurring range of issues that inform the field are all challenged 
by the historical reality of the Nazi legal system which does not fit neatly into 
the role it has been assigned within the discourse. Kristen Rundle has 
criticised jurisprudence with reference to Nazi Germany and, in doing so, has 
highlighted the relevance of Nazi law for legal theory and the importance of 
legal research into the connections between law and Nazi Germany, 
specifically the Holocaust: 
On the one hand, the study of these connections adds a dimension to 
our understanding of the design, dynamics and consequences of the Nazi 
persecution of the Jews that has been traditionally under-emphasised by 
historians of the period. On the other hand, there is a gain to legal 
scholarship in how a deeper understanding of the architecture of that 
persecution presents us with a valuable site from which to flesh out and 
test the bases for our theoretical claims about law.
137
 
TŚĞƌĞ ĂƌĞ ƉƌŽďůĞŵƐ ǁŝƚŚ ZƵŶĚůĞ ?Ɛ ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ƌĞŽƌŝĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ  
jurisprudence towards Nazi law.138 However, jurisprudential engagement 
with Nazi Germany can improve our understanding both of the historical 
period in question - the legal theory of Nazi Germany and the role of law in 
the implementation of the Holocaust  W ĂŶĚ ŽĨ  ‘ŽƵƌ ƚŚĞŽƌĞƚŝĐĂů ĐůĂŝŵƐĂďŽƵƚ
ůĂǁ ? ? ŝŶĐůƵĚing the issues at stake for jurisprudence. The failure within 
jurisprudence to open up to other issues and theories has had a detrimental 
impact on how Nazi Germany is treated within the discourse, because  ‘ƚŚĞ
debate [about the nature of law] frequently seems to degenerate into a 
series of rival claims about how we would or should describe certain real or 
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hypothetical instances of social ordering (Nazi Germany being a popular 
example) ? ?139  
The role of Nazi Germany, I will demonstrate, is  actually ŵŽƌĞ ‘ŚǇƉŽƚŚĞƚŝĐĂů ?
ƚŚĂŶ ‘ƌĞĂů ? ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞdesire to define ŝƚĂƐ ‘ůĂǁ ?Žƌ ‘ŶŽŶ-ůĂǁ ? ?as a consequence 
of a combination of the validity and separability questions) in order to invoke 
it in support of a particular theoretical position is a fundamental feature of 
the discourse. This detracts from understanding it as a manifestation of the 
concept of law on its own, historically sound terms. The desire to employ Nazi 
Germany as a limit case - a source of uncontroversial moral examples to 
make sometimes legal points - holds jurisprudence back from breaking out of 
its circumscribed limits. The jurisprudential examples considered in sections 
III and IV display the characteristics of the representation of Nazi Germany 
discussed above in relation to Riley, and the characteris tics of the discourse 
outlined in this section. The fact that they do so prevents the role of law in 
Nazi Germany from being properly integrated into the discourse as relevant 
to debates about the nature of law because it is inevitably rejected as a point 
of rupture and consigned to the margins as archetypal wicked legal system or 
hypothetical evil state. 
III. Jurisprudential Representation of Nazi Germany: A Superficial, 
hypothetical Wicked Straw Man 
A Key Characteristics of the Representation of Nazi Germany 
The purpose of Section III is to highlight how Nazi Germany is represented in 
current jurisprudential literature, first by using an example to draw out the 
key characteristics, then by providing additional examples of those 
characteristics, and finally by focusing on the representation of Nazi law. This 
substantiates the argument that the jurisprudential representation of Nazi 
Germany that emerges from the literature is that of an historically 
uninformed hypothetical, evil straw man, largely disconnected from the 
reality of the Third Reich. It is superficially employed as a source of 
uncontroversial examples in order to buttress pre-existing theoretical 
positions and trump opposing arguments. In this context the themes to 
highlight are its entrenchment in the discourse in a particular role, its shift 
from the concrete historical realm to the hypothetical realm of 
uncontroversial examples, its superficiality (both in terms of its relationship 
to the jurisprudential matter at issue and the depth of exploration into the 
Nazi past), its lack of specific focus, its disconnection from historical research, 
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and its overarching wickedness.140 This representation occurs in the context 
of a discourse that by its very nature - in its focus on the opposition between 
the competing theoretical paradigms of positivism and natural law and the 
highly conceptual and increasingly narrow issues at stake therein - is 
constructed to eschew empirical, historical evidence and draw on a 
generalised, paradigmatic wicked legal regime rather than the specific Nazi 
ůĞŐĂůƐǇƐƚĞŵ ?ĞǀĞŶǁŚŝůĞŽĨƚĞŶůĂďĞůůŝŶŐƚŚŝƐƉĂƌĂĚŝŐŵ ‘EĂǌŝ ? ?
dŚĞƐĞ ĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐƚŝĐƐ ŵĞĂŶ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ  ‘EĂǌŝ 'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ?ƉŽƌƚƌĂǇĞĚ ǁŝƚŚŝŶ
jurisprudential discourse does not resemble the actual historical case. The 
version of Nazi law that appears most frequently is subsumed within the 
category of archetypal wicked legal systems, whether it is treated as formally 
valid as law or not. There are very few exceptions to this impression, which is 
overriding within the scholarship surveyed. Nazi law per se simply does not 
appear nearly as often as the fairly frequent references to the Third Reich 
generally, most commonly as a source of uncontroversial evil examples. This 
is significant as it reveals how the law in Nazi Germany is not considered 
particularly relevant to determining the philosophical concept of law beyond 
whether the category of wicked legal systems do or do not meet the 
conditions of validity of law. The history of Nazi Germany is an important 
reference point within jurisprudence, but not in an historically justifiable or 
substantively significant form. The examples are drawn from jurisprudence to 
illustrate these points and connect them to the structure of the discourse 
itself.  
The illustrative example from the literature incorporates a number of the key 
characteristics identified. It is a narrow, abstract debate over a specific 
jurisprudential issue that is part of the broader disagreement between 
positivism and natural law about the connection between law and morality. 
In this way it conforms to the structure of jurisprudential discourse outlined 
in Section II. It contains highly generalised references to Nazi Germany which 
reflect its moral status, are not specific to its legal system or any particular 
aspect of the Nazi state and which move easily between the historical and the 
hypothetical realms. Therefore it displays the characteristic of focusing on the 
general, evil history of Nazi Germany rather than its legal system. It involves 
assumptions about the factual content of Nazi references that are 
unsupported by historical evidence. This is in line with the general trend of 
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not supplying evidence for historical claims and relying instead on 
assumptions and preconceptions about the nature of the Nazi state. It finally 
merges ƚŚĞ ŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂů dŚŝƌĚ ZĞŝĐŚ ŝŶƚŽ ƚŚĞ ŚǇƉŽƚŚĞƚŝĐĂů  ‘EĂǌŝ ? ĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ĨŽƌ
moral and rhetorical effect, which is a common trait of the way Nazi Germany 
is referred to in the discourse. 
The example is part of a debate between Dimitrios Kyritsis and Scott Shapiro 
from two articles spanning six years over whether legal conventionalism141 is 
in principle compatible with natural law theory as well as legal positivism.142 
Kyritsis, from a natural law perspective, contends that it is,143 whereas 
Shapiro, from a positivist perspective, claims that it is not.144 Shapiro makes 
two isolated references to Nazi Germany. The first is the example of choosing 
ĂŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂƐĂŶ ‘ĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞ ?ĨŽƌĂůůƚŽĨŽůůŽǁĂŵŽŶŐĂƐĞƚ
of possible constitutions, where he asserts that  ?ƌĞĂƐŽŶĂďůĞƉĞŽƉůĞǁŽƵůĚŶŽƚ
prefer heeding the Constitution of the Third Reich under any 
ĐŝƌĐƵŵƐƚĂŶĐĞƐ ? ?145 The second uses the Nazi extermination of the Jews as an 
ĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ŽĨ Ă  ‘ƉůĂŶ ?146 that does not arise from legal practice (a non-legal 
plan)147 and thaƚŝƐŵŽƌĂůŝŶŶĂƚƵƌĞ ?ŝ ?Ğ ? ‘ŵŽƌĂůůǇŚŽƌƌĞŶĚŽƵƐ ? ) ?148 Shapiro uses 
this to argue that plans in general need not be moral and so legal plans also 
ŶĞĞĚ ŶŽƚ ďĞ ŵŽƌĂů ? ƚŚĞƌĞďǇ ĚĞŶǇŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ŶĂƚƵƌĂů ůĂǁǇĞƌ ?Ɛ ŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇ
connection between law and morality.149 Kyritsis picks up on the second of 
^ŚĂƉŝƌŽ ?Ɛ ƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐ ƚŽ EĂǌŝ 'ĞƌŵĂŶǇĂŶĚƚƵƌŶƐ ŝƚĂƌŽƵŶĚƚŽƌĞũĞĐƚ ^ŚĂƉŝƌŽ ?Ɛ
                                                                 
141
  ‘ƚŚĞ ŝĚĞĂ ƚŚĂƚůĂǁŝƐĂƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞŽĨ ŝŶƚĞƌĂĐƚŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐŽĐĐƵƉǇŝŶŐĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚ
ƌŽůĞƐǁŝƚŚŝŶŝƚ ? ?<ǇƌŝƚƐŝƐ ? ‘tŚĂƚŝƐ'ŽŽĚ ? ?Ŷ96) 144. 
142
 Ibid 387. 
143
 ibid 145. 
144
 ŝďŝĚ ? ? ? ?^ ŚĂƉŝƌŽ ?ƐĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶŝƐĨƌŽŵ^ ŚĂƉŝƌŽ ? ‘>Ăǁ ?WůĂŶƐ ?ĂŶĚWƌĂĐƚŝĐĂůZĞĂƐŽŶ ? ?Ŷ96). 
145
 ^ŚĂƉŝƌŽ ? ‘>Ăǁ ?WůĂŶƐ ?ĂŶĚWƌĂĐƚŝĐĂůZĞĂƐŽŶ ? ?Ŷ96) 390. Shapiro actually rejects the idea 
that the choice of a national constitution as an authority structure is necessarily merely a 
coordination problem. 
146
 dŚĂƚ^ŚĂƉŝƌŽůĂďĞůƐƚŚĞEĂǌŝĞǆƚĞƌŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ:ĞǁƐĂƐĂ ‘ƉůĂŶ ?ŝƐĂĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶŽĨŚŝƐŽǁŶ
ĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ǁŚĂƚ Ă  ‘ƉůĂŶ ? ŝƐ ? dŚis is not related to the long-running 
intentionalist/functionalist debate within historiography over if and when a decision to 
implement the Final Solution was taken and the extent to which the Nazi leadership had a 
 ‘ƉůĂŶ ?ƚŽĞǆƚĞƌŵŝŶĂƚĞƚŚĞ:ĞǁƐĂůů ĂůŽŶŐ (see Kershaw, The Nazi Dictatorship (n 76), especially 
chapter 4) ?^ŚĂƉŝƌŽ ?ƐƵƐĞŽĨƚŚĞ,ŽůŽĐĂƵƐƚ ŝŶƚŚŝƐĐŽŶƚĞǆƚ ŝŶĂƉƉĂƌĞŶƚŝŐŶŽƌĂŶĐĞŽĨ  ?ĂŶĚĂƚ
ůĞĂƐƚǁŝƚŚŽƵƚƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ƚŽ )ĂŶǇƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůĐŽŶƚƌŽǀĞƌƐǇŽǀĞƌŝƚƐƐƚĂƚƵƐĂƐĂ ‘ƉůĂŶ ?ŝƐŝŶĚŝĐĂƚŝǀĞŽĨ
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position.150 Kyritsis argues it is possible to differentiate between plans of a 
legal and a non-legal nature in terms of their moral component.151 On this 
reading the Holocaust was a wicked, non-legal plan152 and Kyritsis can reject 
^ŚĂƉŝƌŽ ?ƐƉƌŽƉŽƐition because, whereas non-legal plans can be value-positive, 
negative or neutral, legal plans are always moral (value-positive), hence the 
inherent connection between law and morality. 
Some of the characteristics identified of jurisprudential discourse are readily 
apparent in this example. Firstly, their dispute is over a narrow, abstract issue 
(whether legal conventionalism is compatible in principle with natural law 
theory), in the context of a larger point of contention between natural law 
and positivism (the connection between law and morality). Secondly, Nazi 
Germany is used superficially to provide uncontroversial examples and 
hypothetical scenarios in support of largely unrelated arguments and to 
trump opposing claims. Thirdly, the Nazi examples are from the general, evil 
history of the Third Reich rather than its legal system. In fact, it is a somewhat 
untested assumption of both Shapiro and Kyritsis that the Final Solution was 
a non-legal plan, so they are both specifically not talking about law when 
invoking Nazi Germany in the second instance. Fourthly, beyond rooting their 
representation at the most general level in the factual existence of the Third 
Reich and ŝƚƐŐĞŶŽĐŝĚĞ ?ƚŚĞƌĞŝƐůŝƚƚůĞƚŽĐŽŶŶĞĐƚĞŝƚŚĞƌ^ŚĂƉŝƌŽ ?Ɛ ‘ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ ?
of the Third Reich or the plan to exterminate the Jews to what actually 
happened in Nazi Germany. The lack of historical detail means the examples 
have no substantive relevance for arguments for or against legal 
conventionalism as a legal theory. 
Nazi Germany is considered a prime example not because of its substantive 
relevance but because of its extreme wicked reputation and ability to trump 
other arguments,153 while ignoring the hinterland of historical reality that the 
term ought to be taken to signify. Shapiro and Kyritsis  agree (and largely take 
ĨŽƌ ŐƌĂŶƚĞĚ ) ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞƌĞ ǁĂƐ Ă  ‘ƉůĂŶ ? ƚŽ ĞǆƚĞƌŵŝŶĂƚĞ ƚŚĞ :Ğǁs, that it was a 
non-legal plan154 and that it was a morally charged, but value-negative plan. 
^ŚĂƉŝƌŽ ďĞůŝĞǀĞƐ <ǇƌŝƚƐŝƐ ? ŽŶůǇ ƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƐ to his argument are to 
assert that the Final Solution is a moral, cooperative enterprise, or is a legal 
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practice (and by implication, according to natural law also a moral 
enterprise). Therefore, only by arguing that the Final Solution did not involve 
a plan or that it was a moral plan, can Kyritsis adhere to his natural law 
principles. Kyritsis cannot make either of these claims because of the obvious 
immorality of the Final Solution within the moral framework of the debate 
and because denying it was a plan involves refuting that the perpetration of 
the Holocaust involved some sort of cooperative enterprise. This would also 
be both counter-intuitive and morally problematic.155 Kyritsis instead turns 
the Nazi example that supposedly trumps him against Shapiro, thereby giving 
his counter-argument additional weight when he shows there is another way 
around the problem. No historical evidence or historiographical scholarship is 
presented for any of the claims made about Nazi Germany, including 
^ŚĂƉŝƌŽ ?Ɛ ĂƐƐĞƌƚŝŽŶ ĂďŽƵƚ ƚŚĞ ĚĞƐŝƌĂďŝůŝƚǇ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ EĂǌŝ ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ ?156 The 
representation of Nazi Germany presented is sufficiently divorced from 
ŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂůƌĞĂůŝƚǇƚŚĂƚŝƚŵŽǀĞƐĨƌŽŵ ĂƐŽƵƌĐĞŽĨ ‘ƌĞĂů ? ?ƐƵbstantive examples to 
one of hypothetical allusion, even though, in this case, the authors at least 
appear always to be discussing the actual, historical case. 
Notwithstanding the obvious wickedness of the Final Solution, consulting the 
historical sources would somewhat problematize the rather straightforward 
way Nazi Germany is represented in these articles. The idea that the Final 
^ŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ƐŚŽƵůĚ ďĞ ƵƐĞĚ ĂƐ ĂŶ ĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ŽĨĂ  ‘ƉůĂŶ ?Ăƚ ůů ŝƐ ?ŶŽƚǁŝƚŚƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ
^ŚĂƉŝƌŽ ?Ɛ ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐ ĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶ ? ĐŽŵƉůŝĐĂƚĞĚ ďǇ ƚŚĞ long-running 
intentionalist/functionalist debate in historiography about how it was 
brought about in terms of the nature, degree, source and timing of any prior 
intent.157 It is for this reason not the most appropriate example to use. 
Similarly, its depiction as a non-legal plan is complicated by the reality of the 
mixture of legal and non-legal measures that contributed to its evolution and 
implementation,158 yet Kyritsis ultimately relies on the claim that the Final 
Solution was not a legal undertaking as a necessary implication of his 
ƌĞũĞĐƚŝŽŶŽĨ^ŚĂƉŝƌŽ ?ƐĚŝůĞŵŵĂ ?ĂŶĚ^ŚĂƉŝƌŽŝŶŝƚŝĂůůǇƉŽƐŝƚƐŝƚĂƐƐƵĐŚ ?ƋƵĂůůǇ ?
the assertion that reasonable people would not desire to heed the Nazi 
constitution must be based on the assumption either that the people in the 
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 See fn 146 above. 
158
 See the discussions in Chapters One, Four and Five of the impact of different examples of 
historical research on our devel oping understanding of the Nazi legal system and its role in 
the Holocaust. 
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Third Reich were not reasonable or that they were reasonable but are so 
different in their fundamental proclivities from the unspecified group of 
 ‘ƌĞĂƐŽŶĂďůĞ ? ƉĞŽƉůĞ ƚŽ ǁŚŝĐŚ ^ŚĂƉŝƌŽ ƌĞĨĞƌƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŝƌƌĞĂƐŽŶĂďůĞŶĞƐƐ ŝƐŶŽƚ
relevant to their decision, so is essentially negated. More likely it relies on an 
outdated totalitarian conception of the Third Reich according to which 
popular consensus played no role in adherence to the Nazi state. In any case 
these statements are historically highly problematic, not least because many 
ordinary people did choose to adhere to the constitution of the Third Reich.  
B From the Historical to the Hypothetical Realm 
The various characteristics of the unhistorical, hypothetical, superficial, 
wicked straw-man representation of Nazi Germany that pervades 
jurisprudential discourse are also evident in a number of other examples. 
Together these build up a picture both of the prevailing treatment of the 
Third Reich in jurisprudence and the jurisprudential questions to which Nazi 
Germany is considered relevant. I will highlight some of the key 
characteristics in this part and show how they are manifested in the literature 
through different examples in order to demonstrate that the representation 
outlined applies across jurisprudential references to the Third Reich.  
The leap from the actual, historical case of Nazi Germany to its figurative, 
hypothetical use is an important structural aspect of its representation as it 
allows references to be isolated from historical evidence and devoid of 
substantiated content. It is illustrated by ƚŚĞ ‘^ŽƉŚŝĞ ?ƐĐŚŽŝĐĞ ?ĞǆĂŵƉůĞƐŝŶƚŚĞ
literature.159 Silvina Alvarez, for example, uses  ‘^ŽƉŚŝĞ ?Ɛ ĐŚŽŝĐĞ ? ĂƐ ĂŶ 
example of symmetrical conflicts,160 and it appears elsewhere in articles 
about conflicting rights to resources161 and consequentialist justifications.162 
The popularity of this choice may be explained by its cultural currency, which 
makes it a prime target for subsequently achieving academic currency. 
However, it is far from unique as a category of Nazi-related examples, and 
illustrates how easily the genuine but highly generalised historical situation of 
an encounter between a Nazi officer and camp inmate can become a purely 
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  ‘^ŽƉŚŝĞ ?Ɛ ĐŚŽŝĐĞ ? ďĞŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ĚŝůĞŵŵĂ ǁŚĞƌĞŝŶ Ă EĂǌŝĐĂŵƉ ŽĨĨŝĐŝĂů ĨŽƌĐĞƐ Ă ŵŽƚŚĞƌ ƚŽ
choose one of her two children to be gassed and the other to work in the labour camp at 
Auschwitz, in order to avoid both being kil led. See Will iam Styron, ^ŽƉŚŝĞ ?ƐŚŽŝĐĞ (Random 
House, 1979); ^ŽƉŚŝĞ ?ƐŚŽŝĐĞ (1982), Alan J. Pakula, Universal Pictures. 
160
 ĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚĂƐ ‘ƚŚŽƐĞŝŶǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞƚǁŽŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶƐƌĞĨĞƌƚŽĂƐĂŵĞǀĂůƵĞŽƌŵŽƌĂůĐŽŶƚĞŶƚ ? ?
SilvŝŶĂůǀĂƌĞǌ ? ‘ŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůŽŶĨůŝĐƚƐ ?DŽƌĂůŝůĞŵŵĂƐ ?ĂŶĚ>ĞŐĂů^ŽůƵƚŝŽŶƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ? ? ? )
Ratio Juris 59, 61. 
161
 ůĂŝƌĞKĂŬĞƐ&ŝŶŬĞůƐƚĞŝŶ ? ‘dǁŽDĞŶĂŶĚĂWůĂŶŬ ? ? ? ?   ) ? ? ? )Legal Theory 279, 296. 
162
 DŝĐŚĂĞů DŽŽƌĞ ?  ‘WĂƚƌŽůů ŝŶŐ ƚŚĞŽƌĚĞƌƐŽĨŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶƚŝĂůŝƐƚ:ƵƐƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐ PƚŚĞ^ĐŽƉĞŽĨ
Agent-ZĞůĂƚŝǀĞ ZĞƐƚƌŝĐƚŝŽŶƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ? ? ? )Law and Philosophy 35, 79-80 
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hypothetical scenario for the purposes of a jurisprudential argument, without 
losing the weight and connotation of immorality associated with Nazism.   
This trope of the morally uncontroversial Nazi example appears repeatedly in 
the literature, including, sometimes more than once, in articles by Michael 
Perry,163 Frances Kamm,164 Larry Alexander,165 Matthew Kramer,166 Joseph 
Raz,167 Antonino Rotolo and Corrado Roversi,168 Christian Dahlman169 and 
Victor Tadros.170 While these examples may describe either actual events or 
situations, such as the existence of the gas chambers or the extermination of 
ƚŚĞ :ĞǁƐ ? Žƌ ĞǆƉůŝĐŝƚůǇ ŚǇƉŽƚŚĞƚŝĐĂů ƐĐĞŶĂƌŝŽƐ ŝŶǀŽůǀŝŶŐ  ‘EĂǌŝƐ ? ?ƚŚĞĨŽƌŵĞƌ ŝƐ
always on a superficial and generalised level and only corresponding 
hypothetical scenarios are given any detail or substance. In neither case do 
the authors involved cite historical sources in support of their references, so 
all details of substance are constructed hypothetically to fit the requirements 
of the scenario. It is therefore easy to move from general examples involving 
Nazi Germany, which may be based broadly in historical fact, to specific 
scenarios that invoke Nazism hypothetically. The effect of this is to adopt the 
moral weight associated with the Nazi regime and apply it to arguments 
derived from the specific example or scenario referred to. There also a 
reverse effect, which is to embed this role for Nazi Germany in the discourse 
and give the impression that such things are all there is to say about it in this 
context, the context of theoretical discourse about the conceptual nature of 
law. 
Whereas the potential historical inaccuracy of the examples is not considered 
important to the argument being advanced, their clear moral message is. The 
wickedness of the Nazi regime is almost always the factor that lends the 
example drawn from it apparent relevance and weight to the jurisprudential 
issue, if only sometimes because of its comparative believability and 
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 DŝĐŚĂĞůWĞƌƌǇ ? ‘DŽƌĂůŝƚǇĂŶĚEŽƌŵĂƚŝǀŝƚǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? )Legal Theory 13(3-4) 211, 212 and 217. 
164
 FranĐĞƐ<Ăŵŵ ? ‘dĞƌƌŽƌŝƐŵĂŶĚ^ĞǀĞƌĂůDŽƌĂůŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ? ? ? )Legal Theory 19, 
20, 25 and 29-35ff. 
165
 >ĂƌƌǇůĞǆĂŶĚĞƌ ? ‘tŚĞŶĂƌĞǁĞZŝŐŚƚĨƵůůǇŐŐƌŝĞǀĞĚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ? ? ? )Legal Theory 325, 327 
166
 DĂƚƚŚĞǁ<ƌĂŵĞƌ ? ‘^ƵƉĞƌǀĞŶŝĞŶĐĞĂƐĂŶƚŚŝĐĂůWŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽŶ ? ? ? ? ? ?) 50 American Journal 
of Jurisprudence 173, 195 
167
 :ŽƐĞƉŚ ZĂǌ ?  ‘ďŽƵƚ DŽƌĂůŝƚǇ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ EĂƚƵƌĞ ŽĨ >Ăǁ ? ? ? ? ? ? )  ? ?American Journal of 
Jurisprudence 1, 11 
168
 ŶƚŽŶŝŶŽZŽƚŽůŽĂŶĚŽƌƌĂĚŽZŽǀĞƌƐŝ ? ‘EŽƌŵŶĂĐƚŵĞŶƚ ĂŶĚWĞƌĨŽƌŵĂƚŝǀĞŽŶƚƌĂĚŝĐƚŝŽŶƐ ?
(2009) 22(4) Ratio Juris 455, 479 
169
 ŚƌŝƐƚŝĂŶ ĂŚůŵĂŶ ?  ‘dŚĞ ŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ KďĞĚŝĞŶĐĞ ƐƐƵŵĞĚ ĂŶĚ KďĞĚŝĞŶĐĞ
ĐĐĞƉƚĞĚ ?  ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ? ? ? )Ratio Juris 187, 194 
170
 sŝĐƚŽƌ dĂĚƌŽƐ ?  ‘/ŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶĐĞ tŝƚŚŽƵƚ/ŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ ? ? ? ?    )  ? ? ? ? )OJLS  193, 200 and 202-
203. 
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simplicity due to its reliance on historical preconceptions.171 While the 
references to Nazi Germany have perceived moral clout, they have little 
substantive, theoretical weight in the argument. More importantly, these 
hypothetical, wicked, uncontroversial examples are used to buttress 
arguments that a deeper historical understanding of Nazi Germany would not 
necessarily support. The almost complete absence of historical evidence is a 
general feature of abstract jurisprudential debate, but in the case of Nazi 
Germany it means that jurisprudential understanding of the subject has not 
been updated since it entered the discourse through the Hart-Fuller debate in 
the postwar period, and this has implications. The paradigmatic wicked 
ƌĞŐŝŵĞƐ ? ǁŚŝĐŚ ĂƌĞ ƐŽŵĞƚŝŵĞƐ ĐĂůůĞĚ  ‘EĂǌŝ ? ? ĚŽ ŶŽƚŝ  ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚ ǁĂǇƐ
represent the actual case of the most paradigmatically wicked regime that 
has been thought to exist. This leads one to ask, if there is no likeness 
between a significant basis for jurisprudential argument and actual wicked 
regimes, what precisely is the concept of law being scrutinised within the 
discourse? It is not the concept of law that was experienced in Nazi Germany, 
even though the Nazi legal system has been invoked as a foundational limit 
case to justify both positivist and naturalist arguments about what law is.  
The absence of historical sources within the literature is testament to this. In 
all of the examples highlighted, historical research plays almost no part, and 
this is true of many other references to Nazi Germany within the discourse. It 
is not necessary to recapitulate these. The relevance of historiography for 
some of the references to the Nazi legal system highlights how the absence of 
historical engagement can distort the use of a Nazi example in a number of 
articles, including by Raymond Wacks and Keith Culver, both of whom use 
potentially unreliable secondary sources in support of their arguments.172 
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 Hitler is opposed by PerƌǇƚŽDŽƚŚĞƌdŚĞƌĞƐĂďĞĐĂƵƐĞŚĞŝƐĂůŵŽƐƚĂƐĨĂƌĂƚƚŚĞ ‘Ğǀŝů  ?ĞŶĚ
of the spectrum as it is possible believably to be. Kamm conjures up two evil  states, one of 
ǁŚŝĐŚŝƐĚĞĨŝŶĞĚďǇŝƚƐŬŝů ů ŝŶŐŽĨďĂďŝĞƐ ? ‘ĂďǇ<ŝů ůĞƌEĂƚŝŽŶ ? )ĂŶĚƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌŽĨǁŚŝĐŚŝƐEĂǌŝ-
controlled, with the implication that they are morally equivalent. Alexander seeks to trump 
ĂŶĞǆĂŵƉůĞƚŚĂƚƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐĞǀĞŶWŽůWŽƚ ?ƐŚŽƌƌĞŶĚŽƵƐĂĐƚƐƐŚŽƵůĚďĞůĞĨƚŽŶůǇƚŽŚŝƐǀŝĐƚŝŵƐƚŽ
avenge, and for this he uses a version of the Holocaust. This has nothing to do with the 
construction of the argument, but is morally more forceful because the Holocaust was so 
wicked that it is difficult to argue that non-victims did not have standing to intervene. There 
is no need to explain further as the reputation of the Nazi regime is such that it is 
automatically understood that to argue against this position might be morally questionable. 
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 Respectively the fi lm Judgment at Nuremberg (1961) Stanley Kramer, Roxlom Films, and a 
Times obituary: ZĂǇŵŽŶĚ tĂĐŬƐ ?  ‘/ŶũƵƐƚŝĐĞ ŝŶ ZŽďĞƐ P /ŶŝƋƵŝƚǇĂŶĚ:ƵĚŝĐŝĂůĐĐŽƵŶƚĂďŝůŝƚǇ ?
(2009) 22(1) Ratio Juris 128; and <ĞŝƚŚ ƵůǀĞƌ ?  ‘>ĞŐĂů KďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ ĞƐƚŚĞƚŝĐ /ĚĞĂůƐ P 
ZĞŶĞǁĞĚ >ĞŐĂů WŽƐŝƚŝǀŝƐƚdŚĞŽƌǇŽĨ>Ăǁ ?ƐEŽƌŵĂƚŝǀŝƚǇ ? ?2001) 14(2) Ratio Juris 176, 177. He 
ƌĞĨĞƌƐ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ  ‘ƉŽǁĞƌĨƵů ŵŽƌĂů ĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŵ ? ŽĨ ,ŝƚůĞƌƚŚĂƚ ƌĞƐƵůƚĞĚ ŝŶĂŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨďŽŵďƉůŽƚƐ
ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚŚŝŵ ?ďƵƚ ‘ǁĂƐŝŶƐƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚƌĞĂƐŽŶĨŽƌŵĂŶǇƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůƐǇŵƉĂƚŚŝƐĞƌƐƚŽďƌĞĂŬǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŝƌ
ĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚ ƚŽƚŚĞƌĞŐŝŵĞ ? ? ? ? ? ) ? 
    
47 
 
These examples, and many more, illustrate how Nazi Germany is treated 
superficially and unhistorically, as hypothetical and wicked - a straw man 
version of itself - to buttress theoretical claims about the concept of law and 
trump opposing arguments. The authors rely on the immoral weight 
associated with the Third Reich and blend this with historiographically 
untested preconceptions about what that state was like, to use its 
hypothetical manifestations for almost whatever purpose required. These 
instances of insufficient historical evidence are supplemented by a larger 
selection of cases (albeit less frequent than general references to Nazism) 
where claims are made about the Nazi legal system with no historical 
support. These are important because of the significance of Nazi law as a 
jurisprudential test case for the concept of law, despite a similar lack of 
historical evidence for the nature of the Nazi legal system. They reveal how 
the embedded role of Nazi Germany within the discourse has  been enabled 
and propagated in part because no counter narrative that reflects 
developments in understanding in historical scholarship has been made 
available to challenge it. 
C The Treatment of Nazi Law 
There are a number of examples within the literature of how Nazi law is 
employed in this way. ĂǀŝĚ &ĂŐĞůƐŽŶŵĂŬĞƐƚŚĞĐůĂŝŵƚŚĂƚ  ‘ŝf the soundest 
theory of law in Nazi Germany could create a prima facie legal duty to 
enforce it, then the justifying principles that constitute the moral component 
of legal riŐŚƚƐĚŽŶŽƚƐĞĞŵǀĞƌǇƌŝŐŽƌŽƵƐ ? ?173 without any analysis of what the 
 ‘ƐŽƵŶĚĞƐƚ ƚŚĞŽƌǇ ŽĨ ůĂǁ ŝŶ EĂǌŝ 'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ? ŵŝŐŚƚ ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞ ?Andrei Marmor 
ƌĞĨĞƌƐƚŽ  ‘ƚŚĞŵĂŶŝĨĞƐƚlegalism of the Nazi regime ?ĂƐŐŝǀŝŶŐƌŝƐĞƚŽƉŽƐƚǁĂƌ
concerns about law and morality174 without scrutinising the underlying 
historical assumption, that the system in Nazi was in fact legalistic. This 
proposition is highly dubious in light of recent research.175 Aharon Barak 
ĂƐƐĞƌƚƐƚŚĂƚ ‘one of the lessons of the Holocaust ?ŝƐƚŽĞŶƐƵƌĞƚŚĂƚĚĞŵŽĐratic 
constitutions  ‘are put into effect by Supreme Court judges whose main task is 
to protect democracy ?.176 However, he does not interrogate whether the Nazi 
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 ĂǀŝĚ &ĂŐĞůƐŽŶ ?  ‘^ƚƌŽŶŐ ZŝŐŚƚƐ ĂŶĚ ŝƐŽďĞĚŝĞŶĐĞ P &ƌŽŵ ,ĞƌĞ ƚŽ /ŶƚĞŐƌŝƚǇ ?  ? ? ? ? ? )  ? ? ? ? )
Ratio Juris 242, 246. 
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 ŶĚƌĞŝDĂƌŵŽƌ ? ‘>ĞŐĂůWŽƐŝƚŝǀŝƐŵ P^ ƚŝ ů ů ĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝǀĞĂŶĚDŽƌĂůůǇEĞƵƚƌĂů ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ? ? ? )OJLS
683, 691-692. 
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 See Section III of Chapter One, which refers to scholarship that calls this claim into 
question, particularly by Vivian Grosswald Curran. See also Herlinde Pauer -Studer and J. 
ĂǀŝĚsĞůůĞŵĂŶ ? ‘ŝƐƚŽƌƚŝŽŶƐŽĨEŽƌŵĂƚŝǀŝƚǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 329 
on the role of moral factors in the Nazi regime. 
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 ŚĂƌŽŶĂƌĂŬ ? ‘,ƵŵĂŶZŝŐŚƚƐŝŶdŝŵĞƐŽĨdĞƌƌŽƌ W Ă:ƵĚŝĐŝĂůWŽŝŶƚŽĨsŝĞǁ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ? ? ? )LS 
493, 493. 
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example suggests that it may be futile to rely on the judiciary to protect the 
constitution.177  
These examples show how the lack of good, or more often any, historical 
evidence to support ostensibly real historical examples from Nazi history, and 
assertions about the Nazi state and legal system, can be problematic for 
some of the jurisprudential arguments that depend on these examples and 
assertions. The failure to engage with historical research leaves 
jurisprudential scholars relying on the one-dimensional, paradigmatic 
wickedness of the regime rather than the complex reality. Where a 
misconceived version of the Nazi legal system is adopted as indicative of 
wicked legal systems generally, there is potential for an important category 
within the concept of law to be improperly represented within the discourse. 
The use of Nazism as an archetypal wicked regime often comes down to the 
question of whether Nazi law was or was not law, and what this might mean 
for the separability question and the validity question. Within this there is a 
degree of harking back to the postwar Nazi role within the Hart-Fuller debate 
and reproducing the understanding of its legal system that prevailed then.  
This is illustrated ďǇĂŶŶǇWƌŝĞů ?ƐƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƚŽƚŚĞƌŽůĞŽĨƚŚĞEĂǌŝƌĞŐŝŵĞŝŶ
the Hart-Fuller debate about the relationship between law and morality, 
while such issues seĞŵ  ‘Ăƚ ůĞĂƐƚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶƚĞǆƚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ tĞƐƚĞƌŶ ǁŽƌůĚ ? ůĞƐƐ
ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚ ƚŽĚĂǇ ? ?178 The homogeneous treatment of the Nazi legal system 
within jurisprudential discourse reflects the embeddedness of its role as a 
paradigmatically evil regime that may or may not have been law, but which 
has nothing of substantive relevance to contribute to jurisprudential 
questions. The general failure to re-evaluate the nature of Nazi law in light of 
historical evidence to see whether it actually conforms to this role means that 
it is often referred to either in support of assertions it does not 
unproblematically substantiate, or as a leftover from a debate once had 
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 KƚŚĞƌ ĞǆĂŵƉůĞƐ ŝŶĐůƵĚĞ ŝŶ <ĞŶŶĞƚŚ ŝŶĂƌ ,ŝŵŵĂ ?  ‘WŽƐŝƚŝǀŝƐŵ ĂŶĚ /ŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚŝŶŐ >ĞŐĂů
Content: Does Law Call  for a Moral Semantics? ?  ? ? ? ? ? )  ? ? ? ? )Ratio Juris 24, 25 and 36 and 
tŝůůŝĂŵ>ƵĐǇ ? ‘ďƐƚƌĂĐƚŝŽŶĂŶĚƚŚĞZƵůĞŽĨ>Ăǁ ? ? ? ? ) ? ? ? ? )OJLS 481, 506-507. 
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 ĂŶŶǇ WƌŝĞů ?  ‘dŚĞŽƵŶĚĂƌŝĞƐŽĨ>ĂǁĂŶĚƚŚĞWƵƌƉŽƐĞŽĨ>ĞŐĂůƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? )  ? ? ? ? )
Law and Philosophy 643, 694. Priel relies for his understanding of Nazism as jurisprudentially 
irrelevant today on the way it was interpreted as relevant for the Hart-Fuller debate in the 
postwar period. There are further examples of the reproduction of the treatment of Nazi law 
in the Hart-Fuller debate: ZŽďĞƌƚ 'ĞŽƌŐĞ ?  ‘ZĞĂƐŽŶ ? &ƌĞĞĚŽŵ ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ZƵůĞ ŽĨ >Ăǁ P dŚĞŝƌ
^ŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶĐĞ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ EĂƚƵƌĂů >Ăǁ dƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? )  ? The American Journal of Jurisprudence 
249, 25 ? ?ƌŝĐ,ĞŝŶǌĞ ? ‘ƉŝŶŽŵŝĂ PWůĂƚŽĂŶĚƚŚĞ&ŝƌƐƚ>ĞŐĂůdŚĞŽƌǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ? ? ? )Ratio Juris 97, 
 ? ? ? ? ŽůůĞĞŶDƵƌƉŚǇ ? ‘>ŽŶ&ƵůůĞƌĂŶĚƚŚĞDŽƌĂůsĂůƵĞŽĨƚŚĞZƵůĞŽĨ>Ăǁ ? ? ? ? ? ? )  ? ? ? ? )Law 
and Philosophy 239, 251; and :ŽŚŶ &ŝŶŶŝƐ ? ‘'ƌŽƵŶĚƐŽĨ>ĂǁĂŶĚ>ĞŐĂůdŚĞŽƌǇ P ZĞƐƉŽŶƐĞ ?
(2007) 13 Legal Theory 315. 
    
49 
 
about the validity of the Nazi legal system, wherein it was last considered 
significant. 
The structure of jurisprudential discourse ensures that the embedded role of 
Nazi law is continually reproduced, because of how it is used to support both 
positivist and naturalist arguments. A good example of this is Nigel 
^ŝŵŵŽŶĚƐ ?ĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚĂďŽƵƚǁŝĐŬĞĚůĞŐĂůƐǇƐƚĞŵƐŝŶƐƵƉƉŽƌƚŽĨŚŝƐ  natural law 
claim of law as a moral idea.179 Simmonds discounts real, historical cases of 
wicked law from further consideration because he argues that it is difficult to 
find actual cases of rulers using law for wicked ends without recognising that 
the law they are manipulating is fundamentally good.180 He also places all 
relevant real and hypothetical examples of wicked regimes used to support 
his argument in the category of selfish and self-serving regimes adopting the 
cloak of legality cynically and instrumentally in order to rely on its perceived 
positive values within society and achieve their repressive aims.181 Natural 
law requires that this type of wicked regime presents a challenge because it is 
one to which it can effectively respond, with the claim that law maintains its 
connection to morality under such conditions. The actual historical example 
of the Nazi legal system challenges this representation on a number of levels.  
The prevailing representation of Nazi Germany within jurisprudential 
discourse outlined in this section strongly endorses one of the criticisms 
made of the legal academy overall in respect of the Third Reich, that of a 
failure of engagement with historical research. Even a cursory questioning of 
the ability of the history of the Third Reich to support the jurisprudential 
arguments it is used to service begins to reveal potential problems with some 
of the claims made. The representation also goes some way to countering 
ZŝůĞǇ ?Ɛ ĐůĂŝŵ ƚŚĂƚ Ă  ‘ĚŝƐĐŽŶƚŝŶƵŝƚǇ ƚŚĞƐŝƐ ? ĚŽĞƐ ŶŽƚ ƉƌĞǀĂŝů ǁŝƚŚŝŶ
jurisprudence. While the scholars cited do not explicitly endorse the notion of 
discontinuity or rupture between the concept of law and Nazi law, it is 
implicit in the way Nazi law is often dealt with. Nazi law is assumed to be 
wicked, it is assumed to be different and it is assumed to be irrelevant 
beyond one narrow issue. Nazi Germany generally is a used as a prime source 
of uncontroversial scenarios, none of which have historical foundation or 
substantive relevance to the issues at hand. It is not investigated in detail 
because its role within the discourse is assumed and fixed by its chief moral 
point of difference. Any and all potential similarities and continuities are 
overlooked.  
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 Nigel Simmonds, Law as a Moral Idea (OUP, 2007). See ĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůůǇĐŚ ? ‘ǀŝů ZĞŐŝŵĞƐĂŶĚ
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IV. The Problem with the Jurisprudential Misrepresentation of Nazi 
Germany 
The representation of Nazi Germany within jurisprudential discourse outlined 
above is problematic broadly for three reasons, beyond the fact that it does 
not accurately reconstruct the Third Reich. Firstly, Nazi Germany is relevant 
to key jurisprudential issues and does challenge some of the dominant 
theoretical assumptions within it. I will return to this point in the following 
chapters. Secondly, the structure of the discourse ensures that it reproduces 
itself and consigns the Nazi past almost exclusively to this role. Finally, even 
though the discourse does allow for differences of opinion as to whether Nazi 
law was in fact law, as a whole in its treatment of Nazi Germany it sustains an 
implicit, underlying narrative of rupture and irrelevance about the Nazi state 
that ensures its continued substantive exclusion from jurisprudential debate 
and prevents us from asking important questions about the nature of 
contemporary law. 
I have said that the conceptual analysis of the nature of law that interests 
jurisprudence is more concerned with a hypothetical, paradigmatic worst-
case wicked legal system against which the limits of its theories can be 
tested, rather than any particular historical instance of law used for wicked 
ends. This application of Nazi law is mistaken and I will raise some objections 
to the general argument. Nazism is an important historical instance of a 
modern, civilised state using legal and other means to govern a country and 
implement genocide, and so it might be considered a prime case on which to 
base a test case of wickedness. Yet the discourse around Nazi Germany has 
become divorced from the specificity of Nazi law, and the characteristics of 
the hypothetical worst-case legal system are not those that appear to be 
most significant about the Nazi legal system. Indeed, the latter seems to 
contradict the content of the former in fundamental ways. In addition, the 
discourse uses the cultural cache that comes with the Third Reich as an 
argumentational trump card and a starting point from which to deduce 
ostensibly logical outcomes in support of various theoretical claims.  
It may be important that legal theorists construct a theory, or competing 
theories, about the criteria for validity within a legal system, and how to 
respond when a system does not satisfy those conditions. However, that is 
not the same as investigating what to do with the Nazi legal system, i f the 
only link between the hypothetical system used to construct the theory and 
the actual system is semantic. The actual characteristics of the Nazi legal 
system are now considered largely irrelevant for abstract jurisprudential 
debate whereas they in fact have great relevance when explored for what 
they say about the relationship between law and the modern state. This is 
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pertinent for the chief battlegrounds of the discourse as it is currently 
structured but more broadly to the key issues with which jurisprudence 
generally is concerned in respect of the concept of law, in this case its role 
and nature within non-democratic regimes, its use for immoral ends and its 
relationship to the political and moral universe of the state. 
The absence of references to historical research in the discourse is 
problematic because of the dramatic reinterpretation of the nature of the 
Nazi state that has taken place within historiography since the 1990s, based 
on the analysis of vast archives of primary sources covering a huge array of 
aspects of Nazi Germany.182 I make the claim that the representation of Nazi 
law and state within jurisprudential discourse crystallised early on, in the 
context of the fairly simplistic, historical and cultural rendering that 
manifested itself in postwar accounts and at Nuremberg.183 The focus on the 
totalitarian nature of the state, the criminal enterprise of the Nazi leadership, 
their barbaric intentions and apparently lawless approach made the Nazi 
legal system quite straightforward to deal with for jurisprudence. It either 
was law or is was not, but it had little material relevance beyond this because 
it was ostensibly such an extreme case and bore so little resemblance to the 
manifestations of the concept of law with which we were and are familiar. 
This representation of Nazi Germany embedded itself within the discourse, 
and helped to shape its focus to the present day. This is illustrated by the way 
Nazi law is often referred to in its Hart-Fuller jurisprudential context, and 
rarely removed from this to be explored in its own right.  
The role of Nazi law within jurisprudence was set at the time of the Hart-
Fuller debate, when the postwar historical understanding of the Third Reich 
embedded itself in the discourse. One characteristic that ensures the 
reproduction of this role is the absence of engagement with new historical 
scholarship, which means there is no alternative understanding of the nature 
of the Nazi legal system to counter the prevailing representation. The other 
characteristic that consigns Nazi law to this role is the structure of the 
discourse itself. The key tenets of positivism and natural law require their 
archetypal wicked legal systems, of which Nazi Germany is the paradigmatic 
case, to exist in a certain form in order to support the arguments they make, 
particularly in terms of the relationship between law and morality. Nigel 
^ŝŵŵŽŶĚƐ ? ƚƌĞĂƚŵĞŶƚ ŽĨ ĞǀŝůƌĞŐŝŵĞƐ ŝŶƐƵƉƉŽƌƚŽĨŚŝƐĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚ ŝŶĨĂǀŽƵƌŽĨ
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natural law shows how the representation of Nazi law is internalised and 
reproduced within jurisprudential discourse.184  
It is important to appreciate how the discourse reproduces the notion of the 
wicked legal system to reinforce the connection to the Hart-Fuller debate 
outlined in Chapter Three, and so the arguments addressed in Chapter Four 
about how jurisprudence ought to be re-evaluated in light of the real case of 
Nazi law can be properly understood. According to the competing claims of 
positivism and natural law, either even Nazi law was law, or something like 
Nazi law cannot possibly be law. Naturalist discourse relies primarily on a 
version of moral regimes that uphold the rule of law to varying degrees and 
wicked regimes who specifically and instrumentally seek to destroy it or 
maintain it largely for cynical purposes. Nazi Germany has long been 
considered to be a prime example of the latter, but is actually another case 
altogether. 
Like positivism, natural law requires the Nazi regime to take on a particular 
set of characteristics and needs Nazi law to adhere to a certain type. This is of 
a formalistic system, which adheres to procedural but not substantive tenets 
of law. It can then, because of its limit case moral nature, be used as a 
convincing limit case legal example in support of particular versions of that 
theory of the concept of law. Again, this version of Nazi law is highly 
problematic. The requirement has become embedded in the discourse 
because of its involvement at the outset of the Hart-Fuller debate and 
because it is continually re-referenced to make the similar and related points. 
Both theoretical paradigms to an extent depend on the Nazi example, and 
both would be challenged by an historiographical elucidation of the nature of 
Nazi law. The internalisation and reproduction of a particular understanding 
of the Nazi legal system thereby constructs and is constructed by the 
structuring of the discourse that refracts the Third Reich through positivism 
and natural law, the validity question and the separability question.  
V. Conclusion: An Implicit Narrative of Rupture and Discontinuity 
dŚĞ  ‘EĂǌŝ 'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ? ƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚ ƚŽ ŝŶ ũƵƌŝƐƉƌƵĚĞŶƚŝĂůĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞ ŝƐĐůĞĂƌůǇŶŽƚƚŚĞ
historical Nazi Germany. Jurisprudence therefore misrepresents the legal and 
historical nature of the Nazi regime. Nevertheless, jurisprudential discourse 
relies on certain assumptions about Nazi Germany, particularly as it 
contributes to discussions about wicked legal systems, for some of its 
important arguments, whereas the historical reality of Nazi law does not 
conform well to the role it has been given. Stephen Riley is wrong to argue 
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that the continuities between contemporary and Nazi law are not sufficiently 
important that we should examine the latter in detail to learn something 
profound about the former, and that a discontinuity thesis in respect of Nazi  
law does not prevail at least within jurisprudence. I argue that the structurally 
determined, discursive consignment of Nazi Germany to its specific 
jurisprudential role manifests an implicit, underlying narrative of rupture that 
effectively prevents the Third Reich from having relevance to broader 
jurisprudential questions and asserts the discontinuity thesis that Riley denies 
exists.  
Until recently positivism has been the dominant jurisprudential paradigm and 
natural law its primary opposition. Analytical positivism is only really 
interested in Nazi law to the point it decides whether it is law or not, and has 
little interest in going beyond this to investigate further. All further questions 
about the wickedness of the Nazi system are moral rather than legal and go 
ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ĐŝƚŝǌĞŶ ?Ɛ ĐŚŽŝĐĞ Žƌ ŽďůŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ ƚŽ ƌĞĨƵƐĞ ƚŽŽďĞǇ ƚŚĞ ůĂǁ ? EĂƚƵƌĂů ůĂǁ ?
because of its normative perspective, may wish to evaluate the nature of the 
system more thoroughly, but only if the system can be said to be lawful. The 
perceived overarching wickedness of the Nazi legal system prevents it from 
being viewed as law from this perspective. This wickedness means it is 
distinguishable in some way from the conception of law under scrutiny in 
jurisprudence. Either it is legally alien or it is morally alien, or both. To the 
extent that this prevents jurisprudential scholars from exploring the potential 
relevance of the actual, historical case of Nazi law, this is a manifestation of 
the discontinuity thesis, the idea that Nazi law represents a rupture from the 
ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ŽĨ ‘ŽƵƌ ? ůĂǁ ?185  
While jurisprudential theorists do not always explicitly rupture Nazi law from 
law more generally, they do so implicitly by a structural denial of its relevance 
to the discourse in which the concept of law is discussed. Vivian Grosswald 
Curran directs that examples such as Nazi Germany 'provide opportunities to 
observe mechanisms that may be dormant and imperceptible at other 
historical periods and in other judicial systems, such as our own, but that 
ŶĞǀĞƌƚŚĞůĞƐƐ ŵĂǇ ďĞ ĞŵďĞĚĚĞĚ ǁŝƚŚŝŶ ƚŚĞŵ ? ?186 This approach encourages 
viewing the Nazi legal system as fundamentally part of the same concept of 
law, while understanding that it emphasises different characteristics within 
that concept and puts law to radically different ends . It is instructive in this 
way and fits with the emerging historical understanding of that system. But it 
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is not adopted by jurisprudence. Recent criticism of the current state of the 
discourse is not generally intended to bring Nazism back into the fold. 
Sometimes, indeed, what is criticised is the perceived over-reliance on Nazi 
Germany as a constructive manifestation of a legal system. However, the 
potential for criticism does raise the possibility that its structural limitations 
might be reconfigured in such a way that Nazi Germany and Nazi law might 
finally, as Laurence Lustgarten has implored, be taken seriously.187 It is, as 
Rundle has observed, important both for our theoretical claims about law 
and for our understanding of the relationship between law and Nazi Germany 
that such regimes are not distinguished as irrelevant but are understood as a 
legitimate and relevant subjects for jurisprudential inquiry. 
This chapter explored the jurisprudential representation of Nazi Germany as  
being flawed and unhistorical. It described how this is embedded and 
reproduced within the structure of the discourse itself and showed what this 
discursive structure looks like. This is connected to the wider arguments of 
this dissertation through the interpretation of the jurisprudential 
representation as manifesting an underlying narrative of rupture. It 
illustrated how challenges to the view that the legal academy has not 
engaged properly with the Nazi past, such as that presented by Stephen Riley, 
are susceptible to some of the same preconceptions as the discourse 
generally. Having established this, the specific connection between how 
jurisprudence now treats the Third Reich and the understanding of Nazi law 
that prevailed within the Hart-Fuller debate can be investigated. This is the 
subject of Chapter Three and will complete my analysis of how jurisprudence 
represents Nazi Germany and enable this to be interrogated with reference 
to the historical case of Nazism. 
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Chapter Three: The Hart-Fuller Debate and the Genesis of Jurisprudential 
 ?DŝƐ ?ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶ ? ‘EĂǌŝůĂǁƐŚŽƵůĚƌĞŵĂŝŶĂƚƚŚĞĐĞŶƚĞƌŽĨŽƵƌ
ũƵƌŝƐƉƌƵĚĞŶƚŝĂůĨŽĐƵƐƚŽĚĂǇ ?188 
I. Introduction: A Restricted Form of Jurisprudence 
This chapter returns to the twentieth century genesis of current 
jurisprudential discourse189 to demonstrate the importance of the Hart-Fuller 
debate190 in determining the main issues at stake within jurisprudential 
discussion of the concept of law and the prevailing representation of Nazi 
Germany. The Hart-Fuller debate ?Ɛ brief treatment of Nazi Germany was 
influenced both by the cultural and historical understanding of Nazism at the 
time191 and the analytical interests of its instigator Herbert Hart. While the 
debate is arguably problematic in terms of its extremely narrow treatment of 
Nazi Germany, it was also quite limited in its theoretical focus and was not 
intended to examine the full extent and nature of Nazi law. However, its 
legacy in terms of the way it has been interpreted and the responses it has 
generated has defined wider jurisprudential discourse and the role of Nazi 
Germany therein, in a way that has isolated and distinguished it from the 
growing historiographical understanding of the Third Reich. 
It is important to trace the prevailing jurisprudential representation of Nazi 
Germany to its source in order to understand how and why it has come to 
play the role it does within the discourse and demonstrate that this role 
depends on the starting point of its postwar renewal and how it has evolved 
over time. This is not based on a finding that Nazi law is irrelevant to key 
jurisprudential issues for convincing, substantive philosophical or empirical 
reasons. This will set up the exploration in Chapter Four of different ways of 
reorienting jurisprudential discourse towards Nazi Germany in the context of 
historical research. I therefore trace the influence of the Hart-Fuller debate 
on the structure of jurisprudential discourse and its treatment of Nazi 
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Germany through an analysis of the two initial Harvard Law Review articles 
by Hart and Lon Fuller, and two collections of articles published in recent 
years to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the debate.192  I will 
introduce the key, relevant issues in the debate, and how Hart and Fuller 
represent Nazi law, before offering a critique of this representation and 
linking it to the current jurisprudence discussed in the previous chapter. I will 
then analyse the legacy of the debate through the fiftieth anniversary 
collections, demonstrating that the Nazi aspect of the debate has largely 
disappeared and rarely merits re-evaluation, while its influence on the 
discourse continues through the literature. 
The 50th anniversary literature will be used to exemplify the current state of 
thinking on the issues raised in the Hart-Fuller debate. These contributions 
are either explicitly outward looking, going beyond the limited issues at stake 
in the initial debate to consider the theories of Hart and Fuller from other 
angles,193 or reinterpretative, delving into the original issues with renewed 
vigour.194 In both cases, however, they emphasise the minimal role Nazi 
Germany has come to play in the myriad of philosophical dialogues that 
comprise the legacy of the Hart-Fuller debate. While the Hart-Fuller debate 
influences areas beyond analytical jurisprudence, Nazi Germany 
predominantly remains an example of a wicked regime that either is or is not 
ůĂǁĨƵů ? ĚĞƉĞŶĚŝŶŐ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ƚŚĞŽƌŝƐƚ ?s philosophical commitments. The 
literature analysed will establish the importance of the Hart-Fuller debate in 
contemporary jurisprudence through the eyes of other legal scholars who 
have commented on its enduring appeal and influence, and in relation to how 
Nazi Germany is viewed.  
II. The Hart-Fuller Debate and its Representation of Nazi Law 
A Introducing the Hart-Fuller Debate 
The Hart-Fuller debate has had a profound impact on jurisprudential 
discourse, in determining its structure and the key issues at stake, and its 
treatment of Nazi Germany and its legal system. While Gustav Radbruch had 
expounded his famous formula for invoking a higher principle when dealing 
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with extreme legal injustice soon after the end of the war in Germany,195 it 
appears that Anglo-American jurisprudence addressed the implications of 
Nazi law for the concept of law first in the Hart-Fuller debate in the late 
1950s. The debate has endured at the heart of jurisprudential dialogue for 
over half a century, being continually referred to and reinterpreted, a fact 
evidenced by its important place in the teaching of jurisprudence and, for 
example, the interest and scholarship ignited by academic events 
ĐŽŵŵĞŵŽƌĂƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞĚĞďĂƚĞ ?Ɛ50th anniversary.196  
The themes covered by the Hart-Fuller debate are well known so I will only 
recall some of its key points here in order to lay the groundwork for 
advancing my thesis, before going on to consider the specific role of Nazi 
Germany in the debate. Initiated by Hart and joined by Fuller, the debate 
took the example of the aftermath of Nazi Germany as an opportunity to 
address some of the criticisms of classical legal positivism, including those of 
the American legal realists. The conceptual issues raised by Hart were 
primarily the separability question and secondarily the validity question. 
Specifically in relation to the Third Reich, he considered whether Nazi law 
could constitute valid law. The analysis of the validity of Nazi law was based 
on a recent Federal Republic of Germany court judgment, an example of a 
 ‘ŐƌƵĚŐĞ ŝŶĨŽƌŵĞƌ ? ƚƌŝĂů ? ƚŚĞ ĨŝƌƐƚ ŽĨ Ă ĐĂƚĞŐŽƌǇ ŽĨ ƉŽƐƚ-Third Reich cases 
dealing with individuals responsible for denouncing victims for criticising the 
regime.197 
Hart repuĚŝĂƚĞĚ ƵƐƚŝŶ ?Ɛ ĐŽŵŵĂŶĚ ƚŚĞŽƌǇ ŽĨ ůĂǁ ĂŶĚdisconnected it from 
the other perceived pillars of classical legal positivism, the separability thesis - 
 ‘ƚŚĞƐĞƉĂƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ ůĂǁƚŚĂƚ ŝƐ ĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ ůĂǁƚŚĂƚŽƵŐŚƚƚŽďĞ ?198 - and the 
analytical component: the idea ƚŚĂƚ  ‘a purely analytical study of legal 
concepts  Q was as vital to our understanding of the nature of law as historical 
or sociological studies  ? ?199 He argued that positivism is distinguishable from 
the command theory, so its critics are unable to rely on rejection of the latter 
to justify rejection of the former. He instead partially defended and 
reinterpreted the classical positivistic, utilitarian legal philosophy of Austin 
and Bentham to argue in favour of the separability thesis. He broadened the 
scope of the utilitarian approach to law by considering not whether an 
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individual legal rule must meet certain moral standards to be considered law, 
ďƵƚ  ‘ǁŚĞƚŚĞƌ Ă ƐǇƐƚĞŵ ŽĨ ƌƵůĞƐǁŚŝĐŚĂůƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌĨĂŝůĞĚƚŽĚŽƚŚŝƐĐŽƵůĚďĞĂ
ůĞŐĂůƐǇƐƚĞŵ ? ?200 employing the Nazi system as his case in point.  
ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐǀĞƌƐŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƐĞƉĂƌĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŚĞƐŝƐ ? ůĞŐĂůƌƵůĞƐ ?ĞǀĞŶƚŚŽƐĞ
that conferred rights, need not necessarily be moral rules or even coincide 
with morality.201 He ĐůĂŝŵĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞ ŝƐĂ  ‘ŚĂƌĚĐŽƌĞŽĨƐĞƚƚůĞĚŵĞĂŶŝŶŐ ?ŝŶ
law,202 which can be used to determine the legal outcome of most cases. This 
helps define the substance of the law - what law is - whereas  ‘ƚŚĞ ǁŽƌĚ
 “ŽƵŐŚƚ ? ŵĞƌĞůǇ ƌĞĨůĞĐƚƐ ƚŚĞ ƉƌĞƐĞŶĐĞ ŽĨ ƐŽŵĞ ƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚ ŽĨ ĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŵ ? ŽŶĞ ŽĨ
ƚŚĞƐĞ ƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚƐ ŝƐ Ă ŵŽƌĂů ƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚ ďƵƚŶŽƚĂůůƚŚĞƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚƐĂƌĞŵŽƌĂů ? ?203 
,Ăƌƚ ĚŝĚ ŶŽƚ ĚĞŶǇ ƚŚĞŶĞĞĚƚŽƌĞƐŽƌƚƚŽ  ‘ŵŽƌĂů ũƵĚŐŵĞŶƚĂďŽƵƚǁŚĂƚƚŚĞ ůĂǁ
ŽƵŐŚƚƚŽďĞ ?ǁŚĞŶŝƚ ĐŽŵĞƐƚŽƚŚĞ ‘ƉĞŶƵŵďƌĂŽĨĚĞďĂƚĞĂďůĞĐĂƐĞƐ ?ŽƵƚƐŝĚĞŽĨ
the core of settled meaning.204 However, he claimed ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ  ‘ƐŽĐŝĂůƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐ
ĂŶĚƉƵƌƉŽƐĞƐ ? ũƵĚŐĞƐĐĂůůƵƉŽŶŝŶƐƵĐŚĐĂƐĞƐĂƌĞĞǆƚĞƌŶĂůƚŽƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶƉĂƌƚ
of the law. They expose the gaps in the law that require judicial creativity to 
fill, rather than enabling the judge to discover something that is already 
 ‘ůĂƚĞŶƚ ? ǁŝƚŚŝŶ ƚŚĞ ůĂǁ, i.e. an inherent morality.205 ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐ ƚŽ ,Ăƌƚ ?  ‘ƚŚĞ
hard core of settled meaning is law in some centrally important sense ĂŶĚ Q
ĞǀĞŶ ŝĨ ƚŚĞƌĞ ĂƌĞ ďŽƌĚĞƌůŝŶĞƐ ? ƚŚĞƌĞ ŵƵƐƚ ĨŝƌƐƚďĞůŝŶĞƐ ? ?206 Consequently we 
should refuse the temptation to include extra-legal factors in the law itself, 
not least because the alternative leaves law uncertain and resolvable only by 
resort to morality: 
To assert mysteriously that there is some fused identity between law as 
it is and as it ought to be, is to suggest that all  legal questions are 
fundamentally l ike those of the penumbra. It is to assert that there is no 
central element of actual law to be seen in the core of central meaning 
which rules have, that there is nothing in the nature of a legal rule 
inconsistent with all  questions being open to reconsideration in the l ight 
of social policy.
207
  
He did not consider this to be either the most desirable or the best 
explanation for the nature of law. It is not desirable both because the 
separation of law and morality enables a clear external moral evaluation to 
be made about evil laws, and because bringing morality into law opens up 
the law to negative morality (immorality) as much as it does to (positive) 
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morality. It is not the best explanation because there is a core of legal 
meaning that is not amenable to manipulation by external, including moral 
factors. 
Hart did allow for a minimum, necessary requirement of natural law within a 
positive legal system, in the form of certain principles that are essential for 
the system and society to function at all. These include a prohibition on 
violence and a minimum protection of property rights, and the principles of 
objectivity and neutrality in the administration of the law  W the idea of 
treating like cases alike.208 They are accepted by Hart as vital for the 
operation of a legal system but are strictly limited in their scope, to the 
extent that only some parts of society need to fall within these principles (i.e. 
to be treated equally under the law, be protected from violence and have 
their property safeguarded) in order for these criteria to be considered 
met.209 In all other cases Hart argued that moral factors are indeed external 
to the law. This properly leaves it open to individuals within the system to 
make moral judgments about bad laws and justifiably refuse to obey them on 
those grounds by resort to moral considerations. Such considerations are 
external to and critical of a legal system that is otherwise formally valid due 
to its compliance with the rule of recognition, and not according to inbuilt 
moral standards the violation of which renders such laws invalid per se. 
Fuller ?Ɛ ƌĞƉůǇ ƚŽ ,Ăƌƚ involved restating their shared overarching concern 
within the debate ĂƐ ŽŶĞ ŽĨ  ‘ŚŽǁǁĞĐĂŶďĞƐƚĚĞĨŝŶĞĂŶĚƐĞƌǀe the ideal of 
fidelity to lĂǁ ? ?210 and reframing the matter in issue in terms of the distinction 
between  ‘order ? and  ‘good order ?. Through these twin refashionings, Fuller 
was able reject positivism based on the separability of law and morality in 
favour of a procedural form of natural law reliant on the inherent connection 
between law and morality. In terms of fidelity to law, he argued that  ‘ůĂǁ ?ĂƐ
something deserving loyalty, must represent a human achievement; it cannot 
be a simple fiat of power or a repetitive pattern discernible in the behavior of 
ƐƚĂƚĞŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐ ? ?211 Fuller claimed that while the question of fidelity to law was 
at the foƌĞĨƌŽŶƚ ŽĨ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ŵŝŶĚ, he had ĨĂŝůĞĚ  ‘ƚŽ ƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞ ĂŶĚ ĂĐĐĞƉƚ ƚŚĞ
implications that this enlargement of the frame of argument necessarily 
ĞŶƚĂŝůƐ ? ?212 These were that positivism was not able to achieve what was 
ŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇĨŽƌĨŝĚĞůŝƚǇƚŽůĂǁ ?ƚŚĞŶĞĞĚƚŽ ‘ƉůĂŶ QƚŚĞĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐƚŚĂƚǁŝůůŵĂŬĞ
ŝƚ ƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ ƚŽ ƌĞĂůŝǌĞ ƚŚĞ ŝĚĞĂ ? ?213 Only natural law could underpin the 
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conditions to inspire the requisite loyalty in the law because of the necessary 
role of morality in such an undertaking: 
I do not think it is unfair to the positivistic phi losophy to say that it never 
gives any coherent meaning to the moral obligation of fidelity to law. 
This obligation seems to be conceived as sui generis, wholly unrelated to 
any of the ordinary, extralegal ends of human life. The funda mental 
postulate of positivism - that law must be strictly severed from morality 
- seems to deny the possibil ity of any bridge between the obligation to 
obey law and other moral obligations.
214
 
In terms of the distinction between order and good order, Fuller defined 
order as the law itself and gŽŽĚ ŽƌĚĞƌ ĂƐ  ‘law that corresponds to the 
ĚĞŵĂŶĚƐŽĨ ũƵƐƚŝĐĞ ?ŽƌŵŽƌĂůŝƚǇ ?ŽƌŵĞŶ ?ƐŶŽƚŝŽŶƐŽĨǁŚĂƚŽƵŐŚƚƚŽďĞ ? ?215 He 
used this to assert the  ‘ŝŶŶĞƌ morality of law ? ? ǁŚŝĐŚ ŝƐ ƚŽ ƐĂǇ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ůaw, 
considered merely as ŽƌĚĞƌ ? ĐŽŶƚĂŝŶƐ  Q ŝƚƐ ŽǁŶ ŝŵƉůŝĐŝƚ ŵŽƌĂůŝƚǇ ? This 
morality of order must be respected if we are to create anything that can be 
ĐĂůůĞĚ ůĂǁ ? ĞǀĞŶ ďĂĚ ůĂǁ ? ?216 While Fuller did not actually outline the eight 
principles of legality comprising the inner morality of law in his Harvard Law 
Review piece,217 the article refers repeatedly to the concept and clearly 
outlines his vision of a procedural natural law based on the idea that law per 
se contains its own innate morality. This morality is of the sort that makes it 
possible to create laws that realise the idea of fidelity to law. Hart, he argued, 
had touched upon the connection between law and morality without 
recognising it as such. ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ĨĂŝůƵƌĞ ƚŽ ƐĞĞ ƚŚĞ ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ĞǀĞŶ
those aspects of justice he had mentioned, such as treating like cases alike, 
was ŝŶĚŝĐĂƚŝǀĞ ŽĨ ŚŝƐ ĨĂŝůƵƌĞ ƚŽƚƌĞĂƚ ůĂǁ ‘ĂƐĂŶŽďũĞĐƚŽĨŚƵŵĂŶƐƚƌŝǀŝŶŐ ? ?218 
dŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ? ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐ ƚŽ  ‘ƚŚĞ ŶĂƚƵƌĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂů ƌƵůĞƐ  that 
ŵĂŬĞůĂǁŝƚƐĞůĨƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ ?219 stopped short of conceding their inherently moral 
nature. By contrast, Fuller saw these as moral rules that are treated as legal 
rules, which are indicative of Ă  ‘ŵĞƌŐĞƌ ? Ăƚ ƚŚĂƚ junction between law and 
morality.220 
                                                                 
214
 ibid 656. 
215
 ibid 644. 
216
 ibid 645. 
217
 These are that laws should: (i) be general; (i i) be publicly promulgated; (i i i) not be 
retroactive; (iv) be understandable; (v) be consistent with one another; (vi) not require 
conduct beyond the abilities of those affected; (vi i) remain relatively consta nt; and (vii i) be 
administered in a manner consistent with their wording; Lon Fuller, The Morality of Law (Yale 
University Press, 1964). 
218
 &ƵůůĞƌ ? ‘&ŝĚĞůŝƚǇƚŽ>Ăǁ ? ?Ŷ4) 646. 
219
 ibid 639. 
220
 Ibid. 
    
61 
 
Fuller acknowledged ƚŚĞƚŚƌĞĂƚƉŽƐĞĚďǇ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛassertion that the inclusion of 
morality in the law might lead to the incorporation of undesirable morality, 
should we accept the necessary connection between law and morality. He 
repudiated this using a number of brief points. These included the argument, 
briefly stated here but central to his naturalism, that good aims intrinsically 
have more coherence than evil aims. He also claimed that the best protection 
against ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ potential danger is not the positivist separation of law and 
morality, but the connection between the two.221 This was illustrated using a 
rhetorical question, whether a judge intent on evil objectives would: 
ĞůŝŬĞůǇƚŽƐƵƐƉĞŶĚƚŚĞůĞƚƚĞƌŽĨƚŚĞƐƚĂƚƵƚĞďǇŽƉĞŶůǇŝŶǀŽŬŝŶŐĂ “ŚŝŐŚĞƌ
ůĂǁ ? ?KƌǁŽƵůĚŚĞďĞŵŽƌĞůŝŬĞůǇƚŽƚĂŬĞƌĞĨƵŐĞďĞŚŝŶĚƚŚĞŵĂǆŝŵthat 
 “ůĂǁŝƐůĂǁ ?ĂŶĚĞǆƉůĂŝŶŚŝƐĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶŝŶƐƵĐŚĂǁĂǇƚŚĂƚŝƚǁŽƵůĚĂƉƉĞĂƌ
to be demanded by the law itself?
222
 
Fuller also claimed that there is a hesitancy against writing wickedness into 
the law, that the greater danger in most cases comes from formalism rather 
that an infusion of immorality, while ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ƚŚĞŽƌǇ ŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌŝůǇ ůĞĂĚƐ ƚŽ
formalism. Whereas Hart argued that positivism allows for a clear, external, 
moral criticism to be made of law, Fuller suggested that positivism could be 
the resort of evil lawyers. The incorporation of morality into law represents a 
barrier to this possibility. 
In the Hart-Fuller debate, Hart understood law as open to abstract conceptual 
analysis, a social fact validated by its promulgation according to procedures 
laid down by higher legal rules.223 It has at its centre a stable core of purely 
legal interpretation that does not require recourse to external factors to 
determine. It is susceptible to use for both moral and immoral ends and 
consequently best separated from morality, which can be most usefully 
applied as an external standard of criticism. As a system it is dependent only 
on very minimal and contingent principles of morality for its functional 
existence. Fuller, on the other hand, saw the higher systemic rules that 
allowed laws to exist and encouraged people to honour them as themselves 
moral. The real danger arises when disconnecting law and morality, because 
it opened up the possibility of resorting to positivism and its cousin formalism 
in order to justify wicked laws. He observed an implicit connection between 
coherence and morality, which meant that legal rules that were coherent 
were also much less likely to be subject to manipulation for wicked purposes, 
whereas the substance of the law was easier to manipulate. Therefore a set 
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of procedural - ostensibly moral - principles worked within the law and 
maintained the connection between law and morality. Hart and Fuller each 
advocated their own theoretical paradigm as both the most desirable way of 
conceptualising law, especially in the wake of the Third Reich, and the best 
explanation for its nature, even in the Nazi legal system. In doing so, Fuller 
placed considerably more emphasis on the actual nature of the Nazi legal 
system than Hart. The next part of this section explains the role of Nazi 
Germany in the Hart-Fuller debate. 
B The Treatment of Nazi Germany 
/Ŷ ƚŚĞ  ‘ŐƌƵĚŐĞ ŝŶĨŽƌŵĞƌ ? case that sparked off and is referred to in the Hart-
Fuller debate, a woman denounced her husband to the authorities for private 
remarks he had made about Hitler when home on leave from the German 
army. The woman was under no legal duty to report these remarks,224 but 
she did so apparently with the intention of getting rid of him. He was 
convicted and sentenced to death for undermining the regime, according to 
Nazi statute law.225 The woman was subsequently convicted by a provincial 
court of appeal in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) in 1949, for the 
unlawful deprivation ŽĨŚĞƌŚƵƐďĂŶĚ ?Ɛ ůŝďĞƌƚǇ.226 ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ
reasoning of the German court was inadvertently incorrect. He understood 
the court in question to have invalidated the relevant Nazi law on an 
essentially Radbruchian basis,227 because of its iniquity. In fact, the Nazi 
statutes were upheld by the FRG court, with the consequence that the judges 
in the relevant Nazi military court were not guilty, while the woman was 
convicted because of her personal motivation for denouncing and awareness 
of the likely serious consequences of her actions for her husband.228 In a 
similar, slightly later case before the Federal Supreme Court, which was not 
considered by Hart and Fuller, a defendant was found guilty as an accessory 
on the basis that the application of the Nazi laws at the time was illegal on 
positive, procedural grounds (rather than higher, natural law principles), and 
the general public, and therefore the defendant, was aware of the illegality of 
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the statute.229 The judges who had prosecuted the case were again immune 
from prosecution because of their access to a defence of intimidation.230 
/ƚ ŝƐ ƉĞƌŚĂƉƐ ĞǀŝĚĞŶƚ ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĞ ďƌŝĞĨ ŽƵƚůŝŶĞ ŽĨ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ŬĞǇ ĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ
previous section that, while Nazi Germany is occasionally mentioned, it is not 
central to his thesis, and receives very little scrutiny beyond the example of 
ƚŚĞ  ‘ŐƌƵĚŐĞ ŝŶĨŽƌŵĞƌ ? ĐĂƐĞ ? dŚŝƐ ŝƐ ? ĂƐ ŵƵĐŚ ĂƐĂŶǇƚŚŝ ŐĞůƐĞ ?ĚƵĞƚŽ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ
abstract, analytical focus on the concept of law; a detailed examination of the 
ǁŽƌŬŝŶŐƐ ŽĨ EĂǌŝ ůĂǁ ǁĂƐ ŶŽƚ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ĐŽŶĐĞƌŶ ? Ɛ ĂǀŝĚ ǇǌĞŶŚĂƵƐ ŚĂƐ
commented about Hartian analytical positivism: 
Hart generally did not consider problems of judicial interpretation of the 
law an appropriate topic for philosophy of law, which he viewed as 
largely descriptive analysis of the conceptual structure of law. It follows 
from that analysis that judicial interpretation of the law largely takes 
place outside of law, in that judges ultimately have to exercise a 
discretion based on their own sense of what law ought to be, rather  
than on what law currently is.
231
 
ŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶƚůǇ ?,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ treatment of Nazi Germany  ‘seem[ed] to avoid the most 
dramatic legal problem with which post-war courts were confronted, namely 
the atrocities committed by Nazi-courts and Nazi-judges  Q by not even 
ĂĚĚƌĞƐƐŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ƉƌŽďůĞŵ ? ?232 dŚŝƐ ŵĞĂŶƚ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘of the actual operation of Nazi 
courts, Hart is blissfully ignorant. This ignorance is not just coincidental; it is 
intrinsic to his approach ƚŽ “ĐŽƌĞ ?ůĞŐĂůƌĞĂƐŽŶŝŶŐ ? ?233 
For Hart the best response to the problem of evil regimes is to pass moral 
ũƵĚŐŵĞŶƚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŽƵƚƐŝĚĞĂŶĚƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĞƚŚĞ ůŝŵŝƚƐŽĨ ůĂǁ ?ƐĂǇŝŶŐ ‘ůĂǁŝƐŶŽƚ
ŵŽƌĂůŝƚǇ ?ĚŽŶŽƚ ůĞƚ ŝƚƐƵƉƉůĂŶƚŵŽƌĂůŝƚǇ ? ?234 In this context the history of Nazi 
Germany is most interesting because it  ‘prompts inquiry into why emphasis 
ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ƐůŽŐĂŶ  “ůĂǁ ŝƐ ůĂǁ ? ? and the distinction between law and morals, 
acquired a sinister character in Germany, but elsewhere  Qwent along with 
the most enlightened liberal ĂƚƚŝƚƵĚĞƐ ? ?235 Hart based his analysis of the legal 
system of the Third Reich on a number of largely unexamined assumptions 
about the nature of Nazi law, which he had no methodological interest in 
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investigating further.236 His preconceptions ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ůĂǁ ǁĂƐ ůĂǁ ? in the Third 
Reich, that the Nazi legal system conformed to his formal notion of legal 
ǀĂůŝĚŝƚǇ ? ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞƐǇƐƚĞŵǁĂƐƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞ ůŝŵŝƚĞĚĨĂĐƚƐŽĨƚŚĞ  ‘ŐƌƵĚŐĞ
ŝŶĨŽƌŵĞƌ ?ĐĂƐĞ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞEĂǌŝƐƚĂƚƵƚĞƐ ŝŶƚŚĞĐĂƐĞǁĞƌĞǀĂůŝĚůĂǁ, applied 
properly merit further evaluation. 
In his reply, Fuller ŚŝŐŚůŝŐŚƚĞĚ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ĐƵƌƐŽƌǇ ƚƌĞĂƚŵĞŶƚ ŽĨ EĂǌŝ ůĂǁ ĂŶĚ his 
ignorance of the system as a weakness with the potential to undermine some 
of his arguments. The fact that Hart considered that Nazi lĂǁǁĂƐ ůĂǁ ‘ŝŶĂ
ƐĞŶƐĞ ƚŚĂƚ ǁŽƵůĚŵĂŬĞŵĞĂŶŝŶŐĨƵůƚŚĞ ŝĚĞĂůŽĨĨŝĚĞůŝƚǇƚŽ ůĂǁ ? came without 
ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ  ‘ƚŚĞĂĐƚƵĂůǁŽƌŬŝŶŐƐŽĨǁŚĂƚĞǀĞƌƌĞŵĂŝŶĞĚŽĨĂůĞŐĂůƐǇƐƚĞŵ
under the EĂǌŝƐ ?237 was problematic ŝŶ &ƵůůĞƌ ?Ɛ ĞǇĞƐ ? ,Ăƌƚ  ‘ĂƐƐƵŵĞ ?Ě ? ƚŚĂƚ
something musƚ ŚĂǀĞ ƉĞƌƐŝƐƚĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ Ɛƚŝůů ĚĞƐĞƌǀĞĚ ƚŚĞ ŶĂŵĞ ŽĨ ůĂǁ ? ?238 
ǁŚĞƌĞĂƐ &ƵůůĞƌ  ‘thought it unwise to pass such a judgment without first 
ŝŶƋƵŝƌŝŶŐ ǁŝƚŚ ŵŽƌĞ ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌŝƚǇ ǁŚĂƚ  “ůĂǁ ? ŝƚƐĞůĨ ŵĞĂŶƚ ƵŶĚĞƌ ƚŚĞ EĂǌŝ
regime ?.239 He was much more interested in the content and application of 
Nazi law, particularly the laws applied by the Nazi tribunal subject of the 
 ‘ŐƌƵĚŐĞŝŶĨŽƌŵĞƌ ?ĐĂƐĞ ?ĂŶĚƐƉĞŶƚƐŽŵĞƚŝŵĞĞǆĂŵŝŶŝŶŐƚŚŝƐ ?,ŝƐŝŶĐůŝŶĂƚŝŽŶƚŽ
ground his arguments in this way in contrast with ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐƚĞŶĚĞŶĐǇƚŽƌĞƐƚƌŝĐƚ
himself to purely conceptual analysis is indicative of the methodological 
differences between analytical positivism and the normative tendency of 
natural law theory.240 Hart did acknowledge the importance of sociological 
and historical analysis for the philosophy of law.241 He also, as we have seen, 
noted that the Nazi experience ought to generate exploration into why the 
law took a particular turn in that instance. However, he did not seek to 
undertake this himself, and did not consider it essential to elucidating the 
concept of law or jurisprudence as a field. Fuller argued that analysis of Nazi 
law was vital to get to the bottom of whether and how fidelity to law - itself 
central to the concept of law - is constructed and maintained in a wicked legal 
system. 
dŚƵƐ ? &ƵůůĞƌ ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚ ŝƚ  ‘ƐĞƌŝŽƵƐůǇ ŵŝƐƚĂŬĞŶ ? ƚŽŵĂŬĞƚŚĞĂƐƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶ ‘that 
the only difference between Nazi law and, say, English law is that the Nazis 
used their laws to achieve ends that are ŽĚŝŽƵƐƚŽĂŶŶŐůŝƐŚŵĂŶ ? ?242 Two of 
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the examples given by Fuller to illustrate the nature of the Nazi regime 
included retroactive legislation and secret laws, both of which were 
employed in the Third Reich. While he acknowledged that these features are 
not alien to modern legal systems elsewhere, Fuller argued that their 
pervasiveness in Nazi Germany erodes and compromises that legal system.243 
dŚĞ ĞǀĞŶ ŵŽƌĞ ĞŐƌĞŐŝŽƵƐ  ‘ĂĨĨƌŽŶƚƐ ƚŽ ƚŚĞŵŽƌĂůŝƚǇŽĨ ůĂǁ ?he cited were the 
proclivity of the regime to bypass law entirely and resort to street violence, 
ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ǁŝůůŝŶŐŶĞƐƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĐŽƵƌƚƐ ƚŽ ŝŐŶŽƌĞ ůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝŽŶ  ‘ŝĨ ƚŚŝƐ ƐƵŝƚĞĚ ƚŚĞŝƌ
convenience or if they feared that a lawyer-like interpretation might incur 
ĚŝƐƉůĞĂƐƵƌĞ “ĂďŽǀĞ ? ? ?244  
As the extent to which a legal system, as an object of human striving, 
measured up to the ideal of law was a matter of degree for Fuller, the extent 
to which the Nazi regime flouted the moral principles at its heart is the 
determining factor in its status as legally valid or invalid. Based upon &ƵůůĞƌ ?Ɛ
ĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ EĂǌŝ ƐƚĂƚƵƚĞƐ ƵƐĞĚ ƚŽ ƉƌŽƐĞĐƵƚĞ ƚŚĞ ŝŶĨŽƌŵĞƌ ?ƐŚƵƐďĂŶĚ ?the 
fact that the Nazi judges were able to resort to turning the literal meaning of 
the law on its head, could by-pass legal forms entirely, and constructed a 
system replete with retroactivity and secrecy, meant their denigration of the 
morality of law was so complete that the Nazi legal system could not be 
called law at all: 
To me there is nothing shocking in saying that a dictatorship which 
clothes itself with a tinsel of legal form can so far depart from the 
morality of order, from the inner morality of law itself, that it ceases to 
be a legal system. When a system call ing itself law is predicated upon a 
general disregard by judges of the terms of the laws they purport to 
enforce, when this system habitually cures its legal irregularities, even 
the grossest, by retroactive statutes, when it has only to resort to forays 
of terror in the streets, which no one dares challenge, in order to escape 
even those scant restraints imposed by the pretence of legality - when 
all  these things have become true of a dictatorship, it is not hard for me, 
at least, to deny to it the name of law.
245
 
For Fuller ƚŚĞŵŽƌĞ  ‘ŽĚŝŽƵƐďǇŽƌĚŝŶĂƌǇƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚƐŽĨĚĞĐĞŶĐǇ ?ĂƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůĂǁ
was, the more it deserved to be treated as invalid, as non-law. Being at the 
extreme end of this odiousness, and applying it systemically across the legal 
system, Nazi law was not law.246  The important question to ask about the 
Nazi legal system in this context was: 
How much of a legal system survived the general debasement and 
perversion of all  forms of social order that occurred under the Nazi rule, 
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and what moral implications this mutilated system had for the 
conscientious citizen forced to l ive under it.
247
 
This is certainly a more sociological approach than that pursued by Hart. It 
involves analysing the actual legal system in question to see what if anything 
remained of moral law, examining how the law is interpreted by legal officials 
ĂŶĚ ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ŵŽƌĂů ƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ  ‘ĐŽŶƐĐŝĞŶƚŝŽƵƐ ? ĐŝƚŝǌĞŶ ?Fuller was 
alive to the difficult position of the latter, living within a radically altered 
ŵŽƌĂůĂŶĚůĞŐĂůƐǇƐƚĞŵ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞ  ‘ŝŵƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ƚƌƵůǇĨƌŝŐŚƚĨƵůƉƌĞĚŝĐĂŵĞŶƚ ?
of the German courts in having to choose between the impossible 
alternatives of declaring all Nazi laws illegal or enforcing all such laws.248  
Fuller argued that in cases where a judge disagreed with the moral principles 
of the higher court which bound her, and found the precedents she was 
bound to apply morally abhorrent, she would not need access to a theory of 
legal positivism to fall back on a formalistic application of the law as a way of 
reconciling the situation  W applying the law in good faith but not taking moral 
responsibility for doing so. In effect this would be her only alternative apart 
from resigning.249 However, because of his belief in strong relationship 
between coherence, morality and law, he also did not: 
Think that such a predicament is l ikely to arise within a nation where 
both law and good law are regarded as collaborative human 
achievements in need of constant renewal, and where lawyers are stil l at 
ůĞĂƐƚĂƐ ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚĞĚŝŶĂƐŬŝŶŐ “tŚĂƚŝƐŐŽŽĚůĂǁ ? ?ĂƐƚŚey are in asking 
 “tŚĂƚŝƐůĂǁ ? ?.250 
It seems that the mere fact of human striving to achieve law infused with 
morality was considered by Fuller to be enough to stave off the debasement 
of law that might come with wicked intentions or an over-reliance on legal 
positivism that effectively separated moral questions from the law. 
Both Harƚ ĂŶĚ &ƵůůĞƌ ?Ɛ ƉƌŽƉŽƐĞĚ ƌĞŵĞĚǇ for states such as the FRG, when 
ĨĂĐĞĚǁŝƚŚĂĐĂƐĞƐƵĐŚĂƐƚŚĂƚŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ŐƌƵĚŐĞŝŶĨŽƌŵĞƌ ?, is somewhat counter-
intuitive in light of their own theories. Indeed, both agreed, for different 
reasons, that a retrospective statute was the best - albeit flawed  W way to 
deal with the situation. Hart considered there to be a candid choice between 
ƚǁŽ ĞǀŝůƐ ?  ‘ƚŚĂƚ ŽĨ ůĞĂǀŝŶŐ ŚĞƌ [the grudge informer] unpunished and that of 
sacrificing a very precious principle of morality endorsed by most legal 
ƐǇƐƚĞŵƐ ?, that against retrospective criminal laws.251 dŚŝƐĐŽŶĨŽƌŵƐƚŽ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ
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claim that Nazi law was law, but does not accept the logical implication of 
this, that the informer complied with valid law and should not legally be 
punished for doing so. It amounts instead to an external moral judgment 
about the informer that becomes by virtue of a retrospective statute a legal 
judgment. This nevertheless does remain true to the separability thesis, 
starting from a position of making a moral judgment about the law, and then 
conforming the law to the preferred morality, albeit in breach of another 
desirable moral principle. It has the merit, for Hart, of being done in  ‘ĨƵůů
consciousness of what was sacrificed in securing her punishment in this 
waǇ ? ?252 
&ŽůůŽǁŝŶŐ&ƵůůĞƌ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶ ƚhat Nazi law was not valid law because of its 
serious breaches of the inner morality of law would suggest that he concurs 
with the erroneous ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ 'ĞƌŵĂŶ ĐŽƵƌƚ ?Ɛ ũƵĚŐŵĞŶƚ ƵƐĞĚ ďǇ
Hart and Fuller, i.e. that it had invalidated the Nazi laws us ing natural law 
ƌĞĂƐŽŶŝŶŐ ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?&ƵůůĞƌ ?ƐĨŽĐƵƐŝŶĚĞĂůŝŶŐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ŐƌƵĚŐĞ
ŝŶĨŽƌŵĞƌ ? ǁĂƐŽŶƚǁŽƚŚŝŶŐƐ ?ƚŚĞŵŽƌĂůĂďŚŽƌƌĞŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĞĚĞĨĞŶĚĂŶƚĂŶĚƚŚĞ
difficult socio-political condition of the German state, trying to rebuild 
following the destruction wrought by the Nazi regime. On this first point, and 
consistent with his theory, he considered it  ‘ŝŶƚŽůĞƌĂďůĞ ? to validate Nazi law, 
ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ ŝƚ ǁŽƵůĚ ŵĞĂŶ ‘these despicable creatures [grudge informers] were 
ŐƵŝůƚůĞƐƐ ? ? /ƚ ǁĂƐ ? ŚĞ ĂƌŐƵĞĚ ? the  ‘ƵƌŐĞŶĐǇ ? ŽĨ ƚŚŝƐ ƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶ ƚŚĂƚ had moved 
Hart to recommend retrospective legislation. On the second, he adopted a 
broader perspective to explicate  ‘ƚŚĞ ƚƌƵĞ ŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨthe dilemma confronted 
by Germany in seeking to rebuild her shattered legal institutions. Germany 
ŚĂĚ ƚŽ ƌĞƐƚŽƌĞ ďŽƚŚ ƌĞƐƉĞĐƚ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ ůĂǁ ĂŶĚ ƌĞƐƉĞĐƚ ĨŽƌ ũƵƐƚŝĐĞ ? ?253 This led 
him also to prefer the use of a retroactive statute as a symbolic break with 
the past, ĂƐ ŝƚǁŽƵůĚĂĐƚ  ‘as a means of isolating a kind of cleanup operation 
frŽŵƚŚĞŶŽƌŵĂůĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞũƵĚŝĐŝĂůƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ? ?tŚŝůĞƐƵĐŚĂƐƚĂƚƵƚĞǁĂƐ
not necessary in natural law terms to invalidate Nazi law, it would make it 
possible to plan more effectively to regain for the ideal of fidelity to law its 
ŶŽƌŵĂů ŵĞĂŶŝŶŐ ? ?254 In his solution to the problem of the grudge informer, 
therefore, Fuller returned to the need to plan for conditions for fidelity to law 
which lay at the heart of much of his argument. 
III. Evaluating the Hart-Fuller Debate 
A Problems with the Treatment of Nazi Germany 
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The evaluation of how Nazi law is treated by Hart and Fuller in this section 
exposes problems with how it is used to support some of their jurisprudential 
claims and highlights a number of characteristics that are linked with how 
current jurisprudential discourse represents the Third Reich. Chief among 
these are the reliance on a moral and/or legal discontinuity between Nazi law 
and contemporary law, the use of Nazi law as a paradigmatic legal system, a 
limit-case against which to test positivism and natural law, and the 
mischaracterisation of the Nazi legal system as an exercise in the cynical 
manipulation of the population. The Hart-Fuller debate is shown to be the 
foundational jurisprudential moment that introduced these characteristics to 
the discourse; its legacy has been their repeated reproduction within the 
discourse. 
Notwithstanding their superficial agreement over at least the form of the 
ƌĞŵĞĚǇ ďĞƐƚ ƐƵŝƚĞĚ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ  ‘ŐƌƵĚŐĞ ŝŶĨŽƌŵĞƌ ? ĐĂƐĞƐ ? ŝƚ ĐŽƵůĚ ďĞ ĂƌŐƵĞĚƚŚĂƚ
Hart and Fuller have little in common when it comes to evaluating their 
engagement with Nazi law and their theoretical positions based on that 
engagement. Hart, after all, considered his concept of law to be almost purely 
analytical so it could stand independently of the specific nature and function 
of law in the Third Reich ? &ƵůůĞƌ ? ďǇ ĐŽŶƚƌĂƐƚ ? ĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐĞĚ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ƉŽƐŝƚŝǀŝƐƚ
paradigm and constructed his own claims to a degree with reference to what 
he saw within EĂǌŝ ůĂǁ ? ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ĐŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶŝŶƌĞƐƉĞĐƚŽĨEĂǌŝ ůĂǁĂƐƚŚĂƚ ŝƚ
was valid as such, and the separability of law and morality provided the best 
explanation of its nature and the most desirable way of tackling the problem 
ŽĨǁŝĐŬĞĚůĂǁƐ ?&ƵůůĞƌ ?ƐƋƵŝƚĞŽƉƉŽƐŝte finding was that Nazi law was not valid 
law, and the inherent morality of law both establishes good reasons to 
honour the law and provides a useful barrier to its manipulation for wicked 
ends.  
It is true that some aspects of their analysis of Nazism need to be appraised 
separately. However, the approaches adopted by Hart and Fuller to Nazi 
Germany also share certain important characteristics. These are first that, 
even for Fuller, the debate is not really about Nazi law, but is about two 
competing visions of the concept of law, which the Nazi legal system, through 
ŝƚƐ ĚĞƌŝǀĞĚ ĐŽŶŶĞĐƚŝŽŶ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ  ‘ŐƌƵĚŐĞ ŝŶĨŽƌŵĞƌ ? ĐĂƐĞ ? ŝƐ ƵƐĞĚ ƚŽ ĞǆĞŵƉůŝĨǇ ?
Second, the assumptions they make about the Nazi legal system are, in 
different ways, flawed and subject to challenge by the historiography of the 
Third Reich. Third, some of the philosophical conclusions drawn by reference 
to the Nazi regime, which is used to support them, stand on very shaky 
ground once their dependence on the misconceived Nazi example is exposed. 
Fourth, the role played by moral judgment in their respective treatments of 
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Nazi law is important and illuminating. I will consider these in this section, 
alongside some separate observations about the two approaches. 
Desmond Manderson picks up on some of the problems with the way the 
Nazi legal system was tackled in the debate, starting with Hart ?ƐĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ: 
For Hart the appearance of law is all  that matters. Politics and history 
are irrelevant to our inquiry. We rely instead on the simple surface and 
clear meaning of words  W with the result in this case [of the  ‘grudge 
informer ?] that we are seriously misled as to what those words actually 
meant to the people who were sentenced to death or  Q sent to the 
ĂƐƚĞƌŶ ĨƌŽŶƚ ? Ɛ ǁĞ ƌĞĂĚ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĐĂƐĞ ? ŝƚsurely seems 
plausible that the Nazi regime in fact depended on a kind of blindness to 
anything but the formal semblance of legality in order to gain legitimacy 
ĨŽƌ ŝƚƐ ĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ ? ,Ăƌƚ ŚŝŵƐĞůĨ ƌĞĨƵƐĞƐ ƚŽ ůŽŽŬ ďĞŚŝŶĚ ƚŚĞ ĐŽƵƌƚ ?Ɛ
statements and treats as legal ůǇ ƐƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚ ƚŚĞ ŵĞƌĞ  “ƚŝŶƐĞů ŽĨ ůĞŐĂů
ĨŽƌŵ ? ?255  
He later moves on to Fuller ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶ: 
Fuller does not acknowledge Nazism did not merely corrupt a legal 
system. It realised a vision of it informed by the anti -positivist ideologies 
of German Romanticism up to and including Heidegger and Schmitt. 
Neither does he acknowledge that the problem is not that law-makers 
ŵŝŐŚƚ ĚĞǀĞůŽƉĂŶ “ŝŵŵŽƌĂůŵŽƌĂůŝƚǇ ?Žƌ  “ĂŵŽƌĞƉĞƌĨĞĐƚƌĞĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ
iniƋƵŝƚǇ ? ?ďƵƚƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂƚǁĞĚŝƐĂŐƌĞĞĂďŽƵƚǁŚĂƚŐŽŽĚŶĞƐƐŝƐŝŶůĂǁŽƌ
in laws. By assuming a core of goodness and a core of evil, which can 
never be confused, he simplifies the problem which confronts many 
societies, those who lived during the Third Reich not least.
256
 
In his comments about Hart, Manderson draws attention to his 
misrepresentation of the actual nature of the Nazi legal regime, in a way 
similar to the criticism offered by Fuller. Hart ?ƐĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ takes it at face value 
that the Nazi laws in question, which he barely mentions let alone 
investigates, functioned in a formal, positivist way and, as an internal system, 
ƌĞůŝĞĚ ĨŽƌ ŝƚƐ ǀĂůŝĚŝƚǇ ? ĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇ ĂŶĚ ůĞŐŝƚŝŵĂĐǇ ŽŶ Ă  ‘ĨŽƌŵĂů ƐĞŵďůĂŶĐĞ ŽĨ
ůĞŐĂůŝƚǇ ? ? dŚĞĚĞĐŽŶƚĞǆƚƵĂůŝǌĞĚ ‘ůĂǁ ? ?ĚĞǀŽŝĚŽĨƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐĂnd history, is akin to 
the settled core of meaning, in that it is a part of law that it is possible to 
analyse in purely conceptual terms, without extra-legal distortion. By taking 
Nazi law literally without further exploration and separating it not just from 
morality but from politics and society as well, Hart effectively places the 
entire Nazi legal system in the settled core of meaning, amenable to logical, 
legal interpretation without reference to external factors. 
DĂŶĚĞƌƐŽŶ ?Ɛ ĐŽŵŵĞŶƚƐ ĂďŽƵƚ &ƵůůĞƌ ? ŚŽǁever, show that his own critique 
based on Nazi law goes beyond that advanced by Fuller himself. It is not 
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ŵĞƌĞůǇ ƚŚĂƚ ,Ăƌƚ ?ƐĂƐƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶƐĂďŽƵƚEĂǌŝ ůĂǁĂƌĞǁƌŽŶŐďĞĐĂƵƐĞ ŝƚĚŝĚŶŽƚ
in fact adhere to a recognisably formal, legal approach, but also because Nazi 
law adopted a different approach entirely. Manderson makes a vital 
distinction between a legal system that corrupts legality and one that 
attempts to establish an alternative vision of legality. When combined with 
ƚŚĞ ŽďƐĞƌǀĂƚŝŽŶ ƚŚĂƚ &ƵůůĞƌ ?Ɛ ĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƚǇ ĂďŽƵƚ ƚŚĞ ƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĂďůĞ ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ
between morality and immorality sociologically is misplaced, this begins to 
question the foundational connection Fuller draws between coherence, 
morality and legality. 
This connectiŽŶŝƐĐĞŶƚƌĂůƚŽ&ƵůůĞƌ ?ƐĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚ ?ďĞĐĂƵƐĞŝƚůŝŶŬƐŚŝƐƉƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĂů
principles of legality creating the conditions for fidelity to law with the claim 
that procedure tends towards coherence which tends towards morality and 
acts as a barrier to the infiltration of a legal system by immorality. A lot rides 
ŽŶƚŚŝƐ ?ZĞĐĂůů ?ĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?&ƵůůĞƌ ?ƐďĞůŝĞĨƚŚĂƚĞƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĂũƵĚŐĞĨĂůůŝŶŐ
back on strict formalistic interpretation to resolve her fundamental moral 
aversion to a binding Supreme Court ruling would be unlikely to arise in a 
ŶĂƚŝŽŶ ‘ǁŚĞƌĞ ůĂǁǇĞƌƐĂƌĞƐƚŝůůĂƚ ůĞĂƐƚĂƐ ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚĞĚŝŶĂƐŬŝŶŐ “tŚĂƚŝƐŐŽŽĚ
ůĂǁ ? ? ĂƐ ƚŚĞǇ ĂƌĞ ŝŶ ĂƐŬŝŶŐ  “tŚĂƚ ŝƐ ůĂǁ ? ? ? ?257 An extrapolation of 
DĂŶĚĞƌƐŽŶ ?Ɛ ŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ EĂǌŝ ůĞŐĂů ƐǇƐƚĞŵ ? ǁŚŝĐŚ ŝƐ ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĞĚ ďǇ
recent legal historical research,258 refutes this defence against immorality 
because of the real, historical tension under the Nazi regime between those 
actively ƐƚƌŝǀŝŶŐ ĨŽƌ Ă EĂǌŝ ǀŝƐŝŽŶ ŽĨ  ‘ŐŽŽĚ ůĂǁ ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚŽƐĞǁŚŽ ĨĞůƚ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ
denigration of liberal principles of legality, as Fuller would have it, already 
ƌƵůĞĚŽƵƚƚŚĞƉŽƐƐŝďŝůŝƚǇŽĨŐŽŽĚůĂǁ ?dŚĞEĂǌŝůĞŐĂůŝĚĞŽůŽŐǇǁĂƐŶŽƚ ‘ĂƚůĞĂƐƚ
ĂƐ ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚĞĚ ? ŝŶĂƐŬŝŶŐĂďŽƵƚ  ‘ŐŽŽĚůĂǁ ?ĂƐ ŝƚǁĂƐĂďŽƵƚ  ‘ůĂǁ ? ?ďƵƚǁĂƐŽŶůǇ
ƌĞĂůůǇ ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚĞĚŝŶ  ‘ŐŽŽĚůĂǁ ?ĂŶĚŚĂĚǀĞƌǇ ůŝƚƚůĞƚŝŵĞĨŽƌǁŚĂƚǁĂƐĨŽƌŵĂůůǇ
 ‘ůĂǁ ? ?259  
Fuller is correct, therefore, ƚŽ ŚŝŐŚůŝŐŚƚ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛlack of consideration of the 
possibility of Nazi judges overturning even the literal meaning of statutes, 
whether through ideological zeal or pressure from above, which, alongside 
the resort to street violence and systemic use of retroactivity and secrecy, led 
Fuller to claim that the Nazi system was not law. However, notwithstanding 
this, he also insists that the regime clothed itself in legal form, and reiterates 
ĂƐƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ůĂǁ ǁĂƐ ůĂǁ ? ŝŶ ƚŚĞ dŚŝƌĚ ZĞŝĐŚ ? ,Ğ ĂůƐŽ ŐŽĞƐ ŽŶĞ ƐƚĞƉ
further by maintaining that positivism contributes to the corruption of law 
while natural law acts as a barrier against it. ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛmethodological 
disinclination to engage in detail with the history of Nazi Germany means he 
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assumes it to be a formally valid legal system that, like any other legal 
system, largely inhabits the settled core of meaning and can be interpreted as 
such. This is used to support his positivist claims about the concept of law, 
where this support does not actually exist in this case. Instead it suggests the 
possibility of a legal system with little formal validity, and almost entirely 
open to interpretation, which Hart might in fact also claim is not law in 
analytical terms, according to his theory of the concept. A legal system deeply 
imbued with, indeed almost entirely determined by, external factors adhering 
to a certain type of Nazi morality may call into question the separability of 
law and morality in some contexts. The question then becomes what to do 
with such a system.260 
&ƵůůĞƌ ?Ɛ ůŝŵŝƚĞĚĞŶgagement with some Nazi statutes equips him with a better 
understanding of the relevant Nazi laws but his extrapolation of this to the 
whole system and use of it to defend procedural natural law over positivism 
is flawed. The Nazi legal system may have lacked coherence, because of its 
openness to ideological interpretation and breach of the principles of legality, 
and been wicked in its aims. It does not, however, support the causal 
connection between coherence, morality and law on which Fuller depends, 
because Nazi law was infused with a different vision of natural law, not 
merely a corruption of the rule of law. For similar reasons it does not 
substantiate the claim that formalism and positivism are more consistent 
with wicked law than natural law. Fuller might argue that this does not 
completely undermine his argument, because coherence could still be viewed 
as correlated with the principles of his inner morality of law. I would argue 
that this claim is under severe threat because his conception of how morality 
ĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶƐ ŝŶ Ă ƐǇƐƚĞŵ ƚŚĂƚ ƐƚƌŝǀĞƐ ĨŽƌ  ‘ŐŽŽĚ ůĂǁ ? ŝƐ ŶŽƚ ĐŽƌƌŽďŽƌĂƚĞĚ ďǇ ƚŚĞ
historical case from which he draws his supporting evidence. 
The final shared misconception about the nature of Nazi law I will highlight is 
the understanding that it represented little more than the cynical 
manipulation of the principles of legality for oppressive purposes by the Nazi 
elite. This links to a related shared criticism that, notwithstanding the 
ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚĚĞŐƌĞĞƐƚŽǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞǇĂŶĂůǇƐĞEĂǌŝ ůĂǁ ?ďŽƚŚ,ĂƌƚĂŶĚ&ƵůůĞƌ ?Ɛuses 
of the Third Reich are driven by their theoretical arguments about the 
concept of law. Both Fuller and Hart wish to advance their preferred 
paradigms of the concept of law, and the Nazi backdrop - because of its 
recent occurrence and wicked nature - provides a useful example on which to 
draw. Hart does not need to explore it in much detail, because of his 
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analytical methodology, and Fuller appears willing to do so only to a limited 
extent. 
This is illustrated by an assumption made by HĂƌƚ ?ƚŚĂƚ ‘under the Nazi regime 
men were sentenced by courts for criticism of the regime. There the choice of 
sentence might be guided exclusively by consideration of what was needed to 
ŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƐƚĂƚĞ ?Ɛ ĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞ ƚǇƌĂŶŶǇ ? ?261 The assertion that punishment for 
criticism of the regime might be guided exclusively by tyranny is, like many of 
HĂƌƚ ?ƐƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚƐĂďŽƵƚEĂǌŝ ůĂǁ ? presented at the same time as speculation 
and received wisdom and is not corroborated by any historical evidence. It is 
not possible to draw a conclusion about the sentencing policy of the whole 
ƌĞŐŝŵĞ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ďĂƐŝƐ ŽĨ ŽŶĞ ĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ? ƚŚĂƚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ  ‘ŐƌƵĚŐĞ ŝŶĨŽƌŵĞƌ ?Ɛ ? ǀŝĐƚŝŵ ?
from a particular time, and in any event an unsubstantiated one. All of the 
type of defendants, the harshness of sentencing and the motivations for 
sentencing changed over time based on the fluctuating circumstances of the 
regime, and cannot be said to be guided exclusively by the need to oppress 
and retain power. The argument Hart draws from this presumption, that the 
ƐĞŶƚĞŶĐŝŶŐ ŵŝŐŚƚ ďĞ ƚĂŬĞŶ ƚŽ ďĞ ƉƵƌƉŽƐŝǀĞ ? ƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů ĂŶĚ ŵĞĞƚŝŶŐ  ‘ŽƵŐŚƚ ?
requirements is not necessarily undermined by the actual history in this 
instance. However, this example can show how even for analytical 
jurisprudence, references to actual historical events to build theoretical 
arguments ought to be substantiated, because changing the underlying 
example can impact the reliability of the theory. 
Fuller also sees Nazi law as a cynical manipulation of legality as it provides for 
him a consistency between the certainty of morality and the Nazi resort to 
immorality to overcome the literal interpretation of the law, on which his 
theory partly depends. It also enables him to support his criticism of 
formalism as a potential facilitator for wicked regimes. A perfectly plausible 
and more readily substantiated alternative is  that the Nazi regime was not 
formalistic and the tensions between different conceptions of morality were 
ƉůĂǇĞĚ ŽƵƚ ŝŶƚŚĞƐƚƌŝǀŝŶŐĨŽƌ  ‘ŐŽŽĚůĂǁ ?ƚŚĂƚƚŽŽŬƉůĂĐĞƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚƚŚĞdŚŝƌĚ
Reich. As the debate was not about Nazi law but about the differences 
between and superior truth claims of positivism and natural law over the 
nature of the concept of law, the actual history of the Nazi legal system takes 
something of a back seat, even in Fuller ?Ɛ ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚ. Given the aims of the 
ĚĞďĂƚĞ ?Ɛ ƉƌŽƚĂŐŽŶŝƐƚƐ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞŝƌ ũƵƌŝƐƉƌƵĚĞŶƚŝĂů ĨŝĞůĚŽĨ ŝŶƋƵŝƌǇ ? ŝƚ ŝƐƵŶĨĂŝƌƚŽ
suggest they ought to have had at that stage a full understanding of the 
workings of Nazi Germany. /ŶĚĞĞĚ ? &ƵůůĞƌ ?Ɛ ĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ŝƐ ŵŽƌĞ ĞǆƚĞŶƐŝǀĞ ƚŚĂn 
most cases of jurisprudence invoking Nazi law. However, that does not mean 
we cannot challenge theoretical paradigms built to some extent on that 
                                                                 
261
 ,Ăƌƚ ? ‘WŽƐŝƚŝǀŝƐŵ ? ?Ŷ4) 613. 
    
73 
 
history when it does not in fact support some of the claims made. Even the 
ĨŽĐƵƐŽŶƚŚĞ  ‘ŐƌƵĚŐĞŝŶĨŽƌŵĞƌ ?ĐĂƐĞŽďĨƵƐĐĂƚĞƐƚŚĞŝƐƐƵĞƐĂƚƚŚĞŚĞĂƌƚŽĨƚŚĞ
Nazi legal system ĂŶĚƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƐ ‘ĂůŵŽƐƚĂŵŽĐŬĞƌǇŽĨǁŚĂƚŝƐĂƚƐƚĂŬĞ ?.262 
It also helps to erect a sort of moral barrier between the rule of law legality 
ƚŚĂƚ ĐŽŶĨŽƌŵƐ ƚŽ &ƵůůĞƌ ?Ɛ ŝŶŶĞƌ ŵŽƌĂůŝƚǇ ? ĂŶĚ ƵŶĚĞƌƉŝŶƐ ŵĂŶǇ ŵŽĚĞƌŶ ůĞŐĂů
systems, and Nazi law, leading to un-nuanced judgment of the latter. The 
correlation between good law and the rule of law is matched by 
ĐŽŶĚĞŵŶĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ  ‘ŐƌƵĚŐĞ ŝŶĨŽƌŵĞƌ ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ůĞŐĂů ƐǇƐƚĞŵ ĂƐ Ă ǁŚŽůĞ ?
,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ůĞŐĂůĞŶĚŽƌƐĞŵĞŶƚŽĨƌĞƚƌŽƐƉĞĐƚŝǀe legislation to deal with the case is 
partly determined by his moral endorsement of punishment for the 
informant wife, and leaves little room for wider considerations of legality or 
morality. Hart does not endorse the absolute separation of law and morality 
as a matter of necessity,263 and his positivism does not reject the importance 
of morality for law in general. His position, therefore, is not contradictory 
from the point of view of legal positivism. However, he fails to submit the 
moral aspects of his argument to sufficient scrutiny, instead cloaking them 
within a general condemnation of the  ‘grudge informer ?, which serves to 
undermine even the legal status he attributes to Nazi law and maintain its 
complete otherness to the rule of law.  
Hart ?ƐĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨ ůĂǁ is disconnected from the Nazi legal system, and this is 
exacerbated by the fact that for the purposes of his conceptual arguments 
any hypothetical wicked legal system will do. This is filled by a perfectly 
understandable moral aversion, which in turn only serves to keep the realities 
ŽĨ EĂǌŝ ůĂǁ Ăƚ Ăƌŵ ?Ɛ ůĞŶŐƚŚ ? ƋƵĂůůǇ ? &ƵůůĞƌ ?Ɛ ƌĞƋƵŝƌ ŵĞŶƚ ƚŽ ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌ ƚŚĞ
wider context of the workings of Nazi law, and specifically the plight of the 
ĐŽŶƐĐŝĞŶƚŝŽƵƐ ĐŝƚŝǌĞŶ ? ŝƐ ĚŝƐƌƵƉƚĞĚ ďǇ ƚŚĞ  ‘ŝŶƚŽůĞƌĂďŝůŝƚǇ ? ŽĨ ĨĂŝůŝŶŐ ƚŽ ƉƵŶŝƐŚ
the informant, as well as the shortfall of inner morality in the Nazi legal 
system. Fuller may have a good case for the ideological imperative of using 
retrospective legislation to ensure a complete and public, symbolic break 
with the past, but this again encourages distance from the legal realities of 
Nazi Germany and posits a rupture that does not exist in historical evolution. 
The political imperative to exacerbate and emphasise discontinuities 
between the Third Reich and postwar Germany ought not to feed into how 
the concept of law is theorised, in a way that takes account of Nazi law. The 
continuities between the different systems are just as important, if not more 
so, for this. For Hart these continuities are limited to a semblance of legal 
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form and a minimal set of naturalist essentials,264 neither which, 
paradoxically, necessarily existed under the Nazi regime. For Fuller they 
barely appear to exist at all. 
B The Jurisprudential Legacy of the Hart-Fuller Debate 
The Hart-Fuller debate has had a strong and prominent legacy for 
jurisprudential discourse, not just in terms of its treatment of Nazi Germany 
but also in defining the key issues at stake. It has unwittingly set the course of 
jurisprudential discourse for the following five decades and entrenched the 
role of Nazi Germany within that discourse. In a 1999 article Frederick 
ĞŽƐƚĞ ŵĂĚĞ ƚŚĞ ĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐ ŽďƐĞƌǀĂƚŝŽŶ ĂďŽƵƚ ƚŚĞ ƌŽůĞ ŽĨ  ‘ƚŚĞ ĚĞĨŝŶŝŶŐ
experiĞŶĐĞŽĨƚŚŝƐĐĞŶƚƵƌǇ ?- the Holocaust - in the legal academy: 
Despite a few, half-hearted and misdirected concessions immediately 
after the War - I am thinking particularly of the unaccountably influential 
Hart/Fuller debate, and of the courses on totalitarianism which, for a 
short time, were offered in some law schools, especially in America - it is 
fair to say that, until  very recently, the English-language legal academy 
has proved itself completely immune to the defining experience of this 
century. This attitude is all  the more bizarre given the centrality of law 
and lawyers to European fascism generally and to the Holocaust in 
particular.
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I will extrapolate two aspects of this comment as particularly pertinent to the 
arguments made in this chapter. These are first the claim that the Hart-Fuller 
ĚĞďĂƚĞ ǁĂƐ ůŝƚƚůĞ ŵŽƌĞ ƚŚĂŶ Ă  ‘ŵŝƐĚŝƌĞĐƚĞĚ ĐŽŶĐĞƐƐŝŽŶ ? ŝŶ ƚĞƌŵƐ ŽĨ ŝƚƐ
ĞŶŐĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ǁŝƚŚ EĂǌŝ 'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ĂŶĚ ŝƐ  ‘ƵŶĂĐĐŽƵŶƚĂďůǇŝŶĨůƵĞŶƚŝĂů ? ĂƐ ƐƵĐŚ ?
The second point is that the Third Reich has relevance for jurisprudence 
ďĞǇŽŶĚ ƚŚĞ ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ǁŚĞƚŚĞƌ ŝƚƐ ůĞŐĂů ƐǇƐƚĞŵǁĂƐŽƌǁĂƐŶŽƚ  ‘ůĂǁ ? ?ďŽƚŚ
ďĞĐĂƵƐĞŽĨƚŚĞƐƚĂƚƵƐŽĨƚŚĞ,ŽůŽĐĂƵƐƚĂŶĚƚŚĞ ‘ĐĞŶƚƌĂůŝƚǇŽĨůĂǁĂŶĚůĂǁǇĞƌƐ ?
in Nazi Germany. In the case of jurisprudence, these two points are 
inextricably entwined. The Hart-Fuller debate - and the work of H.L.A Hart in 
particular - has proved to be of such enduring significance within 
ũƵƌŝƐƉƌƵĚĞŶĐĞƚŚĂƚ ŝƚƐ  ‘ŵŝƐĚŝƌĞĐƚĞĚ ?ƋƵĂůŝƚǇ ŝŶƌĞƐƉĞĐƚŽĨƚŚĞEĂǌŝƉĂƐƚƐĞƚƚŚĞ
discourse off on a path that viewed Nazi Germany as substantively irrelevant 
to the key theoretical questions about the concept of law. 
This enduring impairment is important, I argue, beyond the mere fact that it 
tends to exclude consideration of National Socialism from any more than a 
peripheral role in jurisprudence. The historical reality of the functioning of 
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law in the operation of the Nazi state and the perpetration of the Holocaust 
ĚŽĞƐ ƵƉƐĞƚ ĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƐ ƚŽ ůĂďĞů ƚŚĞ ǁŚŽůĞ ƐǇƐƚĞŵ ĞŝƚŚĞƌ ƐŝŵƉůǇ  ‘ůĂǁ ? Žƌ  ‘ŶŽŶ-
ůĂǁ ? ĂŶĚ ŝŶ ĞŝƚŚĞƌ ĐĂƐĞ ŝƌƌĞůĞǀĂŶƚ ĨŽƌ ũƵƌŝƐƉƌƵdence. It also, however, 
challenges the discourse at a deeper level in that it exposes contradictions 
inherent in the debate between natural lawyers and positivists and calls into 
ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ ƚŚĞ ǀĞƌǇ ƉŽƐƐŝďŝůŝƚǇ ŽĨ ĞůƵĐŝĚĂƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ĐĂƚĞŐŽƌǇ ŽĨ  ‘ǁŝĐŬĞĚ ůĞŐĂů
sǇƐƚĞŵ ? ǁŝƚŚ ĂŶǇĚĞŐƌĞĞŽĨĐŽŵƉůĞǆŝƚǇǁŚĞŶĂƉƉůŝĞĚƚŽĂĐŽŶĐƌĞƚĞŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂů
case.  
In addition to the treatment of Nazi law, the influence of the parameters set 
by the Hart-Fuller debate on jurisprudential discourse should not be 
ƵŶĚĞƌĞƐƚŝŵĂƚĞĚ P  ‘dŚĞĨĂĐƚ ŝs that the exchange between Hart and Fuller really 
did set the agenda for modern jurisprudence: the separation of law and 
morality, the place of values in interpretation, and the relation between the 
concept of law and the values associated with the rule oĨůĂǁ ? ?266 According to 
EŝĐŽůĂ >ĂĐĞǇ ? ƚŚĞ ǁŽƌŬ ŽĨ ,Ăƌƚ ĂŶĚ &ƵůůĞƌ  ‘ŽĨ ĐŽƵƌƐĞ ? ĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞƐ ƚŽ ƐŚĂƉĞ
ĐŽŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇ ũƵƌŝƐƉƌƵĚĞŶĐĞƚŽĂƋƵŝƚĞƌĞŵĂƌŬĂďůĞĚĞŐƌĞĞ ? ?267 ĂŶĚ ‘ŝƚŝƐǁŽƌƚŚ
reflecting on the remarkable fact that it still speaks to us so powerfully 
ƚŽĚĂǇ ? ?268   
Some legal scholars have commented on or criticised the influence of the 
Hart-Fuller debate on the direction and scope of jurisprudential discourse in 
ƌĞĐĞŶƚ ǇĞĂƌƐ ? :ĞƌĞŵǇ tĂůĚƌŽŶ ŚĂƐ ĂĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ ‘ƐŽŵĞ ũƵƌŝƐƚƐ ŚĂǀĞ
suggested that the Hart-Fuller debate actually skewed the agenda for 
jurisprudence in unfortunate ways, which we are only now beginning to 
ĐŽƌƌĞĐƚ Q ? ?269 Waldron probably did not have the representation of Nazi 
Germany in mind, but variations of this suggestion are advanced by those few 
scholars who do explore aspects the relationship between legal theory and 
Nazi Germany, and who often come to mainstream, Anglo-American 
ũƵƌŝƐƉƌƵĚĞŶƚŝĂůĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞǁŝƚŚĂŶŽƵƚƐŝĚĞƌ ?ƐƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞ ?dŚŽŵĂƐDĞƌƚĞŶƐ ?ĨŽƌ
examƉůĞ ?ŚĂƐĚƌĂǁŶĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞĚĞďĂƚĞ ?ƐƐignificance: 
In the Anglo-^ĂǆŽŶ ǁŽƌůĚ ? ƚŚĞ ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ  “ůĞŐĂůŝƚǇ ? ŽĨ EĂǌŝ
Germany or the lack thereof took place primarily within the confines of 
the Hart/Fuller debate for a very long time. This mean that it could safely 
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be isolated and that legal theory could restrict itself to the rule of law as 
ƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐƉƌŝŵĂƌŝůǇ “ŐŽŽĚ ? ?270  
Kristen ZƵŶĚůĞ ĂƌŐƵĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ QƚŚĞ ŚŝƐƚŽƌǇ ŽĨ ĚĞďĂƚĞƐ ĂďŽƵƚ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶŶĞĐƚŝŽŶƐ
ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ůĂǁ ĂŶĚ ŵŽƌĂůŝƚǇ  Q ŚĂǀĞ ƐĞĞŶ ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƐ ƚŽ Ă ǁŝĚĞ ƌĂŶŐĞ ŽĨ
questions about the nature of law tightly circumscribed by the declared 
commitments of the competing legal philosophies on the matter of whether 
ůĂǁĂŶĚŵŽƌĂůŝƚǇĂƌĞŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌŝůǇĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂůůǇƐĞƉĂƌĂďůĞ ? ?271 In Rundle's view, 
the separability question has dictated the terms of the debate, which has 
played into the hands of positivists for whom this issue has more prominence 
than it does for Fuller, whose other philosophical insights have been side-
lined as a result. 
 ĨƵƌƚŚĞƌ ĐŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶĐĞ ŽĨ ƚŚŝƐ ? ĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐ ƚŽ ZƵŶĚůĞ ? ŝƐ  ‘ƚŚĞ ĞǆƚĞŶƚ ƚŽ ǁŚŝĐŚ
debates on the question of the separability thesis have focused on the 
ĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ  “ǁŝĐŬĞĚ ůĞŐĂů ƐǇƐƚĞŵ ? ǁŚĞŶ ŵĂƉƉŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌǇ ƚŚĂƚ
ĚŝǀŝĚĞƐƚŚĞƌĞƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚŝĐĂůĐĂŵƉƐ ? ?272 The positivist formal embrace 
of morally questionable regimes such as Nazi Germany means they have also 
been incorporated into a discourse dictated by the positivist standpoint, 
ůĞĂĚŝŶŐ ƚŽ  ?Ă ůŽǁĞƐƚ ĐŽŵŵŽŶ ĚĞŶŽŵŝŶĂƚŽƌ ůĞǀĞůŽĨĚĞďĂƚĞ ? ?273 However, the 
debate in this regard is often of the lowest common denominator because it 
relies on a superficial (mis)representation of the Third Reich as a wicked legal 
system, not because, as Rundle appears to suggest, the Nazi legal system is 
overused within the discourse and exists at the margins of law and so is not 
the best case from which to explore the issues at play.274 It is not per se that 
there has been too much of Nazi Germany in the discourse, skewing it 
towards simplistic versions of how a wicked legal system impacts on key 
debates by virtue of its inherent wickedness. Rather it is that there has been 
too much of a preconceived misrepresentation of Nazi Germany at the 
foundation of the discourse, and not enough rigorous engagement with the 
law and history of National Socialism, which would invigorate the discourse 
with more complex accounts of so-called wicked legal systems. It might also 
move it beyond the strictures of positivism and natural law. It is also that 
such accounts undermine the debates themselves, built as they are on 
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fundamental misconceptions about the role and nature of law in the Nazi 
state. 
The Hart-&ƵůůĞƌĚĞďĂƚĞ ?ƐƉƌŽĨŽƵŶĚůĞŐĂĐǇĨŽƌ ũƵƌŝƐƉƌƵĚĞŶĐĞ ŝƐĂƉƉĂƌĞŶƚ ŝŶƚŚĞ
connections between how Nazi law is treated in the debate and the 
prevailing representation of Nazi Germany today. It is ostensible in the way 
the key issues of the validity question and the separability question and the 
opposition of positivism and natural law have continued to permeate the 
discourse. And it is evident in the literature that, fifty years on, tackles the 
Hart-Fuller debate all over again and attempts to apply it to a number of 
different and new contexts. It is to this literature that this chapter now turns 
in order to demonstrate that even literature that specifically focuses on the 
Hart-Fuller debate does not have a great deal explicitly to say about Nazi 
Germany, and implicitly often reproduces its fundamental tenets. 
IV. The Hart-Fuller Debate Up To Date: A Case Study of 50th Anniversary 
Literature 
A General Themes in the 50th Anniversary Literature 
The two collections discussed in this section come at the subject of the Hart-
Fuller debate from slightly different angles and with slightly different aims. 
dŚĞĐŽůůŽƋƵŝƵŵƚŚĂƚ ůĞĚƚŽWĞƚĞƌĂŶĞ ?ƐďŽŽŬhad the aim  ‘ƚŽŝĚĞŶƚŝĨǇƚŚĞŵĞƐ
that lay on or below the surface of the debate and to rethink them in light of 
social, political and intellectual developments in the past 50 years, and of 
ĐŚĂŶŐĞĚ ǁĂǇƐ ŽĨ ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ ůĂǁ ĂŶĚ ŽƚŚĞƌ ŶŽƌŵĂƚŝǀĞ ƐǇƐƚĞŵƐ ? ?275 The 
New York University Law Review (NYULR) symposium meanwhile was more 
focused on the terms and context of the debate itself, looking further into its 
internal world. Between the two collections there are contributions intended 
to outline and enlighten the main issues at stake in the debate as they 
continue to be relevant, and to adapt the terms of the debate to the most 
pressing issues in jurisprudence today. The content of the Cane volume is 
much more commensurate with re-evaluating how Nazi law is understood in 
jurisprudential discourse both because some authors offer a critique of one 
Žƌ ďŽƚŚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĚĞďĂƚĞ ?Ɛ ƉƌŽƚĂŐŽŶŝƐƚ ?s treatment of the Third Reich and 
because others challenge the underlying theoretical assumptions of Hart and 
Fuller and, for example, often advance a more sociological form of 
jurisprudence, which might enable more investigation of how law actually 
functioned in Nazi Germany. 
ĂŶĞ ?Ɛ ĐŽůůĞĐƚŝŽŶ ŝƐ characterised by attempts to explore the potential 
ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶĐĞ ŽĨ ŽŶĞŽƌŽƚŚĞƌŽĨ,ĂƌƚĂŶĚ&ƵůůĞƌ ?ƐƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚŝĞƐĨŽƌĂƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ
area left untouched in the original debate, or criticise or defend one or the 
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othĞƌ ?Ɛ ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĨĂĐĞ ŽĨ ĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞ ĨƌŽŵ Ă ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚ ĂƐƉĞĐƚ ŽĨ ůĞŐĂů
scholarship, or across disciplinary boundaries. To that extent its contributions 
are indicative of attempts to move beyond the limitations of strict 
jurisprudential discourse, the representation of the Nazi past in which was 
challenged in Chapter Two. They are more expansive, moving beyond the 
approach, issues and terms of analytical jurisprudence, and often offering a 
critique of these. By contrast the contributions in the NYULR symposium are 
more indicative of what happened in the debate itself; which of the original 
concerns are worthy of revisitation or reinterpretation, and how the role of 
Nazi Germany in the debate is now treated. While it offers a re-evaluation of 
the terms of the ĚĞďĂƚĞ ? ŝƚ ŝƐ ůĂƌŐĞůǇŽŶƚŚĞĚĞďĂƚĞ ?ƐŽǁŶƚĞƌŵƐƚŚĂƚ ŝƚĚŽĞƐ
so, representing an internal critique more reflective for the most part of 
current jurisprudence and how it treats the Third Reich. 
What we learn from these examples is that, while there are many insightful 
contributions that extend the Hart-Fuller debate in interesting ways that 
remain relevant to the Nazi experience, there are few attempts to explore 
further the specific implications of this for the Third Reich, or engage with the 
history of National Socialism more directly. In neither collection is the nature 
of Nazi law itself explicitly re-examined, even though on occasions Hart and 
&ƵůůĞƌ ?Ɛ ƚƌĞĂƚŵĞŶƚ ŽĨ ŝƚ ŝƐ ĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐĞĚ ? dŚĞ ƉĂƌƚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĚĞďĂƚĞ ĂďŽƵƚ EĂǌŝ
Germany is virtually always treated, as it is in the debate and within 
jurisprudence, as an interesting and controversial backdrop and a source of 
examples. It is not considered a theme worth exploring in its own right. It 
touches on a whole range of other issues in its limited capacity, but is not of 
itself considered worthy of re-examination on its own terms, even if some of 
the methodological/theoretical claims made in the Cane collection in 
particular would help to realise such a re-examination. 
This highlights the minimal role played by Nazi Germany in the debate in the 
first place, especially for Hart. There is a sense that the substantive discussion 
often ends tied back up in the original issues, and an argument about which 
of Hart and Fuller's philosophical approaches is preferable and whether or 
not or to what extent the two theses are reconcilable. This reveals how the 
structure and terms of jurisprudential discourse remain fairly rigid from the 
debate itself, erecting barriers that are difficult to break down. The closest 
any author comes to putting Nazi Germany at the heart of their contribution 
is David Dyzenhaus in the NYULR collection.276 ,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ǇǌĞŶŚĂƵƐ ?ƉŝĞĐĞŝƐ
ĂƌĞǀŝƐŝƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ŐƌƵĚŐĞŝŶĨŽƌŵĞƌ ?ĐĂƐĞ ?ŶŽƚĂƌĞĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨEĂǌŝůĂǁ ?
and his analysis is very much of and within the parameters of jurisprudential 
discourse as it stands. He uses the historical case as little more than a 
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backdrop, a thing remembered for its quirkiness rather than for its substance, 
to look again at how positivism and natural law respond to the situation 
presented, but this does not involve a fundamental look at the issues at stake 
or the legal history of Nazi Germany. 
Some of the limitations of the debate and its influence on the evolution of 
jurisprudence are identified, such as the failure of analytical positivism to dig 
deeper into the social and political context of the law. Kristen Rundle is 
correct to suggest that the tide has turned a little in recent years in terms of 
rejecting positivism and embracing less inclusive concepts of the validity of 
law, and this is evident in the ample endorsements and explorations of 
Fuller's philosophy in the collections discussed here. However, it is not clear 
that this will lead to anything other than greater isolation of the wicked legal 
system of Nazi Germany. A more normatively oriented and sociological 
approach to jurisprudence, as implied by many versions of natural law, may 
lend itself to further exploration of actual historical instances of legal 
systems. If, however, this is underpinned by preconceptions about the Nazi 
legal system and its isolation from historical research that reveals interesting 
insights, the Third Reich will continue to play an extremely marginal role in 
even a more naturalistically directed discourse. A large pĂƌƚ ŽĨ ZƵŶĚůĞ ?Ɛ
concern about legal positivism and its influence is founded on the perception 
it is too inclusive a concept, because it provides such a minimal account of 
what counts as a legal system that almost all systems are included. Her 
evaluation of the Nazi legal system is underpinned by the claim that it is an 
example of why such systems ought not to be considered law, and so belong 
outside of how we construct the concept of law. However, subject as it is to 
the historiographical and philosophical criticisms outlined in Chapter Four, it 
shows that even a sociological approach directly concerned with the Third 
Reich can be led by philosophical commitments to overlook important 
historical characteristics of the Nazi legal system.277 
Altogether, the NYULR symposium articles provide a conventional, 
jurisprudential evaluation of the Hart-Fuller debate, which illustrate and 
reproduce the understanding of Nazi Germany prevalent within 
jurisprudence generally today, as highlighted within Chapter Two. The Hart-
Fuller Debate in the Twenty-First Century, provides more of a theoretically 
external critique of some of the arguments and issues from the debate, and 
operates at least on the borders of the constraints of jurisprudential 
discourse. While the two collections share some authors, Jeremy Waldron, 
Leslie Green and Nicola Lacey, and consequently some of the same themes 
and subjects come up, it is the chapters by other scholars in the Cane volume 
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ƚŚĂƚŽĨĨĞƌƚŚĞďĞƐƚĐƌŝƚŝƋƵĞŽĨƚŚĞĚĞďĂƚĞ ?ƐƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨEĂǌŝůĂǁĂŶĚƚŚĞ
most convincing theoretical approaches to taking jurisprudence beyond this , 
at least in terms of incorporating the Third Reich into its discourse.  
B  ‘The Hart-Fuller Debate in the Twenty-First Century ? 
The contributions to this collection are important in the context of the 
current discussion in that they do often take the Hart-Fuller debate in new, 
interesting and relevant directions. They occasionally provide a convincing 
critique of the misconceptions of the jurisprudential representation of Nazi 
law, and of the limitations of positivism and natural law for understanding 
the concept of law in the context of these misrepresentations. However, they 
do not return to attempt to re-evaluate or re-theorise Nazi law in light of 
their findings, which is an important additional step to link the theoretical 
points made to the case of Nazi Germany. Instead it remains very peripheral 
and sometimes reverts to the role assigned to it in the Hart-Fuller debate and 
jurisprudence since, that of a source of uncontroversial examples and 
archetypal wicked legal system. As Nazi Germany is not often a substantive 
part of the analysis and there is little engagement with relevant historical 
research, some of the assumptions about its legal system are reproduced. 
The focus on the philosophical issues taken to be at the heart of the debate - 
rather than the marginal presence of Nazi law  W sometimes results in an 
acceptance of the theoretical paradigms advanced by Hart and Fuller and 
what they entail for the Third Reich. In most cases, instead of exploring 
whether Nazi law complies with the role it is given, different theoretical 
approaches, which are often put forward and would create opportunities to 
explore Nazi law in a different way, stop short of returning to the historical 
experience that provoked the debate and working out the implications of 
these theories in that context.  
The contributions are productive, therefore, inasmuch as they do react 
against the usual constraints and legacy of the Hart-Fuller debate and 
sometimes explicitly show how one or both of its competing paradigms do 
not properly tackle the Nazi legal system. This opportunity is provided by the 
external viewpoint of some of the contributors to jurisprudence. The 
collection is characterised chiefly by pairs of reflections on different subjects 
and aspects of law as they relate to the Hart-Fuller debate, but which were 
often not part of it.278 These include human rights law,279 international 
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criminal law,280 legal pluralism,281 law as a means,282 the commensurability of 
their competing discourses,283 the relationship between norms and 
normativity,284 and legal reasoning.285 Equally, the overall intention of the 
colloquium underpinning the collection was not: 
To confine discussion to the jurisprudential issues canvassed by Hart and 
Fuller. Rather the plan was to identify themes that lay on or below the 
surface of the debate and to rethink them in l ight of social, political and 
intellectual developments in the past 50 years, and of changed ways of 
understanding law and other normative systems.
286
 
Re-evaluating the debate in light of new developments, themes that were not 
part of it originally, and different conceptions of law situates The Hart-Fuller 
Debate in the Twenty-First Century at the outskirts of the body of 
jurisprudential literature that is the focus of this dissertation. Some of the 
contributions remain firmly within this discourse and some challenge it from 
an external perspective. However, the fact that the dominant academic legal 
understanding of Nazi Germany has not evolved hugely in the period since 
the debate, and often remains isolated from historical research, is reflected 
in a lack of attention to Nazi law and an intermittent reliance on some of the 
assumptions about it that persist in the debate and jurisprudence generally. 
Those chapters that spend any time at all on the case of Nazi law do not 
ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƚŚĞďƵůŬŽĨƚŚĞĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶƐ ?<ĂƌĞŶ<ŶŽƉ ?ƐĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨŚƵŵĂŶ
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discourse analysis are the main exceptions in this regard.287 Knop re-
interprets the debate in terms of international human rights law as conflict 
between two different systems, law and morality. This is used as a lens 
through which to view conflicts between different legal systems, whether 
international and domestic, state and non-state or,288 where she returns to 
Nazi law, between the past and the present and systems that comply with 
&ƵůůĞƌ ?Ɛ ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ ŽĨ ůĞŐĂůŝƚǇ and those that do not. Knop partly accesses Nazi 
law in this context through another case, Oppenheimer v Cattermole,289 
where the question of whether to enforce a Nazi denationalisation law 
removing citizenship from German Jews was addressed by the UK courts in a 
tax context, but without really looking in detail at the legislation in 
question.290 
Knop consequently does deal with some of the implications of Hart and 
&ƵůůĞƌ ?Ɛ ƌĞƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞ ƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƐ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ ŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶ ďǇ ŽƚŚĞƌ ƐƚĂƚĞƐ ĂŶĚ
systems of Nazi law as valid or invalid, both contemporaneously and after the 
fact. This is an important historical and philosophical question and it adds 
ƐƵďƐƚĂŶƚŝĂůůǇ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ŝŵƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ŽĨ,ĂƌƚĂŶĚƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇ&ƵůůĞƌ ?ƐĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƐŽĨ
law, which respectively treat Nazi law as law and non-law. However, Knop is 
in her analysis accepting the underlying perception of the Nazi legal system 
as, not just an evil system, but evil law, against which just law is opposed. He 
approach therefore does not consider how Nazi law might be re-theorised or 
better understood historiographically as something more complex and 
difficult than this. Actual Nazŝ ůĂǁŝƐƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚŝŶ<ŶŽƉ ?ƐƉŝĞĐĞ variously as 
Radbruchian substantively unjust law, Fullerian non-legality, or Hartian law as 
a social fact. To this extent her perspective on Nazi law reproduces that of the 
debate itself even while its theoretical perspective supplies opportunities to 
adopt a different approach. 
Krygier likewise makes connections to the Nazi backdrop of the debate and 
ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƐĂŐŽŽĚĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŽĨďŽƚŚ,ĂƌƚĂŶĚ&ƵůůĞƌ ?ƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽEĂǌŝůĂǁ ?,Ğ is 
also ŵŽƌĞĐƌŝƚŝĐĂů ?ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇŽĨ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ treatment of Nazi law, than Knop. His 
focus on the question of how to achieve the rule of law in transitional 
societies provides a subject link to the Nazi period and leads to an emphasis 
on the importance of understanding context and of balancing a one-size-fits-
all approach to legal transitions with one that treats them as so unique it 
 ‘ƐĞǀĞƌƐ ƚŚĞŝƌ ŵŽŽƌŝŶŐƐ ŝŶ ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůƉŽƐƐŝďŝůŝƚŝĞƐĂŶĚůŝŵŝƚĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ĂŶĚŵŽƌĞ
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ďƌŽĂĚůǇ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ŚƵŵĂŶ ĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ ŵŽƌĞ ŐĞŶĞƌĂů ŚƵŵĂŶ ƉƵƌƉŽƐĞƐ ? ?291 The 
need to find the right point between these, or better still the right mode 
apart from these, resonates with the Third Reich, which is often treated as 
too unique for analysis but for which the temptation to address it through 
conventional jurisprudential means ought to be resisted as equally 
inappropriatĞ ? ^ŽŵĞ ŽĨ ƚŚŝƐ ŝƐ ĞǀŝĚĞŶƚ ŝŶ <ƌǇŐŝĞƌ ?Ɛ ĐŽŵŵĞŶƚƐ ŽŶ ,ĂƌƚŝĂŶ
positivism: 
EŽǁ ŽŶĞ ƚŚŝŶŐ ĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝǀĞ ŽĨ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ŝƐ ƚŚĂƚ ŚĞ ŚĂƐ ĂůŵŽƐƚ
nothing to say about the context in which the laws he discussed 
operated. He also says nothing about the character of Nazi laws, the way 
they were applied, or the specific characteristics and interrelations of 
the institutions applying them. He does not appear to think it necessary 
to examine the particular, peculiar, nature of the Nazi legal order or 
even the particular Nazi laws he discusses, other than to observe that 
the latter appear to have been formally legitimate, and they were nasty 
in content. Of a specific law that he does mention, he merely reports its 
stated aim  Q /ƚ ?Ɛ ŶŽƚ ƚŚĂƚ ǁŚĂt else went on is of no account to him 
morally, but that he thinks it counts for nothing legally, and he is talking 
about law. Nazis had laws, and they were immoral; not a happy story 
but a simple one.
292
 
The observation that Hart is not interested in the context or operation of Nazi 
law, and places most substantively compelling issues outside of the realm of 
 ‘ůĂǁ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ũƵƌŝƐƉƌƵĚĞŶĐĞ, is well made. Krygier recognises important 
 ‘ŝƐƐƵĞƐ ŽĨ ĞŵƉŝƌŝĐĂů ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞŽƌĞƚŝĐĂů ƐŽĐŝŽůŽŐǇ ? ƐƵĐŚĂƐǁŚǇƐŽŵĂŶǇŽďĞǇĞĚ 
EĂǌŝ ůĂǁ ? ?293 He is also aware of the enduring relevance of legal questions 
arising from states like the Third Reich and of the importance of  ‘ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐ
ĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞ  “ůĂǁƐ ?ŽĨƚƌƵůǇĞǀŝůƌĞŐŝŵĞƐ ?ĂŶĚĂďŽƵƚǁŚĂƚĂĚĞƋƵĂƚĞƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƐƚŽ
such experiences might require. Those are not issues we have left behind 
ƵƐ ?.294 
Krygier is much more willing to aĐĐĞƉƚ &ƵůůĞƌ ?Ɛ approach, and appears 
reasonably satisfied with how he tackles the Nazi legal system. This leads to 
some replication, or at least lack of evaluation, of naturalistic assumptions 
about Nazi law. Krygier posits a large gap between functional and 
dysfunctional legal systems in a transitional context295 and uses communism 
as an example of how  ‘pre-transitional ĚĞƐƉŽƚŝƐŵƐ ? ŝŶƐƚƌƵŵĞŶƚĂůŝƐĞ ůĂǁĂŶĚ
violate its internal morality.296 However, it is problematic to view Nazi law as 
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purely an instrument in the way conceived of by natural law297 and it is no 
less problematic to underestimate the degree of continuity between the Nazi 
past and states with functional legal systems. Therefore, while Krygier wants 
Hart to look at the context and operation of Nazi law, he does not do so 
himself, or rather he trusts the analysis provided by Fuller despite its 
weaknesses. There is no re-theorisation of the Nazi legal system, even while 
there is a methodological approach that could result in such a re-evaluation. 
The only real critique of how Nazi law was treated in the Hart-Fuller debate 
based on a different understanding of the nature of the Third Reich is 
presented by Manderson. His main focus is on how the very discourses 
ĞŵƉůŽǇĞĚ ďǇ ,Ăƌƚ ĂŶĚ &ƵůůĞƌ ĂƌĞ ŝŶĐŽŵŵĞŶƐƵƌĂďůĞ ?  ‘ŵƵƚƵĂůůǇ ĐŽŶƚƌĂĚŝĐƚŽƌǇ ?
ĂŶĚĞƋƵĂůůǇŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇ ? ?298 
Manderson rejects an approach that attempts to endorse either Hart or 
&ƵůůĞƌ ?Ɛ ƚŚĞŽƌĞƚŝĐĂů ƉĂƌĂĚŝŐŵ ? ŝŶƐƚĞĂĚ ĂƐƐerting that both are wrong and yet 
both are right, that  ‘ǁĞ ŶĞĞĚ ďŽƚŚ ƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƐ ƚŽ ŵĂŬĞ ƐĞŶƐĞ ŽĨ ůĂǁ ?ďƵƚ ŝƚ ŝƐ
impossible tŽĂĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞƚŚĞŵďŽƚŚĂƚŽŶĐĞ ? ?299 This applies to some extent 
to their representations of Nazi law, and Manderson criticises both in this 
regard. This critique was outlined in the previous section of this chapter and 
emphasised how Hart's approach ignores the issues and Fuller's simplifies 
them,300 which has resulted in a discourse at once polarised and 
ŝƌƌĞĐŽŶĐŝůĂďůĞ P  ‘ŶĞŝƚŚĞƌ ,Ăƌƚ ŶŽƌ &ƵůůĞƌ ŝƐ ƌŝŐŚƚ ?Ƶƚ ŶĞŝƚŚĞƌ ĐĂŶ ǁĞ ŵŝǆ Ă
cocktail composed of bits of each of them. Instead the antagonism between 
them, and the anxiety that disagreement forges, captures the unique virtue 
ŽĨ ůĞŐĂů ŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?301 Their perspectives are haunted by one another. 
Manderson is not clear about where his version of Nazi law comes from, as 
historical sources are not cited. His argument is nevertheless important for 
bringing a different understanding of Nazi law to the Hart-Fuller debate, 
ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶŝŶŐ ďŽƚŚ ,Ăƌƚ ĂŶĚ &ƵůůĞƌ ?ƐƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ĂƐŽƉƉŽƐĞĚƚŽƉƌĞĨĞƌƌŝŶŐ
one over the other, and suggesting that there is something in the discourse 
itself that causes problems. 
These three contributions comprise the extent to which Nazi law plays 
ƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐ ŶĞĂƌ Ă ĐĞŶƚƌĂů ƌŽůĞ ŝŶĂŶĞ ?ƐĐŽůůĞĐƚŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞǇĂƌĞŶŽƚǁŝƚŚŽƵƚ
their problems arising from the jurisprudential legacy of the Hart-Fuller 
debate. Apart from those authors who refer to Nazism more conventionally 
ŝŶƚŚĞĐŽŶƚĞǆƚ ?ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚĂĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶŽĨĂƐƉĞĐƚƐŽĨ,ĂƌƚĂŶĚ&ƵůůĞƌ ?ƐŽǁŶƵƐĞŽĨ
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the Third Reich, there is little attention on Nazi law per se. These chapters are 
willing enough to accept the historical representation of Nazi law offered by 
Hart and Fuller even if they disagree with the theory or theories it is used to 
support.302 Sometimes a consequence of this is debates of a much more 
conventional jurisprudential nature that fit within the discursive paradigm 
and theoretical structures outlined in the previous chapter.303  
The other way this collection is beneficial is in the critiques offered of the 
Hart-Fuller debate and the perspectives adopted aside from Nazi law, which 
might nevertheless offer opportunities for re-ĞǀĂůƵĂƚŝŶŐ EĂǌŝƐŵ ?Ɛ ƌŽůĞ ŝŶ
jurisprudential discourse. The existence of these accounts in this volume 
shows the implicit influence the Hart-Fuller debate has had on other areas of 
law, even if now as an object for problematization. It is much harder to find in 
them the implicit influence of a revised understanding of the workings of Nazi 
law, even if the approaches and perspectives adopted are more 
commensurate with its nature than analytical jurisprudence. EŐĂŝƌĞEĂĨĨŝŶĞ ?Ɛ
response to Manderson is the clearest case of highlighting concerns that are 
relevant to the treatment of Nazi law, with an approach amenable to 
exploring Nazi law, without really addressing that particular example.304  The 
ĨŽƌŐŝŶŐŽĨĂŶ ŝĚĞĂůƚǇƉĞŽĨ ‘ŐŽŽĚ ?ůĂǁĂŶĚƚŚĞŽƉƉŽƐŝƚion of archetypal wicked 
law to it, and the shared understanding of morality and the chasm it 
generates between Hart and Fuller on the one side and the historical 
experience of Nazi law on the other are indicative of this.305 
ĂŶĞ ?s collection is telling about the legacy of the Hart-Fuller debate and the 
current state of jurisprudential discourse in two ways, which are ostensibly in 
tension with one another. On the one hand it offers an external point of view 
on jurisprudence that highlights some of the problems with a tight focus on 
the philosophical paradigms of Hart and Fuller as well as with their treatment 
of Nazi law. Sometimes it ventures further down this path of critique than 
other times. On the other hand, it often accepts the representation of Nazi 
law from the Hart-Fuller debate even if it does not accept one or more of the 
theories then espoused, and it does not undertake a re-evaluation or re-
theorisation of Nazi law. The prospect of doing so in a volume about the 
debate might appear far-fetched, but if we were to treat the Nazi legal 
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system as at issue in the debate rather than as a backdrop, it would become 
something worth exploring in a re-examination of the theoretical paradigms 
involved. 
C The NYULR Symposium 
The articles that make up the NYULR symposium on the Hart-Fuller debate 
ĂƌĞ ŵƵĐŚŵŽƌĞƚǇƉŝĐĂůůǇ  ‘ũƵƌŝƐƉƌƵĚĞŶƚŝĂů ? ŝŶƚŚĞŝƌĚŝƐĐƵƌƐŝǀĞƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞĂŶĚƚŚĞ
issues they address, and largely contained within the internal perspective of 
the debate itself  W rooted in the dialogue between positivism and natural law. 
They naturally contain criticisms of one or both of the theoretical paradigms 
advanced by Hart and Fuller and sometimes of the lack of sociological 
engagement in Hartian positivism. Indeed, with some exceptions, a slight 
shift is discernible away from positivism and more towards a Fullerian, 
natural law perspective. But they do not do so from the point of view of 
evaluating what Nazi law was really like and they stick closely to the issues at 
stake within the debate itself. Most of the contributions do not go near Nazi 
law as a genuine subject of inquiry, but rather assume its role as a backdrop 
was the extent of its importance, which renders it irrelevant for the issues 
that they discuss. 
The internal jurisprudential perspective and positivism/naturalism 
partisanship is apparent in many of the contributions. Benjamin Zipursky 
devotes his article ƚŽ ĚĞĨĞŶĚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ŵĞƌŝƚƐ ŽĨ ǁŚĂƚ ŚĞ ƌĞĨĞƌƐ ƚŽ ĂƐ ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ
 ‘ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĂů ƉŽƐŝƚŝǀŝƐŵ ? ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ ƚŚĞ  ‘ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĂů ƉĞƌĨĞĐƚŝŽŶŝƐŵ ? ŽĨ ƌĞĂůŝƐƚƐ ĂŶĚ
natural law theorists.306 Frederick Schauer becomes involved with the 
minutŝĂĞŽĨƚŚĞ  ‘ǀĞŚŝĐůĞƐ ŝŶƚŚĞƉĂƌŬ ?ĂƐƉĞĐƚŽĨƚŚĞĚĞďĂƚĞĂŶĚĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞƐ
the extent to which it has been a major subject of jurisprudential analysis by 
citing a long list of articles dealing with the issue.307 Liam Murphy claims that 
 ‘perhaps the most important development in legal philosophy since Hart, 
Fuller, and Hans Kelsen has been the emergence of a number of sophisticated 
accounts of how a univocal answer to the conceptual dispute [about the 
ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ ŽĨ ůĂǁ ? ŵĂǇ ďĞ ĨŽƵŶĚ ? ?308 This again exposes the extent to which 
jurisprudence has remained focused on the issues within the debate and the 
significance that continues to be assigned to them. Leslie Green defends 
,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ? ĐŽŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐ that while  ‘&ƵůůĞƌ ŝƐ ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚĞĚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ŵŽƌĂůŝƚǇ
                                                                 
306
 ĞŶũĂŵŝŶ ?ŝƉƵƌƐŬǇ ? ‘WƌĂĐƚŝĐĂůWŽƐŝƚŝǀŝƐŵǀĞƌƐƵƐWƌĂĐƚŝĐĂůWĞƌĨĞĐƚŝŽŶŝƐŵ PdŚĞ,Ăƌƚ-Fuller 
ĞďĂƚĞĂƚ&ŝĨƚǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ? ? ? )New York University Law Review 1170. 
307
 &ƌĞĚĞƌŝĐŬ ^ĐŚĂƵĞƌ ?  ‘ ƌŝƚŝĐĂů 'ƵŝĚĞ ƚŽ sĞŚŝĐůĞƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ WĂƌŬ ?  ? ? ? ? ? )  ? ? ? ? )New York 
University Law Review 1109, 1111 and fn 10. 
308
 >ŝĂŵ DƵƌƉŚǇ ?  ‘ĞƚƚĞƌ ƚŽ^ĞĞ>ĂǁƚŚŝƐtĂǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? )  ? ? ? ? )New York University Law Review 
1092. 
    
87 
 
that makes law possible; Hart is also interested in the immorality that law 
ŵĂŬĞƐƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ ? ?309 He goes on:  
At a time when the rule of law is again under threat from official 
i l legality and popular indifference, it is natural to be especially vigilant to 
&ƵůůĞƌ ?Ɛ ĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐ ?  Q ƚ ƚŚĞ ƐĂŵĞ ƚŝŵĞ ? ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ? ƚŚŝƐ ŽƵŐŚƚ ŵĂŬĞƐ
some wish for a more perfect and complete penetration of legality into 
political l ife. Hart reminds us to be careful what we wish for.
310
 
The desire within a symposium about the Hart-Fuller debate to re-examine 
the issues it generated, defend its jurisprudential importance and argue for 
one side over the other is understandable, but the almost complete absence 
of re-evaluation of the role of Nazism and what its implications for some of 
the issues involved illustrates the extent to which the jurisprudential and 
historiographical disciplinary silos remain isolated. Green describes the rule 
ŽĨ ůĂǁ ĂƐ  ‘ĂŐĂŝŶƵŶĚĞƌƚŚƌĞĂƚĨƌŽŵŽĨĨŝĐŝĂů ůĞŐĂůŝƚǇĂŶĚƉŽƉƵůĂƌ ŝŶĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ? ?
neither of which problems afflicted the rule of law in Nazi Germany. Popular 
fear, hostility to the rule of law and support for an alternative conception 
rather than indifference, and official ideology rather than legality, were much 
greater threats to the rule of law in the Third Reich. At the same time, 
ƌĞƚƵƌŶŝŶŐƚŽ,ĂƌƚŽƌ&ƵůůĞƌ ?ƐƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞƌŽůĞŽĨ ůĂǁŝŶĚǇƐĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶĂů
or immoral regimes does not account for the possibility that the regime on 
which they based their analysis used law in a radically different way from 
their understanding. 
The criticisms of the debate tend to refer to one of a number of things. The 
mutual misunderstanding between the two sides is one. Another is the 
analytical bias of the debate.311 A third highlights misconceptions about 
&ƵůůĞƌ ?Ɛ ƚŚĞŽƌǇ ƚŚĂƚ ŚĂǀĞƵŶĚĞƌŵŝŶĞĚŝƚƐĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞƉŽƐŝƚŝǀŝƐŵŵŽƌĞ
ĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞůǇ ? ǇǌĞŶŚĂƵƐ ? ĐůĂŝŵ that the development of the debate has been 
falsely based on the mistaken conflation of the possibility that laws can be 
used as an instrument of power with the idea that law can be explained as an 
instrument is an example of this.312 A fourth criticism, advanced by Jeremy 
Waldron, is that jurisprudence has become so embroiled in the key issues 
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from the Hart-Fuller debate that it has lost its way.313 All of these comments 
ŚĂǀĞ ǀĂůŝĚ ĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞŝƌ ĨĂǀŽƵƌ ? ^ŽŵĞ ? tĂůĚƌŽŶ ?Ɛ Žƌ >ĂĐĞǇ ?Ɛ ĨŽƌ
example, contain within them the potential to move outside of the current 
limitations of jurisprudence and adopt a different approach to Nazi law as 
part of this. None, however, attempt to do this and the most important thing 
appears to be to fetishize the debate itself and re-run some of its major 
points of disagreement. 
>ĂĐĞǇ ƐĂǇƐ  ‘ŝt is only through a dialogue  W one between  conceptual, 
philosophical analysis and socio-historical interpretation of the conditions of 
existence and the potential use of ideas  W that a rounded understanding of 
ƚŚĞ ƌƵůĞ ŽĨ ůĂǁ ?Ɛ ƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂů ? ĂŶĚ ůŝŵŝƚƐ ? ĐĂŶ ďĞ ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĞĚ ? ? dŚĞ ,Ăƌƚ-Fuller 
debate, she argues, invites such a dialogue, and speaks to two questions in 
ĚŽŝŶŐ ƐŽ P  ‘ŽĨ ŚŽǁ ĨĂƌ ? ĂŶĚƵŶĚĞƌǁŚĂƚĐŝƌĐƵŵƐƚĂŶĐĞƐ ? ůĂǁĐĂŶďĞ ŝŶǀŽŬĞĚƚŽ
constrain political power and of how far we can expect it to be a force for 
ŐŽŽĚ ?ŽƌĞǀŝů ? ŝŶŽƵƌĐŽŵƉůŝĐĂƚĞĚƐŽĐŝĂůǁŽƌůĚ ? ?314 The legacy of the debate in 
jurisprudential discourse today, however, has not after more than 50 years 
been a blending of these different approaches or witnessed an attempt to 
tackle these questions based on such a methodology. It is true that the 
juxtaposition of postwar jurisprudence and the recent historical experience of 
law in Nazi Germany ought to have presented an opportunity to tackle some 
very interesting questions in light of a complex and difficult historical case. 
But this did not come to fruition in quite that way, and this  symposium 
collection does not do a huge amount to break away from the discursive 
shackles that have contained jurisprudence for the last half a century. 
V. Conclusion 
This chapter explored two key points in completing the portion of this 
dissertation focused on understanding and elucidating the representation of 
Nazi Germany within jurisprudence. The first was the analysis of the issues at 
stake in the Hart-Fuller debate and its treatment of Nazi Germany. The 
second was to connect the debate to contemporary jurisprudence including 
ďǇ ĞǀĂůƵĂƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ĨŝĨƚŝĞƚŚ ĂŶŶŝǀĞƌƐĂƌǇ ĐŽůůĞĐƚŝŽŶƐ ƚŽ ĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚ ƚŚĞ ĚĞďĂƚĞ ?Ɛ
ĞǆƉůŝĐŝƚ ůĞŐĂĐǇĂƚƚŚŝƐƚŝŵĞ ?ŽƚŚ,ĂƌƚĂŶĚ&ƵůůĞƌ ?ƐƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ  Nazi law 
can be challenged, particularly in terms of how that law was used to inform 
their competing theoretical paradigms. They manifested some of the 
characteristics that prevail within jurisprudence and entrenched the structure 
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and issues of the debate within the discourse. The fiftieth anniversary 
literature presented two different ways of re-evaluating the debate, one 
sometimes involving an external critique of jurisprudence and the other very 
much in the internal life-world of the debate. However, neither saw fit on the 
whole to place Nazi law at the heart of the issues or re-evaluate our 
understanding of it in detail, despite some arguments tending in that 
direction. Both, especially the NYULR symposium exhibited some of the same 
tendencies at play within the debate and jurisprudence generally. 
The implication for my wider thesis is that the jurisprudential understanding 
of Nazi Germany has been fixed for a long time, and the issues it is used to 
contribute to are narrowly defined and pre-determined, as a consequence of 
the legacy of the Hart-Fuller debate. The remaining chapters will be used to 
challenge the jurisprudential representation using recent historical 
scholarship. This is to understand how the historical case of Nazi Germany 
impacts on the paradigmatic jurisprudential theories : positivism and natural 
law. Having established that the jurisprudential representation of the Third 
Reich is based largely on outdated misconceptions, which have been 
embedded in the discourse since the postwar period, this is important for 
trying to understand how exactly jurisprudential theories are impacted by 
Nazi law and considering in which direction jurisprudential discourse ought to 
head in order to make good use of Nazi Germany as an historical experience 
of law. This begins in the next chapter with a discussion of the approaches 
offered by two historically-oriented legal theorists, David Fraser and Kristen 
Rundle. 
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Chapter Four: ZĞŝŵĂŐŝŶŝŶŐƚŚĞ ‘>Ăǁ ? ? ?EŽŶ->Ăǁ ?ŝĐŚŽƚŽŵǇƚŚƌŽugh 
,ŽůŽĐĂƵƐƚ,ŝƐƚŽƌŝŽŐƌĂƉŚǇ ? ‘the Holocaust does not present, theoretically, 
problems of representation ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚĨƌŽŵĂŶǇŽƚŚĞƌŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂůĞǀĞŶƚ ?315 
I. Introduction 
A Reorienting Jurisprudence towards Nazi Germany 
The problems with the jurisprudential representation316 of Nazi Germany317 
and particularly its legal system outlined in the previous two chapters 
highlight a need to redirect the debate within jurisprudence. It is important 
to investigate what the historical Nazi law actually means for jurisprudence, 
to encourage it to at least accept the relevance of the Third Reich to key 
jurisprudential questions and take full account of the implications of Nazi law 
for jurisprudence as it is applied to the Nazi past. The observations made 
open up the possibility of a new relationship between jurisprudence and Nazi 
Germany, which would benefit our understanding of how Nazi law worked 
and its status as a manifestation of the theoretical concept of law. This 
chapter will attempt to do this by evaluating two different legal theoretical 
approaches to reorienting jurisprudence towards Nazi history in the context 
of an example of historical theoretical scholarship. It will do this by 
reimagining the dichotomy between necessarily seeing Nazi Germany as a 
ƐƚĂƚĞ ŽĨ ĞŝƚŚĞƌ  ‘ůĂǁ ? Žƌ  ‘ŶŽŶ-ůĂǁ ? ƚŚĂƚ ŝƐ ĨŽƐƚĞƌĞĚ and reproduced by the 
structure of jurisprudential discourse. This attempt is made problematic by 
the fact that Nazi Germany is ingrained in a certain role in jurisprudence, 
dictated by an abstract, unhistorical methodology and the requirements of 
the twin pillars of positivism and natural law, and informed by an underlying 
narrative of rupture. It is difficult to reconstruct this role from inside the 
discourse given the extent to which some of its tenets and theoretical 
positions are dependent on a particular understanding of the Third Reich. 
David Fraser and Kristen Rundle each critique the direction of jurisprudential 
discourse and the legacy of the Hart-Fuller debate, but in quite different ways 
and adopting very different approaches to overcoming the issues they raise. 
Both would agree that Nazism can play a more prominent role in 
jurisprudential discourse than it currently does, and have sought to shift its 
attention back to the Third Reich. Both authors have challenged the 
circumscribed scope of the discourse in the wake of the Hart-Fuller debate. 
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 Dan Stone, Constructing the Holocaust: A Study in Historiography (Vallentine Mitchell, 
2001) 230. 
316
 The definition of jurisprudence I use throughout this Dissertation is described in detail  in 
Chapter One. 
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 DǇƵƐĞŽĨƚŚĞƚĞƌŵ ‘EĂǌŝƉĂƐƚ ?ĂŶĚŽƚŚĞƌƚĞƌŵƐƌĞĨĞƌƌŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞŚŝƐƚŽƌǇŽĨEĂǌŝ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ
and its legal system are explained in Section I I of Chapter One. 
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dŚĞǇ ĂƌĞ ĞĂĐŚ ƌŝŐŚƚůǇ ƐĐĞƉƚŝĐĂů ĂďŽƵƚ ƚŚĞ ŝŵƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ŽĨ ũƵƌŝƐƉƌƵĚĞŶĐĞ ?Ɛ
general embrace of Hartian positivism, its narrow focus on the polarisation of 
the dialogue between positivism and natural law, and its failure to continue 
to engage with the paradigmatic example that initially caught the attention of 
Hart and Fuller, that of Nazi Germany. However, the way they each address 
these shortcomings is philosophically and methodologically very different. I 
will argue that these distinctions are fundamental and, when considered in 
light of the historical writing of Dan Stone, ZƵŶĚůĞ ?Ɛ ƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ becomes 
historically and philosophically unsupportĂďůĞ ǁŚŝůĞ &ƌĂƐĞƌ ?Ɛ ŵŽƌĞ ƌĂĚŝĐĂů ?
critical perspective is reinforced ?tŚŝůĞZƵŶĚůĞ ?ƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĂŝŵƐ to rebalance 
jurisprudential discourse away from analytical positivism and reorient it 
towards natural law,318 using Nazi Germany to do so,319 I will argue that only 
&ƌĂƐĞƌ ?Ɛdeeper challenge to the structure and nature of the discourse itself is 
sufficient to overcome the difficulties identified in the preceding chapters 
and enable jurisprudence to really take account of the Nazi past.320  
In this chapter I will undertake a close analysis of some of the arguments of 
Stone, Fraser and Rundle and critique the latter two in light of the former. 
Through an exploration of the differences between the outputs of Fraser and 
Rundle I will consider how and why their approaches are so contrasting and 
demonstrate that the role of law in the Holocaust can be used to challenge 
the jurisprudential approach to the concept of law. Jurisprudence and 
historical theory are both faced with tensions in terms of the relevance of the 
Holocaust for their disciplines. Historiography continues to employ an 
empiricist/realist paradigm to reconstruct the Nazi past even while some of 
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 ^ĞĞ ZƵŶĚůĞ ?ƐƌĞĐĞŶƚďŽŽŬ ?<ƌŝƐƚĞŶZƵŶĚůĞ ?Forms liberate: Reclaiming the jurisprudence of 
Lon L. Fuller (Hart Publishing, 2012); and also Kristen Rundle, 'Form and Agency in Raz's Legal 
Positivism' (2013) 32(6) Law & Philosophy 767. 
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 In this Chapter I will  primarily discuss the following works of Rundle:  <ƌŝƐƚĞŶZƵŶĚůĞ ? ‘dŚĞ
Impossibil ity of an Extermi ŶĂƚŽƌǇ>ĞŐĂůŝƚǇ P>ĂǁĂŶĚƚŚĞ,ŽůŽĐĂƵƐƚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ? ? ? )University of 
Toronto Law Journal  ? ? ? ĂŶĚ ZƵŶĚůĞ ?  ‘>Ăǁ ĂŶĚ ĂŝůǇ >ŝĨĞ ?  ?Ŷ271). I will  also refer to her 
review essay of Fraser, Law After Auschwitz (n 23) PZƵŶĚůĞ ? ‘ZĞǀŝĞǁŽĨ>ĂǁĨƚĞƌƵƐĐŚǁŝƚǌ P
dŽǁĂƌĚƐ Ă :ƵƌŝƐƉƌƵĚĞŶĐĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ,ŽůŽĐĂƵƐƚ ďǇ ĂǀŝĚ &ƌĂƐĞƌ  ? ? ? ? ? ) ?  ? ? ? ? ? )  ? ?Sydney Law 
Review 197. 
320
 ŵŽŶŐƚŚŽƐĞďŽŽŬƐĂŶĚĂƌƚŝĐůĞƐŽĨ&ƌĂƐĞƌ ?ƐĐŽŶƐŝĚered here are: The Jews of the Channel 
Islands (n 80); The Fragility of Law (n 80); ĂǀŝďŽƌƐŚĐŚ ?ƐĂƌƚ (n 80); Law After Auschwitz (n 
23) ?  ‘EĂƚŝŽŶĂů ŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐ ? >ŝďĞƌĂů ^ƚĂƚĞ ? &ĂƐĐŝƐƚ^ƚĂ ĞĂŶĚƚŚĞ,ŽůŽĐĂƵƐƚ ŝŶĞůŐŝƵŵĂŶĚ
ƵůŐĂƌŝĂ ?  ? ? ? ? ? )  ?German Law Journal  ? ? ? ?  ‘^ŚĂĚŽǁƐ ŽĨ >Ăǁ ?  ?Ŷ26 ) ?  ‘^ŽƵƚŚ ĨƌŝĐĂŶ
ƌŝĐŬĞƚĞƌƐ ?EĂǌŝ:ƵĚŐĞƐ ?ĂŶĚKƚŚĞƌdŚŽƵŐŚƚƐŽŶ ?EŽƚ )WůĂǇŝŶŐƚŚĞ'ĂŵĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? )  ? ?Osgoode 
Hall Law Journal  ? ? ? ?  ‘ǀŝů  >Ăǁ ? ǀŝů  >ĂǁǇĞƌƐ ? ?  ?Ŷ26);  ‘>Ăǁ ?Ɛ  ?:ĞǁŝƐŚ YƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ ? ? P dŚĞ
,ŽůŽĐĂƵƐƚ ĂŶĚ ƌŝƚŝĐĂů dŚĞŽƌǇ ?  ? ? ? ? ? )  ? ? ? ? )MLR 844; ĂŶĚ  ‘ŽŽŬ ZĞǀŝĞǁ PAn Unfortunate 
Coincidence: Jews, Jewishness, and English Law by ŝĚŝ,ĞƌŵĂŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? )  ? ? ? ? )Journal of Law 
and Society 449. 
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its underlying tenets have been rendered problematic by the Holocaust.321 
Equally, the positivism/naturalism dichotomy continues to hold sway in 
jurisprudence even while the history of Nazi Germany, whose laws Hartian 
positivism strictly validates, is treated as substantively irrelevant and infused 
with a narrative of rupture, and problematizes both paradigms.322 The 
approach and perspective of Stone to historical theory is refreshing and 
relevant because our prevailing conception of law is as much part of the 
modern state as our prevailing conception of history, and it is as much 
undermined by the experience of Nazi Germany. The nod to the significance 
of the Holocaust within empiricist/realist historical scholarship finds its 
equivalent in the superficial integration represented by the jurisprudential 
treatment of the Nazi past. The argument that Nazi law is positive law, 
notwithstanding its sometime immoral content, appears to recognise some 
level of continuity with other forms of positive law. But jurisprudence does 
not delve beneath this superficial acknowledgement to reveal the deeper 
connections, or interrogate what these might mean for the underlying 
concept of law this argument manifests. This was not part of the projects of 
Hart and Fuller, who were addressing specific questions about the validity of 
immoral laws, but this approach has been reproduced consistently within the 
discourse in recent decades and represents an important concern for legal 
theorists engaging with Nazi Germany now. 
B Selection of Sources and Chapter Methodology 
I have chosen to explore the arguments presented by Fraser and Rundle 
specifically for a number of reasons. Firstly, they are two of the very few 
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 dŚĞ ƚĞƌŵ  ‘ĞŵƉŝƌŝĐŝƐƚ ?ƌĞĂůŝƐƚ ? ŝƐ ƵƐĞĚ ŚĞƌĞ ĂƐ Ă ďƌŽĂĚ ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĞƌ ŽĨ ĐŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶĂů
historiographical claims. Taken too literally, it overestimates the extent to which practising 
historians cling to a traditional Rankean philosophy of history, according to which the past 
itself is essentially replicated in the form of historical narrative. Nevertheless, the 
acknowledgement of theoretical problems with historical methodology and narrative only 
goes so far among most historians. As John Tosh puts it, historians  ‘ŬŶŽǁƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƐŽƵƌĐĞƐĚŽ
ŶŽƚ “ƐƉĞĂŬ ?ĚŝƌĞĐƚůǇ ?ƚŚĂƚĨĂĐƚƐĂƌĞƐĞůĞĐƚĞĚ ?ŶŽƚŐŝǀĞŶ ?ƚŚĂƚŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂůĞǆƉůĂŶĂƚŝŽŶĚĞƉĞŶĚƐŽŶ
the application of hindsight, and that every historical account is in some sense moulded by 
the aesthetic and political preferences of the writer. Their defence rests on the contention 
that, while in theory these features may invalidate historical work, in practice they can be  W 
and are  W ĐŽŶĨŝŶĞĚ ƚŽ ŵĂŶĂŐĞĂďůĞ ƉƌŽƉŽƌƚŝŽŶƐ ? ? :ŽŚŶ dŽƐŚ ?The Pursuit of History: Aims, 
Methods and New Directions in the Study of Modern History (3
rd
 edn, Longman, 2000) 132. 
The claims of historical theorists such as Dan Stone about the impact of theoretical problems 
highlighted by the Holocaust on conventional philosophy also go further than those (at least 
in theory) broadly agreed aspects mentioned by Tosh. 
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  ‘dŚĞŝĚĞĂŽĨEĂǌŝůĂǁĂƐ “ŶŽƚůĂǁ ?ƌĞƐŽŶĂƚĞƐŶŽƚũƵƐƚĂƚƚŚĞĐŽƌĞŽĨƚŚĞ,Ăƌƚ-Fuller debate, 
but also with much common and jurisprudential understanding of the state of play which 
existed in German legal  ĐŝƌĐůĞƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚ ? ? ? ? ? ? &ƌĂƐĞƌ ? ‘ “dŚŝƐŝƐEŽƚů ŬĞŶǇŽƚŚĞƌ
>ĞŐĂůYƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ ? ? ?Ŷ35) 60. 
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scholars writing now in the Anglo-American legal academy who are 
concerned with the theoretical implications of Nazi Germany. Secondly, they 
both engage with jurisprudential discourse and are interested in reshaping it 
in a way that better accounts for the Third Reich, which they consider to be 
jurisprudentially relevant. Thirdly, they are interested in the role of law in the 
Holocaust specifically. This is relevant because it is the horror of the Final 
Solution that often gives the impression that the Third Reich represented a 
rupture from law and history. It is also an important consideration for the 
law/non-law dichotomy because, for example, it is common to treat it as a 
ŵĂŶŝĨĞƐƚĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ &ƌĂĞŶŬĞů ?Ɛ ƉƌĞƌŽŐĂƚŝǀĞ ƐƚĂƚĞ ?323 ultimately extra-legal in its 
implementation  W distinct from the normative state ? tŚĞƌĞĂƐ ZƵŶĚůĞ ?Ɛ
ŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶ ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚƐƚŚŝƐŵŽĚĞů ?&ƌĂƐĞƌ ?ƐĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞƐ ŝƚ ?Finally, they tackle 
similar issues from very different perspectives. I characterise Rundle as 
working within jurisprudence as she seeks to use Nazi law to defend a version 
of natural law against positivism, and constructs a theoretical understanding 
of Nazi law from this. By contrast Fraser critiques jurisprudence from the 
outside and directed by Nazi history, with the claim that both natural law and 
positivism in their current form are unable to meet the challenge of 
conceptualising Nazi law. The similarities between the two scholars, which 
mean they are perhaps the only examples available for examination on this 
issue, highlight the differences, which enable the evaluation of two 
fundamentally different philosophical approaches to making Nazi Germany 
relevant for jurisprudential discourse. 
To provide a framework for my deconstruction of the claims of Fraser and 
Rundle, I will utilise some of the arguments of historian and theorist Dan 
Stone.324 I referred to historical problems with the jurisprudential treatment 
of Nazi Germany in the previous two chapters. In this chapter I will 
ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂůůǇĂĚĚƌĞƐƐ^ƚŽŶĞ ?ƐŚŝƐƚŽƌŝŽŐƌĂƉŚŝĐĂůĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽƚŚĞ,ŽůŽĐĂƵƐƚ as a 
phenomenon of the Nazi regime, which has both empirical and philosophical 
ŝŵƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌŚŽǁũƵƌŝƐƉƌƵĚĞŶĐĞŵŝŐŚƚďĞŐŝŶƚŽƚĂŬĞŶŽƚŝĐĞŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ƌĞĂů ?ĂƐ
opposed to hypothetical version of Nazism that currently feeds into the 
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 Fraenkel, The Dual State (n 13). 
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 ^ĞĞ ? ŝŶƚĞƌ ĂůŝĂ ? ŽĨ ĂŶ ^ƚŽŶĞ ?Ɛ ďŽŽŬƐ ? ĂƌƚŝĐůĞƐ ĂŶĚ ĞĚŝƚĞĚ ǀŽůƵŵĞƐ ŽŶ ƚŚĞƐĞ ƚŽƉŝĐƐ P
Constructing the Holocaust: A Study in Historiography (Vallentine Mitchell, 2001); The 
Holocaust and Historical Methodology (Berghahn Books, 2012); Histories of the Holocaust 
 ?KhW ?  ? ? ? ? ) ?  ‘ĞǇŽŶĚ ƚŚĞ  “ƵƐĐŚǁŝƚǌ ^ǇŶĚƌŽŵĞ ? P ,ŽůŽĐĂƵƐƚ ,ŝƐƚŽƌŝŽŐƌĂƉŚǇ ĂĨƚĞƌ ƚŚĞ ŽůĚ
tĂƌ ?  ? ? ? ? ? )  ? ? ? ? )Patterns of Prejudice 454; The Historiography of Genocide (Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2008); History, Memory and Mass Atrocity: Essays on the Holocaust and Genocide 
 ?sĂůůĞŶƚŝŶĞDŝƚĐŚĞůů ?  ? ? ? ? ) ? ‘'ĞŶŽĐŝĚĞĂƐdƌĂŶƐŐƌĞƐƐŝŽŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ?European Journal of Social 
Theory 45; The Historiography of the Holocaust  ?WĂůŐƌĂǀĞ DĂĐŵŝůůĂŶ ?  ? ? ? ? ) ?  ‘dŚĞ
,ŝƐƚŽƌŝŽŐƌĂƉŚǇ ŽĨ 'ĞŶŽĐŝĚĞ P ĞǇŽŶĚ  “hŶŝƋƵĞŶĞƐƐ ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚŶŝĐ ŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶ ?  ? ? ? ? ? )  ?
Rethinking History 127; and Theoretical Interpretations of the Holocaust (Rodopi, 2001). 
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discourse. I will use ĂƐƉĞĐƚƐ ŽĨ ^ƚŽŶĞ ?Ɛ historically-informed theoretical 
argument that the Holocaust represents both an ordinary historical event, 
essentially like any other, and a challenge to the prevailing philosophies 
underlying historical theory. I will show how Stone uses the Holocaust to 
critique both the dominant paradigm of historical writing and the 
philosophical debates that have taken place within the discipline over the 
past couple of decades. I will suggest that this understanding of the 
philosophical, disciplinary implications of the Holocaust has certain significant 
parallels within jurisprudence, which are ƌĞĂůŝƐĞĚŝŶĂǀŝĚ&ƌĂƐĞƌ ?ƐǁƌŝƚŝŶŐďƵƚ
largely overlooked by Kristen Rundle. I use Stone in this chapter because of 
the parallels between his writing and the possibility of using Nazi Germany to 
re-evaluate jurisprudential discourse. The depth of his historical 
understanding of the Third Reich, his focus on the Holocaust, and his use of 
history to address theoretical questions within historiography are relevant for 
the jurisprudential treatment of Nazism and provide an opportunity to bring 
history into the law on a philosophical as well as empirical level. 
While making connections between these scholars across different disciplines 
in this chapter, I am not making the claim, and do not have the scope to do so 
here, that historical research in this area can always be directly translated 
into legal scholarship about the Nazi past. Nor do I argue that the theoretical 
discourse in the two disciplines is necessarily interdependent, or that law and 
history are the same in terms of their association with Nazi Germany or the 
Holocaust.325 My claim is narrower than that, and more specifically significant 
for a jurisprudence of the Holocaust. I argue instead that there is a 
relationship between legal and historical theory in terms of their engagement 
with the Holocaust. This relationship is apparent in themes evident within the 
writing of leading scholars working in this area within history and law. Some 
similarities in the role of the Holocaust within historical  theory and 
jurisprudence, and particularly its philosophical implications for important 
theoretical tenets therein, can be elucidated from these themes. 
This chapter focuses mainly on the Holocaust as an aspect of the Nazi period 
of history and, when addressing law, the role of law in the Holocaust. This is 
largely because the scholars examined here have been primarily engaged 
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 The inter-disciplinary relationship between law and history generally has been addressed 
ĞůƐĞǁŚĞƌĞ ? ^ĞĞ ? ĨŽƌ ĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ? DĞůĂŶŝĞ tŝůů ŝĂŵƐ ?  ‘^ŽĐŝŽ-Legal Studies and the Humanities  W 
>Ăǁ ?/ŶƚĞƌĚŝƐĐŝƉůŝŶĂƌŝƚǇĂŶĚ/ŶƚĞŐƌŝƚǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ? ? )International Journal of Law in Context 243; 
ƐŚĞƌ DĂŽǌ ?  ‘>Ăǁ ĂŶĚ ,ŝƐƚŽƌǇ  W A EĞĞĚ ĨŽƌ ĞŵĂƌĐĂƚŝŽŶ ?  ? ? ? ? ? )  ? ? ? ? )Law and History 
Review 619. While I consider there to be a case for exploring further the similarities in 
respect of how law and history operate with regard to the Nazi past, this is a different 
concern to the one I am addressing here. Cf ŽƐƚĂƐŽƵǌŝŶĂƐ ? ‘,ŝƐƚŽƌǇdƌŝĂůƐ PĂŶ>ĂǁĞĐŝĚĞ
,ŝƐƚŽƌǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ?Annual Review of Law and Social Science 273. 
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with the Holocaust, which is seen to present the most extreme point of 
rupture in the Nazi state, and is consequently considered the best subject for 
the examination of the use of law for wicked ends. However, as I have argued 
elsewhere,326 and the historical research carried out by Stone and Fraser 
indicates, it is rarely possible to separate the Holocaust from the wider Nazi 
state, and it is not desirable to do so if we are to understand how law 
operated in this context. 
/ƚ ŝƐ ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚ ƚŽŶŽƚĞƚŚĂƚ^ƚŽŶĞ ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌĞƚŝĐĂůĂƉƌŽĂĐŚ and rejection of the 
conventions of empiricism/realism in historiography tend towards 
postmodernism in their inclination and as such are not uncontroversial. 
However, he treads the line between radical postmodernism and orthodox 
empiricism and is keen to demystify and challenge the myths associated with 
both sides. Nevertheless, history for Stone is a creative and constructive 
rather than strictly representative process. In the context of this dissertation, 
while the association of the more traditionally empirical historical research 
ƵƐĞĚ ŝŶ ŚĂƉƚĞƌ &ŝǀĞ ǁŝƚŚ ^ƚŽŶĞ ?Ɛ ƚŚĞŽƌĞƚŝĐĂů ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ŝƐ ŶŽƚ always 
unproblematic, Stone accepts the veracity of the basic building blocks of the 
past, even if these can be interpreted in a number of ways, and acknowledges 
the benefits of recent historical research into Nazi Germany, especially as this 
field within the discipline embraces theory and moves gradually away from 
traditional narrative accounts.327 
II. Dan StonĞ ?Ɛ,ŽůŽĐĂƵƐƚ,ŝƐƚŽƌŝŽŐƌĂƉŚǇ ? ‘it makes us aware of general 
problems of representation that arĞŶŽƌŵĂůůǇƉĂƐƐĞĚďǇǁŝƚŚĞĂƐĞ ? 
A /ŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶƚŽ^ƚŽŶĞ ?ƐƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ 
^ƚŽŶĞ ?ƐŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂůƚŚĞŽƌĞƚŝĐĂůŝŶƐŝŐŚƚƐĂƌĞĨŽƵŶĚĞĚŽŶŚŝƐƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞ
history of the Holocaust.328 He highlights the complicity of western civilisation 
in the Nazi genocide, and thus of the historical discipline itself, as it shares 
many of the same modern tenets called into question by those events. He 
sees the ongoing cultural and philosophical significance of the Holocaust as 
collapsing the hitherto sacrosanct, historiographically constructed divide 
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 See my brief discussion of the relationship between the Holocaust and the wider Nazi 
state, both in legal and historical terms, in Section II of Chapter One. 
327
 KŶ^ƚŽŶĞ ?ƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽŚŝƐƚŽƌǇƐĞĞStone, Constructing the Holocaust (n 324). For a more 
radical postmodern understanding of historiography see, for example, Keith Jenkins, 
Rethinking History (Routledge, 1991). For an example of historical writing about Nazi 
Germany moving towards a more theoretical informed and less empiricist approach, see Saul 
Friedlander, Nazi Germany and the Jews, Volume 1: The Years of Persecution, 1933-1939 
(HarperCollins, 1997); and Nazi Germany and the Jews, Volume 2: The Years of Extermination, 
1939-1945 (HarperCollins, 2007) 
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between the past and the present. He argues that the dominant historical 
narratives and metanarratives are unable to account for or adequately 
represent the Holocaust in its full trauma and complexity. Most importantly, 
these claims do not only hold true for the Holocaust, but for other historical 
events too. In this respect, the Holocaust is a history like any other. 
Historians, therefore, should not view the Holocaust as problematic to the 
extent that it does not fit well with the dominant philosophy of history, but 
should begin to view the dominant philosophy of history as itself problematic. 
This historical and philosophical approach, which acknowledges the essential 
normality of the Nazi state, is led by a historical understanding of the period, 
ĂŶĚ ƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĞƐ ƚŚĞ ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ƚŚĞ  ‘ƚŚĞŶ ?ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ  ‘ŶŽǁ ? ? ŚĂƐ
implications for jurisprudence. It challenges the exclusion of Nazi law from 
relevance and the failure to explore it in detail. It undermines the implicit 
narrative of discontinuity that informs the jurisprudential representation of 
Nazi Germany, and consequently requires the discourse to be reimagined if it 
is going to incorporate the Third Reich into its understanding of the concept 
of law. By analogy, it is not Nazi law that is the problem but the discursive 
structures used by jurisprudence to interpret it. 
Stone situates the Holocaust as a critical event for the modern state and a 
challenge to the dominant empiricist/realist philosophy of history, which 
continues to assert a relationship of direct correspondence between 
orthodox historical accounts and the past they narrate.329 In his scholarship 
he addresses the implications of the Holocaust for how history is written, 
how the Nazi past is represented, and how historical knowledge is 
constructed from the fragments of the past. His discussion of the historical 
representation of Nazism includes two issues particularly relevant for this 
thesis, the narrative content of historical writing and the epistemological 
foundations of historical knowledge (the extent and nature of its truth 
claims ) ? ^ƚŽŶĞ ?Ɛ ĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞ ƚŽ ŚŝƐƚŽƌŝŽŐƌĂƉŚǇis not just presented by the 
Holocaust, but is a problem at the heart of the inherent impossibility of 
historical representation. It is indicative of a general flaw in the paradigmatic 
understanding of the relationship between historical writing and the past, 
which is best exposed by reference to the Holocaust, but is by no means 
exclusive to it. The Holocaust merely  ‘makes us aware of general problems of 
representation that are normally passed by with ease when dealing with less 
ƚƌĂƵŵĂƚŝĐ Žƌ ŵŽƌĞĂŶĐŝĞŶƚŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂůŽĐĐƵƌƌĞŶĐĞƐ ? ?330 From this foundation of 
understanding Stone challenges the ability of an otherwise extremely fertile 
field of historical research to come to terms with its subject, and deconstructs 
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the polarised debate within the philosophy of history between those who use 
the Holocaust to uphold the empirical/realist historical method and those 
who employ it to challenge this, often from a postmodern perspective.331 
This approach is relevant to the way in which jurisprudence engages with 
Nazi Germany. He is immersed in both the historical and philosophical 
debates about Nazi Germany, and takes his lead from insights about the 
Holocaust to understand its impact on historical writing. This combination of 
historical understanding and philosophical approach has parallels for 
exploring the relationship between legal theory and the Holocaust. Taken 
together, it reveals the critical power of the Holocaust to provoke a re-
evaluation of mainstream jurisprudential discourse and the dominant 
philosophical paradigms of the concept of law informing it. More simply, it 
both highlights the extent to which the Nazi state is within the scope of what 
ŵĂǇ ŶŽƌŵĂůůǇ ďĞ ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚ  ‘ůĂǁ ? ĂŶĚ Ăƚ ƚŚĞ ƐĂŵĞ ƚŝŵĞ ďƌŽĂĚĞŶƐ ƚŚĞ
theoretical questions that can be asked about the Third Reich beyond the 
issue of whether or not its laws were valid. 
Stone uses the Holocaust to question the ability of the debate between 
empiricist/realist and postmodern historians,332 particularly at its peak of 
engagement of historical theoretical discourse with the Nazi period in the 
1990s and early 2000s,333  to get to the heart of the philosophical challenges 
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 On the debate between postmodernism and empiricism/realism, see for example Ernst 
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 ĂŶ^ƚŽŶĞ ? ‘/ŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ PdŚĞ,ŽůŽĐĂƵƐƚĂŶĚ,ŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂ ůDĞƚŚŽĚŽůŽŐǇ ?ŝŶĂŶStone (ed), 
The Holocaust and Historical Methodology  (n 324). The high point of influence of 
postmodernism in the historical discipline was through the 1990s and early 2000s when a 
number of texts on the subject were produced and briefly grappled with by conventional 
historians, often in the context of the Holocaust. This period also produced a plethora of 
volumes about the nature and philosophy of history written from a range of perspectives. 
See, as a small selection, Ludmilla Jordanova, History in Practice (Arnold, 2000); Alun 
Munslow, Deconstructing History (Routledge, 1997); Alun Munslow, The New History 
(Pearson, 2003); C. Behan McCullogh, The Truth of History (Routledge, 1998); C. Behan 
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Mary Fulbrook, Historical Theory (Routledge, 2002); Tosh, The Pursuit of History (n 321); 
Joyce Appleby, Lynn Hunt and Margaret Jacobs, Telling the Truth About History (W.W. Norton 
& Co., 1994); Richard Evans, In Defence of History (Granta, 1997); Saul Friedlander, Probing 
the Limits of Representation (Harvard University Press, 1992); Eric Hobsbawm, On History 
(Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1997); Arthur Marwick, The New Nature of History: Knowledge, 
Evidence, Language (Palgrave, 2001); and Jenkins, Rethinking History (n 327). 
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 Ɛ ^ƚŽŶĞ ƉŽŝŶƚƐ ŽƵƚ ?  ‘ŝĨ ƚŚĞƌĞ ŝƐ Ă ĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞĚ ŝŶƚĞƌƐƚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ǁŽƌŬ ŽĨ  ?,ĂǇĚĞŶ ? tŚŝƚĞ ?
[Dominick] LaCapra, [Frank] Ankersmit, et al. amongst philosophers of history, this is not true 
of historians at large. And among Holocaust historians a feeling seems to prevail  that turning 
ŽŶĞ ?ƐĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞŽƌĞƚŝĐĂůŵĂƚƚĞƌƐ ŝƐĂĚŝƐƚƌĂĐƚŝŽŶĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ “ƌĞĂů ?ǁŽƌŬŽĨǁƌŝƚŝŶŐŚŝƐƚŽƌǇ ? ?
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presented by the Nazi past for historical writing. The very things about the 
Holocaust that are taken by many to be signs of its extreme and exceptional 
nature, and a safeguard for the historical method, are referred to by Stone as 
indicative of the deficiencies inherent in modern historiography, which 
prevents its adequate representation of such events. In the case of legal 
scholarship, the circumscribed scope of the jurisprudential dialogue between 
natural law and positivism and the specific and limited role it assigns to Nazi 
law, restrict its potential for further engagement with the Holocaust as a 
lawful phenomenon. As in historiography, some of the same aspects of the 
Third Reich that ostensibly situate it ŽƵƚƐŝĚĞ ŽĨ  ‘ůĂǁ ? ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞ ĂǀĞŶƵĞƐ ƚŽ
further reflection on its implications for legal theory.334 It is therefore the 
potential presence of rupture  W its status as a limit case - that provides the 
greatest opportunity for insight into the continuities and normalities within 
different manifestations of the concept of law. 
B The Historical Holocaust 
dŚĞ ŬĞǇ ƚŽ ^ƚŽŶĞ ?Ɛ ƌĞůĞǀĂŶĐĞ ƚŽ ũƵƌŝƐƉƌƵĚĞŶƚŝĂů ĞŶŐĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ EĂǌŝ
past lies in his use of the empirical history of the Holocaust to critique its 
treatment within academic discourse on a theoretical level. The 
historiographical dominance of the empiricist/realist paradigm carried the 
consequence that, to the extent that it was seen to be incomprehensible,  ‘it 
was the Holocaust that was felt to be problematical, not the concept of 
ŚŝƐƚŽƌǇ ? ?335 The obvious difficulties with attempts to narrate the Holocaust 
comprehensively, represent adequately the experience of the victims, or 
incorporate the Third Reich into a meta-narrative of historical progress 
resulted in a sensĞƚŚĂƚ ŝƚǁĂƐƚŚĞ,ŽůŽĐĂƵƐƚƚŚĂƚĚŝĚŶŽƚĨŝƚ ŝŶǁŝƚŚ ‘ŶŽƌŵĂů ?
historical development and conventions. As Stone shows, the Holocaust is in 
ƌĞĂůŝƚǇ ƉĂƌƚ ŽĨ  ‘ŶŽƌŵĂů ? ŚŝƐƚŽƌǇ ? ĂŶĚ ŝƚ ŝƐ ůŽŐŝĐĂůůǇ ŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇ ƚŽ ĂĚĚƌĞƐƐ ƚŚĞ
implications of this for historical writing. This is the remaining route once the 
Holocaust is acknowledged as no longer an aberration, but not capable of 
bring historicised, i.e. subsumed within pre-existing historiographical 
conventions. The characterisation of the Holocaust as both an ordinary 
historical event like any other, and a phenomenon acutely able to highlight 
challenges for historical ƚŚĞŽƌǇ ŐĞŶĞƌĂůůǇ ? ƉĞƌŵĞĂƚĞƐ ^ƚŽŶĞ ?Ɛ writing on the 
subject and underlies his analysis of historical theory. According to this view, 
the merging of the past and the present is so apparent in the case of the 
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 The connections between historical and legal theory in these regards are discussed further 
in the following section, where FraƐĞƌ ?ƐǁƌŝƚŝŶŐŝƐ ů ŝŶŬĞĚŵŽƌĞĞǆƉůŝĐŝƚůǇǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĂƐƉĞĐƚƐŽĨ
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,ŽůŽĐĂƵƐƚ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ŝůůƵƐŝŽŶ ŽĨ Ă ĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ  ‘ŚŝƐƚŽƌǇ ?(the past) and 
contemporary society is exposed. He emphasises the ordinariness of the 
historical agents who were involved in the genocide programme,336 and 
ĐůĂŝŵƐ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ƚŚĞ ,ŽůŽĐĂƵƐƚ ĚŽĞƐ ŶŽƚ ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚ ? ƚŚĞŽƌĞƚŝĐĂůůǇ ? ƉƌŽďůĞŵƐ ŽĨ
representation different from any other historical event. But in this case the 
question is more pertinent, for cultural, moral and for philosophical 
reasons ? ?337 
This interpretation of the Holocaust challenges empiricist/realist narratives 
on a philosophical level, on the basis that otherwise compelling historical 
accounts often fail to address the fundamental problem of historical 
representation it reveals. The application of the orthodox model of historical 
ǁƌŝƚŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞ,ŽůŽĐĂƵƐƚ  ‘ŐŝǀĞƐƌŝƐĞƚŽƚŚĞƉĂƌĂĚŽǆǁŚĞƌĞďǇƚŚĞƐĞƚŽĨĞǀĞŶƚƐ
that challenge basic assumptions about the modern state are approached 
ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚŽƐĞ ƐĂŵĞ ĂƐƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?338 dŚŽƐĞ ĞŶŐĂŐĞĚ ŝŶ ƚŚŝƐ ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ  ‘ QĐĂŶŶŽt 
admit that its subject will not conform to notions of time (linear, progressive) 
Žƌ ŚŝƐƚŽƌǇ  ?ĨŝŶŝƐŚĞĚ ? ĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞ ?  “ŽǀĞƌ ? ) ?.339 Again, the problem is seen to lie 
with the Holocaust itself, or is ignored altogether, rather than persisting in 
the inherent impossibility of representation as it is conceived within this 
paradigm.340 While the Holocaust is fundamentally unexceptional in terms of 
the challenges it poses for historical representation, its heightened cultural 
and moral significance, apparent in its continuing resonances in western 
societies over 50 years after the event, exposes those challenges more starkly 
than other historical periods, and demands that they be addressed. The 
realisation that the Holocaust is a history like any other and an event that 
makes us rethink how history is written confronts a contradictory dis course 
within the historical academy that employs its limit nature in the service of 
arguments in favour of both conventional and postmodern philosophical 
positions. Meanwhile, historians write the history of the Holocaust using 
traditional historical method in increasing detail and complexity, which 
ĨƵƌƚŚĞƌ ĞǆƉŽƐĞƐ ŝƚƐ  ‘ŽƌĚŝŶĂƌǇ ? ŶĂƚƵƌĞ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ĐŚĂƐŵ ƚŚĂƚ ĞǆŝƐƚƐ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ
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narrative reconstruction and historical experience.341 This situation is 
paralleled within jurisprudential discourse where the Nazi past is treated as a 
case of positive law and ĂŶ ĂďĞƌƌĂƚŝŽŶ ? ŽƵƚƐŝĚĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƐĐŽƉĞ ŽĨ  ‘ůĂǁ ? ? dŚĞ
ĚŽŵŝŶĂŶƚ ƉŽƐŝƚŝǀŝƐƚ ĐƵƌƌĞŶƚ ǁŝƚŚŝŶ ũƵƌŝƐƉƌƵĚĞŶĐĞ ƉƵƌƉŽƌƚƐ ƚŽĐůĂŝŵEĂǌŝ  ‘ůĂǁ ?
as law, but is structured around such a restricted set of issues that it is 
entirely unequipped to address the theoretical implications of the complicity 
of law in the Holocaust.342 
Stone uses the Holocaust to critique the contradictions within and the 
poverty of much of the historical theoretical discourse. Notwithstanding the 
perceived impact of postmodernism on the discipline, empirical historical 
research into Nazi Germany has rumbled on regardless of post-Holocaust, 
historical philosophical debate.343 To a large extent this is a symptom of the 
way the debate itself was conducted, and Stone addresses the nature of the 
discourse in his critique, emphasising its polarisation into entrenched 
opposing theoretical camps, each using the Holocaust as an ultimate, 
unassailable defence of their position. This caused the debate to stagnate, 
presented an obstacle to extensive engagement across philosophical 
frontiers, and distorted and simplified the significance of the Holocaust for 
the issues involved. This distŽƌƚŝŽŶ ǁĂƐĞǆĞŵƉůŝĨŝĞĚ ŝŶŚŽǁ ‘both those who 
favored postmodern approaches and those who saw thĞ ŶĞĞĚ ƚŽ  “ĚĞĨĞŶĚ ?
ŚŝƐƚŽƌǇ ƵƐĞĚ ƚŚĞ ,ŽůŽĐĂƵƐƚĂƐĂŬŝŶĚŽĨ  “ƚƌƵŵƉĐĂƌĚ ? ? ? ?344 The entrenchment 
of the rear-ŐƵĂƌĚĂĐƚŝŽŶĐĂŵĞĂƐ  ‘ƚŚĞ  “ŶŽďůĞĚƌĞĂŵ ?ŽĨ “ǁƌŝƚŝŶŐƵƉ ?ƚŚĞƉĂƐƚ
wie es eigentlich gewesen ist [how it really was] began to recede from 
ŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĂŶƐ ?ƌĞĂůŵŽĨĞǆƉĞĐƚĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?,ŝƐƚŽƌŝĂŶƐƐƚĂƌƚĞĚƚŽƌĞƐŽƌƚƚŽ “ĚĞĨĞŶƐĞƐ ?ŝŶ
ŽƌĚĞƌ ? ĂƐ ƚŚĞǇƐĂǁŝƚ ?ƚŽ  “ƐĂǀĞ ?ŚŝƐƚŽƌǇĂƐĂĚŝƐĐŝƉůŝŶĞĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŽŶƐůĂƵŐŚƚŽĨ
ŝƌƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďůĞƌĞůĂƚŝǀŝƐƚƐ ? ?345  
Other historical theorists have also seen this as a reactionary response to the 
ĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞƐ ĂŶĚ ĐůĂŝŵƐ ŽĨ ƉŽƐƚŵŽĚĞƌŶŝƐŵ ? ŽďƐĞƌǀŝŶŐ ƚŚĂƚ ŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĂŶƐ  ‘ŚĂǀĞ
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simply not welcomed the idea that they should analyze and appreciate their 
work from the vantage point of the linguistic turn and relinquish their claims 
ƚŽŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂůƌĞĂůŝƐŵ ? ?dŚĞǇŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶ ‘ƵŶĂďůĞƚŽĐŽƵŶƚĞƌƚŚĞƌĞůĂƚŝǀŝƐƚĐŚĂƌŐĞ
of [Hayden] White and others by presenting a compelling account of what 
ƚŚĞǇ ĂĐƚƵĂůůǇ ĚŽ ǁŚĞŶ ƚŚĞǇ ǁƌŝƚĞ ŚŝƐƚŽƌǇ ? ?346 Carolyn Dean has urged that 
 ‘ QŚŝƐƚorians and others must come to terms with the displaced effects of 
ƚŚĞŝƌŽǁŶƚŚĞŽƌĞƚŝĐĂů ůŝŵŝƚĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?ĂŶĚ ‘ŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĂŶƐƐŚŽƵůĚƐĞĞŬƚŽĐŽŶĨƌŽŶƚƚŚĞ
ƚƌĂƵŵĂƚŝĐŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨŐĞŶŽĐŝĚĞ ŝŶĂŵŽƌĞƚŚĞŽƌĞƚŝĐĂůůǇĞŶŐĂŐĞĚĨĂƐŚŝŽŶ ? ?347 As 
ZŽďĞƌƚ ƌĂƵŶ ƉƵƚƐ ŝƚ  ‘ QŚŝƐƚŽƌŝŽŐƌĂphy which looks at past reality as a 
ƐƵďƐƚĂŶĐĞ ƚŽ ďĞĞƉŝƐƚĞŵŽůŽŐŝĐĂůůǇƌĞǀĞĂůĞĚŚĂƐƚŽďĞŐŝǀĞŶƵƉ ? ?348 Crucially, 
ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?  ‘ƚŚŝƐ ŝŶ ŶŽ ǁĂǇ ŝŶǀĂůŝĚĂƚĞƐ ďĂƐŝĐ ĞŵƉŝƌŝĐĂů Žƌ ĂƌĐŚŝǀĂů ǁŽƌŬ ? ?349 In 
ĨĂĐƚ  ‘ĂŶǇ ƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĂŶ ?ƐŵĂǇďĞĞŵƉŝƌŝĐĂůůǇǀĞƌŝĨŝĞĚ ? The facts, 
ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ? ĂƌĞŶŽƚŐŝǀĞŶ ?ďƵƚŚĂǀĞƚŽďĞ  “ĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚĞĚ ?ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŽĨ
writing history  W which is not incompatible with rigorous reliance upon the 
ĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞ ? ?350 This is no more than an acknowledgement that  ‘ QƚŚĞŵĞĂŶŝŶŐƐ
we give to the past  Q ĂƌĞ ĨŽƌŐĞĚ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ƚŚĞ ĐƌĞĂƚŝǀĞ ĂĐƚ ŽĨ ǁƌŝƚŝŶŐ
ŚŝƐƚŽƌǇ ? ?351  
C Re-evaluating Historiography After the Holocaust 
For Stone, then, the Holocaust is not problematical in the ways previously 
thought, due to its essentially ordinary nature. The dominant concept of 
historical theory is problematical because of the flawed potential for events 
such as the Holocaust to be constructed within existing, paradigmatic modes 
of representation. He acknowledges the developments in historical 
scholarship in the last twenty years, in that it has moved away from a 
historiography of rupture to one that integrates the Nazi past into the past 
more generally. However, this is only the first stage towards understanding 
the Holocaust as an historical event and creating disciplinary tools that 
enable us to interrogate and integrate it properly: 
The thrust of scholarly historical work of the 1990s has been away from 
ƚŚĞƉŽƐƚǁĂƌĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ,ŽůŽĐĂƵƐƚĂƐĂďĞƌƌĂƚŝŽŶ QƚŽĞŵƉŚĂƐŝǌĞ
instead the continuities between German society before and after the 
Nazi period, as well as the more general impli cations of the Holocaust 
ĨŽƌŵŽĚĞƌŶŝƚǇĂŶĚǀŝĐĞǀĞƌƐĂ ?sŝƚĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŚĞƐĞǁŽƌŬƐĂƌĞ QƚŚĞǇĚŽŶŽƚ
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consider that the very excess, the rush of energy which permitted 
normal societal structures to become organs of mass murder, may 
prevent the Holocaust from being incorporated into a cognitive-rational 
approach.
352
 
Historiography has begun to move away from the postwar narrative of 
rupture, an important step that has so far eluded jurisprudence. This would 
involve rejecting theses of discontinuity, of criminality and non-law, in favour 
of a more nuanced interpretation based on continuity and integration. It 
would also involve tackling the interpretive limitations imposed by the two 
paradigmatic theoretical models within the discourse. An acknowledgement 
that the HŽůŽĐĂƵƐƚ ŝƐǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞƐĐŽƉĞŽĨďŽƚŚǁŚĂƚǁĞĐĂůů ‘ŚŝƐƚŽƌǇ ?ĂŶĚǁŚĂƚ
we call  ‘ůĂǁ ? ŐŽĞs some way to overcoming rupture, but it does not 
ŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌŝůǇ ĂŶƚŝĐŝƉĂƚĞ ĂŶ ĞƋƵĂůůǇ ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚ ĨƵƌƚŚĞƌ ŵŽǀĞ ? WĂƌƚ ŽĨ ^ƚŽŶĞ ?Ɛ
ĐŽŵƉůĂŝŶƚ ŝƐ ƚŚĂƚ ƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ  ‘ŚĂƐ ƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞĚ ƚŽ ƚŚe Holocaust primarily by 
ŶŽƌŵĂůŝǌŝŶŐ ŝƚ  QƐŽƚŚĂƚŐĞŶŽĐŝĚĞŝƐŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚĞĚĂƐƉĂƌƚŽĨŶŽƌŵĂůŝƚǇŝŶƐƚĞĂĚŽĨ
ďĞĐŽŵŝŶŐ Ă ƌĞĂƐŽŶ ƚŽ ĐŚĂŶŐĞ ŝƚ ? ?353 That next move is to change the 
normality. For jurisprudence, this would involve constructing a concept of law 
that sees wicked legal systems as inherent in it, because that is what 
historical experience requires, then re-imagining the discourse to take 
account of this. 
dŚĞƌĞĂƌĞĂŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚǁĂǇƐŽĨƐĞĞŝŶŐƚŚĞEĂǌŝƉĂƐƚĂƐ ‘ŶŽƌŵĂů ? ?dŚĞ
first, which Stone rejects, is something akin to historicisation, to incorporate 
the Holocaust into the dominant empiricist/realist philosophy of historical 
ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶ ? ^ƵĐŚ ĂƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞĐĂŶŐŽĂƐĨĂƌĂƐŽǀĞƌƚƵƌŶŝŶŐƚŚĞ  ‘ƌƵƉƚƵƌĞ ?
thesis, both in legal and historical discourse, by placing the Holocaust within 
normal processes of historical development and legal continuity. However, it 
does not necessarily, and in practice often does not, mean overturning its 
ensuing incorporation within conventional historiographical metanarratives, 
Žƌ ŝƚƐĞůĨĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞƚŚĞƵŶĚĞƌůǇŝŶŐƌĞĂƐŽŶƐĨŽƌƌĞŶĚĞƌŝŶŐEĂǌŝůĂǁĂƐ ‘ŶŽŶ-ůĂǁ ? ?
dŚĞ ƐĞĐŽŶĚ ǀĞƌƐŝŽŶ ŽĨ ŶŽƌŵĂůĐǇ ? ĂƉƉĂƌĞŶƚ ŝŶ ^ƚŽŶĞ ?Ɛ ǁŽƌŬ ? ŐŽĞƐ ĨƵƌƚŚĞƌ ? /ƚ
ĂĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞƐ ƚŚĞ  ‘ŽƌĚŝŶĂƌǇ ? ŶĂƚƵƌĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ,ŽůŽĐĂƵƐƚ ĂƐ Ă ŚŝƐƚŽƌǇ ůŝŬĞ ĂŶǇ
other, and to that eǆƚĞŶƚ ĂĐĐĞƉƚƐ ŝƚ ĂƐ Ă ƉĂƌƚ ŽĨ  ‘ŶŽƌŵĂůŝƚǇ ? ? tŚĂƚ ĂƉƉĞĂƌƐ
abnormal and incomprehensible became normal in an historical and legal 
context that in important ways resembles our own. This enables the 
deconstruction of the false opposition between the norm and the exception 
that tends to inform debates about the Holocaust,354 and founds the 
inclusion of the Nazi past within historical discourse and its intrinsic 
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comparability with other historical events. It also leads to a questioning of 
what the implications for our dominant theoretical paradigms are, whether in 
legal or historical scholarship, if the Holocaust can be part of, and caused by, 
ƚŚĂƚ ŶŽƌŵĂůŝƚǇ ? ƚ ƚŚĞ ŚĞĂƌƚ ŽĨ ^ƚŽŶĞ ?Ɛ ƌĞĂƐŽŶŝŶŐ ŝƐ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶǀŝĐƚŝŽŶ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ŝŶ
order to think through Nazism, we must recognize an inevitable complicity 
ǁŝƚŚŝƚ ? ?355 This complicity is central to the role of the Holocaust in critiquing 
jurisprudential discourse.356 
dŚĞ ŬĞǇ ĂƐƉĞĐƚƐ ŽĨ ^ƚŽŶĞ ?Ɛ ƐĐŚŽůĂƌƐŚŝƉ ƚŚĂƚ ĂƌĞ ƌĞůĞǀĂŶƚ ĨŽƌ ŵǇ ĐƌŝƚŝƋƵĞ ŽĨ
jurisprudential discourse are, therefore, its  commitment to being guided by 
the history of the Holocaust, the recognition that this history is fundamentally 
 ‘ŶŽƌŵĂů ? ĂŶĚ ǇĞƚ ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƐ ĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞƐ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ĚŽŵŝŶĂŶƚ ŚŝƐƚŽƌŝŽŐƌĂƉŚŝĐĂů
paradigm, and the need to reconstruct historical discourse in order to take 
account of the Holocaust. These features are present to varying degrees in 
the legal theoretical writing of Fraser and Rundle. They have resonance for a 
critique of jurisprudence ďĂƐĞĚŽŶƚŚĞƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚŝƚŝŐŶŽƌĞƐƚŚĞ ‘ƌĞĂů ?
history of Nazi Germany in favour of a hypothetical limit-case version, and 
which employed a moment of rupture to effectively exclude Nazi law from 
the discussion of the concept of law, whether based on positivist or natural 
law philosophical principles. The following discuss ion will show that even 
attempts to explicitly integrate Nazi law are highly problematic when they 
come from within jurisprudence, because they are directed and constrained 
by the theoretical paradigms that have underpinned it ?Ɛ ĞŶŐĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ since 
the postwar period. Only a historically-led, external critique can get to the 
bottom of the relationship between the concept of law and the Nazi legal 
system. 
III. ŽŵƉĞƚŝŶŐŝƌĞĐƚŝŽŶƐ ? ‘dŽǁĂƌĚƐĂ:ƵƌŝƐƉƌƵĚĞŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĞ,ŽůŽĐĂƵƐƚ ?Žƌ
 ‘dŚĞ/ŵƉŽƐƐŝďŝůŝƚǇŽĨĂŶǆƚĞƌŵŝŶĂƚŽƌǇ>ĞŐĂůŝƚǇ ? ? 
A Competing Directions for Jurisprudence 
I have noted that although David Fraser and Kristen Rundle share some 
common ground in terms of their critique of jurisprudential treatment of the 
Third Reich, they adopt very different approaches when it comes to 
refocusing its attention on Nazi law. Once the imperative of allowing Nazi 
Germany a fuller contribution to our understanding of the concept of law is 
established, the question remains which of these approaches, if either, is 
most effective for doing so. This section will introduce the different 
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approaches of the two legal theorists and highlight some of the key 
similarities and differences. Section IV will then carry through the argument 
ƚŚĂƚ &ƌĂƐĞƌ ?Ɛ ŝƐ ƚŚĞ ŽŶůǇ ŽƉƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƚǁŽ ƚŚĂƚ ĐŽŶĨŽƌŵƐ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂů
understanding of the Holocaust advanced by Stone. As with Stone, I will 
adopt Ă ĐůŽƐĞ ƌĞĂĚŝŶŐ ŽĨƐŽŵĞŽĨ&ƌĂƐĞƌĂŶĚZƵŶĚůĞ ?ƐĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚƐ ŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽ
reveal their key points and relationship to one another. 
Fraser attempts to undermine the notion of Nazi law as non-law from both 
historical and legal theoretical perspectives, by outlining a more complex 
empirical picture of the role of law in the Nazi state and the Holocaust and by 
challenging the veracity of the prevailing jurisprudential discourse that 
frames the issue, that of positivism versus natural law. He makes the case for 
greater historical awareness, because, in his view, a progressive 
ũƵƌŝƐƉƌƵĚĞŶĐĞ ŝŶ ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ,ŽůŽĐĂƵƐƚ  ‘ĐĂŶŽŶůǇďĞŵĂĚĞŵĂŶŝĨĞƐƚ ŝĨǁĞ
actively engage in the necessary rigorous, concrete, social and political 
analyses of the phenomena aŶĚ ŝĚĞĂƐ ǁŝƚŚ ǁŚŝĐŚ ǁĞ ĂƌĞ ĐŽŶĨƌŽŶƚĞĚ ? ?357 
Equally, he rejects the conceptualisation of EĂǌŝ ůĂǁ ĂƐ  ‘ŶŽŶ-ůĂǁ ? ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ
philosophical claim that  ‘other hermeneutics, including one that would offer 
a mirror image of the Nazi state as deeply imbued with a legalistic and legal 
self-ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ ?ŵƵƐƚŶŽƚďĞŶĞŐůĞĐƚĞĚ ? ?358  
This is partly predicated on an emphasis on the normalcy inherent in the 
Holocaust, which challenges the narrative of rupture that permeates 
jurisprudential treatment of Nazi Germany.359 Thus he sees the Holocaust as 
 ‘ƚŚĞ ĐƵůŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĂĐƚƐ ŽĨ ŽƌĚŝŶĂƌǇ ƉĞŽƉůĞ ŝŶƚŚĞ ŽƌĚŝŶĂƌǇ ĐŽƵƌƐĞ ŽĨ
ĞǀĞŶƚƐ ǁŝƚŚŝŶ ŽƌĚŝŶĂƌǇ ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚĂů ĂŶĚ ůĞŐĂů ƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞƐ ? ?360 &ƌĂƐĞƌ ?Ɛ
theoretical arguments about law in relation to the Nazi past are inextricably 
entwined with this understanding of the nature of the Holocaust, which is 
informed by a detailed empirical analysis ŽĨ ŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂů ĞǀĞŶƚƐ ? &ƌĂƐĞƌ ?Ɛ
ĞǀĂůƵĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ ůĂǁ ?ĂŶĚŚŝƐĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶŽĨ  ‘Ă ũƵƌŝƐƉƌƵĚĞŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĞ,ŽůŽĐĂƵƐƚ ? ?
begins with the Holocaust as history, the history of the Holocaust. At the 
same time the alternative, exceptionalising approach, which underpins 
narratives based on criminality and rupture is rendered problematic by his 
empirical and theoretical insights.361 Fraser recognises the unusual and 
traumatic aspects of the Holocaust while remaining grounded in its essential 
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ordinariness, which opens it up to the possibility of evaluation, and brings it 
within the realms of jurisprudence:  
Only by positing an argument in which it is possible to at one and the 
ƐĂŵĞ ĂŶĚ ƚŝŵĞ ĚĞƉůŽǇ ƚŚĞ ^ŚŽĂŚ ĂƐ ƵŶŝƋƵĞ ? ĂƐ ĂŶ ĞƚŚŝĐĂů  “ĞǆƚƌĞŵĞ
ŶŽǀĞůƚǇ ? ĂŶĚ ƚŽ ŶŽŶĞƚŚĞůĞƐƐ ĂƐƐĞƌƚ ƚŚĂƚ ŝƚ ŝƐ ŽƉĞŶĂŶĚ ĂǀĂŝůĂďůĞ ƚŽ
analysis and comprehension, to an immanent critique, is a jurisprudence 
of ĂŶĚĂĨƚĞƌ “ƵƐĐŚǁŝƚǌ ?ƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ ?362 
This situates the theoretical challenges of the Holocaust for jurisprudence at 
ƚŚĞ ũƵǆƚĂƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĂƚ ǀĞƌǇ ŶŽƌŵĂůĐǇ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞĞƚŚŝĐĂů  ‘ĞǆƚƌĞŵĞŶŽǀĞůƚǇ ?ŽĨ
the Holocaust as a whole. The fact that such barbarism can occur within an 
ĞƐƐĞŶƚŝĂůůǇ  ‘ŶŽƌŵĂů ? ůĞŐĂů ƐĞƚƚŝŶŐ ĂŶĚbe committed by fundamentally 
 ‘ŽƌĚŝŶĂƌǇ ?ƉĞŽƉůĞƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƐƚŚĞƌĞĂƐŽŶĂŶĚƚŚĞƉŽƐƐŝďŝůŝƚǇĨŽƌĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŶŐ ‘ůĂǁ
ĂĨƚĞƌƵƐĐŚǁŝƚǌ ? ?ƐǁŝƚŚŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂůƚŚĞŽƌǇ ?ƚŚĞ,ŽůŽĐĂƵƐƚĞǆƉŽƐĞƐĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞƐ
to law that are innate to it, but could not easily be seen without i t. These 
ĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞƐ ůŝĞ ǁŝƚŚŝŶ ƚŚĞ ũƵǆƚĂƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ  ‘ŶŽƌŵĂůŝƚǇ ? ĂŶĚ  ‘ŐĞŶŽĐŝĚĞ ? ? ďƵƚ ƚŽ
access them it is first necessary to deconstruct the narrative of rupture that 
underpins jurisprudential discourse. 
Rundle ?Ɛ ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ draws explicit links between Nazi law, the history of the 
Holocaust and legal theory, and to this extent moves beyond the existing  
jurisprudential discourse. Her scholarship explores and connects the 
empirical and theoretical aspects of law and the Nazi state, and engages with 
historical research, or at least historical sources that shed light on the role of 
law in Nazi Germany. This results in a more nuanced account of natural law 
than has previously been applied to the Nazi legal system. Her Fullerian 
philosophical framework finds its concrete manifestation in the everyday life 
of Jews living under Nazi law before, during and after Kristallnacht. This is 
evidenced by the accounts of daily life contained in the contemporary diaries 
of Jewish residents of Nazi Germany. The observations of those who write 
about living under persecution within the Nazi state reinforce her 
philosophical conviction that  ‘ƚŚĞ ƉŽƐƐŝďŝůŝƚǇ ŽĨ ŚĂǀŝŶŐ Ă  “ůŝĨĞ ? ? Žƌ ŵŽƌĞ
ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂůůǇ ? Ă  “ĚĂŝůǇ ůŝĨĞ ? ? ĐŽƌƌĞƐƉŽŶĚƐ ŝŶ ƐŽŵĞ ĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĂƚŝǀĞ way with the 
ƉƌĞƐĞŶĐĞŽĨůĂǁ ? ?363  
Rundle also refers to Nazi laws themselves to support her conviction that 
November 1938 represented a transformation from  ‘legal ? persecution to 
 ‘non-legal ? extermination of the Jews. Thus, ƐŚĞ ƌĞũĞĐƚƐ ĂŶ  ‘ĞǆƚĞƌŵŝŶĂƚŽƌǇ ?
interpretation of earlier Nazi laws, exemplified by the Nuremberg Laws, as 
leading inexorably to the Holocaust. Rather, she argues, these laws set the 
parameters for the continuation of Jewish social activity, which was later 
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taken away in spite of, not because of them.364 From November 1938, Rundle 
argues that the parasitic influence of Nazism on the legal system engendered 
 ‘Ădegenerative process that involved successively greater departures from 
ĐŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶĂů ƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚƐ ŽĨ ůĞŐĂůŝƚǇĂƐƚŝŵĞƉƌŽŐƌĞƐƐĞĚ ? ?365 The experience of 
the Jewish population under Nazi law before 1938 was one of ever 
decreasing circles of social activity, but always remaining above a minimum 
threshold below which the possibility of acting as a legal subject is expunged. 
Accordingly, while the Nazi anti-Jewish legislative programme took shape 
predominantly before the war,  ‘ QƚŚĞ ƉŽůŝĐǇ ŽĨ ĞǆƚĞƌŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ ƚŚĂƚ ƐŚŽƌƚůǇ
followed belonged to an extra-legal world of SS directives that remained, at 
all times, contingent on the whims of those who had the power to issue 
ƚŚĞŵ ? P366 
By 1938, the Jewish subject of Nazi law had been living under an 
oppressive, grossly discriminatory and incrementally pathological legal 
order for over five years. But even in the early months of 1938, there 
were stil l  authorities to report to and rules to follow, forms to fi l l  out 
ĂŶĚ ƐŝŐŶ ? ĂŶĚ ŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐ ƚŽ ƌĞĐĞŝǀĞ ĂŶĚ ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ƚŚĞŵ  Q Ƶƚ ŽǀĞƌ ƚŚĞ
course of that year, the modes of Nazi oppression expanded in their 
variety and escalated in their effects until, on the night of 9 -10 
November, there was wanton destruction and defilement, brutal 
violence and murder, arbitrary arrest and transportation to 
concentration camps for no apparent crime. This, we are told [by 
ĐŽŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇĂĐĐŽƵŶƚƐ ? ?ŝƐǁŚĞŶ “ĚĂŝůǇů ŝĨĞ ?ĞŶĚĞĚ ?367
ZƵŶĚůĞ ?ƐĂĐĐŽƵŶƚ ŝƐŵŽƌĞƚŚĂŶĂƐƚƌĂŝŐŚƚĨŽƌǁĂƌĚĂƐƐĞƌtion of Nazi law as non-
law founded on assumptions about Nazi history and exclusively abstract 
reasoning about the necessary connection between law and morality. While 
ZƵŶĚůĞ ĚŽĞƐ ĞŶĚŽƌƐĞ ĂŶĚ ĚĞǀĞůŽƉ&ƵůůĞƌ ?ƐŶĂƚƵƌĂů ůĂǁƚŚĞŽƌǇ ? ŝƚƐĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ
to the Nazi state is flexible, allowing for the possibility of Nazi law up to a 
ƉŽŝŶƚ ? dŚĞ ƋƵĂŶƚŝƚĂƚŝǀĞ ĨůĞǆŝďŝůŝƚǇ ƉĞƌŵŝƚƚĞĚ ǁŝƚŚŝŶ &ƵůůĞƌ ?Ɛ ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚ ŽĨ ůĂǁ
reaches a point of qualitative disintegration, Rundle argues, after 
Kristallnacht. At that point the elements constituting lawfulness, including 
the minimum of legal agency, were no longer present. 
In terms of the discourse itself, therefore, ZƵŶĚůĞ ?Ɛ ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ŝƐ ƚŽ ĚƌĂǁ ŽŶ
and contribute to jurisprudence, attempting to develop a more sophisticated 
account of Fullerian natural law theory through its application to the 
Holocaust. Her criticism of the existing discourse does have merit. She is 
correct to identify that part of the problem contributing to its currently 
circumscribed scope is that Hart and Fuller did not deal in any real detail with 
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Nazi law and did not directly address the Holocaust.368 They were largely 
focused on a particular example from the Nazi past: a case that took place 
after the end of the war, involving an instance of Nazi law not concerned 
specifically with the persecution or extermination of Jews. However, this 
reflects the fact that there is something fundamental at stake, above and 
beyond the restricted scope of the debate, which Rundle attempts to expand. 
The legacy of the Hart-Fuller debate limited the discourse around 
jurisprudence and the Nazi past, but it was also ultimately not really about 
Nazi law.369 
&ƌĂƐĞƌ ?ƐƐĐŚŽůĂƌƐŚŝƉ ?ďǇĐŽŶƚƌĂƐƚ ? ŝƐƉƌŝŵĂƌŝůǇĐŽŶĞƌŶĞĚǁŝƚŚŚŝŐŚůŝŐŚƚŝŶŐĂŶd 
dealing with the underlying problems inherent in a discourse that 
perpetuates a founding misconception about the nature of Nazi law. Whereas 
ZƵŶĚůĞ ƐƚĂƌƚƐ ǁŝƚŚ &ƵůůĞƌ ?Ɛ ŶĂƚƵƌĂů ůĂǁ ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇĂŶĚ ĂƉƉůŝĞƐ ŝƚ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ
evolution of the Nazi legal regime, FrasĞƌ ?Ɛ ƐƚĂƌƚŝŶŐ ƉŽŝŶƚ ŝƐ ƚŚĞ ,ŽůŽĐĂƵƐƚ
itself. He uses this to critique the existing discourse as a whole, exposing it as 
unhelpful to the advancement of understanding of the role of law in the Third 
Reich, particularly as it was used to perpetrate the Final  Solution. Fraser 
details the complexity of Nazi history and the context of Nazi law to expose 
ƚŚĞ ĨĂůůĂĐǇ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ  ‘EĂǌŝ ůĂǁ ĂƐ ŶŽŶ-ůĂǁ ? ƚŚĞƐŝƐ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ĚĞĨŝĐŝĞŶĐŝĞƐ ŝŶ Ă
discourse centred on natural law and positivism when applied to the 
Holocaust. Consequently, &ƌĂƐĞƌ ?ƐĐĂůůĨŽƌĂ ‘ũƵƌŝƐƉƌƵĚĞŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĞ,ŽůŽĐĂƵƐƚ ?ŝƐ
ĂůŵŽƐƚ ĚŝĂŵĞƚƌŝĐĂůůǇ ŽƉƉŽƐĞĚ ƚŽ ZƵŶĚůĞ ?Ɛ ĐůĂŝŵ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ  ‘ŝŵƉŽƐƐŝďŝůŝƚǇ ŽĨ ĂŶ
ĞǆƚĞƌŵŝŶĂƚŽƌǇ ůĞŐĂůŝƚǇ ? ? dŚĞ ĨŽƌŵĞƌ ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌƐ ŝƚ ŝŵƉĞƌĂƚŝǀĞ ƚŚĂƚ ŝŵƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐ
ŽĨ ƚŚĞ  ‘ůĂǁ-full-ŶĞƐƐ ? ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ,ŽůŽĐĂƵƐƚ Ăre recognised, while the latter is 
equally certain that the use of law for extermination in the way of the Nazi 
genocide is not possible within a legal framework. 
B Confronting the Jurisprudential Contradiction 
The fundamental difference between the arguments of Rundle and Fraser is 
the extent to which Fraser assert the complicity of law with the Holocaust. 
This theoretical engagement, not just with the lawfulness of the Nazi legal 
system but with the role of the Holocaust within that system and its 
implications for other modern legal systems, is unusual within the legal 
academy. Frederick DeCoste has commented on this recently,370 claiming: 
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Evil  as a force in human affairs has not occupied postwar intellectual 
practice in the West. This is not to say that the evil  revealed by the 
Holocaust and other Disasters of the murderous twentieth century has 
ďĞĞŶ ŝŐŶŽƌĞĚ Žƌ ĨŽƌŐŽƚƚĞŶ ? /ƚ ŚĂƐŶ ?ƚ ? /ƚ ŝƐ ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ƚŽ ƐĂǇ ƚŚĂƚ ŽƵƌ
practices of engaging and interrogating that now naked evil  have been 
something very much less than central to our disciplines.
371
 
,Ğ ĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞƐ ?  ‘ƐƵƌĞůǇ ƌĞŵĂƌŬĂďůǇ ? ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚĞƌƐ ŚĂǀĞ ŚĂĚ ŵŽƌĞ ƚŽ ƐĂǇĂďŽƵƚ
the matter than have academic lawyers who have with very rare exception 
stood mute since the Hart-&ƵůůĞƌĚĞďĂƚĞŽĨƚŚĞ ůĂƚĞ  ? ? ? ?Ɛ ? ?372 Putting to one 
ƐŝĚĞĞŽƐƚĞ ?ƐďƌŽĂĚĞƌĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚƐĂďŽƵƚĂŐĞŶĞƌĂůĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐĨĂŝůƵƌĞƚŽĐŽŵĞ
to terms with evil,373 it is clear that the Holocaust, as a feature of the Nazi 
past, has been largely absent from jurisprudential debates. Instead the 
discourse related to the Third Reich revolves around the philosophical 
dialogue between natural law and positivism that emerged from the Hart-
Fuller debate.374 This dialogue has turned away from its origins as a response 
to the Nazi state and the contrasting approaches and conclusions of Rundle 
and Fraser comprise two ways of addressing the paradox represented by a 
jurisprudential discourse that does not engage with Nazi Germany even while 
large parts of it are devoted to an account of the validity of law that in theory 
incorporates such a wicked legal system as its original case. 
The contradiction that lies at the heart of jurisprudential discourse about the 
Holocaust is central to understanding their different perspectives. In 
jurisprudential discourse, it is not self-evident what the implications are for 
applying either the positivist or opposing natural law paradigms to the case of 
Nazi Germany, because of the restricted parameters of the debate and the 
underlying narrative and isolation from historical research that excludes the 
historical case of Nazi law from genuine examination. ZƵŶĚůĞ ?ƐƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞ to 
the jurisprudential contradiction does involve criticism of some of the limits 
on jurisprudential discourse imposed by the Hart-Fuller debate. She asserts, 
for example, that ƚŚĞĚĞďĂƚĞŚĂƐďĞĞŶ ‘ƚŝŐŚƚůǇĐŝƌĐƵŵƐĐƌŝďĞĚďǇƚŚĞĚĞĐůĂƌĞĚ
commitments of the competing legal philosophies on the matter of whether 
ůĂǁĂŶĚŵŽƌĂůŝƚǇĂƌĞŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌŝůǇĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂůůǇƐĞƉĂƌĂďůĞ ? ?375  
,Ğƌ ŵĂŝŶ ĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐ ? ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ? ĂƌĞ  ‘ǁŚĞƚŚĞƌ ƚŚĞ ĚŽŵŝŶĂŶƚ ŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚations of 
Nazi law in mainstream legal philosophy are adequate to the task of 
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ĞŶůŝŐŚƚĞŶŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ŶĂƚƵƌĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ :ĞǁŝƐŚ ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ ŽĨ EĂǌŝ ůĂǁ ? ?376 and the 
ĞǆƚĞŶƚƚŽǁŚŝĐŚ  ‘much effort is still devoted to defending, as the best account 
of the nature of law, legal philosophies that embrace rather than alienate the 
examplĞ ŽĨƚŚĞǁŝĐŬĞĚůĞŐĂůƐǇƐƚĞŵ ? ?i.e. versions or descendants of Hartian 
positivism.377 Thus, the features of the current discourse that exercise Rundle 
centre on its perceived over-emphasis on the separability thesis, and how this 
has resulted in key aspects of Lon &ƵůůĞƌ ?Ɛ ĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚ ďĞŝŶŐ ŽǀĞƌůŽŽŬĞĚ ?
especially the role of the agency and experience of those living under the 
relevant laws in founding legal validity. Far from rejecting the relevance of 
the philosophical question of the validity of Nazi law, as she claims Fraser and 
Vivian Grosswald Curran do,378 ZƵŶĚůĞ ?ƐĂŝŵŝƐƚŽƌĞŽƌŝĞŶƚƚŚĞĚĞďĂƚĞƚŽƐŽŵĞ
extent towards the Third Reich, but principally towards other factors relevant 
ƚŽƚŚĞǀĂůŝĚŝƚǇƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶĂŶĚƚŽǁĂƌĚƐĂƌĞŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ&ƵůůĞƌ ?ƐƐĐŚŽůĂƌƐŚŝƉ ? 
In this context, ZƵŶĚůĞ ?ƐƚŚĞƐŝƐďĞĐŽŵĞƐĂƌĞĂĐƚion against a particular sort of 
positivistic constraint imposed on the discourse by the legacy of the Hart-
Fuller debate. She observes: 
The Nazi legislative program against the Jews, which saw to the removal 
of those legally defined as Jewish from civic, cultural, and economic l ife 
in Germany, is widely regarded in legal philosophy as tragic proof that 
law has no intrinsic moral worth. Beyond this general diagnosis, 
however, the major debates of legal philosophy reveal no serious 
examination of the specifi cities of the Jewish experience of Nazi law, nor 
of the factual coincidence of the decline of the legal persecution of the 
Jews and the advent of policies, including the extermination program, 
that proceeded extra-legally.
379
 
This argument is concerned with the prioritisation within parts of the 
discipline of the analytical jurisprudence of Hart over an at best 
undernourished and at worse misleading ŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ&ƵůůĞƌ ?Ɛ natural law 
ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ? ,Ğƌ ƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ŝƐ ƚŽ ŐŝǀĞ &ƵůůĞƌ ?Ɛ ǁƌŝƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ƉƌŽƉĞƌ ĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽn it 
deserves, and re-apply it to the Nazi past in order to reinvigorate both it and 
the case it makes for invalidating at least the exterminatory parts of Nazi law. 
Ultimately, of course, demonstrating the unlawfulness of the Holocaust 
renders Nazism largely irrelevant for jurisprudence, removing its alleged 
focus on the lowest common denominator that concerns Rundle. Similar 
criticisms of jurisprudence have, by contrast, led Fraser to move beyond the 
positivism/natural law dichotomy, and challenge whether the question of 
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validity is the most productive way of advancing understanding of the 
relationship between jurisprudence and the Holocaust.  
tŚŝůĞ ƚŚĞ ĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞĚ ůĞŐĂů ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚŝĞƐ  ‘ĞŵďƌĂĐĞ ƌĂƚŚĞƌ ƚŚĂŶĂůŝĞŶĂƚĞ ?ƚŚĞ
EĂǌŝ ůĞŐĂů ƐǇƐƚĞŵ ? ĂŶĚ ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞ  ‘ƚƌĂŐŝĐ proof that law has no intrinsic moral 
ǁŽƌƚŚ ? ŝŶ ƚŚĞŽƌǇ ? ŝŶ ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ůĞŐĂů ƐĐŚŽůĂƌƐŚŝƉ ŝŶƚŚŝƐĂƌĞĂ ŝƐĨŽƵŶĚĞĚŽŶƚŚĞ
ŵǇƚŚ ŽĨ ĂďĞƌƌĂƚŝŽŶ ? ƌƵƉƚƵƌĞĂŶĚEĂǌŝ ůĂǁĂƐ  ‘ŶŽŶ-ůĂǁ ? ?380 The jurisprudential 
ƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŝƐƐƵĐŚƚŚĂƚ ‘ŝf we are to construct an historical memory of the rule of 
law and the Holocaust, within an ideological and political tradition which 
cherishes and values law, that memory must rely on the radical discontinuity 
of the period 1933- ? ? ? ? ?dŚĞEĂǌŝƐƚĂƚĞŵƵƐƚďĞĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝǌĞĚĂƐĂ “ĐƌŝŵŝŶĂů
ƐƚĂƚĞ ? ŝŶǁŚŝĐŚ  “ůĂǁ ?ĞǆŝƐƚĞĚŝŶĨŽƌŵŽŶůǇ ? ?381 This is a false construction of 
history and law, because it denies the fundamental relationship between law 
and the Holocaust revealed by a detailed analysis of the history of Nazi 
Germany.382 It also denies the implication for jurisprudence ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ǁĞĂƌĞĂůů
Ɛƚŝůů “Ğǀŝů ?ůĂǁǇĞƌƐďĞĐĂƵƐĞǁĞĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞƚŽĞǆŝƐƚŝŶƚŚŝƐĐŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞƐƚĂƚĞŽĨůĞŐĂů
ĂŵŶĞƐŝĂ ĂŶĚ ĂƐ ďĞŶĞĨŝĐŝĂƌŝĞƐ ŽĨ ůĂǁ ?Ɛ ĐŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶƚ ƐĞůĨ-amnesty and self-
ĚĞŶŝĂů ? ?383 /Ŷ ƐŚŽƌƚ ? ŝƚ ĚĞŶŝĞƐ ůĂǁ ?Ɛ ĐŽŵƉůŝĐŝƚǇin the horrific excesses of the 
Nazi state. 
dŚĞ ƐƚĂƌƚŝŶŐ ƉŽŝŶƚ ŽĨ &ƌĂƐĞƌ ĂŶĚ ZƵŶĚůĞ ?Ɛ ĐƌŝƚŝƋƵĞŽĨ ƚŚĞ ũƵƌŝƐƉƌƵĚĞŶƚŝĂů
discourse is similar, then, in thaƚ &ƌĂƐĞƌ ĂŐƌĞĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞƌĞ ŝƐ  ‘a general  W 
although not universal and not without nuance  W belief in Anglo-American 
ůĞŐĂů ƚŚĞŽƌǇƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƐĞƉĂƌĂƚŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶůĂǁĂŶĚŵŽƌĂůŝƚǇ  QŝƐƐƚŝůů ƚŚĞďĞƐƚ
ǁĂǇŽĨĞǆƉŽƵŶĚŝŶŐĂŶĚĞǆƉůŽƌŝŶŐƚŚĞ ŝĚĞĂŽĨ  “Ğǀŝů ůĂǁ ? ? ?384 But the direction 
in which Fraser heads from this point is very different. Whereas Rundle does 
not address the underlying contradictions within the discourse in terms of the 
ƌĞĂƐŽŶƐ ǁŚǇ EĂǌŝ ůĂǁ ŝƐ ŶĂƌƌĂƚĞĚ ĂƐ  ‘ŶŽŶ-ůĂǁ ? ǁŚĞŶ ƚŚĞ ƉƌĞǀĂŝůŝŶŐ
philosophical position would disagree with this categorisation, this is at the 
ŚĞĂƌƚŽĨ&ƌĂƐĞƌ ?ƐƉƌŽũĞĐƚ. When he questions  ‘ǁhy law is absent from most of 
our discussions of the Shoah, and most importantly why the Shoah is absent 
from most of our discussions about law  ?ŝƚĂůŝĐƐ ĂĚĚĞĚ ? ? ?385 Fraser confronts 
underlying questions about the concept of law: whether law can have a moral 
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 ƌŽƵŐŚƚ ƚŽ ů ŝŐŚƚ ŽŶ ŵĂŶǇ ŽĐĐĂƐŝŽŶƐ ŝŶ &ƌĂƐĞƌ ?Ɛ ǁƌŝƚŝŶŐ ? ĂƐ ǁĞůů ĂƐ ƚŚĂƚ ŽĨ &ƌĞĚĞƌŝĐŬ
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legal academy in Section I of Chapter One. 
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foundation following the Holocaust, what might underpin the rule of law 
where both positivist and natural law accounts fail to convince, and what are 
the narrative limits of law.  
These questions represent part of a critical examination of how and why the 
Holocaust is narrated as  ‘law-less ? rather than  ‘law-full ? ?/Ŷ&ƌĂƐĞƌ ?ƐĐĂƐĞ ?ƚŚĞ
experience of Nazi law reveals a construction of legality that forces us to 
reconsider the post-Holocaust legal conception of both law and the 
Holocaust. This refers back to the idea, referred to in earlier chapters,386 that 
an examination of the history of Nazi Germany causes us to revise both our 
understanding of the nature and functioning of the Nazi legal system and the 
jurisprudential concept of law that internalised and reproduces the pre-
existing interpretation. The differences highlighted between Fraser and 
ZƵŶĚůĞ ?Ɛ ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĞƐ ƚŽ ŚŽǁ ƚŚŝƐ ŝƐ ĂĐŚŝĞǀĞĚĂƌĞƐƚƌŝŬŝŶŐ ?ZƵŶĚůĞĂƉƉůŝĞƐĂŶ
updated Fullerian framework to Nazi law, while Fraser takes the historical 
phenomenon of the Holocaust as a whole and assesses its theoretical 
implications for law. Rundle critiques the dominant positivist account from 
the point of view of a particular conception of natural law, whereas Fraser 
seeks to challenge the legitimacy of applying positivism and natural law to 
the Nazi case. Rundle argues that law, properly conceived and understood, 
can only be responsible for persecution of a certain degree, while Fraser 
looks to investigate and expose the complicity of law in and through the 
Holocaust as a whole.  
Section IV illustrates ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞƐĞ ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐ ŵĞĂŶ ƚŚĂƚ &ƌĂƐĞƌ ?Ɛ ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ
corresponds muĐŚŵŽƌĞĐůŽƐĞůǇǁŝƚŚ^ƚŽŶĞ ?ƐǁŚĞƌĞĂƐ ZƵŶĚůĞ ?ƐŝƐƵŶĚĞƌŵŝŶĞĚ
by some unresolved jurisprudential and historiographical problems. Whereas 
Rundle remains wedded to the opposition of law and non-law, and the 
structure of positivism and natural law, Fraser moves outside of this. Rundle ?Ɛ 
use of the history of Nazi Germany, notwithstanding her explicit attempt to 
reorient jurisprudence towards it, show that any attempt to reconstruct how 
jurisprudence understands the Third Reich is dependent on adopting an 
external perspective. This is a perspective that understands the history, has 
not internalised the positivist or naturalist representation of Nazi law, and is 
not committed to the debate between positivism and natural law. 
IV.  dŚĞŵĂƚŝĐŽŵƉĂƌŝƐŽŶŽĨƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĞƐ ?  ‘ĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐůĂǁǇĞƌƐ  ?ŚĂǀĞ
with very rare exception stood mute since the Hart-Fuller debate of the late 
 ? ? ? ?Ɛ ? 
A Reflecting Stone in Fraser and Rundle 
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I argue that jurisprudence is prevented from engaging successfully with the 
Nazi legal system unless it moves beyond the limitations of the existing 
jurisprudential discourse and disciplinary paradigm to address the ordinary 
ŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨƚŚĞ,ŽůŽĐĂƵƐƚĂŶĚƚŚĞǁŝĚĞƌƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚŝĐĂů ŝƐƐƵĞƐ ŝƚƌĂŝƐĞƐ ?&ƌĂƐĞƌ ?Ɛ
ƉƌŽũĞĐƚ ŝƐĂůŝŐŶĞĚǁŝƚŚ^ƚŽŶĞ ?ƐŝŶŚŝƐƉƵƌƐƵŝƚŽĨƚŚŝs course, in questioning  ‘ƚŚĞ
ĐƌŝƚĞƌŝĂ ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ ǁŚŝĐŚ ƚŚĞ  “ĨĂůƐĞ ůĂǁ ? ƚǇƌĂŶŶǇ ŽĨ  “EĂǌŝ ůĂǁ ? ŵƵƐƚďĞĂŶĚŝƐ
ũƵĚŐĞĚ ? ?387 and ƐĞĞŬŝŶŐƚŽĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚ ‘ƐŽŵĞŽƚŚĞƌŶŽƌŵĂƚŝǀĞ ŽƌĞƚŚŝĐĂůƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞ
 QŝĨĂŶǇ ŝĚĞĂŽĨƚŚĞƌƵůĞŽĨůĂǁŝƐƚŽďĞƐĂǀĞĚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƚƌĂŐŝĐŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐal record 
ŽĨ ůĞŐĂůŝƚǇ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ^ŚŽĂŚ ? ? ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ  ‘ůĞŐĂů ƉŽƐŝƚŝǀŝƐŵ ŝƐ ŶĞǀĞƌ ĞŶŽƵŐŚ ? ?388 
Insofar as positivist accounts of law tolerate systems such as that in Nazi 
Germany in their advancement of positivism, they might be considered to be 
superficially embracing them as valid law. However, in the sense that they fail 
to engage both with the full complexity of Nazi law, and with the 
consequences of Nazi Germany for the version of law they advocate, such 
systems are effectively alienated from law. This is to the detriment of our 
understanding of how law functions under such conditions. It is as though for 
positivism the question is settled  W ǇĞƐEĂǌŝ ‘ůĂǁ ?ŝƐůĂǁďǇŶĂŵĞ ?ďƵƚŶŽƚůĂǁ
that has anything to do with us and our laws, or can add to our debate about 
the nature of law, or that can say anything at all about our moral and legal 
universe. It is bad law. Or rather, untouchable law.  
When moving beyond the question of the validity of Nazi law, the full 
complexity of the relationship between law and genocide become apparent 
ĂŶĚ ǁŝƚŚ ŝƚ ƚŚĞ ĨĂůůĂĐǇ ŽĨ ƐŝŐŶŝĨǇŝŶŐ ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ ƚǇƉĞƐ ŽĨ ůĂǁĂƐ  ‘ůĂǁ ?Žƌ  ‘ŶŽŶ-
ůĂǁ ? ?&Žƌ&ƌĂƐĞƌ ?ďƵƚŶŽƚĨŽƌZƵŶĚůĞ ?ƚŚĞŶĞĐĞƐƐŝƚǇŽĨĂƐŬŝŶŐƚŚĞƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶĂƚĂůů
is displaced by what actually occurred. The legal historical reality poses 
enough questions about the nature of law after the Holocaust. Rundle is 
ĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĞĚ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ ũƵƌŝƐƉƌƵĚĞŶƚŝĂů ŝƐƐƵĞ ŽĨ ǁŚĞŶ  ‘ůĂǁ ? ŝƐ ǀĂůŝĚ ĂƐ ůĂǁ ĂŶĚ
remains engaged in conversation with natural law and positivism. Despite the 
attention Fraser sometimes gives to the issue of demonstrating that Nazi law 
ǁĂƐŶŽƚ  ‘ŶŽŶ-ůĂǁ ? ?ƚŚŝƐ ŝƐĂƉƌĞŵŝƐĞƚŽĂďŝŐŐĞƌĐůĂŝŵƚŚĂƚĞŶƚŝƌĞůǇƌĞũĞĐƚƐƚŚĞ
discourse of natural law versus positivism as an unwelcome distraction to our 
legal theoretical understanding and interpretation of the Nazi past. On this 
ĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ZƵŶĚůĞ ?Ɛ ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ƐŚĂƌĞƐ ůŝƚƚůĞ ŝŶ ĐŽŵŵŽŶǁŝƚŚ ^ƚŽŶĞ ? &Ăƌ ĨƌŽŵ
ƐĞĞŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ,ŽůŽĐĂƵƐƚ ĂƐ  ‘ŽƌĚŝŶĂƌǇ ? ? ŝƚĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞƐƚŽĞǆĐůude it from the realm 
of the lawful. Far from using the Holocaust to critique the mainstream 
discourse, Rundle remains part of the discourse and excludes the Holocaust 
from it. And instead of taking a lead from the Holocaust as a historical 
ƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽŶ ?ZƵŶĚůĞ ?ƐƚĞƌŵƐŽĨƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞĂƌĞĚŝĐƚĂƚĞĚďǇĂŶĂƌƌŽǁĂƐƉĞĐƚŽĨ
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the question of the criteria for the validity of laǁĂƐƌĞǀĞĂůĞĚƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ&ƵůůĞƌ ?Ɛ
ƐĐŚŽůĂƌƐŚŝƉ ? dŚŝƐ ŝƐ ĂŐĂŝŶ ŶŽƚ ƚŽ ĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐĞ ůĂƌŐĞ ƉĂƌƚƐ ŽĨZƵŶĚůĞ ?Ɛ ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŝŶŐ
thesis, and particularly her valuable reinterpretation of Fullerian natural law. 
But there is, not least in the scholarship of Stone and Fraser, much more to 
say about the relationship between law and the Holocaust than this. 
The relationship between jurisprudence and the Holocaust cannot be 
explored effectively without taking into account the additional historical and 
theoretical issues highlighted by Stone and Fraser. To ignore these insights 
leads to a restricted form of jurisprudence that inevitably buys into its own 
contradictory narrative about the role of the Nazi past within legal theory, 
that it represents an aberration that exists outside ŽĨ  ‘ŶŽƌŵĂů ? ůĞŐĂů
development. This leads inexorably back to a jurisprudence that finds little or 
ůŝŵŝƚĞĚ ƌĞůĞǀĂŶĐĞ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ EĂǌŝ ƉĂƐƚ ? ZƵŶĚůĞ ?Ɛ ĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƐ ƚŽ ŵŽǀĞ ďĞǇŽŶĚ ƚŚŝƐ
narrative and bring Nazi Germany into the jurisprudential debate are 
insightful but only permit relevance of the Nazi past for a limited range of 
specific jurisprudential issues. Beyond this, her approach and conclusions 
ultimately reinforce the pre-existing discourse because they rely so heavily on 
its terms of reference and continue to deny the lawful nature of the 
,ŽůŽĐĂƵƐƚ ? ZƵŶĚůĞ ?ƐĚŝƐŵŝƐƐĂůŽĨƚŚĞ,ŽůŽĐĂƵƐƚĂƐŶŽƚ ůĂǁĂĨƚĞƌ  ? ? ? ?ŵĞĂŶƐ
that she only tackles the legal theoretical implications of one part of the 
advancing persecution and extermination of the Jews under the Nazi legal 
system. This is all she intends to do but, as with jurisprudential discourse in 
this area generally, this initial finding prevents further exploration of the 
broader philosophical consequences of the Holocaust. 
Fraser, by contrast, uses the Holocaust to critique the whole discourse 
around legal validity, which is part of the self-serving memory of law in the 
face of complicity in the Holocaust. He demonstrates in a range of historically 
ŽƌŝĞŶƚĞĚ ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ  ‘ŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚŝǀĞ ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ? ŽĨ ůĂǁǇĞƌƐ ŝŶƐŝĚĞ ĂŶĚ
outside of Nazi Germany treated what they were doing as law, and law was 
not in a position to stop them from implementing their genocidal policies. 
Fraser emphasises ƚŚĞ  ‘ŽƌĚŝŶĂƌǇ ? ŶĂƚƵƌĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ,ŽůŽĐĂƵƐƚ ĂŶĚƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶs the 
moral foundations of law and the failure of positivism and natural law to 
convince on a closer examination of the Nazi state. By doing so he aligns 
himself with Stone in terms of asking big philosophical questions of his 
discipline from a point of view that includes the Holocaust as part of, not 
distinct from, that same discipline. ZƵŶĚůĞ ?ƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚdoes not fall within the 
ƐĂŵĞ ĐƌŝƚŝĐĂů ĨƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬ ĂƐ ^ƚŽŶĞ ?Ɛ and pursues different philosophical 
commitments altogether.  
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Rundle is aware of the  ‘ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚ ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚŝĐĂů ĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚƐ ?389 that 
distinguish ŚĞƌǁŽƌŬĨƌŽŵ&ƌĂƐĞƌ ?Ɛ. The closest she comes to moving outside 
of ũƵƌŝƐƉƌƵĚĞŶƚŝĂů ĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞ ŝƐ ĂŶ ĂĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞŵĞŶƚ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ƚŚĞƌĞ ƌĞŵĂŝŶƐ Ă
ĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂů ŝŶĐŽŚĞƌĞŶĐĞǁŝƚŚŝŶŽƵƌƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨ ůĂǁƚŚĂƚ  QĐĂŶŽŶůǇďĞ
bridged if law is required to come to terms with itself, at both a conceptual 
ĂŶĚ ĞƚŚŝĐĂů ůĞǀĞů ? ?390 Notwithstanding this acknowledgement, she does not 
really confront this problem in her writing. This is to a large extent a 
consequence of the different aims of their respective research. These are to 
some extent revealed in the way Rundle locates her research in contrast to 
&ƌĂƐĞƌ ?Ɛ P 
Fraser and I both argue that the Nazi legal campaign against the Jews is 
capable of carrying the label of law, but we do so for different reasons, 
and this leads us to different conclusions. I grant the Nazi legal program 
against the Jews the title of law in order, first, to highlight the 
qualitative differences within the forms through which the persecution 
of the Jews was carried out and, second, to explore the philosophical 
implications of these differences, including what we might learn from 
the coincidence of the demise of law and the advent of the 
extermination program. Fraser, by contrast, grants the Nazi legal 
program against the Jews the title of law for two different reasons: to 
expose the self-serving legal memory of the role of law in the Holocaust 
that l ies behind the characterization of Nazi law as not law, and to 
advance an instrumental conception of legality in which any outcome is 
ostensibly possible through the use of law.
391
 
Rundle suggests that her conclusions are, in one respect at least, shared with 
Fraser but their reasons for reaching those conclusions are different. 
However, her critique inevitably centres on the issue that most interests her, 
the question of the validity of Nazi law. Thus she says of Fraser that  ‘ŝt is clear 
ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĞ ĚĞůŝďĞƌĂƚĞůǇ ďƌŽĂĚ ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶ ŚĞ ĞŵƉůŽǇƐ ƚŚĂƚ ŚŝƐ  “ũƵƌŝƐƉƌƵĚĞŶĐĞ ?
is not one that is intended to be, like the more orthodox theories, an account 
ŽĨ ǁŚĂƚ ŵĂŬĞƐ ůĂǁ  “ůĂǁ ? ? ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƐĞŶƐĞ ŽĨ ǁŚĂƚŵĂŬĞƐ ůĂǁ valid ? ?392 This is 
absolutely true. Fraser is not primarily concerned with the validity question 
because it is not deemed to be the most interesting or important legal 
theoretical question to ask in respect of the Nazi past.  
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392
 ZƵŶĚůĞ ? ‘ZĞǀŝĞǁŽĨ>ĂǁĨƚĞƌƵƐĐŚǁŝƚǌ ? (n 319 )  ? ? ? ?^ŝŵŝůĂƌůǇ ? ‘ Q&ƌĂƐĞƌĐŽŶĐĞŝǀĞƐŽĨŚŝƐ
project as outside of, or unrelated to, the mainstream jurisprudential debate between legal 
ƉŽƐŝƚŝǀŝƐŵ ĂŶĚ ŶĂƚƵƌĂů ůĂǁ ? ? ĂŶĚ ŚŝƐ ƵŶĚĞƌƚĂŬŝŶŐ ŝƐ  ‘ƐƋƵĂƌĞůǇconcerned with what 
perceptions of Nazi law can teach us about how jurisprudential understandings are 
ĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚĞĚ ƌĂƚŚĞƌ ƚŚĂŶ ŚŽǁ ƚŚĞ ĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ŽĨ Ă  “ǁŝĐŬĞĚ ůĞŐĂů ƐǇƐƚĞŵ ?ƚĞƐƚƐƚŚĞƚŚĞŽƌĞƚŝĐĂů
ĐŽŚĞƌĞŶĐĞŽĨŽƉƉŽƐŝŶŐĂĐĐŽƵŶƚƐŽĨůĞŐĂůǀĂůŝĚŝƚǇ ? ? 
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The more compelling concern for Fraser is highlighted by the following 
statement: 
We can no longer, if we ever could, find solace in some simplistic 
jurisprudential or historical assertion about the fundamentally and 
inherently flawed nature of the system under Nazi tyranny. Life and law 
were, and are, more complicated than that. Nazi law continues to haunt 
not just the continent of Europe, but casts its shadow over the world of 
Anglo-American law and jurisprudence.
393
  
This is also the more vital question for jurisprudence. This is made apparent 
by the limitations of the current jurisprudential debate, the insights of 
^ƚŽŶĞ ?Ɛ ƐĐŚŽůĂƌƐŚŝƉ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ůĞƐƐŽŶƐ ĨƌŽŵ ŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂů ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ĂďŽƵƚ ƚŚĞ
Holocaust. In her critique of Fraser, Rundle ignores the key significance of 
&ƌĂƐĞƌ ?Ɛ ƐĐŚŽůĂƌƐŚŝƉ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ ŶĂƚƵƌĂů ůĂǁ ?ƉŽƐŝƚŝǀŝƐŵ ĚĞďĂƚĞ ǁŝƚŚŝŶ
jurisprudence. This is not, as Rundle claiŵƐ ? ƚŚĂƚ &ƌĂƐĞƌ ĂĚǀĂŶĐĞƐ  ‘ĂŶ
ŝŶƐƚƌƵŵĞŶƚĂů ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ůĞŐĂůŝƚǇ ? ? EŽƌ ŝƐ ŝƚ ƚŚĂƚ &ƌĂƐĞƌ ƐŚŽƵůĚ ƉĂǇ ŵŽƌĞ
ĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ĞǆŝƐƚŝŶŐ ĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞ ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ ŝƚ ŚĂƐ ŝŶĐůƵĚĞĚ ĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƐ  ‘ƚŽ
ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĂĐŽŚĞƌĞŶƚĞǆƉůĂŶĂƚŝŽŶŽĨǁŚǇEĂǌŝůĂǁǁĂƐ “ŶŽƚ ůĂǁ ? ? ?394 Rather, it is 
that the existing discourse has taken that part of legal scholarship that might 
be concerned with the theoretical implications of the Holocaust down a cul -
de-sac in its engagement with the Nazi past: a dead end that reveals little 
ĂďŽƵƚ ůĂǁ ?ƐƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉwith the Holocaust, ignores the insights of historical 
research, and has circumscribed the development of jurisprudential 
understanding of the concept of law in this area. 
This is ĨƵƌƚŚĞƌ ĞůĂďŽƌĂƚĞĚ ǁŝƚŚ ƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ƚŽƐŽŵĞĂƐƉĞĐƚƐŽĨ^ƚŽŶĞ ?ƐǁƌŝƚŝŶŐ
emphasised in Section II. Stone understands the HoůŽĐĂƵƐƚ ĂƐ  ‘ŽƌĚŝŶĂƌǇ ? ŝŶ
nature. He uses it to critique the limitations and contradictions within the 
discourse and the dominant empiricist/realist philosophical paradigm within 
the discipline from which its more radical implications are excluded. He also 
advocates a conception of historiography that comes to terms with rather 
ƚŚĂŶ ŝŐŶŽƌĞƐ ƚŚĞ ŝŶĞǀŝƚĂďůĞ ĐŽŵƉůŝĐŝƚǇ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ  ‘ƵƐ ? ĂŶĚ  ‘ƚŚĞŵ ? ? ŝŶ ƚŚĞ
theoretical tenets that underpin both orthodox historicism and the 
Holocaust. Historical research into Nazi Germany has largely moved from an 
aberration model to an integration or normalisation model. Stone would shift 
it again to a model that re-evaluates its own foundations in the light of the 
Holocaust. Jurisprudence, by contrast, remains implicitly wedded to the 
postwar, Nuremberg, criminal state conception of the Third Reich,395 and so 
struggles to reach the first stage of recognition of normality advocated by 
Stone.  
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 &ƌĂƐĞƌ ? ‘ “dŚŝƐŝƐEŽƚů ŝŬĞŶǇŽƚŚĞƌ>ĞŐĂůYƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ ? ? ?Ŷ35) 125. 
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 ZƵŶĚůĞ ? ‘ZĞǀŝĞǁ ŽĨ>ĂǁĨƚĞƌ ƵƐĐŚǁŝƚǌ ? ?Ŷ319) 202. 
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 See Chapter Six on this. 
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A definitive answer to the question of the validity of Nazi law, even if this 
were possible396 and whichever way it went, would contribute little towards 
the re-evaluation of the dominant jurisprudential paradigms in light of the 
complicity of law with the Holocaust. Nor would it do much to integrate the 
Holocaust within the existing discourse, because its present exclusion is not 
based on jurisprudential arguments that claim wicked laws are invalid. It is 
based on an entrenched understanding of the role of law and the nature of 
the Holocaust that cannot permit the latter to encroach too far on the 
ĨŽƌŵĞƌ ? &ŽůůŽǁŝŶŐ ^ƚŽŶĞ ?Ɛ ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚŝĐĂů ůĞĂĚ ?jurisprudential scholars should 
heed what more recent, more sophisticated, more detailed historical 
research has to say and  ‘ƌĞƐŝƐƚ ƚŚĞ ƚĞŵƉƚĂƚŝŽŶ ƚŽ ůĞĂƉ  Q ƚŽ ƚŚĞconclusion 
that the correct, best or sole historical template for a study of the Nazi 
period, and even of the atrocities of the Hitler state, is that of crime, criminal 
ůĂǁĂŶĚĐƌŝŵŝŶĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?397   
Equally, current jurisprudential discourse has a similar s tructure to that of the 
historical discourse criticised by Stone. It is somewhat polarised between two 
entrenched competing positions, in this case natural law and positivism. This 
cycle of competing positions, while often extremely refined and advanced, 
hinders approaches that look for answers outside of the scope of the 
ĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞ ? dŚŝƐ ŝŵƉĞĚŝŵĞŶƚ ŝƐ ŝůůƵƐƚƌĂƚĞĚ ďǇ ĂƐƉĞĐƚƐ ŽĨ ZƵŶĚůĞ ?Ɛ ĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐŽĨ
&ƌĂƐĞƌ ?Ɛ ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ? ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇ ƚŚĞ ǁĂǇ ƐŚĞ ĂĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ ŚĞ ĐŝƚĞƐ ŚŝƐ
project as existing outside of the issue of the validity of Nazi law and the 
positivism/natural law debate. At the same time she offers a critique centred 
on the terms of the debate, encouraging Fraser to engage with scholars who 
do provide a theoretical argument for the claim that Nazi law is not law. An 
alternative starting point of the Holocaust itself, revealed in historical 
research and the writing of Stone to be fundamentally ordinary, mandates 
that there must be a relationship with law on some level that demands 
exploration and explanation. It is then its more exceptional features that lead 
to a re-evaluation of the nature of this relationship. 
dŚĞ ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐ ŚŝŐŚůŝŐŚƚĞĚ ŝŶ ƚŚŝƐ ƐĞĐƚŝŽŶ ƐŝƚƵĂƚĞ &ƌĂƐĞƌ ?Ɛ ǁƌŝƚŝŶŐ ǁŝƚŚŝŶ Ă
ƐŝŵŝůĂƌ ƚŚĞŽƌĞƚŝĐĂů ĂŶĚ ĞŵƉŝƌŝĐĂů ĂŐĞŶĚĂ ƚŽ ^ƚŽŶĞ ?Ɛ ? ĂƐ Ă ĐƌŝƚŝƋƵĞ of the 
dominant paradigm that challenges the value of the discourse altogether. By 
contrast they mark Rundle out as continuing within the conventional  
jurisprudential framework, focused on the narrow question of the validity of 
Nazi law as opposed to how the Holocaust may question the foundational 
                                                                 
396
 Fraser points out that lĂĐŬŽĨĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚ ĂďŽƵƚǁŚĂƚĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞƐƚŚĞƌƵůĞŽĨůĂǁŝƐ ‘ĞŶĚůĞƐƐ
because law is in reality l ittle more than the persuasive deployment of rhetorical devices and 
ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĞƌƐ ? ?Fraser, Law After Auschwitz (n 23) 78. 
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tenets of this discourse. This is primarily an external critique ŽĨ ZƵŶĚůĞ ?Ɛ
work. She is interested in the question of the validity of Nazi law and wants to 
contribute to the understanding of Fullerian naturalism in this area to 
readdress imbalances and misunderstandings within the discourse rather 
than to undermine it completely. However, alongside the aforementioned 
 ‘ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚ ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚŝĐĂů ĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚƐ ? ? ĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽǁŚŝĐŚZƵŶĚůĞ ŝƐƚĂĐŬůŝŶŐ
a narrow jurisprudential problem while Fraser addresses broader legal 
theoretical issues,398 ŝƚ ŝƐ ĞĂĐŚ ĂƵƚŚŽƌ ?Ɛ ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŶĂƚƵƌĞ ŽĨƚŚĞ
Holocaust itself that directs them to their philosophical conclusions. Rundle 
applies an existing theoretical model to certain aspects of the Nazi legal 
system that are related to the Holocaust, and reaches conclusions about the 
ŝŵƉŽƐƐŝďŝůŝƚǇ ŽĨ  ‘ĞǆƚĞƌŵŝŶĂƚŽƌǇ ůĞŐĂůŝƚǇ ? ? &ƌĂƐĞƌ ƐĞĞ  ƚŚĞ ,ŽůŽĐĂƵƐƚ ĂƐ ƚŚĞ
same challenge to fundamental conceptions of liberal legality as Stone does 
for historical writing, and reaches very different conclusions about the 
possibility of a jurisprudence of and after Auschwitz. 
This first critique of Rundle relies on the philosophical understanding of the 
Holocaust offered by Stone, and the legal theoretical inclinations of Fraser, to 
neither of which Rundle necessarily subscribes. The argument I construct 
with reference to these positions is that jurisprudential writing about the 
Holocaust, in which Rundle is engaged on some level, cannot be effectively 
accomplished without taking into account the full historical context and the 
broader philosophical questions and challenges raised by the Holocaust. This 
asseƌƚŝŽŶŚĂƐŝŵƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌZƵŶĚůĞ ?ƐƐĐŚŽůĂƌƐŚŝƉďĞĐĂƵƐĞŝƚŝŵƉůŝĞƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ
self-imposed limitations on the scope of her research to some extent 
compromise its ability to address the full range of encounters between 
jurisprudence and the Holocaust. This is ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇ ŝŶƚĞƌŵƐŽĨŚŽǁ^ƚŽŶĞ ?Ɛ
understanding of the Holocaust - as an event that is both ordinary and which 
raises generally applicable challenges to our dominant philosophies - can 
cause us to rethink some of the theoretical tenets underlying jurisprudence 
when a similar understanding is applied to jurisprudence.  
Rundle is not attempting to deconstruct jurisprudential discourse as a whole, 
or to move beyond the validity question, or get to the bottom of the inherent 
complicity between law and the Holocaust; quite the opposite. She instead 
seeks to reinforce natural law in the face of the dominance of positivism, is 
primarily interest in the validity question, and denies the complicity of law 
with the exterminatory phase of the Final Solution. However, she is 
attempting to re-direct jurisprudence to take better account of the history of 
Nazi law and this aspect offers the possibility of an internal critique of her 
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 ^ĞĞƚŚĞĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ‘ũƵƌŝƐƉƌƵĚĞŶĐĞ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ůĞŐĂůƚŚĞŽƌǇ ?ŝŶƚŚŝƐ
context in Section II of Chapter One. 
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work, based on specific historical and philosophical flaws that emerge from it. 
These issues mean that her thesis fails to convince fully on its own terms. 
B Ŷ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂůƌŝƚŝƋƵĞŽĨZƵŶĚůĞ ?ƐƌŐƵŵĞŶƚƐ 
The ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂůĐƌŝƚŝƋƵĞŽĨZƵŶĚůĞ ?ƐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ is connected to the external critique 
by the significance of the use of the Holocaust as history by Rundle in her 
articles, and the implications of her conclusion that the Final Solution was not 
lawful. There are some problems with this jurisprudential approach to Nazi 
law, particularly as a historical artefact. These are caused by the limited legal 
theoretical frame of reference employed by Rundle, in the form of the role of 
ůĞŐĂů ĂŐĞŶĐǇ ŝŶ ǀĂůŝĚĂƚŝŶŐ ůĂǁ ĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐ ƚŽ &ƵůůĞƌ ?Ɛ ŶĂƚƵƌĂů ůĂǁ ƚŚĞŽƌǇ ? ƚŚĞ
limited range of historical sources she refers to, and her interpretation of the 
non-exterminatory character of certain Nazi laws. There is insufficient scope 
to go into all of these in great detail here, but I will do so to the extent 
ŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇ ƚŽ ƐƵƉƉůĞŵĞŶƚ ƚŚĞ ĞǆƚĞƌŶĂů ĐƌŝƚŝƋƵĞ ĂĚǀĂŶĐĞĚ ĂďŽǀĞ ? ZƵŶĚůĞ ?Ɛ
focus on the Jewish experience in the Third Reich is an important perspective, 
but it overlooks the participant positions of other historical agents, which 
may support a different thesis from an alternative perspective.399 The 
experience of the Jewish legal, historical agent is therefore not fully 
ĐŽŶƚĞǆƚƵĂůŝƐĞĚ ? ĂŶ ŝƐƐƵĞ ĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚĞĚ ƚŽ ďǇ ZƵŶĚůĞ ?Ɛ ƌĞůŝĂŶĐĞ ŽŶ Ă ĨĞǁ
contemporary diary accounts. The narrow focus and starting point of natural 
law theory dictates the type of historical sources Rundle refers to, those that 
elucidate the experience of Jews living under Nazi persecutory laws. It 
prohibits engagement with other perspectives that might raise additional 
legal theoretical issues or call her conclusions into question. Rundle is not 
ĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĞĚ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞƐĞ ? ŽŶůǇ ǁŝƚŚ ǁŚĂƚ &ƵůůĞƌ ?ƐĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨĂŐĞŶĐǇƐĂǇƐĂďŽƵƚ
the validity of Nazi law when related to a few examples of the Jewish 
experience. This almost automatically places her arguments within the scope 
of the existing debates about natural law and positivism, even while 
redirecting their attention back towards the Nazi past.  
dŚĞ ĞĨĨĞĐƚ ŽĨ ƚŚŝƐ ŽŶ ZƵŶĚůĞ ?Ɛ ĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚƐ ŝƐ ŝůůƵƐƚƌĂƚed by the way her 
historical sources are used to support the idea that pre-1938 legislation such 
as the Nuremberg laws were law, and not exterminatory in character, 
whereas post-1938 persecution was exterminatory and lawless. This makes 
sense in the context of the quantitative flexibility allowed by Fuller in the 
ƐĐŽƉĞŽĨĂŐĞŶĐǇƉĞƌŵŝƚƚĞĚǁŝƚŚŝŶ ‘ůĂǁ ? ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞƉŽŝŶƚŽĨƋƵĂůŝƚĂƚŝǀĞĚĞƉĂƌƚƵƌĞ
                                                                 
399
 The laws governing non-Jewish citizens during the war, for example, would provide a 
ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚ ƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀŝƚǇ ? ƋƵĂůůǇ ? ƚŚĞ ƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞ ŽĨ EĂǌŝ 'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ?Ɛ ƐƚĂƚĞ ĐŽŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌŝĞƐ
provides yet another viewpoint to be considered (see Fraser, Law After Auschwitz (n 23) ch 4: 
 ‘ “dŚĞ KƵƚƐŝĚĞƌ ŽĞƐ EŽƚ ^ĞĞ ůů  ƚŚĞ 'ĂŵĞ Q ? P WĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶƐ ŽĨ 'ĞƌŵĂŶ >Ăǁ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ŶŐůŽ -
American World, 1933- ? ? ? ? ? ) ? 
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when the abuse of legal forms becomes too much. However, viewing the 
evolution of the Holocaust as a whole, the idea, for example, that the 
Nuremberg laws were not part of the exterminatory legal process requires 
serious examination. That leading Nazi figures may not have had 
extermination in mind when the laws were written, and indeed that the laws 
allowed some scope for social activity by the Jews subject to them, does not 
mean they were not part of the process of permanent revolution and 
cumulative radicalisation that led inexorably if not inevitably to the Final 
Solution. As some of the legal tools that distinguished and isolated the Jewish 
population from the rest of the Volksgemeinschaft, the Nuremberg laws 
certainly bear scrutiny as an important step along the way to extermination.  
The route to the Holocaust revealed by historical analysis was gradual, often 
improvised, ad hoc and localised, and developed and radicalised over time, 
with few centralised leaps in policy.400 Similarly the Nazi legal system, which 
contributed to this development, involved a complex mix of measures and 
rules, multiple sources of law, and an evolution away from the rule of law to 
a Nazi conception of law as ideology.401 Neither of these historical accounts 
fits well with positing a qualitative disconnection between important 
discriminatory laws prior to 1938 and an acceleration of persecution to 
extermination after Kristallnacht. The use of the absence of genocidal 
motivation of Nazi officials in, for example, 1935 as evidence for a qualitative 
leap to non-law in 1938, after which genocide moved onto the agenda, 
appears to require in other cases an intentionalist interpretation of historical 
development. The long-running dispute between intentionalists and 
functionalists among the community of historians of Nazi Germany up to the 
1990s, which witnessed a gradual erosion of the intentionalist viewpoint, 
demonstrated that history does not work that way, and certainly not this 
history.402 Nazi genocidal policy and law moved forward step by step, 
gathering momentum from individual events and collective action and in that 
context to claim that persecutory laws in 1935 were nothing legally to do 
with genocide is not in my view supportable. 
In the same way, the broadly progressive nature of the persecution and 
extermination of the Jews by the Nazi state, which is acknowledged by 
Rundle at least for the period prior to 1938, calls into question the historical, 
and perhaps theoretical, veracity of the jump to extra-legality claimed for 
November 1938. This is especially to the extent to which such a jump then 
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 This can be seen in microcosm in the development of the Concentration Camp system, 
recent scholarship about which is discussed in Sections III and IV of Chapter Five. 
401
 On the role of ideology in the Nazi legal system see Section II of Chapter Five. 
402
 See Kershaw, The Nazi Dictatorship (n 76), especially chapter 4. 
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ŚĂƐƚŚĞƌĂĚŝĐĂů ŝŵƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĐŽŶƐŝŐŶŝŶŐƚŚĞ,ŽůŽĐĂƵƐƚƚŽƚŚĞƌĞĂůŵŽĨ  ‘ŶŽŶ-
ůĂǁ ? ĂŶĚ ? ŝŶ ĚŽŝŶŐ ƐŽ ? ĨŽƌĞĐůŽƐŝŶŐ ĨƵƌƚŚĞƌjurisprudential inquiry. Whatever 
else can be said, there was a legal system in Nazi Germany, and there were 
an increasingly radical set of policies that resulted in the implementation of 
the Final Solution. These two features of the Third Reich were not completely 
separate, and it is equally impossible to detach pre-1938 persecution from 
post-1938 extermination by denying any form of legal continuity across that 
ďŽƌĚĞƌ ? ǀĞŶ ŝĨ ŽŶĞ ǁĞƌĞ ƚŽĂƌŐƵĞƚŚĂƚ  ‘ĞǆƚƌĂ-ůĞŐĂů ?ĞůĞŵĞŶƚƐĚŽŵŝŶĂƚĞĚƚŚĞ
anti-Jewish programme during the War, this would not deny a relationship 
between law and the Holocaust that raises fundamental questions about the 
complicity of the modern jurisprudential concept of law with the Nazi legal 
system. It is not justifiable therefore to posit a legal and consequently 
historical break along this process at an essentially arbitrary point.403 
ZƵŶĚůĞ ?Ɛ selective deployment of historical sources is unconvincing as well in 
the wider context of historical research that exposes continuity, evolution 
and radicalisation, but not qualitative leaps or the notion of a need for 
original genocidal intent from 1935 to link what was then law with what 
becomes extermination after 1938. From a jurisprudential perspective 
ZƵŶĚůĞ ?Ɛ ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ĂůƐŽ recycles if not precisely the same debates then a 
comparable (mis)rendering of Nazi Germany and a similar paradigm of 
thought that is preoccupied with the separability question to the detriment 
of empirical examination of complex and varied forms of law. She attempts to 
reform jurisprudence by calling on a certain unhistorical version of the Nazi 
past and fails to do so in a way that properly accounts for the experience of 
law in Nazi Germany because of this version and by remaining wedded to a 
particular account of natural law theory. 
This combination of the internal and external critiques of her argument about 
the validity of Nazi law in the Holocaust and the reorientation of 
jurisprudence to take account of it, show up certain flaws that mean it cannot 
convincingly be used to address the challenges to jurisprudential discourse 
highlighted in the previous chapters. Philosophically Rundle is unwilling and 
unable to address the complicity of law in the Third Reich when the 
Holocaust is understood as a seamless aspect of the Nazi state. 
Jurisprudentially, she is committed to demonstrating Fullerian natural law 
theory and does not challenge the wider problems within the discourse in 
how it addresses Nazi Germany. Historiographically her concept of law leaves 
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 Central genocidal decisions were not taken in 1938, or soon afterwards. The use of the 
test of human agency under the law on the basis of some contemporary diarist accounts to 
posit a point of rupture from law to non-law around November 1938 is in this sense 
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no room for how historical events actually developed and is based on too 
selective a collection of sources to provide a full picture of the Nazi legal 
system. Some of these points find echoes in how her arguments clash with 
ƚŚĞ ŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ,ŽůŽĐĂƵƐƚ ĂĚǀĂŶĐĞĚďǇ^ƚŽŶĞ ?&ƵƌƚŚĞƌŵŽƌĞ ?^ƚŽŶĞ ?Ɛ
reading of the Holocaust as essentially ordinary but representing a 
philosophical challenge to disciplinary paradigms founded on similar 
ŵŽĚĞƌŶŝƐƚ ƚĞŶĞƚƐ ĨŝŶĚƐ ŶŽ ƉĂƌĂůůĞů ŝŶ ZƵŶĚůĞ ?Ɛ ǁƌŝƚŝŶŐ ? ^ŚĞ ŝŶƐƚĞĂĚ ĂŝŵƐ ƚŽ
alienate the Holocaust from the concept of law and remain within the 
ƐƚƌŝĐƚƵƌĞƐ ŽĨ ũƵƌŝƐƉƌƵĚĞŶƚŝĂůĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞ ?&ƌĂƐĞƌ ?ƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ? ŝƚŚĂƐďĞĞŶƐŚŽǁŶ ?
ƐŚĂƌĞƐ ŵƵĐŚ ŝŶ ĐŽŵŵŽŶ ǁŝƚŚ ^ƚŽŶĞ ?Ɛ ĂŶĚ ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƐ ĐŽŵƉĞůůŝŶŐ ƌĞĂƐŽŶƐ ĨŽƌ
jurisprudence to engage much more with Nazi Germany and really try to 
understand the implications of its legal system for the concept of law.  
V. Conclusion: Implications for Legal Scholarship 
The theoretical construction and historical understanding of the Holocaust 
put forward by Stone and Fraser opens up its relevance for contemporary 
jurisprudential questiŽŶƐǁŝƚŚŝŶ&ƌĂƐĞƌ ?ƐƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ?ĂŶĚůĞĂĚƐƚŽƚŚĞǀŝĞǁƚŚĂƚ
 ‘EĂǌŝ ůĂǁƐŚŽƵůĚƌĞŵĂŝŶĂƚƚŚĞĐĞŶƚĞƌŽĨŽƵƌũƵƌŝƐƉƌƵĚĞŶƚŝĂůĨŽĐƵƐƚŽĚĂǇ ? ?404 It 
is currently not, however. The positivist conviction that continues to hold 
sway in Anglo-American legal circles is fatally damaged by the historical 
example of Nazi Germany. The conviction that Nazi law is not relevant law, if 
it is law at all, has, notwithstanding its exclusion from this discourse, become 
central to other representations of the Nazi past within legal scholarship.405 
Consequently, it is not simply a matter of reintroducing the Nazi element to 
the existing positivist/natural law debate. Rather, the nature of the 
Holocaust, both as a traumatic historical phenomenon and a materialisation 
of Nazi law, means deconstructing this discourse altogether, moving outside 
of this narrow debate, and refocusing on the implications of the Holocaust for 
the concept of law. 
This critical approach to the mainstream discourses and dominant paradigms 
in their respective disciplines is apparent in the writing of both Stone and 
Fraser. In terms of the discourse, as Stone highlights the tendency to use the 
Holocaust as a trump card in philosophical debates, Fraser makes a similar 
point with respect to legal discourse. In terms of the underlying philosophical 
paradigms, Stone and Fraser both use notions of continuity and complicity to 
ďƌĞĂŬ ĚŽǁŶ ĨĂůƐĞ ďĂƌƌŝĞƌƐ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ƚŚĞ ƉĂƐƚ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚ ?  ‘ŽƵƌ ? ůĂǁ ĂŶĚ
 ‘ƚŚĞŝƌ ? ůĂǁ ? /Ŷ ŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂů ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ? ƚŚĞ ďƌŝŐŚƚ ůŝŶĞƐ ĚƌĂǁŶ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ŽƉƉŽƐŝŶŐ
posŝƚŝŽŶƐ Ăƚ ƚŚĞ ĂďƐƚƌĂĐƚ ůĞǀĞů ďĞĐŽŵĞ ƵŶƚĞŶĂďůĞ ? ĂƐ  ‘ĐŽŵƉĞƚŝŶŐ ůĞŐĂů ůŝĨĞ-
ǁŽƌůĚƐ ? ŝŶŚĂďŝƚĞĚ ďǇ  “Ğǀŝů ůĂǁǇĞƌƐ ? ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ŽŶĞ ŚĂŶĚ ĂŶĚ  “ƌĞĂů ? ůĂǁǇĞƌƐ  ?Žƌ
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 &ƌĂƐĞƌ ? ‘ “dŚŝƐŝƐEŽƚů ŝŬĞŶǇŽƚŚĞƌ>ĞŐĂůYƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ ? ? ?Ŷ35) 125. 
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just lawyers) on the other, coexist and struggle over the political and 
ũƵƌŝƐƉƌƵĚĞŶƚŝĂů ŵĞĂŶŝŶŐ ŽĨ  “ůĂǁ ? ? ?406 The correlation and continuity of ideas 
between different legal officials in the past, lawyers now and lawyers then, 
and legal scholars on opposing sides of academic debates is crucial to 
understanding the need to rethink aspects of jurisprudence in the wake of 
the Holocaust. It challenges the existing periodization of post-Holocaust law, 
ǁŚŝĐŚ ŝƐ  ‘ƚŚĞ ƚĞŵƉŽƌĂů ďĂƌƌŝĞƌ ǁŚŝĐŚ ƐĞĞŬƐ ƚŽ ƉƌĞǀĞŶƚ  Q ƚŚĞ ĞƐƐĞŶƚŝĂů
character of the Holocaust more generally from emerging from the myths of 
post-ǁĂƌũƵƌŝƐƉƌƵĚĞŶĐĞ ? ?407  
There is an equivalent to this ŝŶ ^ƚŽŶĞ ?Ɛ ǁƌŝƚŝŶŐ ? tŚĞƌĞthe Holocaust is 
treated as outside of the law, it is also used to uphold the orthodox 
ĞŵƉŝƌŝĐŝƐƚ ?ƌĞĂůŝƐƚ ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ƚŽ ŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂů ǁƌŝƚŝŶŐ ?tŚĞƌĞ ƚŚĞ  ‘ĞƐƐĞŶƚŝĂů
ĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌ ? ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ,ŽůŽĐĂƵƐƚ ŝƐ ĐŽŶƐŝŐŶĞĚ to the past, its traumatic and 
ongoing presence is prevented from impacting upon the dominant 
metanarratives underpinning the writing of law and history. By usurping the 
ŶĞĞĚ ƚŽ ƐĞƉĂƌĂƚĞ ĂŶĚ ĚŝƐƚŝŶŐƵŝƐŚ  ‘ďĞĨŽƌĞ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ĂĨƚĞƌ ?ƵƐĐŚǁŝƚǌ, and instead 
considerŝŶŐ ƵƐĐŚǁŝƚǌ ĂƐ ƚŚĞ  ‘ŶŽƌŵĂů ũƵƌŝƐƉƌƵĚĞŶƚŝĂů ƐƚĂƚĞ ? ? ƌĂƚŚĞƌ ƚŚĂŶ ƚŚĞ
ĞǆĐĞƉƚŝŽŶ ?&ƌĂƐĞƌŵŝƌƌŽƌƐ^ƚŽŶĞ ?ƐĐůĂŝŵĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞ,ŽůŽĐĂƵƐƚĂƐŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂůĂŶĚ
historiographical norm. The history of the Holocaust urges us both to 
integrate it into our conception of jurisprudence and transform that 
conception ŝŶ ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞ ƚŽ ŝƚ ? /ƚ ĐĂůůƐ ŽŶ ƵƐƚŽĂĐĐĞƉƚ ŝƚĂƐĂ  ‘ŶŽƌŵĂů ?ƉĂƌƚŽĨ
ůĞŐĂů ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ĂŶĚ ? ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ĂŶ ĂĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞŵĞŶƚ ŽĨ ůĂǁ ?Ɛ ĐŽŵƉůŝĐŝƚǇ
with it, to transform our appreciation of the role of law in genocide. 
Historiography has arguably been too successful at the first step in recent 
years, historicising the Nazi past to the point where its potential meta-
theoretical significance is sometimes overlooked altogether. The second step, 
a transformative re-evaluation, is problematic for both history and law, but 
the adoption of a Holocaust-led, critical perspective brings these questions to 
light and opens them for debate. This would aid jurisprudential discourse to 
break out of from its present structural limitations and explore the 
relationship between law and the Holocaust in much greater depth and 
detail. 
The importance of a robust evaluation of the history of the Holocaust is clear 
from the arguments presented in this chapter. It comes back to the point 
raised in relation to jurisprudential discourse that, in order for the concept of 
law to be truly universal, it must come to terms with the nature of law in 
wicked regimes including Nazi Germany. In order for this to happen, the 
history of the Nazi legal system needs to play a role. This chapter and previous 
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 Fraser,  ‘ǀŝů >Ăǁ ?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chapters have highlighted areas where the history of Nazi Germany 
contradicts the jurisprudential understanding of it. The next chapter builds by 
exploring some of these in more detail, including the emerging English 
language legal history of the Third Reich and a case study of recent historical 
scholarship about the Nazi concentration camp system. 
 
    
124 
 
Chapter Five: Learning Jurisprudential Lessons from the Historiography of 
EĂǌŝ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ? ‘ƚŚĞĞǆƚĞŶƚƚŽǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞƌĞǁĂƐactually an internal logic to 
ƚŚĞůĞŐĂůƐǇƐƚĞŵŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞEĂǌŝƌĞŐŝŵĞŝƐƐƚƌŝŬŝŶŐ ?408  
I. Introduction 
A. Taking Account of the Historiography of Nazi Germany 
Chapter Four argued that the nature of the historical Holocaust and its 
implications for law meant that it was necessary to challenge fundamentally 
the assumptions of jurisprudential discourse as it applies to the case of Nazi 
law.409 This chapter will use more conventional, empirical historical 
scholarship to reinforce and expand upon these arguments. It will use case 
studies of historical scholarship to demonstrate how misconceived the 
prevailing jurisprudential representation of Nazi Germany is, and consider 
some of the implications for jurisprudence of a historically sound 
understanding of law in the Third Reich. The historical scholarship examined 
in this chapter through its two case studies reveals that, in order to theorise 
Nazi Germany properly as a legal state, it is necessary for jurisprudence to 
acknowledge its complex nature. It must adopt a nuanced and differentiated 
approach appropriate to that complexity, rather than consigning it to the role 
of an unhistorical source of uncontroversial hypotheticals and subsuming 
Nazi law within the one-dimensional category of wicked legal systems.  
The case study research shows how Nazi history becomes much more 
interesting and relevant for jurisprudential scholars elucidating the concept 
of law, when its actual historical specificity is taken into account. It rejects the 
idea of Nazi Germany as a state of non-law without a legal framework 
recognisable to contemporary jurisprudence, or as representing a rupture 
from it. It advocates against the language of the extreme, drawing attention 
instead to the ordinariness of the lives and decisions of even concentration 
camp perpetrators. Finally it undermines the structural distinction between 
positivism and natural law in the context of the Third Reich by illustrating that 
neither adequately explains the nature of the Nazi legal system. The 
characteristics shown to be present in jurisprudential discourse in chapters 
Two and Three do not stand up to historical scrutiny in light of this research. 
In addition, the alternative offered by Kristen Rundle,410 to reorient 
jurisprudence towards a natural law narrative based on the Nazi experience, 
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 ,ĂƌƌǇZĞŝĐŚĞƌ ? ‘ǀĂĚŝŶŐZĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝů ŝƚǇĨŽƌƌŝŵĞƐŐĂŝŶƐƚ,ƵŵĂŶŝƚǇ PDƵƌĚĞƌŽƵƐ>ĂǁǇĞƌƐ
ĂƚEƵƌĞŵďĞƌŐ ? ŝŶ^ƚĞŝŶǁĞŝƐĂŶĚZĂĐŚůŝŶ ?The Law in Nazi Germany (n 67) 143. 
409
 dŚĞ ǁĂǇ ‘ũƵƌŝƐƉƌƵĚĞŶĐĞ ?ĂŶĚƌĞůĂƚĞĚƚĞƌŵƐĂƌĞƵƐĞĚŝŶƚŚŝƐĚŝƐƐĞƌƚĂ tion is explained in 
Section II of Chapter One, as is the use of terms to describe Nazi Germany, suc ŚĂƐ ‘EĂǌŝ
ƉĂƐƚ ? ? ‘dŚŝƌĚZĞŝĐŚ ?ĂŶĚƐŽŽŶ ? 
410
 Discussed in detail  in Sections III and IV of Chapter Four. 
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does not adequately account for the presence of law in the implementation 
of the Holocaust and the complexity and evolution of the system. 
The largely empirical history addressed in this chapter is complementary to 
the more theoretical approach adopted by Dan Stone for interrogating the 
jurisprudential understanding of Nazi law. Karin Orth, historian of the Third 
Reich, has argued that it is necessary to combine empirical and theoretical 
approaches across the humanities and social sciences when attempting to 
understand, for example, the behaviour of Nazi perpetrators. She asserts that 
 ‘ƚŚŝƐ ĂůŽŶĞ ĂůůŽǁƐ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƉůĂƵƐŝďůĞ  QĞǆƉůĂŶĂƚŝŽŶƐ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ
ďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ^^ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶĐĞŶƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ĐĂŵƉƐ ? ?411 /ŶĚĞĞĚ ? ŝŶ ŚĞƌ ǀŝĞǁ  ‘it 
seems axiomatic that the empirical findings of historians should be allied to 
ƚŚĞƚŚĞŽƌĞƚŝĐĂůĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĞƐŽĨƚŚĞƐŽĐŝĂůƐĐŝĞŶĐĞƐ ? ?412 This assertion is equally 
applicable to the relationship between the history of the Nazi legal system 
generally (of which the role of perpetrators is one feature) and 
jurisprudential consideration of the concept of law.413 
To the extent both that certain jurisprudential arguments depend on a 
misconceived and unhistorical interpretation of Nazi law, and that the actual 
experience of Nazi law is continuous with the jurisprudential understanding 
of the concept of law, the history of Nazi Germany has something to 
contribute to jurisprudential debate. This history underpins the claim that the 
jurisprudential representation of the Third Reich is flawed, in the same way 
that historiographical misconceptions about Nazi Germany currently inform 
jurisprudential arguments about, for example, wicked legal systems. And in 
the same way that assumptions about the nature of the Third Reich dictate 
its use as an uncontroversial extreme and rhetorical trump card, the versions 
of positivism and natural law that are constructed on the jurisprudential 
understanding of the Third Reich and are then reapplied to Nazi law, can also 
be challenged by a different historical rendering of the Nazi past. In this 
context it appears self-evident that a discipline relying on theories based on 
concrete assumptions about a past that survives predominantly as historical 
record should test its assumptions against the relevant historiographical 
findings. The conceptions of Nazi law that endure in historical research may 
not be sufficiently informed by legal theory to be imported directly into 
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 <ĂƌŝŶ KƌƚŚ ?  ‘dŚĞ ŽŶĐĞŶƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ĂŵƉWĞƌƐŽŶŶĞů ?ŝŶ:ĂŶĞĂƉůĂŶ ?EŝŬŽůĂƵƐtĂĐŚƐŵĂŶŶ
(eds), Concentration Camps in Nazi Germany: The New Histories (Routledge, 2010) 55. Some 
ŽĨKƌƚŚ ?ƐƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚŝƐĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞĚŝŶ sections III and IV of this chapter as part of the case study of 
concentration camp system research. 
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 Ibid. 
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 There is not scope in this dissertation for a comprehensive theorisation of the relationship 
between empirical and philosophical scholarship, and this is not necessary for what I am 
suggesting here.  
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jurisprudence or to address of themselves the questions of how to theorise 
Nazi law adequately. However, by taking account of this research, 
jurisprudential theorists can translate historiographical interpretations into 
legally relevant material from which answers to legal theoretical questions 
can be constructed for jurisprudence. 
B Selection of Case Studies 
The first case study is of the nascent English-language, legal historical 
research into the Nazi legal system itself, specifically with regard to the 
important role of ideology in Nazi law.414 This scholarship has begun to 
appear in the last few years, largely thanks to the influence of translated 
continental research into the Nazi legal system, particularly from German 
legal historian Michael Stolleis.415 It is not a unified, coherent body of 
scholarship, but is disparate because of its emerging nature. It is also not 
entirely contained within the historical discipline. Certain interdisciplinary 
influences, from philosophy in particular, are incorporated within the 
literature referred to in this chapter because of their legal historical focus on 
the role of ideology in Nazi law. This unifies the theme of the case study, the 
important question of how Nazi law is understood in terms of its relationship 
to Nazi ideology. This issue is pressing because it puts the Nazi legal system 
on the historiographical agenda in a disciplinary context where the 
importance of issues around ideology, ethics and morality in the Third Reich 
are increasingly recognised and examined.416  
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 The examples of the l iterature that will  be considered in this chapter in relation to Nazi 
ŝĚĞŽůŽŐǇĂƌĞ P^ƚŽůůĞŝƐ ?  ‘>ĂǁĂŶĚ>ĂǁǇĞƌƐ ? ?Ŷ62); Stolleis, The Law Under the Swastika (n 24); 
various contributors to Steinweis and Rachlin, The Law in Nazi Germany (n 67); Carolyn 
ĞŶƐŽŶ ĂŶĚ :ƵůŝĂŶ &ŝŶŬ ?  ‘/ŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ P EĞǁ WĞƌƐ ƉĞĐƚŝǀĞƐ ŽŶ EĂǌŝ >Ăǁ ?  ? ? ? ? ? )  ? ? ? )
Jurisprudence 341; and Herlinde Pauer-^ƚƵĚĞƌ ? ‘>ĂǁĂŶĚDŽƌĂůŝƚǇƵŶĚĞƌǀŝů ŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐ PdŚĞ
^^:ƵĚŐĞ<ŽŶƌĂĚDŽƌŐĞŶ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ? ? )Jurisprudence 367. This l iterature incorporates a mix of 
Anglo-American and continental scholars and some examples from disciplines other than 
history, particularly philosophy, whose relevant work is focused on the legal history of Nazi 
'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ? dŚĞ ůĞŐĂů ŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂů ĂƐƉĞĐƚƐ ŽĨ ĂǀŝĚ &ƌĂƐĞƌ ?Ɛ ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ĂƌĞ ŶŽƚ ŝŶĐůƵĚĞĚ ŚĞƌĞ
because his writing is addressed separately in Chapter Four. 
415
 The recent emergence, scope and content of a translated and original English-language 
legal historical scholarship of Nazi Germany is  discussed in Section III of Chapter One. ^ƚŽůůĞŝƐ ?
research is included here notwithstanding his German origins. While the focus of this 
dissertation is on the Anglo-American legal academy, this does not preclude it having access 
to English-language historical research that is cross-pollinated from, in this case, Germany. 
There is no inconsistency, therefore, in using historical material that originated from outside 
of the Anglo-American world to critique Anglo-American legal scholarship. 
416
 For example, Geoff Eley, Nazism as Fascism: Violence, Ideology, and the Ground of 
Consent in Germany 1930-1945 (Routledge, 2013); and Wolfgang Bialas and Lothar Fritze 
(eds), Nazi Ideology and Ethics (Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2014). 
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These aspects are now considered within historiography as an important 
contributor to the consensual basis of the regime and an essential ingredient 
in the decision-making of many of those living in the Third Reich. The 
recognition of widespread endorsement among German society of certain 
ideological claims has to a significant degree revised the totalitarian, 
repressive model of Nazi rule according to which the all-pervasive Gestapo 
ensured the compliance of society. It has also helps provide more persuasive 
and comprehensive explanations for the apparently incomprehensible 
actions of individuals within institutions such as the SS (Schutzstaffel), 
Gestapo, Wehrmacht and Einsatzgruppen, particularly when implementing 
the Final Solution.  The role of the legal system - its officials, rules and 
institutions - has become more important in how it contributed to both the 
terrorisation and regulation of the Third Reich, and its involvement in the 
Holocaust. The significance of ideology in shaping, underpinning and directing 
the Nazi legal system is particularly relevant for the jurisprudential 
understanding of Nazi law as it provides a framework for theorising the 
nature of the system as a manifestation of the concept of law. It also 
counteracts attempts to understand Nazi law through the paradigms of 
positivism and natural law, because it reveals historical features of the legal 
system that arguably mean it does not conform to either of these theoretical 
models, or the role they assign the Nazi regime as an archetypal wicked legal 
system. 
My analysis of this case study will focus on these points. First, what the 
history of the relationship between law and ideology in the Third Reich tells 
us that undermines the representation of Nazi Germany within 
jurisprudential discourse. Second, how the research suggests that the system 
can be theorised as law infused with ideology and why this goes beyond a 
cynical manipulation/instrumentalisation interpretation of Nazi government, 
which often underpins particularly naturalist arguments about wicked 
regimes. And third, why the ethical guidance of the legal system by Nazi 
ideology, along with other features of the legal regime, is not easily 
amendable to the classic, modern versions of positivism and natural law. This 
new scholarship is beginning to overturn the application of the discontinuity 
thesis to the idea of Nazi law, highlighted by historians in recent years ,417 
because its complexity and nuances prevent it from being easily labelled as 
the absolute other. 
The second case study encompasses recent historical literature about the 
nature and development of the concentration camp system in the Nazi 
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state,418 and has been selected for a number of reasons. It is relatively new 
scholarship so represents as far as possible the current state of 
understanding of the subject in the historical profession. The previous 
historiography of the concentration camp system in Nazi Germany has itself 
been subject to criticism, and awareness within the literature of these 
limitations is pertinent in this case. Many of the characteristics of the 
previous work criticised by the authors studied here, such as the insistence 
on points of rupture at certain times, a simplistic, totalitarian camp model, 
and a one-dimensional portrayal of those working in the camp system, are 
indicative of the underlying narrative that continues to influence the 
jurisprudential representation of Nazi Germany. I prefer, in my selection of 
materials, the general, thematic history of the concentration camp system 
over narratives of individual camps because the narrow focus of the latter 
precludes detailed engagement with the general state of previous 
scholarship. The broader focus of the case study is much more relevant to the 
jurisprudential issues highlighted in earlier chapters. 
I have also chosen the second case study because it is a fairly self-contained 
area of historical research, with a delineated output, and yet its findings 
touch on a number of different areas that are directly or indirectly relevant to 
law. It is consequently possible to discuss this research output in some detail 
within this chapter, in order to make the necessary points supporting my 
argument. The literature raises questions that are pertinent to the underlying 
narrative of rupture and discontinuity that informs the jurisprudential 
treatment of the Third Reich and its legal system. These include the role of 
law in the relationship between competing institutions such as the judiciary 
and SS and the evolutionary, improvised and ad hoc development of the 
camp system. They also include the background and motives of those tasked 
with implementing Nazi policy in the camps and enforcing and upholding the 
Nazi justice system. 
The emphasis of this historical research on the wider constellation of causes 
and functions of the concentration camp system, alongside its differentiated 
approach, is also methodologically revealing for the prevailing jurisprudential 
                                                                 
418
 In particular, beyond detailed studies of individual camps, the work of Nikolaus 
Wachsmann, Jane Caplan and others. See, inter alia, the chapters in Caplan and Wachsmann, 
Concentration Camps (n 411 ) ?tĂĐŚƐŵĂŶŶ ? ‘>ŽŽŬŝŶŐŝŶƚŽƚŚĞďǇƐƐ P,ŝƐƚŽƌŝĂŶƐĂŶĚƚŚĞEĂǌŝ
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(ed), Nazism, War and Genocide: New Perspectives on the History of the Third Reich  
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understanding of the Third Reich. It exposes the inherent contingency of the 
institutions and the agents acting within them; their inevitable reliance on 
the context in which they operated. As with the first case study, the 
application of historical methodology uncovers findings that question the 
preconceptions upon which jurisprudential references to Nazi Germany are 
based. The substantive historical findings about how the camp system 
actually developed and functioned expose evidence about the complexity of 
the system and the different forms of rules governing and influencing it. They 
also unearth the extent of continuity across previously erected artificial 
barriers at the start and end of the regime and the beginning of the war in 
1939. These findings undermine pre-existing conceptions about the 
centralised, hyper-organised, monolithic and totalitarian character of the 
state. At the same time they challenge the notion of an essentially criminal 
and arbitrary structure of decision-making and rule enforcement, and the 
concept of a rupture in legal and historical time surrounding the period of 
Nazi rule.  
Being more directly concerned with the Nazi legal system, the first case study 
includes literature specifically addressing the nature of Nazi law and its 
relationship with ideology. This research tackles head on the characterisation 
of Nazi  ‘ůĂǁ ? ĂƐ ŵĞƌĞůǇ ƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞ law or naturalist non-law, contradicting and 
confounding them both. The second case study has a different focus, on a 
particular operation within the state  W the concentration camp system  W used 
to implement Nazi policies against various sections of the population, and 
which came to be intimately involved in implementing the Final Solution. This 
operation intersects with the laws, officials and institutions of the legal 
system and is therefore able to bring to the fore some of the complexities of 
ĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƐƚŽĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚŝĂƚĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ‘ůĂǁ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ŶŽŶ-ůĂǁ ? ŝŶƚŚĞdŚŝƌĚZĞŝĐŚ ?ĂŶĚ
undermine claims of discontinuity between  ‘ĞǆƚƌĞŵĞ ? ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƐ ĂŶĚ
 ‘ŶŽƌŵĂů ? ůŝĨĞ ?tŚŝůĞƚŚĞǇŚĂǀĞĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚĨŽĐƵƐĞƐĂŶĚƚŽƐŽŵĞĞǆƚĞŶƚŚŝŐŚůŝŐŚƚ
different concerns about the current jurisprudential treatment of Nazi 
Germany, certain themes run through the literature from both case studies. 
These themes point to the direction of travel of historiography as a whole in 
its understanding of the Nazi regime.  
C Terminological Pitfalls 
Throughout this chapter it is important to be sensitive to the linguistic and 
interpretive particularities of the disciplines involved. When considering the 
interdisciplinary significance of historical research, the isolation between the 
different disciplines manifests itself in some of the terminology used within 
the literature. Simply put, particular words or phrases may have one meaning 
for lawyers and another for historians, and it is necessary to be sensitive to 
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this when writing across the boundary between the two disciplines. This is 
most apparent for two aspects of the case studies discussed here. The first 
terminological pitfall is in the tendency of the authors to refer to the Nazi 
ƐǇƐƚĞŵ ŽĨ  ‘ƚĞƌƌŽƌ ? ŝŶƚĞƌĐŚĂŶŐĞĂďůǇ ǁŝƚŚ ŽƚŚĞƌ ƉŚƌĂƐes intended to denote 
ŽƉƉƌĞƐƐŝǀĞ ƌƵůĞ ? dŚĞ ƚĞƌŵ  ‘ƚĞƌƌŽƌ ? ŝƐ ƵƐĞĚ ƋƵŝƚĞ ĨƌƋƵĞŶƚůǇ  ?Ğ ?Ő ? ƚŚĞ  ‘ůĞŐĂů
ƚĞƌƌŽƌ ? ĂŶĚ  ‘ĞǆƚƌĂ-ůĞŐĂů ƚĞƌƌŽƌ ? ŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚĞĚ ŝŶ EĂǌŝ ƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐ ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ'ĞƌŵĂŶ
society), but would often have different meanings when applied in a 
specifically legal context.419 Where it is unavoidable to use these phrases in 
ƚŚŝƐ ĐŚĂƉƚĞƌ ? ǁŚĞŶ ƌĞĨĞƌƌŝŶŐ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂů ůŝƚĞƌĂƚƵƌĞ ? ƚŚĞ ƚĞƌŵ  ‘ƚĞƌƌŽƌ ?
should be understood in the sense used in the historiography (i.e. as 
ĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞůǇƐǇŶŽŶǇŵŽƵƐǁŝƚŚ ‘ƌĞƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶ ? ) ?420
dŚĞƐĞĐŽŶĚƚĞƌŵŝŶŽůŽŐŝĐĂůƉŝƚĨĂůůůŝĞƐŝŶƚŚĞƵƐĞŽĨƚŚĞƚĞƌŵƐ ‘ůĞŐĂů ?ĂŶĚ ‘ĞǆƚƌĂ-
ůĞŐĂů ?ŐĞŶĞƌĂůůǇƚŽŝŶĚŝĐĂƚĞĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚĂƐƉĞĐƚƐŽĨƚŚĞƐǇƐƚĞŵŽĨEĂǌŝƌƵůĞ ?dŚŝƐŝƐ
particularly sensitive in the context of the jurisprudential validity question. In 
this chapter, generalised use of these terms conforms to conventions within 
the historiography in order to represent the scholarship accurately. This 
tends to distinguish between aspects of the system established according to 
the passage of laws pursuant to the conventional process of rule-making and 
aspects of the system established by other methods (such as Führer Orders). 
It should not be taken of itself to indicate a philosophical argument about the 
legal status of particular Nazi rules or actions or endorse this distinction from 
a legal-theoretical perspective. The application of these terms does not 
necessarily reflect a thoroughly argued or jurisprudentially sound 
understanding of these different concepts within the literature. Indeed, the 
 ‘ůĞŐĂů ? ? ?ĞǆƚƌĂ-legaů ? ŽƉƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ŚŝƐƚŽƌŝŽŐƌĂƉŚǇ ŽĨ EĂǌŝ 'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ŝƐ Ă
feature of the enduring influence of ƌŶƐƚ &ƌĂĞŶŬĞů ?Ɛ  ‘ĚƵĂůƐƚĂƚĞ ?ƚŚĞŽƌĞƚŝĐĂů
ĨƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬ ?ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ  ‘ůĞŐĂů ?ĐŽŶĨŽƌŵŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞŶŽƌŵĂƚŝǀĞƐƚĂƚĞĂŶĚƚŚĞ ‘ĞǆƚƌĂ-
ůĞŐĂů ? ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ƉƌĞƌŽŐĂƚŝǀĞ ƐƚĂƚĞ ?421 However, the substance of the research 
itself problematizes this construction of Nazi governance because of the 
amorphous nature of the legal system and the overlaps between ostensibly 
legal and non-legal rules, institutions and officials.422 
A final pitfall exists iŶ ƚŚĞ ũƵǆƚĂƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ůŝďĞƌĂů  ‘ŵŽƌĂůŝƚǇ ? ǁŝƚŚ EĂǌŝ
 ‘ŝĚĞŽůŽŐǇ ? ?In this dissertation I have employed ƚŚĞ ƚĞƌŵ  ‘ŵŽƌĂůŝƚǇ ? ǁŚĞŶ
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 For example in Victoria Sentas, Traces of Terror: Counter-Terrorism Law, Policing, and 
Race (OUP, 2014). 
420
 For example, as in Eric A Johnson, Nazi Terror: The Gestapo, Jews, and Ordinary Germans 
(Basic Books, 2000). 
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 Fraenkel, The Dual State (n 13). 
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 This is elucidated further throughout the case study discussions in sections II and III of this 
chapter. 
    
131 
 
addressing the role of value-judgments in jurisprudential discourse423 but 
ƌĞǀĞƌƚ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ƚĞƌŵ  ‘ŝĚĞŽůŽŐǇ ?in this chapter when tackling the value system 
underpinning the Nazi legal system.424 This differentiation primarily reflects 
the way the terms are used within the different discourses. Jurisprudential 
scholars such as Hart and Fuller and their intellectual descendants talk 
explicitly about the relationship between law and morality, while historians 
and philosophers will most commonly refer to Nazi ideology.425 This 
adherence to convention should not be interpreted as an endorsement of 
this distinction, especially given the claim of critical theory that liberal legality 
presupposes an ideological position as much as Nazi law.426 Its existence 
partly ƌĞĨůĞĐƚƐ ƚŚĞ ǁĂǇ ƚŚĞ ƚĞƌŵƐ  ‘ŵŽƌĂůŝƚǇ ? ĂŶĚ  ‘ŝĚĞŽůŽŐǇ ? ĂƌĞ ŐĞŶĞƌĂůůǇ 
understood - the former a system of values which can take on either a 
descriptive or normative character; the latter a system of political ideas with 
an often negative connotation  W which tends, problematically, to locate Nazi 
law and the jurisprudential concept of law in distinct realms. The difficulties 
with evaluating continuities between these spheres presented by this 
distinction are beyond the scope of this dissertation, except to the extent to 
which they form part of the naturalist association of law with a particular, 
normative conception of morality to the exclusion of other value systems, 
including Nazi morality, and thereby contribute to the rupture thesis.427 
II. The Implications of Nazi Law for Jurisprudential Discourse 
A The Jurisprudential Problem with Nazi Law 
The emerging scholarship about the role of ideology in the Nazi legal system 
will be used to challenge the historical understanding of Nazi law that prevails 
within jurisprudence, show that the experience of law in Nazi Germany is 
relevant in important ways to the concept of law, and expose flaws within the 
circumscribed scope of jurisprudential discourse and its structuring around 
natural law and positivism. I observed in Chapter One that the version of Nazi 
law that prevails within jurisprudence brings with it un-investigated 
assumptions about the legal system. These are on the one hand that it 
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 /ŽĐĐĂƐŝŽŶĂůůǇĚĞƉĂƌƚĨƌŽŵƚŚŝƐĐƵƐƚŽŵƚŽƌĞĨĞƌƚŽ ‘EĂǌŝŵŽƌĂůŝƚǇ ? ?ƉƌĞĐŝƐĞůǇƚŽĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐĞ
the point that it reflected a system of values largely accepted by German society and which 
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Nazi law for positivist and naturalist jurisprudential positions on the separability question. 
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fulfilled certain formal prerequisites, which would make it valid law according 
to positivist criteria, and on the other hand that it breached certain moral 
standards, which would make it non-law for many natural lawyers. Either 
way, both groups would have little incentive to carry out further legal 
theoretical research into Nazi Germany once its status as a limit case for their 
respective philosophical positions was established. This opens up the 
possibility of using Nazi Germany as a repository of uncontroversial examples 
rather than a serious object of jurisprudential examination. 
In the case of natural law, a Nazi regime that moved outside of law would 
have no legal relevance beyond demonstrating that law and morality are in 
fact necessarily connected by virtue of it transcending the boundaries of law. 
For positivism, both the major conceptual concerns about the nature of Nazi 
law and the potential responses to it become moral rather than legal issues, 
once the social fact of formal law in the Third Reich is established in analytical 
terms. Chapter Two made the argument that the subsuming of Nazi law 
within the category of a wicked legal system, albeit as a paradigm example, 
consigned it to a particular role within jurisprudential discourse in relation to 
positivism and natural law and assigned to it certain generic characteristics 
determined and reproduced by the structure of the discourse. As a 
paradigmatic wicked legal system, Nazi law is more useful to jurisprudence as 
a hypothetical limit case for how bad the law could be, against which to test 
its theories about the concept of law, than as a complex, historical 
manifestation of law that challenges jurisprudential assumptions and 
questions its theoretical positions. 
The emergent English-language legal historical scholarship introduced in 
Chapter One,428 which comprises a combination of recently translated 
German work and some original English research influenced by this 
continental scholarship, gives an impression of Nazi law very different from 
that assumed and represented within jurisprudential discourse. Michael 
^ƚŽůůĞŝƐ ? ŽďƐĞƌǀĂƚŝŽŶƐ ŚĂǀĞ ŝŶĚŝĐĂƚĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ Ă ƐŝŶŐůĞ ? ƵŶŝǀĞƌƐĂů ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨ ůĂǁ
according to which a legal system is either valid or invalid is difficult to uphold 
in the face of the complexity, diversity and changeability of the Nazi legal 
ƐǇƐƚĞŵ ?dŚĞĚŝůĞŵŵĂŚĞĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌƐŽĨ ‘the existence of law in a system that is 
on the whole unlawful and unjust or that at least commits  many unlawful 
ĂĐƚƐ ?429 presents the regime as a sort of legal paradox. It at the same time has 
law but is systemically unlawful; or is lawful but has many unlawful facets. 
Either way, he argues, the actual presence of law, recognised as such at the 
time both internally and externally, discounts potential positivist and natural 
                                                                 
428
 See Section III of Chapter One. 
429
 ^ƚŽůůĞŝƐ ? ‘>ĂǁĂŶĚ>ĂǁǇĞƌƐ ? ?Ŷ62) 214.  
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law arguments in support of claims that there was no law. The other 
solutions to this dilemma Stolleis considers are either that some regular law 
continued to exist beyond the reach of ƚŚĞƐƚĂƚĞ ?ŽƌƚŚĂƚ  ‘tyranny dispenses 
with a substantive distinction between law and nonlaw [sic] and describes as 
law anything that ŵĞĞƚƐ ĐĞƌƚĂŝŶ ĨŽƌŵĂů ĐƌŝƚĞƌŝĂ ? ?430 Stolleis does not appear 
satisfied with either of these options because of the complexity of the 
system, and the emerging legal historical understanding of the role of 
ideology in Nazi law problematizes both of them.  
The first option is contested because it appears that Nazi ideology suffused 
ƚŚĞ ůĞŐĂů ƐǇƐƚĞŵ ĂŶĚ ĚŝĚ ŶŽƚ ƌĞƐƉĞĐƚ Ă ĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ &ƌĂĞŶŬĞů ?Ɛ
prerogative and normative states. It was not therefore the case that the state 
was ideological in nature and prerogative in operation whereas the remnants 
of the traditional system were legal in nature and normative in operation. 
dŚĞƌĞůŝĂŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĞƐĞĐŽŶĚŽƉƚŝŽŶŽŶ ‘ĨŽƌŵĂůĐƌŝƚĞƌŝĂ ?ƚŽŵĂŬĞEĂǌŝůĂǁůĂǁĨƵů
ďǇ ĚŝƐƐŽůǀŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ  ‘ƐƵďƐƚĂŶƚŝǀĞĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶ ?ďĞƚǁĞĞŶůĂǁĂŶĚŶŽŶ-law adheres 
to the positivist jurisprudential view that the substantive injustice of a legal 
system is no detriment to its validity assuming it meets certain formal 
criteria. However, the Nazi leadership were not primarily concerned with 
formal legal criteria, which might restrict the ability of the law to implement 
ideologically-driven policy. It may not be too much of a stretch in fact to claim 
the reverse, that the distinction between law and non-law was collapsed by 
the equation of law with ideology rather than by its reduction to form. 
According to this, law that adhered to the Nazi Weltenschauung (worldview) 
was accepted as legitimate whereas law that did not was manipulated or 
overturned or gradually superseded by other forms of law.  
I argue that the available scholarship considered in the remainder of this case 
study about the role of ideology in Nazi law tends in that direction.431 This 
presents a further predicament for both natural law and positivism because it 
implies that positivistic rules were ultimately subordinated to naturalist 
standards (standards of Nazi morality derived from its ideology), which were 
used to validate rather than invalidate the legal system. The problem is that 
these jurisprudential models have difficulty in their current form 
conceptualising a system that relies for its legitimacy on natural law criteria 
even at the expense of positivist criteria, but not a form of naturalism 
recognisable to the jurisprudential concept of natural law. The role Nazi law 
plays for natural lawyers is largely that of an instrumentally and cynically 
wicked legal system, where the rule-of-law potential inherent in legality is 
manipulated for the repressive benefit of the regime. Its role for positivism is 
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to meet certain threshold formal and minimal naturalist432 standards which 
give it coherence as a legal system but a system which does not necessarily 
depend on any moral content that may be included within the system. Nazi 
law does not adhere in its historical form to either of these roles, both of 
which can rely on similar historical assumptions about that legal system to 
come to their conclusions.433 
B Ideology in the Nazi Legal System 
Building on this, it is important to reflect on what Nazi ideology intended for 
the legal system if it is possible to countenance that it was more than merely 
the barely concealed, parasitic Realpolitik of a criminal leadership hell-bent 
on barbarity, striving to achieve its egregious political aims. This suggestion is 
not unproblematic because it assumes that the Nazi party did have 
something like a coherent plan for German law and state, whereas Stolleis 
himself asserts that  ‘ƚŚĞƌĞĐĂŶďĞŶŽƌĞĂů  “ůĞŐĂůĚŽĐƚƌŝŶĞ ?  ?ůĞŐĂůƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ ?
ůĞŐĂůƚŚĞŽƌǇ )ŽĨEĂƚŝŽŶĂů^ŽĐŝĂůŝƐŵ ? ?434 The fragmentary philosophical origins 
of Nazi ideology,435 the often pragmatic manoeuvres of the Nazi leadership 
and its relatively short and dramatic period in power (nearly six years of 
which was shrouded in the chaos of war) mean that ascertaining a coherent 
theory of Nazi legality is very challenging. However, there are some things we 
can say about the attempted Nazi legal revolution, and these things are 
interesting for their implications for jurisprudence. 
Nazi ideology was squarely opposed to and set on destroying the rule of law. 
Hitler was clearly averse to law, at least in its liberal, individualistic 
ŵĂŶŝĨĞƐƚĂƚŝŽŶ ? ĂŶĚ ŚŝƐ  ‘ĐŽŶƚĞŵƉƚ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ ůĂǁ ǁĂƐ ŵĂƚĐŚĞĚ QďǇŚŝƐĚŝƐĚĂŝŶ
for lawyers, whom ŚĞ ĚĞĞŵĞĚ  “ĚĞĨĞĐƚŝǀĞ ďǇ ŶĂƚƵƌĞ ? ? ?436 Consequently Nazi 
ůĂǁ ‘ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚĂŐƌŽƐƐĚĞƉĂƌƚƵƌĞĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƌƵůĞŽĨůĂǁ PƚŚĞEĂǌŝƐĞƌĂĚŝĐĂƚĞĚ
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 i .e. both can understand the Third Reich as a repressive, manipulative, cynical totalitarian 
regime with a legal system that contains a certain formal consistency and which can be 
criticised on moral grounds, which were absent from Nazi law. In simple terms, the question 
then becomes whether the system can be considered valid as law when there was no moral 
content to its governing rules. It is not as important for positivism that the law was 
manipulated or had no moral content, as it does not claim that law and morality are 
necessarily separate, just that they are necessarily separable. It is nevertheless assumed that 
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debate in Sections II and III of Chapter Three. 
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 ZŽďĞƌƚ ?ZĂĐŚůŝŶ ? ‘ZŽůĂŶĚ&ƌĞŝƐůĞƌĂŶĚƚŚĞsŽůksgerichtshof: The Court as an Instrument 
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legal security and certainty; allowed judicial and state arbitrariness; blocked 
epistemic access to what the law requires; issued unpredictable legal 
ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞŵĞŶƚƐ ? ĂŶĚ ƐŽ ŽŶ ? ?437 /ŶƐƚĞĂĚŽĨƚŚĞƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐŽĨ ůŝďĞƌĂů ůĞŐĂůŝƚǇ ?  ‘ƚŚĞ
ƉƌŝŵĂƌǇ EĂǌŝ ƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚ ŽĨ  “ŐŽŽĚ ůĂǁ ? ǁĂƐ ƚĂŬĞŶ ƚŽ ďĞ ƚŚĞ ĂĚǀĂŶĐĞŵĞŶƚ ?
purification and collective properties thought to be essential to the 
ĨůŽƵƌŝƐŚŝŶŐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ 'ĞƌŵĂŶ  “ůŽŽĚ-ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ?  ?Blutsgemeinschaft) ? ? dŚŝƐ
ǁŝƚŶĞƐƐĞĚ ? ĂŵŽŶŐ ŽƚŚĞƌƚŚŝŶŐƐ ?Ă  ‘ĚĞŶŝĂůŽĨƚŚĞseparation between law and 
Nazi  “ŵŽƌĂůŝƚǇ ? ? ?438 ĂĐŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĞ ŝĚĞĂůƚŚĂƚ ‘ĞƚŚŝĐĂůƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐƐŚŽƵůĚ
ďĞ ĞŵďĞĚĚĞĚ ŝŶ ůĂǁ ? ?439 In the Nazi Weltenschauung the perceived good of 
the Volksgemeinschaft (national community) was placed above the 
advancement and protection of the individual.440 The good of the national 
community was dependent on the eradication of racial impurity, which 
ŵĞĂŶƚƚŚĞĂďŽůŝƚŝŽŶŽĨĞƋƵĂůŝƚǇďĞĨŽƌĞƚŚĞůĂǁĨŽƌ ‘ƌĂĐŝĂůĂůŝĞŶƐ ? ?dŚĞŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů
ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ǁĂƐ ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚ ƚŽ ŚĂǀĞ ĂŶ ĞƚŚŝĐĂů ĐŽŵƉĂƐƐ ? Ă  ‘ŚĞĂůƚŚǇ ƉŽƉƵůĂƌ
sentiment ? ? ĞŵďŽĚŝĞĚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƉĞƌƐŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ &ƺŚƌĞƌ ĂŶĚ ĞŵďĞĚĚĞ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ
interpretation of the law.441 This, as a manifestation of the living, ethical will 
of the people, was not intended to be defined strictly but could be applied to 
determine who was with and who was an enemy of the Volk, resulting in the 
erosion of concepts such as certainty and non-retroactivity. The subjection of 
the individual to the community also meant that individual fairness was not a 
paramount concern, because the individual was not the main priority, and 
especially not the non-aryan individual.442 
The Nazi regime was engaged in,  ‘ƌĞǀĞƌƐŝŶŐůŝďĞƌĂůƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐ ? ?443 dŚŝƐ ‘explicit 
rejection of principles underlying both common and Roman (civil) law 
ƐǇƐƚĞŵƐ ?444 was the incarnation of a perverse view of the world.445 Its 
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 Pauer-^ƚƵĚĞƌ ? ‘>ĂǁĂŶĚDŽƌĂůŝƚǇ ? ?Ŷ414) 371. 
440
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Chapter Four of Stolleis, The Law Under the Swastika (n 24) 64-83. 
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 The description of this phrase and similarly nebulous moral concepts as a form of legal 
interpretation used to break the shackles of original legislative intent and legal meaning can 
be found at ibid 15. 
442
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:ƵƐƚŝĐĞ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ dŚŝƌĚ ZĞŝĐŚ ?  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? )  ? ?Dickinson Journal of International Law 343, 
especially section IV. 
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 ŽƵŐůĂƐ' ?DŽƌƌŝƐ ? ‘ŝƐĐƌŝŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĞŐƌĂĚĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĞĨŝĂŶĐ  P:ĞǁŝƐŚ>ĂǁǇĞƌƐƵŶĚĞƌEĂǌŝƐŵ ?
in Steinweis and Rachlin, The Law in Nazi Germany (n 67) 107. 
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 ZĂĐŚůŝŶ ? ‘ZŽůĂŶĚ&ƌĞŝƐůĞƌ ? ?Ŷ436) 80. 
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  ‘KĨ ĐŽƵƌƐĞ ƚŚĞ EĂǌŝ ůĞŐĂů ƚŚĞŽƌŝƐƚƐ ŚĂĚ Ă ĚĞĞƉůǇ ƉĞƌǀĞƌƚĞĚ ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ũƵƐƚŝĐĞ ĂŶĚ
morality. The community-oriented sentiments of the members of the volks-community 
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perversity, however, is perhaps secondary in the jurisprudential context to its 
historical and legal ramifications. For example: 
It is difficult to understand contagion-centred anti-Semitism  W an 
antipathy perceiving not only heredity, but direct or indirect physical 
contact as a dire threat  W as anything other than a form of delirious 
paranoia. Since this appears to have been a paranoia that many 
Germans shared, and that ultimately became anchored in the law, the 
question of delirium, at least in a clinical sense, seems unresolved.
446
 
As the perversity of Nazi ideology became part of a legal system widely 
accepted as both valid as law and authoritative, highlighting its perversity 
alone does not tackle the problem of the implementation of the 
consequences of the enduring hegemony of the ideology at least somewhat 
on the basis of consensual politics. Nazi ideology did have profound and 
ĚĞůŝďĞƌĂƚĞ ĐŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶĐĞƐ ĨŽƌ ůĂǁ ĂŶĚ ? ŶŽƚǁŝƚŚƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ ^ƚŽůůĞŝƐ ? ĐŽŵŵĞŶƚƐ ?
 ‘the extent to which there was actually an internal logic to the legal system 
implemented by the Nazi regime is striking. There was an underlying ideology 
at the heart, driving the regime ? ?447 This is not to say that Nazi ideology or the 
legal system it spawned was necessarily sustainable, or that the full scale 
legal revolution logically anticipated by Nazi morality could ever have 
successfully taken place, such was the instability and dynamis m of the 
ƌĞŐŝŵĞ ? /ƚƐ ŝŶŚĞƌĞŶƚ  ‘ĐƵŵƵůĂƚŝǀĞ ƌĂĚŝĐĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ŵĂǇ ŚĂǀĞ ƌĞƐƵůƚĞĚ ŝŶ ŝƚƐ
inevitable self-destruction,448 but it is possible that some compromise of 
ideology, pragmatism and power would have sustained the regime over a 
longer period in different circumstances: 
Whether the Nazi system would have had to retain a minimum of 
regularity in order to survive, or whether, fail ing that, it would have sunk 
into a chaos of rival power centers and become ungovernable even 
without the war are not questions we can answer. But there is much to 
suggest that the relationship between norm and prerogative (law and 
injustice) would not have remained stable. Instead, it would have 
continued to shift in one direction or another, and not necessarily in a 
selfdestructive one. Authoritarian regimes, too, can develop forces that 
ƐƚĂďŝůŝǌĞƚŚĞƐǇƐƚĞŵĂŶĚŐĞŶĞƌĂƚĞĂƐƵƌƉƌŝƐŝŶŐůǇůŽŶŐů ŝĨĞƐƉĂŶ Q449 
Either way, the Nazi state and its legal system did achieve many of its 
ideological aims, aims that are often considered unthinkable  W or at least 
unspeakable  W today. It did so in, and to a civilised Rechtsstaat at the centre 
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448
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 ^ƚŽůůĞŝƐ ? ‘>ĂǁĂŶĚ>ĂǁǇĞƌƐ ? ?Ŷ62) 216. 
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of the western world, within living memory. This alone gives sufficient cause 
to wonder what it was about law and state in Nazi Germany that enabled the 
Holocaust to take place, and that allowed the legal system to become so 
completely and explicitly subordinated to state ideology such that law and 
injustice continued to exist, not merely side-by-side, but as inherent within 
one another. It also begs us to question whether this says something 
fundamental or different about the concept of law than expressed in the 
Hart-Fuller debate and the manifold versions of positivism and natural law 
that prevail as its legacy within jurisprudential discourse today. 
C Countering Positivist and Naturalist Conceptions of Nazi Law 
The understanding of the Nazi legal system antagonistic to the rule of law but 
infused with ideology, and dependent for its validity and authority at least to 
an extent on that ideology, highlights two ways of thinking about Nazi law in 
the context of positivism and natural law. These are mutually contradictory, 
at the same time making it a paradigmatic case and a powerful  refutation of 
both schools of thought. The conclusion I draw from this is that a discours e 
structured around a debate between positivism and natural law is not the 
best way of thinking about the nature of Nazi law. If we argue that the Nazi 
renunciation of liberal legality is a complete rejection of legal principle, 
stripping law away until all that is left is power in a legal shell, it becomes the 
ŵŽƐƚ ƉƌŝŵŝƚŝǀĞ ĨŽƌŵ ŽĨ ƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞ ůĂǁ ? ,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ? ĞǀĞŶ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ ƉŽƐŝƚŝǀŝƐƚ
conception of law has certain formal requirements which determine how law 
comes into existence and how it is applied within a system: 
That the law of a system is identified by criteria provided by a rule of 
ƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƚŝŽŶ ĂĐĐĞƉƚĞĚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĐŽƵƌƚƐ ?  Q ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ĐŽƵƌƚƐ
exercise a genuine though interstitial law-making power or discretion in 
those cases where the existing expli ĐŝƚůĂǁĨĂŝůƐƚŽĚŝĐƚĂƚĞĂĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ ? Q
that there is no important necessary or conceptual connection between 
law and morality.
450
 
It is highly questionable whether Nazi law meets even the formal conditions 
of validity mentioned here. While the Führer Principle can be seen as some 
sort of legal grundnorm451 with peremptory power over other laws, legal 
rules in Nazi Germany emanated from so many different spheres and in such 
amorphous form that it is difficult to find any real rule of recognition capable 
ŽĨ ĨŽƌŵĂůůǇ ĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶŝŶŐ ǁŚĂƚ ǁĂƐ ĂŶĚ ǁĂƐ ŶŽƚ  ‘ůĂǁ ?ǁŝƚŚŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƐǇƐƚĞŵ ?
Whether particular measures were or were not part of the law was not an 
important consideration from an ideological perspective or in terms of 
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ŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚŝŶŐƚŚĞƌĞŐŝŵĞ ?ƐƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐ ?ĞǀĞŶŝĨ ŝƚǁĂƐĂƚƚŝŵĞƐĨƌŽŵĂƉƌĂŐŵĂƚŝĐ
standpoint. The lines between law and politics were too blurred.  
Similarly, the court system was subjected to such a combination of broad 
discretion and direction from above that both the genuineness of its 
discretion and its merely interstitial power can be challenged or at least 
understood in a way not conceived of within ,Ăƌƚ ?Ɛ positivist model. The 
ideological underpinning of the Nazi legal system meant its judges were 
ultimately expected to come to the right ideological determinations, which 
were legal almost by virtue of their perceived moral rectitude, rather than 
implement the letter of the law in a way that might undermine the national 
community. This can be perceived as a broad form of discretion giving the 
ũƵĚŝĐŝĂƌǇ ŵŽƌĞ ƚŚĂŶ ŵĞƌĞůǇ  ‘ŝŶƚĞƌƐƚŝƚŝĂů ? ůĂǁ-making power to the extent that 
its decisions flatly contradicted the existing, explicit written law. The judiciary 
was also increasingly subjected to heavy influence from the Nazi leadership, 
some of whom took on the power to overturn decisions viewed as 
ŝĚĞŽůŽŐŝĐĂůůǇ ŝŶĐŽƌƌĞĐƚ ? /Ŷ ƚŚŝƐ ƐĞŶƐĞ ƚŚĞ ĐŽƵƌƚ ?ƐĚŝƐĐƌĞƚŝŽŶ ǁĂƐ  very limited, 
but not to the extent of the enacted law. Finally, the infusion of ideology at 
the heart of law challenges the notion of a settled core of legal meaning 
existing in the Third Reich at all. Everything is potentially in the penumbra 
because the system itself is contingent on ideological, natural law grounds. 
Nazi law then might be no law at all after all. However, the infusion of Nazi 
morality into the legal system such that they became inseparable makes it 
very difficult to claim that Nazi law represented a form of pure positivism.452 
dŚĞ ĨŝŶĂů ,ĂƌƚŝĂŶ ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞŵĞŶƚ ŽĨ  ‘ŶŽ ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚ ŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇ Žƌ ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂů
ĐŽŶŶĞĐƚŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶůĂǁĂŶĚŵŽƌĂůŝƚǇ ?ŝƐƐŝŵŝůĂƌůǇŽďĨƵƐĐĂƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞƌĞĂůŝƚǇŽĨ
Nazi law. While there may have been no conceptual connection between law 
ĂŶĚ  ‘ŵŽƌĂůŝƚǇ ? ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƐĞŶƐĞ ŵĞĂŶƚ ďǇ ďŽƚŚ ,Ăƌƚ ĂŶĚ&ƵůůĞƌ ? ƚŚĞƌĞ ƐĞĞŵƐ ƚŽ
have been a strong and necessary connection between law and some form of 
morality outside of the strictly legal sphere, i.e. Nazi morality. The naturalist 
element was genuinely intrinsic to the legal system of Nazi Germany  W law 
become ideology in its reformed Nazi manifestation. It may have involved a 
rejection of the rule of law, but this surely merely invalidates it for natural 
ůĂǁ ƚŚĞŽƌŝƐƚƐ ƐƵĐŚ ĂƐ >ŽŶ &ƵůůĞƌ ? ǁŚŽƐĞ  ‘ŝŶŶĞƌ ŵŽƌĂůŝƚǇ ŽĨ ůĂǁ ? ĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƐ ƚŽ
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ŝŶŐƌĂŝŶ ůŝďĞƌĂů ůĞŐĂůŝƚǇ ?Ɛ ŬĞǇ ƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐ ŝŶƚŽ ůĂǁ ?Ɛ ĨŽƌŵĂů ƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞ ?453 Nazi 
ideology posited a set of alternative principles on which to base its legal 
system, which enabled it to function as law, be recognised as such and be 
used to implement the policies of the Nazi government. These alternative 
legal principles were not merely ad hoc, pragmatic measures to achieve and 
maintain power, but were a symptom of some fundamental tenets of the 
thankfully under-theorised and never fully realised Nazi Weltenschauung. 
This points to a form of natural law based on Nazi legal principles, as legal 
ƚƌƵƚŚ ŝŶ EĂǌŝ 'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ĚĞƉĞŶĚĞĚ ĂůŵŽƐƚ ĞŶƚŝƌĞůǇ ŽŶ ŵŽƌĂů  ‘ƚƌƵƚŚ ? ? dŚĞ
contested nature of morality in the Nazi state challenges the conceptual 
possibility and the wisdom  W not to mention the practicality in an evolving 
political context - of relying on natural law to invalidate the Nazi legal 
system.454  
Officials and citizens and party members in the Nazi state were referring to 
moral principles when making choices, but an alternative version of morality 
that often led them to make alternative choices.455 Is a legal system so reliant 
on non-ůĞŐĂů ?  ‘ĞƚŚŝĐĂů ? ƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐ Ă ĨŽƌŵ ŽĨ ŶĂƚƵƌĂů ůĂǁ Žƌ ŝƚƐ ĂŶƚŝƚŚĞƐŝƐ ? ƚŚĞ
epitome of positive law or no law at all? For reasons associated with both the 
impact of Nazi ideology on the legal system and the empirical complexity and 
diversity of Nazi law, this question cannot be answered in one correct way 
using the framework of positivism and natural law, and it is not, therefore, 
ƚŚĞ ƌŝŐŚƚ ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ ƚŽ ĂƐŬ ? dŚĞ  ‘ǀĂůŝĚŝƚǇ ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ ?ŝƐŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂůůǇŵŽŽƚ  W there 
was law in Nazi Germany, as legal historians such as Michael Stolleis make 
ĐůĞĂƌ ? dŚĞ  ‘ƐĞƉĂƌĂďŝůŝƚǇ ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ ? ŵĞĂŶǁŚŝůĞ ŝƐ ŽŶůǇ ĨƵƌƚŚĞƌ ĐŽŵƉůŝĐĂƚĞĚ ďǇ
the Nazi example. The complexity inherent in the system challenges the 
jurisprudential characterisation of Nazi law as no more than an archetypal 
wicked regime as long as one is prepared to dig beneath the surface. The 
central role of ideology compromises the naturalistic dependence on a 
discourse of cynical manipulation of the rule of law for oppressive purposes. 
ŽƚŚŽĨƚŚĞƐĞĂƐƉĞĐƚƐĐŽƵŶƚĞƌŶŽƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƌƵƉƚƵƌĞĨƌŽŵ ‘ŶŽƌŵĂů ?ůĞŐĂůƐǇƐƚĞŵƐ ?
Recognising Nazi law as law brings it closer in the first place. 
Acknowledgement of its complexity forces us to get beyond the superficial 
layer of absolute wickedness to reveal the myriad of continuities and 
differences that coexist beneath. And understanding the relationship 
between law and politics in the Third Reich as an alternative version of that 
which exists in other systems allows it to be viewed as something more than 
just anti-law  W ƚŚĞĚĞƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶŽĨ ‘ůĂǁ ?ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚĂŶĞŶƚŝƌĞůǇĂůŝĞŶŝĚĞŽůŽŐǇ ? 
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 Pauer-^ƚƵĚĞƌ ? ‘>ĂǁĂŶĚDŽƌĂůŝƚǇ ? ?Ŷ414). 
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It is much more important and relevant in light of the understanding of Nazi 
law emerging from recent scholarship to use it to ask other questions of the 
concept of law than the validity and separability questions. These are in the 
area of how law actually functions in a wicked regime and how it is used to 
achieve wicked ends accepting that it is some form of law. What impact, for 
example, does the legal nature of authority have on the actions and decisions 
of perpetrators in the Holocaust or the evolution of repressive and genocidal 
institutions? There is not scope to tackle such questions within this 
dissertation, but the academic, historical case studies analysed in this chapter 
are intended to create a situation where these questions can be asked within 
jurisprudence in respect of Nazi Germany because the current questions do 
not result in adequate answers that can be applied to that system. They are 
the sorts of questions provoked as well by the historical research into aspects 
of the Third Reich related to the legal system, such as those considered in the 
second case study.  
III. The Nature and Evolution of the ConcentratiŽŶ ĂŵƉ ^ǇƐƚĞŵ ?  ‘a 
ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŽĨĞǀĞŶƚƐŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚĞĚŝŶƚŽƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ? 
A Responding to the Rupture Thesis 
A comprehensive account of the evolution of the historiography of the 
concentration camp system in Nazi Germany is beyond the scope of this 
dissertation. However, some observations about that literature, and its  
previous limitations as revealed in the case study referred to here, are able to 
challenge the sort of preconceptions about the Nazi past that have informed 
historical and legal research, and remain within jurisprudence. Jane Caplan 
and Nikolaus Wachsmann set their research quite explicitly against the 
backdrop of scholarship that has gone before. I will briefly highlight the 
criticisms they make of the pre-existing English language scholarship before 
going on to suggest that the aspects of this previous literature that are most 
worthy of criticism are similar to the perception of the historical reality of the 
Nazi past that continues to inform the jurisprudential understanding of Nazi 
law. As Caplan, Wachsmann and others argue, despite the appearance from 
the 1990s of some German language scholarship on the role of the pre-war 
concentration camps, this literature had not been translated into English and 
 ‘ŝƚƐ ŝŵƉĂĐƚon the historiography of the Third Reich and totalitarian terror has 
ďĞĞŶ ůŝŵŝƚĞĚ ? ?456 /ŶƐƚĞĂĚ ?  ‘Ă ƐƚĞĂĚǇ ƐƚƌĞĂŵ ŽĨ ƐƵƌǀŝǀŽƌ ŵĞŵŽŝƌƐ ? ŶŽǀĞůƐ ?
newspaper articles and films has cemented the place of the camps in 
Western popular culture as the place of ultimate Ğǀŝů ? ? ĂŶ ƵŶĚĞƌĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞĚ
interpretation not properly challenged in English language historiography 
                                                                 
456
 'ŽĞƐĐŚĞůĂŶĚtĂĐŚƐŵĂŶŶ ? ‘ĞĨŽƌĞƵƐĐŚǁŝƚǌ ? ?Ŷ418) 520. 
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until recently.457 The same is true of those who worked in the camps, the 
members of the camp SS.458 
More recent research also attempts to move the camp system out from 
under the shadow of Auschwitz, which had previously dominated, to provide 
a more convincing explanation of its growth and operation.459 The Auschwitz 
paradigm of the extreme wartime extermination camp encouraged the view 
of Nazi camps during the Second World War as distinct from what came 
before and after, appearing in virtually complete form almost out of 
nowhere, and separate and conceptually distinct from legal forms of 
oppression and discrimination. Thus Auschwitz, and therefore the camp 
system as a whole, was viewed through the eyes of the rupture thesis, an 
analysis the scholarship in this case study confronts and moves beyond. The 
literature looks at both the structures of the camps and the motivations and 
experiences of those involved in order to produce a more complete and 
complex understanding of the functioning of the camp system. The overall 
picture of the concentration camp system in Nazi Germany that emerges is 
one of continuity as opposed to rupture, evolution as opposed to revolution, 
integration as opposed to isolation, and differentiation as opposed to 
standardisation.460 It emphasises the widespread nature of the camps, which 
were pervasive in Nazi society, the many different forms they took and the 
often ad hoc dynamism with which they were adapted and reinvented. The 
ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚƌĞǀĞĂůƐƚŚĂƚ  ‘ƚŚĞEĂǌŝĐĂŵƉƐǁĞƌĞĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝǌĞĚ ?ĂƚďŽƚŚĞŶĚƐŽĨƚŚĞ
dŚŝƌĚ ZĞŝĐŚ ? ďǇ ĐŚĂŽƐ ĂŶĚ ŝŵƉƌŽǀŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?461 meaning any attempt to 
ĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚ Ă  ‘ƚǇƉŝĐĂů ? ĐĂŵƉ  ‘ĚŽĞƐ ŶŽƚ ĨƵůůǇ ƌĞĨůĞĐƚƚŚĞ ĐŽŵƉůĞǆ ŚŝƐƚŽƌǇ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ
ĐĂŵƉƐ ? ?462  
The examples presented in the research indicate that even within the 
historiography of Nazi Germany, as with the English language legal history 
addressed in the previous case study, only relatively recently are deeper and 
more nuanced explanations for Nazi systems and institutions of rule being 
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 Ibid. 517. 
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 tĂĐŚƐŵĂŶŶ ? ‘>ŽŽŬŝŶŐŝŶƚŽƚŚĞďǇƐƐ ? ?Ŷ418) 253. 
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  ‘EŽǁŚĞƌĞ ǁĂƐ ƚŚĞ ŚŽƌƌŽƌ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĐĂŵƉƐ ŵŽƌĞ ĞǀŝĚĞŶƚ ƚŚĂ n in Auschwitz, which has 
become shorthand for concentration camps (and nazi terror more generally). But there was 
ŵŽƌĞ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ŶĂǌŝ ĐĂŵƉƐ ƚŚĂŶ ƵƐĐŚǁŝƚǌ ? ? 'ŽĞƐĐŚĞůĂŶĚtĂĐŚƐŵĂŶŶ ? ‘ĞĨŽƌĞƵƐĐŚǁŝƚǌ ? ?Ŷ
418) 518. It is worth noting that Auschwitz was itself a camp complex rather than an 
individual camp, but the term is used here as much for what it symbolises in the l iterature as 
for a factual description of the camp(s) at Auschwitz. 
460
 ^ĞĞ:ĂŶĞĂƉůĂŶĂŶĚEŝŬŽůĂƵƐtĂĐŚƐŵĂŶŶ ? ‘/ŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚEŝŬŽůĂƵƐtĂĐŚƐŵĂŶŶ ? ‘dŚĞ
Dynamics of Destruction: the Development of the Concentration Camps, 1933 - ? ? ? ? ? ŝŶ
Caplan and Wachsmann, The New Histories (n 418). 
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advanced based on detailed empirical evidence. The principal characteristics 
of the historical literature rejected by the authors in this case study include 
endorsement of temporal ruptures, adherence to the monolithic, totalitarian 
state model, mono-dimensional portrayals of Nazi perpetrators and a 
dismissal of Nazi Germany as essentially irrelevant. These characteristics also 
continue to inform jurisprudential understanding of Nazi Germany - as 
Chapter Two indicated - but need to be challenged as they are not based on 
the actual historical experience of the Third Reich. 
The idea of rupture implies that Nazism can be disentangled in time from the 
developmental processes going on around it, whether historical, social, legal, 
economic or political. As such, it is reliant on the idea both that what went 
before and after the Nazi period have nothing of significance in common with 
the Third Reich, and that what existed during Nazi rule was somehow 
intrinsically homogenous and not amenable to empirical or theoretical 
deconstruction.463 This second assertion is contradicted by efforts to place 
the camp system within a framework of historical periodization, taking into 
account the function and nature of the camps and how they changed over 
time. The complex periodization of camp history proposed by Wachsmann, 
comprising six different phases across 12 years, is symptomatic of the high 
degree of improvisation, variety and dynamism inherent in the system.464 It 
suggests that attempts to distinguish on a fundamental level between types 
of camp, and the periods before, during and after Nazi rule are unlikely to 
represent accurately the empirical reality of the camps. In the pre-war camps, 
for example, there were fewer prisoners, and inmate death was uncommon 
rather than a regular occurrence ? dŚĞƌĞ ǁĂƐ ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?  ‘ŶŽĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞƌƵƉƚƵƌĞ
in 1939. Rather the camps mutated from places of brutal abuse into sites of 
unprecedenƚĞĚ ĂƚƌŽĐŝƚǇ ? ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ ĞĂƌůǇ ĞǆĂŵƉůĞƐ ƉƌŽǀŝĚŝŶŐ Ă ƉƌĞĐĞĚĞŶƚ ĨŽƌ
 ‘ĐĂŵƉƐ ĂƐ ĞǆƚƌĂ-legal sites for the exercise of extreme political and racial 
ƚĞƌƌŽƌ ? ?465 
The way the camps developed embedded great synchronic variety and 
dynamic diachronic change into the system. The powerful symbolism of 
Auschwitz fostered an image of the camps inevitably too narrowly concerned 
with one camp complex and that necessarily viewed them as fundamentally 
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 This is even allowing, in the case of the concentration camps, for the imposition of an 
internal rupture in 1939 (at the start of the Second World War), to explain the emergence of 
the phenomenon of Auschwitz and its role in the Holocaust. 
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distinct from what came before and after.466 Not only does this obfuscate the 
partial distinction between camps with different functions (for example, 
extermination camps and labour camps), but it also fails to acknowledge the 
evolutionary process by which the wartime camps came about. This point is 
further emphasised by Jens-ŚƌŝƐƚŝĂŶ tĂŐŶĞƌ ?Ɛ ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ŽŶƚŚĞƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ
between work and extermination in the concentration camps.467 It shows the 
complex periodization that applies to the development of this aspect of the 
camp system alone.468 The dynamism of the camps, changing and evolving as 
circumstances required, indicate that their function was not uniform 
throughout the Third Reich, and cannot be simply encapsulated in a concept 
such ĂƐ  ‘ĂŶŶŝŚŝůĂƚŝŽŶ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ůĂďŽƵƌ ? ? tŚŝůĞ ƚŚĞƌĞ ǁĂƐ Ă ƚĞŶƐ ion between 
their initial use for re-education and their later use for supplying productive 
war labour, the nature of the camps adapted over time with different aspects 
taking priority at different times, and their history must be seen in this 
context.469 The competing aims of the camp system, in this case work and 
extermination, cannot be seen as diametrically opposed, with only one either 
prevailing at any particular time or throughout the Nazi period. Rather, 
priorities changed according to circumstances, and were the result of a 
complex mix of practical, economic and ideological factors. 
The scholarship dispels the notion of rupture and also provides a more 
nuanced picture of continuity across the boundaries of 1933 and 1945. It 
goes beyond the received narrative of camps having been invented before 
the Nazis came to power, to highlight the legal process by which detention 
was brought about as much as the institutions of the camps themselves. The 
Nazi use of the tool of protective custody had precedent in Germany, with its 
long history of arrest without trial, which was re-ĨĂƐŚŝŽŶĞĚ ‘ŽŶĂĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞůǇ
ƵŶƉƌĞĐĞĚĞŶƚĞĚ ůĞǀĞů ĂŶĚ ƚŽ ƋƵŝƚĞ ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚ ĞŶĚƐ ? ?470 Examples like this, that 
get to the heart of the development of the legal tools of persecution and 
discrimination employed in the Third Reich, demonstrate ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ŝŶ ŽƌĚĞƌ ƚŽ
truly understand the significance of the concentration camps for the period 
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 Jens-Christian Wagneƌ ?  ‘tŽƌŬĂŶĚ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 There has been significant historical debate about the relative and absolute importance of 
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1933 to 1939 we must look across the divides of 1933, 1939 and also, 
ƉĞƌŚĂƉƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?471  
This understanding of the camp system feeds into the general theme calling 
for greater differentiation and acknowledgement of complexity when dealing 
with the Nazi past. The intricate texture of the different factors involved in 
the system is emphasised, and with this comes the need to produce a more 
ŶƵĂŶĐĞĚ ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƉĂƐƚ ? ŝĞƚĞƌ WŽŚů ?Ɛ ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ŝŶƚŽ ƚŚĞ ƌŽůĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ
concentration camps in the Holocaust is an example of how a differentiated 
account of events, supported by detailed empirical evidence, is more 
convincing than fixed interpretations built around a central, simplistic 
interpretation.472 ƋƵĂůůǇ ? tĂŐŶĞƌ ?Ɛ ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ŝůůƵƐƚƌĂƚĞƐ ŚŽǁ ƐƵĐŚ ĂŶ
approach is more effective in explaining and understanding the Nazi past 
than entrenched, monolithic interpretations asserting the primacy of politics 
or economics.473 Acknowledging both the problem with overarching concepts 
and the temptation to express moral judgment through analytical concepts, 
Wagner argues: 
As a metaphor for moral ŝŶĚŝŐŶĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŚĞƵƐĞŽĨƚŚĞƚĞƌŵ “ĂŶŶŝŚŝůĂƚŝŽŶ
ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚůĂďŽƵƌ ?ďǇŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĂŶƐŵĂǇďĞĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞůǇƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚĂďůĞ ?ďƵƚŝƚ
is not particularly helpful in an analytical sense, since it implies an 
ideological programme and, in doing so, disregards the impetus of 
contingent factors.
474
  
This emphasises the need to strike the right balance of interpretation 
between monolithic, centralised ideological direction and more localised 
 ‘ĐŽŶƚŝŶŐĞŶƚ ĨĂĐƚŽƌƐ ? ?475 The concept of annihilation through labour can imply 
a single, unified, top-down, exclusively ideological policy, which in important 
ways distorts the way it actually came about and its real nature. It also 
bestows on it a certain moral judgment and distance that, while 
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understandable, can discourage attempts to get to the bottom of what really 
happened in such cases.  
In a number of different areas of research into the functioning of the 
concentration camp system, mono-causal models of explanation relying on 
stark oppositions and homogenous groupings of events, individuals or 
structures, have been refuted and surpassed by more nuanced and 
differentiated accounts. There was not one type of Nazi camp, but rather 
many which changed and evolved on an ad hoc basis over time. This does not 
necessarily preclude any sort of general analysis, the use of larger 
explanatory models or the deduction of overarching interpretations. It does 
mean, however, that we need to be more careful when considering these to 
ensure that they are sufficiently differentiated to account for their different 
historical manifestations. Rupture and discontinuity must be applied with 
great care when evaluating any aspect of the Nazi regime. Of course some 
things were very different and in that sense discontinuous with what came 
before and after, and radical change did take place. The danger highlighted 
by the concentration camp research lies in the notion of rupture informing 
the whole interpretive framework that underlies the examination of the Third 
Reich. The assumption of rupture as the default position because of the 
apparently overwhelmingly alien nature of some things associated with 
Nazism tends towards the homogenisation of Nazi Germany and the 
ĐƌǇƐƚĂůůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨŽƵƌƌĞĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶƐŽĨŝƚĂƌŽƵŶĚƚŚĂƚǁŚŝĐŚŝƐŵŽƐƚ ‘ŽƚŚĞƌ ?ƚŽ
ourselves, rather than the important continuities that flow through the 
remainder of the concentration camp scholarship. 
B The Role of Perpetrators in the Camp System 
This part specifically addresses the role of Nazi perpetrators and those 
complicit in Nazi acts in the concentration camp system.476 In the picture that 
emerges of the personnel of the camp SS and others involved in running the 
camps, the problems with ƚƌǇŝŶŐ ƚŽ ůŽĐĂƚĞ Ă  ‘ƚǇƉŝĐĂů ?ƉĞƌƉĞƚƌĂƚŽƌŽƌĂĚǀĂŶĐĞ
                                                                 
476
 dŚĞ ƚĞƌŵ  ‘ƉĞƌƉĞƚƌĂƚŽƌ ? ƐŚŽƵůĚ ďĞ ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚŽŽĚ ŝŶ ƚŚŝƐ ƐĞĐƚŝŽŶ ĂƐ ŝŶƚĞŶĚĞĚ ƚŽ ďĞ ǁŝƚŚŝŶ
inverted commas, indicating the contingent nature of its application, which is as a general 
and descriptive term for those involved in implementing, or collaborating with  the 
implementation of, Nazi policy in the context of the concentration camp system. It is 
employed in this way predominantly for simplicity, as a straightforward way of describing the 
different ways of partaking in the Nazi regime in this specific area of research, from which 
many different forms and levels of perpetration arise. It is not merely that individual 
perpetrators were involved in certain areas, for example in the running of the concentration 
camps themselves. Rather, the whole system relied on individuals and groups implementing 
policies intended to repress, alienate, injure and kil l  members of the society, and that they 
were also part of that society. This includes the Camp SS, legal officials, members of the 
Gestapo and the criminal police, denouncers, and others. 
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mono-causal motivations for perpetrator behaviour are exposed. The 
question of how to research, represent and even define Nazi perpetrators is a 
longstanding one within historiographical scholarship, a comprehensive 
discussion of which is outside of the scope of this dissertation.477 Explaining 
the behaviour of certain specific types of perpetrator groups within the 
system, and particularly the  ‘Camp SS ?, is an important part of the 
historiographical research that has received some attention,478 but the 
functioning of the system as a whole is most relevant to the issue of how 
jurisprudence continues to represent the Nazi past. 
DĂŶǇ ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚ ƚǇƉĞƐ ŽĨ EĂǌŝ  ‘ƉĞƌƉĞƚƌĂƚŽƌ ? ĞŵĞƌŐĞ ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶĐĞŶƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ
camp system research. These include the archetype of the camp perpetrator, 
the camp SS elite, as well as the much more numerous camp guards, those 
ǁŚŽ ŽǀĞƌƐĂǁ ƚŚĞ  ‘ĚĞĂƚŚ ŵĂƌĐŚĞƐ ? ƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƚŚĞĞŶĚŽĨƚŚĞǁĂƌ and members 
of the wider population and private business. These groups are revealed in 
the literature as characterised by their diversity: changing dramatically over 
time, representing varying backgrounds, harbouring very different 
motivations, and working in very diverse circumstances. The picture of 
perpetration in the Nazi state, even in the limited area of the concentration 
camp system, is very complex and because of this undercuts conceptual 
models that fail to take account of this high degree of differentiation. The 
most recent literature emphasises conditions of ordinariness rather than 
extremeness, and diversity rather than homogeneity of motivation, ensuring 
it is impossible to pinpoint a typical perpetrator or to distinguish them clearly 
ĂƐĂŐƌŽƵƉĨƌŽŵŽƚŚĞƌ  ‘ŶŽƌŵĂů ?ƉĞŽƉůĞ ?479 
Research about those who operated and worked in the camps is instructive 
for our understanding of Nazi perpetrators more generally, and for our 
general understanding of the functioninŐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ EĂǌŝ ƐƚĂƚĞ ? <ĂƌŝŶ KƌƚŚ ?Ɛ
                                                                 
477
 The issues involved do not merely go to understanding how and why the Holocaust and 
other Nazi policies were carried out, although these are important, but also who exactly is a 
perpetrator and what does this mean. Are all  Germans guilty as complicit in the acts of the 
Nazi government? Should the Nazi elite be more responsible for the Holocaust than the 
ŵĂŶǇ  ‘ŽƌĚŝŶĂƌǇ 'ĞƌŵĂŶƐ ? ǁŚŽ ƚŽŽŬ ƉĂƌƚ ? ,Žǁ ŵƵĐŚƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝů ŝƚǇƐŚŽƵůĚďĞĂƐƐŝŐŶĞĚƚŽ
members of the occupied governments who helped implement Nazi policies or local non-
Germans on the ground who collaborated in enforcing them? What about the bystanders, 
who wilfully turned a blind eye to what was going on, or looked on and did nothing; and 
those victims who also played a role in carryi ng out Nazi policies against their own 
ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚŝĞƐ ?KŶƚŚĞƐƵďũĞĐƚŽĨƚŚĞŝŶǀŽůǀĞŵĞŶƚŽĨ  ‘ŽƌĚŝŶĂƌǇ'ĞƌŵĂŶƐ ?ŝŶƚŚĞ,ŽůŽĐĂƵƐƚ ŝŶ
the East, see Christopher Browning, Nazi Policy, Jewish Workers, German Killers (Cambridge 
University Press, 2000); and Browning, Ordinary Men  (n 98). 
478
 ^ĞĞĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞKƌƚŚ ? ‘dŚĞŽŶĐĞŶƚƌĂƚŝŽŶĂŵƉWĞƌƐŽŶŶĞů ? ?Ŷ411). 
479
 This impression is taken from various contributions to Caplan and Wachsmann, The New 
Histories (n 418), as discussed in this section. 
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findings displace  ‘the old image of most SS officers as individually abnormal 
sadists and monsters with a perhaps more disquieting sense of them as 
 “ŶŽƌŵĂů ?ŵĞŶƚƌĂŝŶĞĚƚŽŽƉĞƌĂƚĞ ŝŶĂďŶŽƌŵĂůĐŝƌĐƵŵƐƚĂŶĐĞƐ ? ?480 It is evident 
that many of these perpetrators were ordinary in nature and had an 
improvisational role in the system, collectively driving it forward. In the 
environment of tŚĞ ĐĂŵƉƐ ? ƚŚĞ ŵŽƌĞ  ‘ĞǆƚƌĞŵĞ ? ƚĂƐŬ of mass murder 
intermingled with more mundane jobs to become part of the normal daily 
routine. This is exemplified by the juxtaposition of two orders given 
consecutively at Auschwitz in August 1942, one concerning safety when 
taking part in gassings and the other regulating behaviour on public 
transport.481 Each is given and received in the same way, but their 
implications are to our minds radically different. 
Even only looking at the concentration camp system, the perpetrator 
community as a whole was very diverse. Orth notes:  
There were men and women, elderly soldiers and very young men, 
Germans and non-Germans, SS men and prisoner functionaries, rank-
and-fi le sentries and highly-decorated SS leaders, Protestants, Catholics 
and other religious believers, ideologues and Army conscripts, some 
who served only a few weeks and others who served the full  twelve 
years of National Socialism, sadistic kil lers and others who treated 
inmates comparatively humanely.
482
 
The commandant staff of the camp SS, its functional elite, which was 
characterised by smaller numbers and a lower turnover than the camp guards  
generally, was a more homogeneous group, with a high proportion from the 
war-youth generation and the middle-classes of society.483 The functioning of 
ƚŚŝƐ ŐƌŽƵƉ ǁĂƐ ĚĞĨŝŶĞĚ ďǇ Ă ŶĞƚǁŽƌŬ ŽĨ ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉƐ ĂŶĚ  ‘ŚĞůĚ ƚogether by 
shared criminality, through a common socialisation in duty and forms of 
ĐŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞǀŝŽůĞŶĐĞ ? ?484 The main purpose of the community created by the SS 
ǁĂƐƚŽĞŶŐĞŶĚĞƌĂĨĞĞůŝŶŐŽĨ ‘ŶŽƌŵĂůŝƚǇĂŶĚƐƚĂďŝůŝƚǇ ? ?/ŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽĂĐŚŝĞǀĞƚŚŝƐ, 
social and cultural events played an important role and connected the men to 
the towns surrounding the camps, and violence was integrated structurally 
into the system.485 The significance of the ideological context in which the 
ĐĂŵƉ^^ĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶĞĚ ?  ‘ĐĂƉƚƵƌĞƐƚŚĞƌĞůŝĂŶĐĞŽĨ ?ŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂů )ĂŐĞŶƚƐŽŶƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐ
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 Caplan and Wachsmann, The New Histories (n 418) 11. 
481
 tĂĐŚƐŵĂŶŶ ? ‘>ŽŽŬŝŶŐŝŶƚŽƚŚĞďǇƐƐ ? ?Ŷ418) 266. 
482
 KƌƚŚ ? ‘dŚĞ ŽŶĐĞŶƚƌĂƚŝŽŶĂŵƉWĞƌƐŽŶŶĞů ? ?Ŷ411) 45. 
483
 ibid 49. 
484
 ibid 51. 
485
 Ibid. 
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ĚĞĞŵĞĚ  “ŶŽƌŵĂů ? ŝŶ ƚŚĞŝƌ ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ? ƚŚe validity of which was 
ƵŶƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶĞĚ ĂŶĚǁŚŝĐŚĐŽƵůĚďĞƌĞĨůĞǆŝǀĞůǇĂƉƉůŝĞĚ ? ?486 
The role of normality in the lives of the camp SS, emanating from the 
empirical research, should not be underestimated from a theoretical 
perspective, especially where there is a temptation to overlook it through the 
juxtaposition of an external concept of normality against the extreme nature 
of some of the tasks undertaken. So-ĐĂůůĞĚ  ‘ŶŽƌŵĂůŝƚǇ ? ǁĂƐŶŽƚŽƉƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶĂů
to camp violence, but was deliberately fostered by the support and 
involvement of colleagues, families and the community to be part of the 
same experience, and to reinforce the ideology and morality of Nazism. Along 
with normality, diversity is an important characteristic of the concentration 
camp system perpetrator group. It is vital to understanding the complexity of 
the Nazi system to differentiate between perpetrators of differing types 
carrying out differing tasks. For example, in the so-ĐĂůůĞĚ  ‘ĚĞĂƚŚŵĂƌĐŚĞƐ ? ŝŶ
the final throes of the Third Reich, the more centralised, bureaucratic forms 
of control that had previously guided the direction of the Holocaust gave way 
ƚŽ ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ĚŝƐĐƌĞƚŝŽŶ ŝŶ ĂŶ ĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚ ƚŚĂƚ ŚĂĚ  ‘ďĞĐŽŵĞ ŶŝŚŝůŝƐƚŝĐ ĂŶĚ
ĚĞǀŽŝĚ ŽĨ ƐŚĂƉŝŶŐ ƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐ ? ?487 Somewhat in contrast with the perceived 
wisdom about Nazi Germany, the marches occurred quite chaotically and 
involved many random killings.488 Consequently, it is necessary to analyse 
ƉĞƌƉĞƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ŝŶ ƚŚŝƐ ĂƌĞĂ ŽŶ ŝƚƐ ŽǁŶ ƚĞƌŵƐ ĂŶĚ  ‘ĞǆĂŵŝŶĞ ǁŝƚŚ ƉƌĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ ƚŚĞ
motivation and circumstances of the murders, the different groups of 
murderers, the political circumstances under which the murders took place 
ĂŶĚƚŚĞƐŽĐŝĂůŝŶĨƌĂƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞƚŚĂƚƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĞĚƚŚĞŵ ? ?489 
A further area in which both normality and diversity are relevant is in the 
complicity of the wider population with the concentration camp system. 
Post-war public denials of knowledge of the camps were in part a response to 
the widespread complicity and wilful blindness of much of German society 
towards the Nazi regime revealed in recent historical research. The repressive 
aspects of Nazi rule relied on a combination of secrecy and openness to 
achieve its aims, and over time the camps became more visible and 
integrated within local communities, especially with the establishment of 
satellite labour camps in villages and towns, which were often welcomed as 
positive for the local economy. They were not sealed environments, but 
connected and synthesised with the local communities in a number of ways. 
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 ibid 54. 
487
 ĂŶŝĞůůĂƚŵĂŶ ? ‘dŚĞĞĂƚŚDĂƌĐŚĞƐĂŶĚƚŚĞ&ŝŶĂůWŚĂƐĞŽĨEĂǌŝ'ĞŶŽĐŝĚĞ ?ŝŶĂƉůĂŶĂŶĚ
Wachsmann, The New Histories (n 418), 182. See also Daniel Blatman, The Death Marches: 
The Final Phase of Nazi Genocide (Chaya Galai tr, Harvard University Press, 2011). 
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 WŽŚů ? ‘dŚĞ,ŽůŽĐĂƵƐƚ ? ?Ŷ472) 160. 
489
 ůĂƚŵĂŶ ? ‘ĞĂƚŚDĂƌĐŚĞƐ ? ?Ŷ487) 181.  
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As Karola Fings argues, models of explaining Nazi rule reliant ŽŶ  ‘ƚĞƌƌŽƌ ?
overlook the level of consensus, and the existence and functioning of the 
ĐŽŶĐĞŶƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ĐĂŵƉƐ ŵƵƐƚ ďĞ ǀŝĞǁĞĚ  ‘ŶŽƚ ŝŶ ŝƐŽůĂƚŝŽŶ ? ďƵƚ ĂƐ Ă ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ŽĨ
ĞǀĞŶƚƐŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚĞĚŝŶƚŽƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ? ?490 
This has the potential to create a conflation, or at least a continuum, between 
ƚŚĞ  ‘ĞǆƚƌĞŵĞ ? ďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌ ŽĨ ĐĂŵƉ ƉĞƌƉĞƚƌĂƚŽƌƐ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ŵŽƌĞ  ‘ŶŽƌŵĂů ?
circumstances of the wider population. Once again, the need for greater 
nuance is revealed by the insights of the historical research. We cannot 
diametrically oppose normal life and extreme acts, but must acknowledge 
their coexistence and examine more closely the relationship between the 
two. It is untenable in the face of the research to rely on a single, static 
perpetrator model, when the reality saw the emergence of a diverse and 
dynamic group. It is rarely possible to reduce perpetrator motivation or 
character to a small number of elements, or divorce it from a wider and more 
complex moral universe. Instead perpetrator behaviour and decision-making 
should be seen as part of, and crucially influenced by, a wider context 
including the legal system. There is no single model of a Nazi perpetrator, but 
lots of groups and individuals often acting in different ways and for different 
reasons while contributing to the functioning of the regime. 
The concentration camp research considered in this section has involved 
discussions of the rejection by that research of pre-existing notions of rupture 
within the camp system, the importance of complexity and differentiation in 
research about the camps, and the significance of normality in the life of 
camp perpetrators. All of these elements can be used to challenge the 
prevailing representation of Nazi Germany within jurisprudential discourse, 
particularly its underlying narrative of rupture and general disinclination to 
engage with historical research. Even where the examples presented from 
the concentration camp system scholarship are not specifically legal in 
nature, they interconnect with the law in various ways, and in doing so 
demonstrate that attempting to understand the legal system in isolation from 
its wider context will at best reveal only part of the legal picture. The camp 
institutions and perpetrators operated in the context of legal measures and 
extra-legal decisions, and crossed the alleged boundary between the 
normative and prerogative states. This complex inter-relationship between 
                                                                 
490<ĂƌŽůĂ&ŝŶŐƐ ? ‘dŚĞWƵďůŝĐ&ĂĐĞŽĨƚŚĞĂŵƉƐ ?ŝŶĂƉů ŶĂŶĚtĂĐŚƐŵĂŶŶ ?The New Histories 
(n 418), particularly 110-122. In relation to the connections between the camps and the local 
ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚŝĞƐ P  ‘^ŽĐŝĂů ĐŽŶƚĂĐƚƐ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ĐĂŵƉƐ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞŝƌ ĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚƐ ĂƌĞ ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚďǇ
the contact of residents witŚ Q^^ŐƵĂƌĚƐĂŶĚƚŚĞŝƌĨĂŵŝůŝĞƐ ?ƚŚĞĐŽŵŵĞƌĐŝĂůƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉƐ
ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĐĂŵƉƐ ?ĂŶĚĐŽŶƚĂĐƚǁŝƚŚƉƌŝƐŽŶĞƌƐǁŽƌŬŝŶŐŽƵƚƐŝĚĞƚŚĞĐĂŵƉƐ ? ? ? ? ? ) ? 
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law and non-law is illustrated by the relationship between the SS and the 
judiciary in the camp system, which is discussed in the following section. 
IV. Lessons for the Jurisprudential Representation of Nazi Germany 
A The Complex Relationship ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ‘>Ăǁ ?ĂŶĚ ‘EŽŶ->Ăǁ ? 
Both the legal historical and concentration camp system case studies have 
important implications for the jurisprudential understanding of Nazi 
Germany. If we understand the common representation of Nazi Germany 
within jurisprudential discourse to be that of a superficial, hypothetical, evil 
straw man largely unconnected to historical reality, and that of Nazi law to be 
a one-dimensional, archetypal wicked legal system, the historiography 
challenges this treatment. Furthermore, if it is predicated on an underlying 
narrative of rupture and discontinuity, the research considered here seriously 
questions this presumption. Finally, if the jurisprudential debate between 
positivism and natural law over the validity question and the separability 
question depends to some extent on the competing conceptions of the Nazi 
legal system ĂƐ ĞŝƚŚĞƌ  ‘ůĂǁ ? Žƌ  ‘ŶŽŶ-ůĂǁ ? ?the ideological component of Nazi 
law and the institutional workings of the concentration camp system both 
problematize this dichotomy. 
In this section I will first address the interaction between what have often 
historiographically been considered the legal and extra-legal aspects of the 
camp system, ůĂƌŐĞůǇ ĂĚŚĞƌŝŶŐ ƚŽ &ƌĂĞŶŬĞů ?Ɛ ŶŽƌŵĂƚŝǀĞ ĂŶĚ ƉƌĞƌŽŐĂƚŝǀĞ
elements of the state. In the camp research, this is best represented by the 
relationship between the Nazi SS and the German judiciary, a specific, 
concrete illustration of the function of law on the ground in the Nazi state. 
The scholarship dispels the idea of pure opposition between the legal system 
and the SS, with the former striving to maintain the (rule of) law and the 
latter working to carve out a law-free sphere of influence. Instead, this 
competitive element is better characterised in terms of institutional rivalry 
and the general picture that emerges is  quite different from and significantly 
more complex than that of law versus non-law, with distinct legal and extra-
legal spheres.  
dŚĞ ŶŽƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ  ‘ůĞŐĂů ? ĂŶĚ  ‘ĞǆƚƌĂ-ůĞŐĂů ? ŵŽĚĞƐ ŽĨ  ‘ƚĞƌƌŽƌ ? delineated on the 
basis of the normative and prerogative states conforms with ^ƚĞƉŚĞŶZŝůĞǇ ?Ɛ
claim that, while there was a legal system in Nazi Germany, this had 
ƚƌĂŶƐĨŽƌŵĞĚ ŝŶƚŽĂ ‘ƋƵĂƐŝ-ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞ ?ďǇƚŚĞƉŽŝŶƚŽĨƚŚĞ,ŽůŽĐĂƵƐƚ ?491 It 
ŝƐ ĂůƐŽ ƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůůǇ ĂŵĞŶĂďůĞ ƚŽ ZƵŶĚůĞ ?ƐĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞǁĂƐĂƉŽŝŶƚ ŝŶ
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the Nazi period when lawful persecution became unlawful extermination.492 
While I disagree with both of these interpretations of the relationship 
between law and the Holocaust in the Third Reich, this does not necessarily 
amount to the claim that all actions of the Nazi state were part of the law, 
and therefore lawful in that sense. There is a distinction to be drawn between 
ƚŚĞ ũƵƌŝƐƉƌƵĚĞŶƚŝĂů ĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚ ƚŚĂƚ ǁŚĂƚĂƉƉĞĂƌĞĚƚŽďĞ  ‘ůĂǁ ?ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂůƚĞƌŵƐ
ǁĂƐĂĐƚƵĂůůǇ ‘ŶŽŶ-ůĂǁ ?ŝŶĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂůƚĞƌŵƐďĞĐĂƵƐĞŽĨŝƚƐĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂůďƌĞĂĐŚ
of criteria of natural justice, and the historiographical assertion that some 
state actions were implemented within a legal framework whereas others 
(such as arbitrary mass shootings) were not regulated by law at all. However, 
even this distinction is problematized conceptually by the potential for such 
incidents to conform in principle to higher natural law norms endorsed in the 
Third Reich. There is also a relationship between the two claims in that they 
both have the potential to place law in opposition to non-law, making the 
lawful contradictory to the unlawful ? tŚŝůĞ &ƵůůĞƌ ?Ɛ ŶĂƚƵƌĂů ůĂǁ ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇ
allows for a legal system to meet the requirements of lawfulness to different 
degrees, there still comes a point of qualitative leap into non-law, which, 
according to those criteria, the Nazi regime is generally understood to have 
breached.493 The model of the prerogative and normative state encourages 
historians to see the legal and the extra-legal as largely separate spheres, and 
locate the more horrifying acts of the state in the prerogative state. Franz 
EĞƵŵĂŶŶ ?ƐBehemoth model meanwhile denies the existence of law in the 
Third Reich at all both on an empirical and philosophical basis.494 
The relationship between the judiciary and the SS in the concentration camp 
system shows in one context that it is very difficult in the case of Nazi 
Germany to distinguish law from non-law - the legal from the extra-legal - 
because of the complex and evolving dynamic between the two. The legal 
historical scholarship discussed in the first case study in this chapter 
demonstrates the importance of ideology in Nazi law and how that element 
blurs the boundaries between natural law and positivism and makes it 
unproductive and inconclusive to focus on the validity question and the 
separability question. This makes it highly problematic to separate positivist 
                                                                 
492
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formal law from naturalist moral breach of law. The historical research in this 
case study illustrates something similar in the case of law and non-law. The 
nature of the Nazi legal system and the institutions that existed within and 
interacted with it was such that law was both pervasive and often took on an 
imprecise form. Thus, the distinction between the normative state - ƚŚĞ ‘ůĂǁ ?
- maintaining features such as due process, and the prerogative state  W the 
 ‘ŶŽŶ-ůĂǁ ?- less formal and not, for example, subject to the jurisdiction of the 
ordinary courts or the product of legislation, is precarious given the range of 
processes and functions at work, and ultimately collapses when confronted 
with the actual workings of the system. 
The scholarship reveals a complex interrelationship between different forms 
of repression and exploitation, whether they are discriminatory laws, street 
violence, concentration camps, ordinary courts and prisons, private sector 
and community involvement with forced labour, or pressure to conform from 
within German society. The interrelationship between different aspects of 
the system of repression is evident from the research. It shows that in the 
first year of Nazi rule up to 200,000 predominantly political opponents were 
temporarily imprisoned in the camps, thousands of whom were brought 
before judicial courts, and many others who were not.495 As the SS took over 
coordination of the camp system, between 1934 and 1937, the numbers 
inside the camps increased dramatically, and by mid- ? ? ? ? ‘ĂƐŽĐŝĂůƐ ?ďĞŐĂŶƚŽ
ŽƵƚŶƵŵďĞƌ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ƉƌŝƐŽŶĞƌƐ ? ?496 dŚĞ ĞĂƌůǇ ĐŽŶĐĞŶƚƌĂƚŝŽŶĐĂŵƉƐ ‘ĨŽƌŵĞĚĂŶ
alternative penal system, beyond the control of the judiciary, in which 
revolutionary law prevailed and police-ƐƚĂƚĞ ŵĞƚŚŽĚƐ ǁĞƌĞ ĂƉƉůŝĞĚ ? ?497 
However, the detention of Jews in these camps followed their arrest 
pursuant to protective, instructive and preventive custody measures, all legal 
antecedents.498 They were part of a range of measures  ‘ĂŝŵĞĚĂƚƚŚĞŐƌĂĚual 
isolation of German Jews from social, culturĂůĂŶĚĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐůŝĨĞ ? ?ĂŶĚ ‘staged 
in such a way that the non-:ĞǁŝƐŚŵĂũŽƌŝƚǇĐŽƵůĚĂĐĐĞƉƚŝƚĂƐƌŝŐŚƚĨƵů ? ?499 
This complex interrelationship between  ‘ůĞŐĂů ?ĂŶĚ ‘ĞǆƚƌĂ-ůĞŐĂů ?ŵŽĚĞƐŽĨƌƵůĞ
is further highlightĞĚ ďǇ ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ŝŶƚŽ ƚŚĞ ƉƌĞǀĂůĞŶĐĞ ŽĨ  ‘ƐƵŝĐŝĚŝŶŐ ? in the 
concentration camps. The practice of covering up camp murders as suicide 
counters the oppositional view of the judiciary and the SS, according to which 
legal officials worked against SS attempts to control the concentration camps 
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beyond the regular reach of the law. In fact, Christian Goeschel 
ĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞƐ ? ƚŚĞŝƌ ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ ǁĂƐ  ‘ĂďŽǀĞĂůůĂŶŝ ƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůƌŝǀĂůƌǇ ? ?500 In 
the early camps, murders were often covered up as suicides because of the 
risk of legal prosecution and of revealing the brutality of the camps to the 
outside world, including the law-abiding German public. Such camp murders 
ǁĞƌĞ  ‘ŝůůĞŐĂů ?ĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞĨŽƌŵĂů ůĂǁďĞĐĂƵƐĞ ‘ŽŶůǇƚŚĞ ũƵĚŝĐŝĂƌǇŚĂĚƚŚĞ
authority to pass death sentences  ? ?501 However, these actions could be 
authorised by alternative methods, such as Führer Orders, forming part of a 
competing system of laws and making it difficult to draw clear distinctions 
ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ‘ůĞŐĂů ?ĂŶĚ ‘ĞǆƚƌĂ-ůĞŐĂů ?ĐŽŶĚƵĐƚŝŶƐƵĐŚĐŽŶƚĞǆƚƐ ? 
Even after the outbreak of war, when the institutional conflict was largely 
resolved in favour of the SS, the legal system itself became increasingly 
ƌĂĚŝĐĂůŝƐĞĚĂŶĚƚŚĞƌĞŐŝŵĞ ?ƐůĂĐŬŽĨĐŽŶĐĞƌŶǁŝƚŚĚƵĞƉƌŽĐĞƐƐǁĂƐ ‘ďĂĐŬĞĚďǇ
ŵĂŶǇ ůĞŐĂů ŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƐ ? ?502 Officials often enforced their right to investigate 
dubious camp deaths in order to maintain their own power and jurisdiction 
rather than as a form of opposition to the government. In fact, the two 
institutions frequently worked together in this period. These findings point to 
ƚŚĞŶĞĞĚƚŽ  ‘ůŽĐĂƚĞƚŚĞĐŽŶĐĞŶƚƌĂƚŝŽŶĐĂŵƉƐŝŶĂǁŝĚĞƌǁĞďŽĨŶĂǌŝƚĞƌƌŽƌĂŶĚ
combine legal, social and political history to understand the pre-war origins 
of a system of terror, repression and mass murder on an unprecedented 
ƐĐĂůĞ ? ?503 The concentration camp system cannot simply be classified as 
outside of the law and the SS and the judiciary cannot easily be placed on 
either side of a legal/extra-legal divide. The notion that one of the few places 
Jews remained alive towards the end of the war was the concentration camp 
ƐǇƐƚĞŵďĞĐĂƵƐĞ ŝƚǁĂƐƚŚĞŽŶůǇ ‘ůĞŐĂů ?ǁay for them to survive504 underscores 
the sterility of interpretations that categorise concentration camps as 
institutions without legality and external to the law. It was law - in 
collaboration with other institutions, policies, measures and societal norms - 
that forced Jews into the concentration camps, law that prevented them 
from existing outside of the camps, law that sometimes meant they remained 
alive in a specific context and law that led to their murder. The lawful 
exclusion of certain groups in Nazi society to particular parts of the system 
has jurisprudential implications, and its consequences for our understanding 
of the concept of law require further exploration. 
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B Why the History Challenges ZƵŶĚůĞ ?Ɛ ‘ǆƚĞƌŵŝŶĂƚŽƌǇ>ĞŐĂůŝƚǇ ?dŚĞƐŝƐ 
The jurisprudential relevance and implications of the picture of Nazi 
governance extracted from the case studies considered in this chapter are 
significant in other ways as well. The treatment of Nazi law as continuous 
both across time and with rules, institutions and acts at the edge of the legal 
system undermines the discontinuity thesis. The localised, improvised, 
evolving nature of change within state systems and institutions  heavily 
qualifies a one-dimensional, totalitarian model of Nazi terror. The diverse 
backgrounds and motivations of camp perpetrators, and the inherent 
contingency and reliance on context of agent decisions, renders obsolete the 
uncontroversial, evil figurĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ  ‘EĂǌŝ ? ƚŚĂƚ ĂƉƉĞĂƌƐ ƌĞŐƵůĂƌůǇ ǁŝƚŚŝŶ
jurisprudential literature.505 The complex, multi-faceted and devolved nature 
of the decision-ŵĂŬŝŶŐ ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ŝŶ ŵĂŶǇĐĂƐĞƐƵŶĚĞƌŵŝŶĞƐĂ  ‘ĐƌŝŵŝŶĂůƐƚĂƚĞ ?
theory of Nazism according to which a few criminal conspirators at the top of 
the Nazi leadership wielded virtually untrammelled, monolithic power over 
state and society. The sheer ordinariness of Nazi perpetrators, bureaucracy, 
institutions and decisions demands that we look beyond the superficial 
characterisation of the Third Reich as inherently extreme to find out what is 
 ‘ŶŽƌŵĂů ? ĂŶĚƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞŵŽƐƚĂůĂƌŵŝŶŐĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞEĂǌŝƐƚĂƚĞ ?ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇ ŝŶ ŝƚƐ
use of law. 
In the wake of these findings, analysis of the concept of law is a much more 
interesting jurisprudential exercise, not least because its abstract theoretical 
sophistication is matched by the empirical intricacy of the examples upon 
which it calls. This is best illustrated by considering briefly how the research 
addressed in this chapter impacts on Kristen ZƵŶĚůĞ ?Ɛ ĐůĂŝŵƐ ? ďĂƐĞĚŽŶƚŚĞ
EĂǌŝ ůĞŐĂů ƐǇƐƚĞŵ ? ƚŚĂƚ &ƵůůĞƌ ?Ɛ ŶĂƚƵƌĂů ůĂǁ ƚŚĞŽƌǇ ŝƐ Ă ŐŽŽĚ ŵŽĚĞů ĨŽƌ
analysing Nazi law and that  W according to it  W exterminatory legality is an 
impossibility.506 The difficulties for natural law theory generally presented by 
the ideological component of Nazi law include that it contests an 
understanding of the Nazi regime based primarily on its evil and cynical 
manipulation of the rule of law and - not unrelated - that it destabilises the 
presumed normative basis upon which legal systems are or ought to be 
founded. These are addressed in the earlier sections of this chapter and will 
ŶŽƚ ďĞ ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚ ŝŶ ŵŽƌĞ ĚĞƚĂŝů ŚĞƌĞ ? ^ƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂůůǇ ŝŶ ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶ ƚŽ ZƵŶĚůĞ ?Ɛ
claims, the particular elements of the historical research that raise the 
strongest objections are the innate continuities, the importance of normality, 
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and the embeddedness of the prerogative and normative states within one 
another, and the Holocaust within the rest of the Nazi state. 
These elements relate to particular asƉĞĐƚƐŽĨZƵŶĚůĞ ?ƐĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚ ?dŚĞƐĞĂƌĞ
ƚŚĞ ŝŶƐŝƐƚĞŶĐĞŽŶĂŵŽŵĞŶƚŽĨƋƵĂůŝƚĂƚŝǀĞ  ‘ůĞĂƉ ?ĨƌŽŵůĂǁƚŽŶŽŶ-law around 
the time of Kristallnacht in November 1938, the effective separation of the 
Holocaust from the persecution of the Jews that came before, and the claim 
ƚŚĂƚ ĚŝƐĐƌŝŵŝŶĂƚŽƌǇ ůĂǁƐ ĨƌŽŵ ĞĂƌůŝĞƌ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ  ? ? ? ?ƐƵĐŚ ĂƐ ƚŚĞ  ‘EƵƌĞŵďĞƌŐ
>ĂǁƐ ?ĚŝĚŶŽƚƉƌĞƐĂŐĞǁŚĂƚĐĂŵĞůĂƚĞƌŝŶůĞŐĂůƚĞƌŵƐďĞĐĂƵƐĞƚŚĞŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶŽĨ
those who fashioned such laws was not extermination at the time. In terms 
of the leap from law to non-law, the history of the evolution of the 
implementation of Nazi policy in different areas, and specifically the 
concentration camp system as it moved through its own phases of 
development towards extermination, makes it very difficult to sustain 
empirically the notion of a qualitative shift of such significance, which 
amounts to a moment of rupture. The concentration camp historians have 
drawn back from previous notions of a rupture in that system around 1939 
because it over-emphasises the shift in question and underplays how the 
camps evolved over time dynamically, in a greater number of related phases.  
This process can also be seen in the development of the institutional rivalry 
between the SS and the judiciary in relation to jurisdiction over the camps. 
ZĂƚŚĞƌ ƚŚĂŶ ƚŚĞ  ‘ŶŽƌŵĂƚŝǀĞ ? ũƵĚŝĐŝĂƌǇ ďĞŝŶŐ ƐƵĚĚĞŶůǇ ŽƵƐƚĞĚ ďǇ a 
 ‘ƉƌĞƌŽŐĂƚŝǀĞ ? ^^ ? ƚŚĞ ƚǁŽ ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐ ǁŽƌŬĞĚ ďŽƚŚƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌ ĂŶĚ ŝŶ
competition over time until ultimately the SS wrestled power within its own 
jurisdiction. A legal model based on two phases, one of pre- ? ? ? ?  ‘ůĂǁ ?ĂŶĚ
post- ? ? ? ?  ‘ŶŽŶ-ůĂǁ ? ŵƵƐƚ ĐŽŵĞ ƵŶĚĞƌ ƐĐƌƵƚŝŶǇ ŝŶ ƚŚŝƐ ĐŽŶƚĞǆƚ ĂƐ ĂŶ
unhistorical way of understanding the incremental change and radicalisation 
that connected 1933 and before, to 1942 and after, and that characterised 
change generally in the fast-moving historical period of Nazi rule. The 
tightening of measures against the Jewish population subsequent to the 
Kristallnacht pogrom, which was noted by some contemporary diarists, does 
not appear any more worthy of threshold jurisprudential status than other 
important moments, also related in different ways to the legal system, such 
as the Aktion T4 decree, the commencement of mass shootings on the 
Eastern front, the opening of the Operation Reinhard death camps or the 
Nuremberg Laws themselves. November 1938 is only pinpointed as 
important because of the coincidence of certain diary observations with 
ZƵŶĚůĞ ?Ɛ ŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨƚŚĞ ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞĂŶĚƐĐŽƉĞŽĨŚƵŵĂŶĂŐĞŶĐǇƵŶĚĞƌ
ƚŚĞ ůĂǁĂƐƉĂƌƚŽĨ&ƵůůĞƌ ?ƐŶĂƚƵƌĂůůĂǁƚŚĞŽƌǇ as well as the particular interest 
in the agency of the Jewish population. Taken out of context, this appears a 
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sound conclusion to draw, but it does not fit well with the broader history of 
the period. 
The same qualitative moment of rupture that distinguishes law from non-law 
and effectively renders exterminatory legality impossible also enables the 
Holocaust, which must be viewed as an exterminatory phenomenon, to be 
considered both exceptional and existing entirely outside of the realm of law. 
The impliĐĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ZƵŶĚůĞ ?Ɛ ƚŚĞƐŝƐ ŝƐ ƚŚĂƚ Ăůů ĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ ƚŚĞ :ĞǁƐ
subsequent to the point of rupture were non-law, regardless of their source, 
form or nature, because they took on an exterminatory character. A further 
implication of this is that the Holocaust is exceptionalised in legal terms from 
the rest oĨ ƚŚĞ EĂǌŝ ƐƚĂƚĞ ? ǁŚŝĐŚ ? ĞǀĞŶ ǁŝƚŚŝŶ ZƵŶĚůĞ ?Ɛ ŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶ ?
continued to exist with a legal framework. It is also made an exception from 
the concept of law, reinforcing in a different way the discontinuity thesis. 
Again, other aspects of the history of Nazi Germany, represented in this 
discussion by the concentration camp system scholarship, negate an 
understanding that separates the Holocaust from the rest of the state so 
clearly. The normalcy of the lives and environment of the perpetrators, even 
the elite Camp SS personnel, the ad hoc evolution of the entity of the camps 
as prison sites for political enemies to sites of extermination, the role of legal 
instruments in that process, and the gradual shift of legal and political 
jurisdiction from the judiciary to the SS illustrate that a clear break does not 
provide an empirically justifiable conceptualisation of the relationship 
between the Reich and the Holocaust. 
A final aspect of rupture is ostensible in Rundle approach, in the labelling of 
the Nuremberg Laws and other earlier persecutory legal measures against 
the Jews as non-exterminatory in character because they did not intend for 
the foreclosure of all possibility of human agency. The idea that this i s 
somehow qualitatively different from later measures which, in reality, 
continued a long sequence of increasingly stringent measures in a process of 
radicalisation relies, as was noted in Chapter Four, on the historically 
problematic notion of original intent in order for it to be considered 
genuinely continuous with the later period. Simply put, that the framers of 
the Nuremberg Laws did not intend for genocide to take place within a 
decade does not mean that those laws did not foreshadow that genocide in 
important respects. Equally, the historical reconstruction of the 
concentration camp system shows that its own development towards 
extermination was often localised, fragmentary and improvised rather than 
centralised, premeditated and monolithic. The contention that the lack of a 
deliberate and centralised move towards genocide in 1935 means that what 
occurred then was fundamentally different from what occurred in 1940 
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seems to neglect this significant development in our understanding of how 
the Final Solution came about. 
^ŽŵĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞƐĞ ĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚƐ ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ ZƵŶĚůĞ ?Ɛ ƉƌŽǀŽĐĂƚŝǀĞ ŶĂƚƵƌĂů ůĂǁ ƚŚĞƐŝƐ
have reprised in part some of the objections made in the context of Dan 
^ƚŽŶĞ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ ŝŶƚŚĞƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐĐŚĂƉƚĞƌ ?dŚĞǇŚĂǀĞĚŽŶĞƐŽ ŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽŚŝŐŚůŝŐŚƚ
a different historiographical perspective on those claims; i.e. to show how the 
case studies in this chapter bear on one approach to reorienting 
jurisprudence towards Nazi Germany. They have also done so to illustrate 
more broadly the relevance of the history of Nazi Germany to jurisprudential 
debate. Rundle attempts to do this by using contemporary sources to 
reinforce a reinterpreted Fullerian natural law argument. We do not disagree 
entirely on the use of the history of Nazi Germany in jurisprudential debate. 
However, the detailed and advanced historiography of aspects of the Third 
Reich is most relevant because it demonstrates the problems with both 
positivist and naturalist constructions of the concept of law, and with the 
representation of the Nazi past within jurisprudential discourse generally. 
V. Conclusion 
Law worked in complex ways in the Nazi state, and the relationship between 
the regime and the legal system changed over time. Rejecting rupture in 
favour of continuity and accepting the diverse nature of Nazi perpetration 
draws out much more significant aspects for jurisprudence. The 
acknowledgement that law functioned in the Third Reich in many respects in 
much the same way it functions in other states: among other things, highly 
politicised, responsive to societal norms, complex, dynamic and contingent 
on a number of factors. The trends highlighted in the two case studies 
considered in this chapter, of the significance of ideology as a diffuse feature 
within the Nazi legal system and of the importance of the context of 
continuity and change rather than rupture, are trends within Third Reich 
historiography as a whole and represent a highly sophisticated and 
documentarily substantiated understanding of Nazi Germany. 
If we are to build jurisprudential theories that fully explore the Nazi past, 
which inform legal scholarship about Nazi Germany, at least in part on the 
empirical reality of the Nazi regime, it is necessary to comprehend fully how 
law was used in the Nazi state and the implications of the Nazi period for the 
concept of law. Historical research, in the grasp of legal theorists, can enable 
the construction of more convincing theories of how the Nazi legal system 
worked and more fully understand the nature of wicked manifestations of 
the concept of law. The examples from the case study explored in this 
chapter demonstrate the necessity of rejecting the rupture thesis, which 
ultimately casts Nazism as irrelevant for law, as empirically and theoretically 
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flawed. It encourages the acceptance of historical development as a process 
of continuity and change, and implores us to embrace detailed historical 
research as a basis around which to construct workable theories of law. This 
involves treating the Nazi past as a complex rather than simple history, and 
dictates a more nuanced set of responses to its events than jurisprudential 
discourse currently enables.  
Historiographical observations should cause us to deconstruct the 
oppositions between continuity and discontinuity, the camps and the 
community, the SS and the judiciary, and the normal and the extreme, so we 
can understand the Nazi past. Nazi Germany was not simply a criminal state. 
It had law, its law was recognised as such, and its law was not fundamentally 
different in important ways from the laws of other states at the time, or 
today. It also had people who operated within, without and across the 
boundaries of the law, and those people, who did things in some parts of 
their lives that are extreme and incomprehensible from the outside, 
nevertheless acted within a strikingly familiar normative framework to that 
which structures our lives.  
The case studies presented in this chapter built on the historical theoretical 
ĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚƐ ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚ ŝŶ ŚĂƉƚĞƌ&ŽƵƌĂƌŽƵŶĚĂŶ^ƚŽŶĞ ?ƐƐĐŚŽůĂƌƐŚŝƉĂŶĚŝŶ
suppŽƌƚŽĨĂǀŝĚ&ƌĂƐĞƌ ?ƐĐƌŝƚŝƋƵĞŽĨƚŚĞƉƌĞǀĂŝůŝŶŐƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨEĂǌŝůĂǁ ?
They did so by providing concrete and jurisprudentially relevant examples 
from historiography of how the regime and legal system functioned, and how 
they challenge both the presumptions about the Third Reich that underpin its 
jurisprudential treatment and the theoretical paradigms of positivism and 
natural law as they are applied to it. In this, they contested the prevailing 
jurisprudential representation of Nazism established in chapters Two and 
Three of this dissertation. Chapter Six will look to use the focal point of the 
Nuremberg trials to connect the historical critique of jurisprudential 
discourse to other areas of the legal academy. It will argue that Nuremberg 
can be seen as a moment of legal rupture that constructed historical 
narratives of rupture that resonate through ICL scholarship as well as 
jurisprudence, and examine how it is that legal scholarship continues to be 
informed by these narratives of rupture. 
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Chapter Six: The Importance of Nuremberg: Constructing Moments and 
Narratives of Rupture 
I. Introduction 
A Connecting Jurisprudence, ICL Scholarship, Historiography and the 
Nazi Past 
This chapter will establish a connection between some of the elements 
discussed in this dissertation: jurisprudential discourse, the development of 
historiography about Nazi Germany,507 the Nazi past itself and international 
criminal law scholarship. These things are connected by and to Nazi war 
crimes trials, and particularly the Nuremberg trials. Nuremberg - IMT and 
NMT  W stands at the centre of a discursive nexus between the Third Reich and 
aspects of Anglo-American legal and historical scholarship.508 It is significant 
on a number of levels and helps to explain why Nazi Germany is represented 
as it is within jurisprudence. This chapter will highlight two of these levels of 
significance and in doing so explain how the different elements mentioned 
above are linked. This is important for two reasons. The first is that it shows 
that other areas of the Anglo-American legal academy share the 
jurisprudential mistreatment of Nazi Germany that curtails the theoretical 
comprehension of Nazi law. The second is that it helps to explain why 
postwar historiography of the Third Reich can be seen to have contributed to 
some of the characteristics of the jurisprudential representation of Nazi 
Germany, such as the rupture thesis,509 while much more recent historical 
scholarship works directly against this.510 
The two ways in which Nuremberg is significant in the context of this 
dissertation will be established with reference to recent legal and historical 
scholarship about Nazi war crimes trials. The first is that Nuremberg 
constructed historical narratives and legal realities with respect to Nazi 
Germany, which endured within historiography and legal theory respectively. 
In doing so it created a discursive and philosophical rupture between law in 
Nazi Germany and the law in the post-war, Anglo-American world - the law 
which has animated jurisprudential debate about the concept of law. This is 
discussed in Section II of this chapter. The second way in which Nuremberg is 
                                                                 
507
 ThĞ ǁĂǇ ‘ũƵƌŝƐƉƌƵĚĞŶĐĞ ?ĂŶĚƌĞůĂƚĞĚƚĞƌŵƐĂƌĞƵƐĞĚŝŶƚŚŝƐĚŝƐƐĞƌ tation is explained in 
Section // ŽĨ ŚĂƉƚĞƌ KŶĞ ? ĂƐ ŝƐ ƚŚĞ ƵƐĞ ŽĨ ƚĞƌŵƐƚŽĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞEĂǌŝ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ?ƐƵĐŚĂƐ ‘EĂǌŝ
ƉĂƐƚ ? ? ‘dŚŝƌĚZĞŝĐŚ ?ĂŶĚƐŽŽŶ ? 
508
 dŚĞƚĞƌŵƐ/Dd ?EDd ?  ‘/>ƐĐŚŽůĂƌƐŚŝƉ ?ĂŶĚ ‘EĂǌŝǁĂƌĐƌŝŵĞƐƚƌŝĂůƐ ?ĂƌĞĞǆƉůĂŝŶĞĚŝŶ^ ĞĐƚŝŽŶ
II of Chapter One. 
509
 The characteristics of the jurisprudential representation of Nazi Germany are outlined in 
Chapter Two. 
510
 Some examples of this scholarship and how it counters the jurisprudential representa tion 
of Nazi Germany are addressed in detail  in chapters Four and Five. 
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significant is in its role as the symbolic focal point for ICL scholarship as the 
genesis of modern international criminal law and the historic forerunner of 
the International Criminal Court (ICC). English language ICL scholarship, to the 
extent it has addressed Nazi war crimes trials, has focused almost entirely on 
the Nuremberg IMT, and to a lesser and more recent extent the NMT, 
neglecting a myriad of other trials. As such, Nuremberg provides a legal prism 
through which this scholarship engages with Nazi Germany.511 Because of its 
specific interest in the substance and procedure of international criminal law, 
ƚŚĞ ĨůĂǁƐŝŶƚŚĞƚƌŝĂůƐ ?ƌĞĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞdŚŝƌĚZĞŝĐŚĂƌĞƌĞƉůŝĐĂƚĞĚŝŶ />
scholarship, despite the existence of a growing historical literature that 
documents the problems with how Nazi Germany was understood through 
Nuremberg.512 ICL scholarship consequentially mirrors jurisprudential 
discourse in some aspects of its treatment of the Nazi past. This point is 
addressed in Sections III and IV of this chapter. 
This returns us to an issue raised at the start of this dissertation, that the 
criticisms that have so far been made of the Anglo-American, academic legal 
treatment of the Nazi past go beyond jurisprudence, and have often been 
directed at the legal academy as a whole.513 This dissertation focuses 
primarily on jurisprudence and it is not within its scope to explore all the 
potential aspects of these wider claims. However, this chapter will show that 
some of these criticisms - the propagation of a rupture thesis, a general 
ignorance of the Holocaust, a superficial appreciation of the governance of 
the Third Reich  W also apply within ICL scholarship, which is interconnected 
with jurisprudence via the Nuremberg trials. It also returns us more precisely 
to the idea of a rupture thesis, which isolates the Nazi past from the non-Nazi 
present, specifically in terms of law. This chapter links the arguments that 
Nuremberg at the same time comprised a jurisprudential moment of rupture 
and contributed to an academic, discursive narrative of rupture within 
historiography, the latter of which endured for a long time and the former of 
which continues to influence how Nazi law is understood. 
                                                                 
511
 The historical scholarship discussed in this chapter does explore Nazi war crimes trials 
beyond those at Nuremberg, examples of which are included in Part B of this opening 
section.  ‘EƵƌĞŵďĞƌŐ ? ŝƐ ĂĚŽƉƚĞĚ ĂƐ ŬĞǇ ĚŝƐĐƵƌƐŝǀĞ ŵŽŵĞŶƚ ŝŶƚŚŝƐ ĐŚĂƉƚĞƌ ĨŽƌ ůĞŐĂů
scholarship (ICL scholarship, jurisprudence and the rupture thesis generally) because of its 
focus and influence within ICL scholarship, its chronological location ahead of the Hart-Fuller 
debate and its importance in constructing enduring narratives in both law and history. 
However, historians raise common issues in respect of other trials, such as the Frankfurt-
Auschwitz Trial, in terms of how the Nazi past is represented and the pr oblematic impact of 
dual pedagogic and justice-making purposes of Nazi war crimes trials. 
512
 The nature and scope of this academic historical and legal l iterature is discussed in the 
next part of this section, and its content in more detail  in sections III and IV respectively. 
513
 See Section I of Chapter One. 
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B Categories of Scholarship: Law and History 
There is a large body of scholarship - both legal and historical - about Nazi 
war crimes trials, which shows little sign of abating, and the trials themselves 
stretch from towards the end of the Second World War through to very 
recent years.514 A comprehensive analysis of these trials and the scholarship 
that surrounds them is beyond the limitations of this chapter. Instead it 
focuses on examples from three strands of scholarship about Nazi war crimes 
trials. I will refer to recent literature that analyses the narratives constructed 
at Nuremberg together with its legal theoretical underpinning to expose their 
impact on the postwar jurisprudential and historical representation of Nazi 
Germany.515 I will then consider the contrast between the treatment of 
Nuremberg in ICL scholarship and that in historical writing to highlight the 
parallels between ICL scholarship and jurisprudence in how the Third Reich is 
represented and assert some of the limitations of ICL scholarship in 
advancing a sound theoretical understanding of Nazi law. This latter literature 
is indicative of the overall content of Nazi war crimes trial scholarship over a 
number of decades while also representing developments and divergences 
that have become more apparent in the last few years.  
This remainder of this section will be used to introduce the scope of these 
two strands of Nazi war crimes trials scholarship and differentiate between 
the legal and historical strands. The current sweep of scholarship can roughly 
be divided into two categories, respectively overarching the disciplines of law 
and history. Firstly, there are those texts adopting a substantive legal 
approach, authored by scholars usually in the legal academy, but occasionally 
also practising lawyers. These generally give a technical account of legal 
aspects of the trials they examine, often with reference to the development 
of international criminal law. They are almost entirely addressed to the 
different Nuremberg trials, with the main focus being the IMT.516 Secondly, 
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 See for example the l iterature about the Nuremberg Trials alone cited in Fraser, Law After 
Auschwitz (n 23) 123, fn 2. 
515
 This includes in particular &ƌĂƐĞƌ ?  ‘^ŚĂĚŽǁƐ ŽĨ >Ăǁ ?  ?Ŷ26) and Fraser,  ‘ǀŝů  >Ăǁ ?ǀŝů 
>ĂǁǇĞƌƐ ? ?  ?Ŷ26) ? ŚƌŝƐƚŝĂŶĞ tŝůŬĞ ?  ‘ZĞĐŽŶƐĞĐƌĂƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ dĞŵƉůĞ ŽĨ :ƵƐƚŝĐĞ P /ŶǀŽĐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ŽĨ
Civil ization and Humanity in the NureŵďĞƌŐ:ƵƐƚŝĐĞĂƐĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? )  ? ? ? ? )Canadian Journal of 
Law and Society 181; and the contributions to Priemel and Stil ler, Reassessing the 
Nuremberg Military Tribunals (n 6). 
516
 This category incorporates, among others, Norbert Ehrenfreund, The Nuremberg Legacy: 
How the Nazi War Crimes Trials Changed the Course of History  (Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); 
Stephan Landsman, Crimes of the Holocaust: The Law Confronts Hard Cases (University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2005); Guénaël Mettraux (ed), Perspectives on the Nuremberg Trial 
(OUP, 2008); Kevin Jon Heller, The Nuremberg Military Tribunals and the Origins of 
International Criminal Law (OUP, 2011); and David A. Blumenthal and Timothy L.H. 
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there are those texts that adopt a predominantly historical methodology, and 
authored by scholars working primarily in university history faculties. This 
category includes texts that provide an historical analysis of a particular trial, 
and collected volumes that apply a thematic approach to a group of 
proceedings, both of which focus on the historical background and context.  
These texts do branch beyond Nuremberg to consider other Nazi war crimes 
trials.517  
dŚĞďůƵƌƌŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞďŽƵŶĚĂƌŝĞƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶǁŚĂƚŵŝŐŚƚ ůŽŽƐĞůǇďĞƚĞƌŵĞĚ ‘ůĞŐĂů ?
ĂŶĚ ‘ŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂů ?ƐĐŚŽůĂƌƐŚŝƉŝŶƚŚŝƐƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĂƌĞĂƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƐĂĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞƚŽƚŚŝƐ
categorisation, which is further complicated by the analysis of theoretical-
philosophical aspects in both categories of scholarship. These problems, 
which can persist both in the research object under scrutiny and the 
background and methods of the scholars, must be acknowledged. Research 
into the subject of Nazi war crimes trials necessarily involves a certain 
amount of interdisciplinary fleet-footedness. Historians writing about 
essentially legal events generally pay heed to the law involved in prosecuting 
war crimes trials. Equally, lawyers investigating what are also historical events  
often delve into at least some of the context and background that brought 
them about. However, a distinction between these categories is nevertheless 
apparent. The ICL scholarship strand is primarily concerned with EƵƌĞŵďĞƌŐ ?Ɛ
doctrinal and procedural relationship to international criminal law, and the 
strand of historical writing is concerned with the wider history of the trials 
themselves and their relationship to Nazi Germany. 
ICL scholarship tends to focus on substantive rules and procedures, applying a 
primarily legal, conventionally jurisprudential, mode of analysis to these 
aspects of war crimes trials. This is often reflected in the disciplinary 
backgrounds of the various authors. For example, Norbert Ehrenfreund was a 
US state Superior Court judge who had reported on the Nuremberg IMT. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
McCormack, The Legacy of Nuremberg: Civilising Influence or Institutionalised Vengeance  
(Martinus Nijhoff, 2008). All  of these have been published since 2005. 
517
 Recent examples of this category of l iterature include Valerie Hébert, ,ŝƚůĞƌ ?Ɛ'ĞŶĞƌĂůƐŽŶ
Trial: The Last War Crimes Tribunal at Nuremberg  (University of Kansas Press, 2010); Rebecca 
Wittmann, Beyond Justice: The Auschwitz Trial (Harvard University Press, 2005); Devin O. 
Pendas, The Frankfurt Auschwitz Trial, 1963-1965: Genocide, History, and the Limits of the 
Law (CUP, 2006); Hilary Earl, The Nuremberg SS-Einsatzgruppen Trial, 1945-1958: Atrocity, 
Law, and History (Cambridge University Press, 2009); Donald Bloxham, Genocide on Trial: 
War Crimes Trials and the Formation of Holocaust History and Memory (OUP, 2001); Patricia 
Heberer, Jürgen Matthäus, Atrocities on Trial: Historical Perspectives on the Politics of 
Prosecuting War Crimes (University of Nebraska Press, 2008); and Nathan Stoltzfus and 
Henry Friedlander, Nazi Crimes and the Law (Cambridge University Press, 2008). All  but one 
of these is published in the last ten years and half of them in the last five. 
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Stephan Landsman, author of Crimes of the Holocaust,518 holds a chair in tort 
law and social policy and specialises in the civil jury system. Much of the 
academic interest in these trials unsurprisingly centres on their significance 
for, and impact upon, the subsequent development of international criminal 
law and other international war crimes trials, and this element is well 
represented in those involved in producing legal war crimes literature. The 
editor of the volume Perspectives on the Nuremberg Trial,519 Guénaël 
Mettraux is a defence counsel and specialist in international criminal law, 
while Kevin Jon Heller, author of The Nuremberg Military Tribunals and the 
Origins of International Criminal Law,520 researches in criminal law and 
international criminal law.521 Similarly, the editors of The Legacy of 
Nuremberg,522 David Blumenthal and Timothy McCormack, are respectively 
specialists in criminal and United Nations law, and international humanitarian 
and criminal law.  
The division between the broadly legal and historical categories of 
scholarship is evident in which war crimes trials are examined. The focus has 
been very limited, particularly among ICL scholarship. This legal research 
continues to be almost entirely directed to the Nuremberg IMT, because of 
its status and relevance as an international tribunal,523 while historical 
accounts have branched out considerably in recent years, with the 
emergence of specific works on individual NMT proceedings and the 
Frankfurt-Auschwitz trial, and some collected volumes incorporating a range 
of lesser known proceedings.524 The subject and approach of the research is 
another point of differentiation. Historical accounts generally look to provide 
a detailed narrative of the various legal and non-legal factors related to the 
trials, running from pre-trial machinations to the ultimate fate of the 
convicted defendants. They also include such reflections as  on the 
relationship between truth and justice in history and law, and address the 
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 Landsman, Crimes of the Holocaust (n 516). 
519
 Mettraux, Perspectives on the Nuremberg Trial (n 516). 
520
 Heller, The Nuremberg Military Tribunals (n 516). 
521
 ůƚŚŽƵŐŚ ,ĞůůĞƌ ?Ɛ ďĂĐŬŐƌŽƵŶĚ ŝŶ ƐŽĐŝŽůŽŐǇ ŵŝŐŚƚ ? ŝŶ ƉĂƌƚ ? ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚ ĨŽƌ ƐŽŵĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ
departures apparent in his text from the bulk of legal Nazi war crimes trials scholarship. See 
the discussion of his text in Section III of this chapter. 
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 Blumenthal and McCormack, The Legacy of Nuremberg (n 516). 
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 Note, for example, those works by Ehrenfreund, Mettraux, and Blumenthal and 
McCormack (fn 516 above). The Nuremberg NMT has received some attention within ICL 
scholarship in recent years, including Heller, The Nuremberg Military Tribunals (n 516). These 
are discussed further below but do not displace the overarching issue, because this research 
continues to display some of the most importa nt characteristics outlined of the wider body 
of research. 
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broader historical context including public reaction to the trials. Monographs 
of individual trials tend to adopt a conventional chronological narrative but 
within this framework endeavour to place some of the issues that arise in 
their own context, that of the broader historiography of Nazi Germany. While 
the occasional legal account is somewhat comparable to this model,525 for 
the most part such works are structured around and attend to the legal rules 
and procedures that apply to the relevant trial generally or particular aspects 
of the trial.  
The presentation of the scholarship in categories focused on academic 
discipline highlights the preoccupation of a preponderance of the existing 
research with certain aspects of Nazi war crimes trials, and the gaps this 
leaves which might be filled by other sorts of research. It emphasises 
differences in approach and methodology that result in different research 
outcomes, and reveals a paucity of collaboration between ICL scholarship and 
historical research into Nuremberg and other trials . Above all it shows the 
highly circumscribed theoretical scope of ICL scholarship, which comprises 
the legal ĚŝƐĐŝƉůŝŶĞ ?ƐƉƌŝŵĂƌǇĞŶŐĂŐĞŵĞŶƚǁŝƚŚEĂǌŝǁĂƌĐƌŝŵĞƐƚƌŝĂůƐ ? There is 
little academic legal consideration of the Nazi past beyond the immediate 
jurisprudence of the legal rules and procedures relating to the development 
of international criminal law. This betrays a reliance on a single conception of 
law as something able to deal with the problem of historical atrocity 
exemplified in the Third Reich, mirroring the approach manifested in many of 
the war crimes trials themselves. The need to engage further with this 
underlying legal theoretical issue is generally not acknowledged and the 
possibility of alternative conceptions of law being applicable to this area is 
accordingly ignored. The extent of legal critique of Nuremberg tends to be 
limited to an evaluation of ĐůĂŝŵƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŝŵƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ǀŝĐƚŽƌ ?Ɛ ũƵƐƚŝĐĞ ĂŶĚ
some procedural shortcomings. The distorting impact of the representation 
of Nazi Germany within the trials or the jurisprudential and discursive 
framework applied to them is rarely addressed. The implication of these 
issues is explained in more detail in Sections III and IV of this chapter. 
II. Constructing Moments and Narratives of Rupture 
 ‘EƵƌĞŵďĞƌŐ ? ŝƐ ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚ ĂŶ ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚ ŵŽŵĞŶƚ ŝŶƚŚĞŚŝƐƚŽƌǇŽĨƚŚĞĂďŝůŝƚǇ
of international law to address gross criminal acts occurring at state level, 
whether in the fields of international criminal law, international humanitarian 
law or international human rights law. The term generally refers to the 
Nuremberg International Military Tribunal (IMT), the most famous of the war 
ĐƌŝŵĞƐ ƚƌŝĂůƐ ƌĞůĂƚŝŶŐ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ EĂǌŝ ƌĞŐŝŵĞ ? dŚĞ ƚĞƌŵ  ‘EƵƌĞŵďĞƌŐ ? ƐŽ ŽĨƚĞŶ
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 Especially Heller, Nuremberg Military Tribunals (n 516), which narrates the history of the 
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associated with these proceedings can also refer to the Nuremberg Military 
Tribunals (NMT), the 12 subsequent trials of various aspects of the Nazi state 
including its Justice system in the so-called Justice case.526 These proceedings, 
especially the IMT, have been assigned a certain status, symbolic as well as 
substantive, at the genesis of international criminal law as laying the 
groundwork of a precedent for international prosecutions, a procedural 
ĨƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬ ?ĂŶĚƐŽŵĞƐƵďƐƚĂŶƚŝǀĞŽĨĨĞŶĐĞƐ ?  ‘EƵƌĞŵďĞƌŐ ?ŝƐƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚĨŽƌƚŚĞ
legal academy in another quite different and equally important way. This is in 
shaping the representation of Nazi Germany that has come to primacy within 
jurisprudential discourse initially through the Hart-Fuller debate and, 
alongside constructing a narrative of lawlessness about the Nazi regime, in 
itself manifesting a moment of legal rupture that echoes through our 
understanding of Nazi law. 
Kim PriemĞů ĂŶĚ ůĞǆĂ ^ƚŝůůĞƌ ?Ɛ ĞĚŝƚĞĚĐŽůůĞĐƚŝŽŶReassessing the Nuremberg 
Military Tribunals
527 describes, among other things, how a narrative of Nazi 
criminality underpinned the prosecution strategy in the NMT proceedings 
and made its way into mainstream historiography as a prevailing 
interpretation of the Nazi regime in subsequent years and decades. It also 
shows the importance of defence narratives of Nazi governance, which 
themselves asserted the totalitarian power of the leadership and the 
influence of particular Nazi institutions in an effort to minimise the culpability 
of the defendants. The prosecution had little interest in emphasising the 
similarities and overlaps between Nazi law and the law being used to 
prosecute Nazi war criminals and the defence had nothing to gain by focusing 
ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ĞůĞŵĞŶƚƐ ŽĨ  ‘ŶŽƌŵĂůŝƚǇ ? ƚŚĂƚ ĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞĚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ EĂǌŝ ƐƚĂƚĞ
notwithstanding the horrors it committed. However, the narratives 
ĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚĞĚĂƚĂŶĚďǇƚŚĞEDdǁĞƌĞŚƵŐĞůǇŝŶĨůƵĞŶƚŝĂů ?dŚĞǇ ‘ŵĂĚĞƚŚĞŝƌǁĂǇ
into historical textbooks, speeches of commemoration, and the phrasing of 
ƌĞƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ ĂĐƚƐ ? Ăƚ ƚŚĞ ĞǆƉĞŶƐĞ ŽĨ ŽƚŚĞƌ ŶĂƌƌĂƚŝǀĞƐ 528 ĂŶĚ  ‘ǁŽƵůĚ ƐŽŽŶ
ďĞĐŽŵĞ ĐĂŶŽŶŝǌĞĚ ŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂů ŽƉŝŶŝŽŶ ? ?529 at once impacting historical, legal 
and public discourse: 
The Nuremberg trials established several interpretations of the Nazi 
ƌĞŐŝŵĞ ? DŽƐƚ ŽŵŝŶŽƵƐ ĨƌŽŵ ƚŽĚĂǇ ?Ɛ ƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞ ǁĂƐ ƚŚĂƚ ? ĚƵƌŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ
years of the trial program, the planning of the Nazi persecution and 
extermination policy were reduced to a conspiracy of Hitler, Himmler, 
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 US v Josef Alstoetter et al, Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals, 
Vol III,  ‘dŚĞ :ƵƐƚŝĐĞ ĂƐĞ ?(United States Government Printing Office, 1951). For a brief run-
down of the 12 NMT trials, see &ƌĂƐĞƌ ? ‘^ŚĂĚŽǁƐŽĨ>Ăǁ ? ?Ŷ26) 403. 
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 Priemel and Stil ler, Reassessing the Nuremberg Military Tribunals (n 6). 
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 WƌŝĞŵĞůĂŶĚ^ƚŝů ůĞƌ ? ‘EƵƌĞŵďĞƌŐ ?ƐEĂƌƌĂƚŝǀĞƐ ? ?Ŷ78) 2. 
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and Heydrich, and that perpetrators who carried out this policy 
effectively consisted of the SS. Equally crucial was that the mass murder 
of the European Jews was singled out from other Nazi mass violence. 
Institutional networks between the Nazi party and the state 
bureaucracy, economic interests of German industry, the cooperation 
between thĞ tĞŚƌŵĂĐŚƚ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ^^  Q ǁĞƌĞ ƉŽŽƌůǇ ŚŝŐŚůŝŐŚƚĞĚ ? dŚƵƐ ?
connections between the persecution and extermination of the Jews and 
mass-kil l ings and il l -treatment of other people, forced labour, 
malnutrition and anti -gueril la warfare, Germanization, population and 
settlement policy, eugenics, racial policy, and antisemitism were 
insufficiently l inked with one another.
530
 
The isolation of the Final Solution from other state violence and the 
concomitant playing down of the many connections between the normal 
institutions of state and those used to perpetrate the Holocaust added to the 
impression given by the focus on a murderous conspiracy of the Nazi 
leadership implemented by the SS. This was effectively that a few criminal 
Nazis had manipulated and controlled the German state to enable their racist 
and exterminatory policies to be put into effect. A narrative of criminality 
within general history becomes a more specific narrative of rupture in legal 
theoretical terms via a simple step. A government of criminality is by 
definition a government of lawlessness. A lawless regime is by definition a 
regime without law. ConsequentlǇ ƚŚĞ  ‘ůĂǁ ? ŽĨ ƚŚĞ dŚŝƌĚ ZĞŝĐŚ ŝƐŶŽƚ ůĂǁĂƚ
all. 
The construction of a narrative of rupture was particularly apparent in the 
trials involving the SS, the organ considered responsible for implementing the 
worst atrocities of the regime.531 dŚĞŵǇƚŚŽĨƚŚĞ^^  ‘ƐƚĂƚĞǁŝƚŚŝŶĂƐƚĂƚĞ ? as 
bearing primary if not sole responsibility for Nazi extermination policy and 
practice was leveraged by both prosecution and defence and proved 
extremely persistent.532 For the prosecution it fit with the model of a criminal 
and lawless Nazi leadership perpetrating horrendous crimes while holding the 
population in its totalitarian grasp. It consequently meant it was not 
ŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇ ƚŽ ĐŽŶĚĞŵŶ  ‘'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ? ĂƐ Ă ǁŚŽůĞ ? ďƵƚ ŽŶůǇ  ‘Nazi ? Germany, 
allowing the German state to rise unscathed from its ashes. For the 
defendants in some of the proceedings, such as those relating to the 
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 ůĞǆĂ ^ƚŝů ůĞƌ ?  ‘^ĞŵĂŶƚŝĐƐ ŽĨ ǆƚĞƌŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ ? dŚĞ hƐĞ ŽĨƚŚĞEĞǁdĞƌŵŽĨ'ĞŶŽĐŝĚĞŝŶƚŚĞ
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respectively US v Oswald Pohl et al, Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military 
Tribunals, Vol V,  ‘dŚĞWŽŚůĂƐĞ ?(United States Government Printing Office, 1951); and US v 
Otto Ohlendorf et al, Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals, Vol IV, 
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Wehrmacht and German industry, it separated them from the crimes of the 
regime.  
&ƌĂŶǌ EĞƵŵĂŶŶ ?Ɛ Behemoth533 was an influential text behind the 
ƉƌŽƐĞĐƵƚŝŽŶ ?Ɛ ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐ ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ĂŶĚ understanding of the Nazi regime, and 
the consequent structuring of the NMT proceedings around an institutional 
analysis of the Third Reich.534 This was reflected in the Pohl case as well as in 
the industrialist cases.535 EĞƵŵĂŶŶ ?Ɛ ŽǁŶ ĞǆƉůĂŶĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉ
ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ  ‘>ĞǀŝĂƚŚĂŶ ? ĂŶĚ  ‘ĞŚĞŵŽƚŚ ? ŚŝŐŚůŝŐŚƚƐthe extent to which legal 
rupture was at the heart of his analysis: 
It was Hobbes who made both the Leviathan and the Behemoth popular. 
His Leviathan is the analysis of a state, that is a political system of 
coercion in which vestiges of the rule of law and of individual rights are 
stil l  preserved. His Behemoth  QŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ QĚĞƉŝĐƚƐĂŶŽŶ-state, a chaos, 
a situation of lawlessness, disorder, and anarchy.  
Since we believe National Socialism is  W or tending to become  W a non-
ƐƚĂƚĞ ?ĂĐŚĂŽƐ ?ĂƌƵůĞŽĨůĂǁůĞƐƐŶĞƐƐĂŶĚĂŶĂƌĐŚǇ ?ǁŚŝĐŚŚĂƐ “ƐǁĂůůŽǁĞĚ ?
the rights and dignity of man, and is out to transform the world into a 
chaos by the supremacy of gigantic land masses, we find it apt to call  the 
National socialist system The Behemoth.
536
 
The ĐŽŶƚƌĂƐƚ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ Ă ĐŽĞƌĐŝǀĞ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ƐǇƐƚĞŵ ƌĞƚĂŝŶŝŶŐ  ‘ǀĞƐƚŝŐĞƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ
ƌƵůĞ ŽĨ ůĂǁ ? ĂŶĚ  ‘Ă ŶŽŶ-ƐƚĂƚĞ ? Ă ĐŚĂŽƐ ? Ă ƌƵůĞ ŽĨ ůĂǁůĞƐƐŶĞƐƐ ĂŶĚ ĂŶĂƌĐŚǇ ?
highlights the significance of the distinction between  ‘ůĂǁ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ŶŽŶ-ůĂǁ ?ƚŽ
EĞƵŵĂŶŶ ?ƐĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨĂBehemoth Nazi state, which he viewed as the latter. 
Neumann ƌĞũĞĐƚĞĚ &ƌĂĞŶŬĞů ?Ɛ  ‘ĚƵĂů ƐƚĂƚĞ ?ĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ŝŶƉĂƌƚŽŶĂƐŝŵŝůĂƌďĂƐŝƐ P
ƚŚĂƚ ŝƚĂůůŽǁĞĚƌŽŽŵĨŽƌĂ  ‘ŶŽƌŵĂƚŝǀĞƐƚĂƚĞ ?ĂůŽŶŐƐŝĚĞƚŚĞ ‘ƉƌĞƌŽŐĂƚŝǀĞƐƚĂƚĞ ? ?
whereas Neumann denied the presence of law in Nazi Germany altogether.537 
The Behemoth version of Nazi Germany was that of a lawless and therefore 
criminal state, and this is how it was presented at Nuremberg.538 
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This failure of historical reconstruction relies on a point of rupture existing 
ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ‘ůĂǁĨƵů ? ůĞŐĂůƐǇƐƚĞŵƐĂŶĚƚŚĞ  ‘ĂŶĂƌĐŚǇ ?ŽĨĂĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞďƌĞĂĐŚŽĨƚŚĞ
rule of law represented by the Third Reich. This  impacted on the 
development of Nazi historiography through its influence at Nuremberg. 
Donald Bloxham has connected  ‘ƚŚĞ ĞĂƌůŝĞƐƚ ŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨEĂǌŝŐĞŶŽĐŝĚĂů
policy and most of the major historiographical debates about that subject in 
the succeeding half-ĐĞŶƚƵƌǇ ? ?539 These ŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶƐǁĞƌĞ  ‘ŝŶĚĞůŝďůǇŵĂƌŬĞĚ
by interpretive distortions that stemmed both from preconception and from 
ƚŚĞůĞŐĂůƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŝƚƐĞůĨ ? ?540 While historians of Nazism and its war crimes trials 
are beginning to overcome this problematic legacy, the jurisprudence that 
conceived Nuremberg, and which reflects the interpretive difficulties that 
beset postwar historiography, remains unchallenged within influential areas 
of the legal academy, in particular jurisprudential discourse. 
The fact that narratives of lawlessness, and therefore criminality, and 
therefore rupture between the Nazi state and other,  ‘ůĂǁĨƵů ?states helped to 
construct enduring discourses about the Third Reich within historical writing 
has had consequences for jurisprudential discourse. The parallels between 
this interpretation and the representation of the Nazi regime within 
jurisprudence as a superficial, hypothetical, evil straw-man and its legal 
system as a paradigmatic, archetypal wicked legal system are evident.541 
Nuremberg shaped the public consciousness as well as the historical 
consciousness, and was also therefore the source of the legal consciousness 
of the Third Reich that underpinned the Hart-Fuller debate in the late 1950s. 
Nazism looms large as evil, totalitarian and criminal within jurisprudential 
discourse, supported by an underlying narrative of rupture. It does not come 
across as an in many wayƐ ‘ŶŽƌŵĂů ?ƐƚĂƚĞǁŝƚŚĂĐŽŵƉůĞǆ and functioning legal 
system. It is often unhistorical  W unsupported by historical evidence  W and 
ahistorical  WĂďƐƚƌĂĐƚĞĚ ŽƵƚƐŝĚĞ ŽĨ  ‘ŶŽƌŵĂů ? ŚŝƐƚŽƌǇ. There appears in this 
context to be a connection between the prevailing representation, an 
apparent reliance on a cultural understanding of the nature of the Third 
Reich, the impact of Nuremberg narratives on this understanding, and the 
timing of the Hart-Fuller debate. In essence, lacking resort to alternative 
historical evidence, jurisprudential scholars are often left reliant on the 
Nuremberg paradigm of Nazi government in their references to the Third 
Reich  W the historic historiography of the Third Reich that infused public 
consciousness in the post-war period. 
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The specific imposition by the NMT prosecutors of a narrative of criminality 
on the Nazi legal system is highlighted in recent academic commentary on 
the NMT Justice case, in which legal officials from the Nazi regime were 
prosecuted. The case also illustrates the intended juxtaposition of the law the 
allies used to prosecute the Nuremberg war crimes trials and the law  W or its 
absence  W of Nazi Germany. This reveals how the rupture between the Nazi 
legal system and the rule of law does not just exist in theoretical academic 
discourse but was also manifested as a postwar legal and historical moment. 
Looking at the appeals to the concept ŽĨ  ‘ĐŝǀŝůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ŝŶƚŚĞĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞŽĨƚŚĞ
Justice ĐĂƐĞ ? ŚƌŝƐƚŝĂŶĞ tŝůŬĞ ŚĂƐ ĂƌŐƵĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ƚƌŝĂů  ‘ǁĂƐ ŶŽƚ ƐŝŵƉůǇ ĂŶ
exercise in judging and condemning Nazi violence; rather, it was announced 
as a crucial element of re-ĞŶƚŚƌŽŶŝŶŐůĂǁŝŶ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ? ?542  
The Justice case narrative did not deny that the Nazis thought that they had 
law, or that there was something sometimes called law in Nazi Germany, but 
rather that it was really law. It  ‘constructed a strict categorical distinction 
ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ EĂǌŝ ůĂǁ ĂƐ  “ƉƌŽƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ ? ŽĨ ůĂǁ ĂŶĚ ŝƚƐ ŽǁŶůĂǁĂƐĂďĞŶĞǀŽůĞŶƚ
civilizing force ?.543 The trial was therefore  ‘ŵĞĂŶƚƚŽƌĞĚĞĞŵĂŶĚƌĞĐŽŶƐĞĐƌĂƚĞ
ůĂǁ ĂƐ Ă ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞ ƚŽ  Q ƚŚĞ ƵƐĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ form of law to violate what the 
Altstoetter judges deemed the essential substance ŽĨ ůĂǁ ? ?544 According to 
ƚŚŝƐ ? EĂǌŝ 'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ǁĂƐ ƵŶĐŝǀŝůŝƐĞĚ ĂŶĚ ŝƚƐ  ‘ůĂǁ ? ǁĂƐ ĐŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶƚůǇ ŝŶǀĂůŝĚ ?
dŚŽƐĞ ǁŚŽ ŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚĞĚ ĂƚƌŽĐŝƚŝĞƐ ĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐ ƚŽ EĂǌŝ  ‘ůĂǁ ? ǁĞƌĞ ĂĐƚŝŶŐ ĂƐ
criminals and subject to the proper, civilised law. The opposition of Nazi law - 
non-law - with civilised law - international law, the law of Nuremberg  W 
enabled the concept of law itself to be saved from the degradation and 
deviance of the Third Reich. 
ǇŵĂŬŝŶŐEĂǌŝ ůĂǁ ‘ŶŽŶ-ůĂǁ ? ?the defendants could be both criminalised and 
demonised, placed in stark opposition to their accusers and the law upon 
which they called ? dŚŝƐ  ‘ĂůůŽǁĞĚ ƚŚĞ ŽƵƌƚ ƚŽ ĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚ Ă ŶĂƌƌĂƚŝǀĞŽĨ
Germany's descent into barbarism that absolved law and the institutions 
ĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚĞĚ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ  “ĐŝǀŝůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ ? ƐŚĂƌĞĚ ďǇ ƚŚĞ hŶŝƚĞĚ ^ƚĂƚĞs from any 
ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇĨŽƌƚŚĞ  “ĚĞƐƚƌƵĐƚŝǀĞƵƌŐĞƐ ?ĞǆŚŝďŝƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞEĂǌŝƐƚĂƚĞ ? ?545 This 
ĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƚŽ  ‘ĂďƐŽůǀĞ ?ƚŚĞƌƵůĞŽĨ ůĂǁĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƚĂŝŶƚ of Nazi law did not merely 
paint the Third Reich as unlawful, thereby distinguishing it as a matter of 
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historical narrative and periodization from the law that came before and 
after. In in doing so it also created a moment of rupture between the two. 
 ‘EĂǌŝ ůĂǁ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ůĂǁ ?ĂƚƚŚĂƚƉŽŝŶƚďĞĐĂŵĞĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂůůǇĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚƚŚŝŶŐƐ ?ĂŶĚ
the horrific violence of the Holocaust and other Nazi atrocities became the 
domain of Nazi law or, more pointedly, non-law. The international law used 
at Nuremberg to prosecute criminal Nazi behaviour was the opposite of Nazi 
law  W it was incapable of anything but restoring law to its rightful place. 
tŝůŬĞ ?Ɛ ŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶ ĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐĞƐ ƚŚĞƌĞƐŽƌƚƚŽĂmode of natural law  W law 
with its substance  W to deal with a problem with minimal positive law  W law in 
form only. David Fraser has taken tŝůŬĞ ?Ɛ ƉŽŝŶƚ ĨƵƌƚŚĞƌto problematize the 
normative jurisprudential ďĂƐŝƐŽĨƚŚĞĂůůŝĞƐ ?ĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇĂƚEƵƌĞŵďĞƌŐ ?546 While 
Wilke claims that the prosecution did not treat Nazi law and international law 
as competing systems, because Nazi law was not considered law at all,547 
Fraser highlights a more subtle confusion in ƚŚĞ ĂůůŝĞƐ ? discourse, which 
included subjugating Nazi law to the higher legal norms of positive 
international law while at the same time invalidating it on substantive, 
natural law grounds. While clearly inconsistent at a legal theoretical level,548 
ƚŚĞ ĂƚƚĞŵƉƚ ƚŽ ƐĞƉĂƌĂƚĞ  ‘ůĂǁ ? ĨƌŽŵ  ‘EĂǌŝ ůĂǁ ?ǁĂƐĂůƐŽ ŝŶƚĞŶĚĞĚƚŽĐƌĞĂƚĞĂ
rupture between the different legal systems, to distinguish actively between 
Nazi law  W non-law  W and what came after, notwithstanding the similarities 
ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ƚŚĞ ƚǁŽ ? ĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůůǇ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ  ‘ůŝĨĞ-ǁŽƌůĚƐ ? ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ůĂǁǇĞƌƐ ŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚ ?549 
Fraser argues, therefore, that the construction of Nazi law as non-law and the 
assertion of the fidelity of the rule of law inherent in many war crimes trial 
processes following Nazi Germany represented an elaborately interwoven 
double denial: 
The primary legal-ideological function of post-Auschwitz juristic events 
ŝŶǀŽůǀŝŶŐƚŚĞƉƌŽƐĞĐƵƚŝŽŶŽĨEĂǌŝĂŶĚŽƚŚĞƌǁĂƌĐƌŝŵŝŶĂůƐŝƐ QƚŽĂƚƚĞŵƉƚ
to convince us again and again, with each case against each perpetrator, 
of the discontinuity, the radical break of 1933-1945. Once that 
epistemological step has been accompli shed, law assures us of a return 
to the safety of modernity, of the primacy of the rule of law.
550
 
tŝůŬĞ ?ƐĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐŽĨƚŚĞJustice case shows how the tribunal resorted to natural 
law claims in order to paint Nazi law as non-ůĂǁ ?&ƌĂƐĞƌ ?ƐĞǆƉŽƐĞƐĂŶƵŵďĞƌ
of additional layers beyond this that highlight the jurisprudential confusion 
inherent in ƚŚĞƉƌŽƐĞĐƵƚŝŽŶ ?ƐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ?ůŽŶŐƐŝĚĞƚŚŝƐƐƵďƐƚĂŶƚŝǀĞŝŶǀĂůŝĚĂƚŝŽŶ
of Nazi law existed a layer of positive law, according to which international 
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law had superiority over infringing domestic law. Not least because of the 
early developmental stage of international criminal law at that point, its 
authority over domestic law rested its own legitimacy to a degree on its 
inherent moral superiority, a natural law foundation. The legitimacy of the 
tribunal itself, however, could not be validated by positive international law 
norms founded on normative superiority because of the limits imposed by 
the Hague Convention.551 Rather than positive law ? ƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ? ƚŚĞ ĂůůŝĞƐ ?
jurisdiction to impose the tribunal at all rested on positive power, the power 
and consequently the authority and possibly the legitimacy that came with 
the complete destruction of the Nazi state. Even this legitimacy is arguably 
based on a moral claim: the higher moral principles required to justify the 
complete eradication of such an evil state entity as the Third Reich in the first 
place. 
Consequently, these attempts to render Nazi law illegitimate  W as non-law  W 
were unsuccessful as a matter of legal theory.552 The associated efforts to 
posit a categorical distinction between Nazi law and the law of Nuremberg 
also fail because of the similarities that persist between the two systems.553 
No theoretical argument was able to invalidate the fact of Nazi law 
convincingly, so a simple hierarchy of legal norms was brought into play in 
order to categorise Nazi law as criminal. The discursive efforts to create a 
sharp divide between Nazi law and  ‘proper ? law on the basis of the distinction 
between civilisation and criminality/barbarity were not wholly unsuccessful in 
terms of their legacy in academic discourse and the public consciousness, but 
fail empirically and philosophically because they are unable to overcome the 
essential correspondence of the two systems. Each layer of justification relied 
on the one above it, naturalism on positivism on naturalism, resting 
ultimately on the authority of force.554 These claims could only ever be 
confused and inconsistent as they had to rely all at once and equally 
unconvincingly on the rhetoric of naturalism, the legal authority of positivism, 
and the de facto ƌĞĂůŝƚǇ ŽĨ ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ƉŽǁĞƌ ? dŚĞ ƉƌŽƐĞĐƵƚŝŽŶ ?Ɛ ŶĂƚƵƌĂů ůĂǁ
discourse was insufficient to justify its own legitimacy, as was its resort to 
legal positivism. Neither could, without self-contradiction, adequately 
invalidate Nazi law. 
It would already be difficult to reconcile this confused theoretical 
combination with a narrative of a totalitarian conspiracy dependent on the 
manipulation and instrumentalisation of the bare form of law, the narrative 
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of Nazi governance constructed by the prosecution at Nuremberg. It is 
virtually impossible to justify isolating it philosophically from the reality of the 
Nazi legal system, which employed its own confused amalgamation of 
positive law, natural law and pure force.555 Legislation was passed and 
enforced where necessary to appease the existing elites and ensure popular 
support, and the authority of positive law was frequently employed. At the 
same time, resort to higher norms both circumvented the positive law where 
desirable and place the legal system on a natural law footing more in line 
with Nazi ideology. Despite their ostensibly legal rise to power, the Nazi 
regime was also very willing to use pure force where necessary to achieve its 
aims. The absence of rigid categorisations and the lack of a clear distinction 
between regular law, natural law and law as pure politics  W brute force  W 
might be thought of as a defining and isolating feature of the regime. The fact 
that the jurisprudential foundations of Nuremberg are similarly muddled 
instead illustrates that a quite different analysis is appropriate, an analysis 
that treats the jurisprudence of the Nazi state as in fundamental ways 
comparable to that of Nuremberg. 
Despite the apparent jurisprudential and historical problems with the 
approach at Nuremberg, what endures in academic legal discourse are 
elements of both its confused naturalist and positivist discourse. On the one 
hand the authority of posited international law over domestic law has been 
established through adherence to a positive system of international criminal 
law, underpinned by vestiges of its naturalist claim to moral superiority. On 
the other hand a narrative of Nazi law as non-law continues to prevail within 
ICL scholarship, which largely accepts and adopts the Nuremberg account of 
the Third Reich,556 parts of jurisprudence informed by Nazi law, and in the 
rupture thesis underpinning jurisprudential discourse generally.557 This exists 
within jurisprudence alongside a somewhat confused positivist conviction 
that Nazi law must be some sort of law, albeit law in form only, influenced by 
a strong sense that Nazi law is so different to the remainder of the concept of 
law that it is not worthy of further investigation or proper analysis. Nazi law 
as non-law is based on a combination of the founding of the Nuremberg 
ŶĂƌƌĂƚŝǀĞŽŶEĞƵŵĂŶŶ ?ƐĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ Nazi state as a criminal state  W and 
the resulting prosecution and defence narratives of Nazi governance - and 
the related efforts to distinguish Nazi law from  ‘proper ? law through appeals 
to internationalist concepts such as civilisation. The inherent contradiction in 
these positions is not reflected in the academic legal discourse that employs 
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them. In the case of jurisprudential discourse, therefore, Nazi Germany is not 
considered substantively relevant to important theoretical issues other than 
as a particularly shocking and extreme example. Nazi law is little more than 
the paradigm of an archetypal wicked legal system.  
The literature examined in this section shows that Nuremberg was vital for 
constructing and disseminating a narrative of Nazi law as non-law in the 
ƉŽƐƚǁĂƌ ƉĞƌŝŽĚ ĂŶĚ ŵĂŶŝĨĞƐƚŝŶŐ  ‘ƉƌŽƉĞƌ ? ůĂǁ ĂƐ ƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐ ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚ ĨƌŽŵ
Nazi criminality. It connects Nazi Germany itself - the object of scrutiny as 
well as prosecution in the Nuremberg trials - with the historiography of 
totalitarianism and the jurisprudence of rupture. Notwithstanding the 
absence of historical evidence in the Hart-Fuller debate, its general 
representation of the Third Reich is consistent with that advanced by and at 
Nuremberg.558 Historical writing about Nazi Germany at the time was 
similarly influenced by Nuremberg (as well as Fraenkel and Neumann) and 
would have been unlikely to posit a radically different conception of Nazi law. 
However, the absence of jurisprudential engagement with historiography in 
subsequent decades has reinforced and exacerbated this representation in 
the legal academy, while the historical academy has moved far away from it. 
As earlier chapters of this dissertation showed, the Third Reich has been used 
in support of theories of the concept of law from which its reality diverges in 
radical and sometimes unexpected ways.559 
III. Nazi War Crimes Trials Scholarship 
A The Triply-Limited Discourse of ICL Scholarship 
The absence of engagement with historical research in certain parts of the 
legal academy also contributes to a lack of significant revision of the role of 
Nuremberg within ICL scholarship. In its case, neither the ignored 
complexities of the Nazi legal system, the wider political and social context of 
the trials, nor the confused and questionable basis of the legal position of the 
prosecuting powers is addressed, notwithstanding that there exists a body of 
historical research on which to draw about some of these points. Nuremberg 
is an important historical focal-point for ICL scholarship, for obvious symbolic 
and substantive legal reasons. However, because of their understandable 
interest in contemporary international criminal law rules and procedures, 
scholars in this area tend not to look beyond the clear connections between 
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these characteristics and the Nuremberg tribunals, to interrogate broader 
historical and theoretical questions that impact on the reconstruction of Nazi 
Germany within academic legal discourse. This results in a triply limited 
discourse, which rarely considers other Nazi war crimes trials apart from 
Nuremberg (and usually apart from the IMT), does not scrutinise the 
representation of the Nazi legal system, and adopts a very specific 
jurisprudential analysis, eschewing wider theoretical concerns. 
&ƌĂƐĞƌ ?Ɛ commentary on the limitations of international criminal law 
discourse can be used to highlight some of the key concerns that are revealed 
by the analysis of legal and historical scholarship of the trials that follows. As 
he highlights, international criminal law scholars tend to take one of two 
positions on the role of Nuremberg in their field. According to these 
accounts, either Nuremberg laid the foundation for positive international 
criminal law, culminating in the Rome Statute and the International Criminal 
Court, or it all was  W and remains  W Ă ŵĂƚƚĞƌ ŽĨ ǀŝĐƚŽƌ ?Ɛ ũƵƐƚŝĐĞ ?560 This 
simplified dichotomy of interpretation exposes the limitations of legal 
categories, institutions and forms for getting to grips with what happened at 
Nuremberg, in the war crimes trials generally, and in Nazi Germany. The 
inherent contention of ICL that its objects of scrutiny must be  ‘ĐƌŝŵŝŶĂů ? by 
definition engenders an assumption that the accused are inevitably guilty of 
heinous war crimes, and a concomitant outrage accompanies acquittals.561 
The assertion of international criminal law jurisdiction over individuals 
alleged to have committed atrocities brings with it a number of automatic 
assumptions about how both the state in question and the trials of its agents 
are to be treated as a matter of legal history: 
The overarching frame of our inquiries must resist the temptation to 
leap from a study of criminal trials of Nazi officials and German 
industrialists to the conclusion that the correct, best or sole historical 
template for a study of the Nazi period, and even of the atrocities of the 
Hitler state, is that of crime, criminal law and criminalization. While this 
was unquestionably the ideology behind the NMT trials generally  Q
other hermeneutics, including one that would offer a mirror image of 
the Nazi state as deeply imbued with a legalistic and legal self-
understanding, must not be neglected.
562
 
The legal academy ought not to adopt uncritically the legal and historical 
hermeneutic framework imposed by Nuremberg when evaluating either the 
tribunals or the Third Reich because that framework is jurisprudentially 
flawed and has since been overtaken and revised by subsequent 
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historiography. We cannot assume that as a matter of jurisprudence Nazi law 
should be treated as non-law just because that is what Nuremberg dictated. 
We cannot pretend to understand the nature of the Third Reich just by 
understanding what was said about it at a handful of its war crimes tribunals. 
ŶĚ  ‘ǁĞ ŵƵƐƚ ŶĞŝƚŚĞƌ ĂĐĐĞƉƚ ŶŽƌ ƌĞũĞĐƚ ƚŚĞ ƐǇŵďŽůŝĐ ĂƐƉĞĐƚƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ EDd
without careful, nuanced and concrete jurisprudential and historical 
ĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ? ?563 This speaks to one of the limitations of ICL scholarship, that it 
replicates ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶŝŶƚĞƌƌŽŐĂƚĞƐEƵƌĞŵďĞƌŐ ?s construction of the Nazi past 
because it is not concerned either with broader questions of legal theory or 
the operation of the Nazi regime. 
ICL scholarship does tend to fall into these traps in relation to the Third Reich. 
WƌŝĞŵĞů ĂŶĚ ^ƚŝůůĞƌ ?Ɛ ƐƚƵĚǇ shows that the Nuremberg narratives made their 
way into public and historical discourse in the subsequent period and 
remained embedded there for a considerable length of time.564 The legal 
reliance on this now revised post-war historiography is reinforced by the 
jurisprudential exclusion of Nazi law as non-law at Nuremberg to construct a 
barrier between academic discourse and the reality of law in Nazi Germany 
that is common to both jurisprudence and ICL scholarship. This barrier is 
maintained in part by a lack of understanding of Nazi law that will not be 
addressed as long as more recent developments in historical research are 
overlooked within the legal academy.565  
There has been little effort so far to look at the NMT trials for what they 
ǁĞƌĞ ?  ‘ƚŽ ƚĂŬĞ ƐĞƌŝŽƵƐůǇ ďŽƚŚ ƚŚĞ ĞƉŝƐƚĞŵŽůŽŐŝĐĂů ƉƌĞŵŝƐĞƐ ŽĨ ũƵĚŝĐŝĂů
proceedings and the dialectical tension of the historical-ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƚƌŝĂů ? ?566 In 
his own analysis of the behaviour of Nazi legal officials through the Justice 
ĐĂƐĞ ?DĂƚƚŚĞǁ>ŝƉƉŵĂŶŶŽƚĞƐƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŚĞůĞŐĂůůŝƚĞƌĂƚƵƌĞŐĞŶĞƌĂůůǇŚĂƐĨĂŝůĞĚƚŽ
ĞǆĂŵŝŶĞ ƚŚĞ ƌŽůĞ ŽĨ ũƵƌŝƐƚƐ ŝŶƚŚĞdŚŝƌĚZĞŝĐŚ ? ?567 These points highlight two 
other limitations of ICL scholarship in this area: the narrow doctrinal focus 
that prevents wider normative and theoretical questions being addressed, 
and the disciplinary, legal framework that does not engage with the political 
and social context of the trials. A detailed exploration of the role of law in the 
Third Reich, supported by an historiographical appreciation of its societal 
context confirms ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ EƵƌĞŵďĞƌŐ ŶĂƌƌĂƚŝǀĞ ŽĨ EĂǌŝ 'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ  ‘ǁĂƐ ŝŶ ŝƚƐ
narrow legal sense and its broader symbolic purchase the result not of an 
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ŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞ ĂŶĚ ǀĞƌŝĨŝĂďůĞ ŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂů ƚƌƵƚŚ ? ?568 Nazi Germany had a completely 
different ƌĂŝƐŽŶĚ ?ġƚƌĞto that implied by a criminal conspiracy intent only on 
expansion through aggressive war and its legal system a different complexion 
altogether.569 An appreciation of Nazi law that saw it as operating at the 
hands of an anti-Semitic ideology, ultimately to bring about genocide, would 
be more historically verifiable and jurisprudentially accurate, and would call 
into question the narratives constructed at and by Nuremberg. 
The triply limited discourse of ICL scholarship maintains its focus on 
Nuremberg at the expense of other Nazi war crimes trials and does not 
challenge at a fundamental level the legal theories underpinning Nuremberg 
or its representation of the Third Reich. Its tight disciplinary scope means that 
historical writing about the same trials is often not treated as relevant to its 
doctrinal and procedural focus. As a result, ICL scholarship tends to 
reproduce a narrow construction of the past, which it does not critique in any 
meaningful way. This is illustrated in Part B with reference to a number of 
specific examples from the literature. 
B Reinforcing a Narrow Construction of the Nazi Past 
What is notable about recent ICL scholarship about Nazi war crimes trials is 
that it continues to follow an approach that reflects preferences traditionally 
exhibited in this area of scholarship. It largely focuses on the Nuremberg IMT 
as if the many subsequent trials, both international and domestic, did not 
exist. To a degree this is a natural consequence of the research interest of 
most of those involved, which is the nature and development of international 
criminal law. However, this does not account for the general neglect until 
recently of the Subsequent Nuremberg Military proceedings, for example, 
nor of what other domestic Nazi war crimes trials might contribute to 
international criminal justice. Nor does it explain why Anglo-American legal 
scholars interested in other aspects of the law should not wish to tackle some 
of the issues raised by these other proceedings.  
While research specialism may dictate the focus of the work of a number of 
those scholars currently writing about Nazi war crimes trials, the absence of 
interest from lawyers in other fields in this area is as responsible for the 
restricted scope of the current literature. One explanation for a lack of wider 
interest in the trials and other aspects of the Nazi past from ICL scholars and 
other legal academics is that the prevailing conception of the law as absent 
from and antidote to Nazi Germany constructed at Nuremberg is reinforced 
by the legal scholarship that does engage with Nazi-related subjects, for 
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example jurisprudential discourse. As a result of this it is perhaps not 
ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇƚŽĞǆƉůŽƌĞƚŚĞƐĞ ŝƐƐƵĞƐĨƵƌƚŚĞƌ ? ůĂǁ ?ƐƌŽůĞǀŝƐĂǀŝƐƚŚĞ
Nazi past is cemented. The central problem with this, exposed by historical 
scholarship, is that the historical picture of Nazism now emerging contradicts 
the legal impression of the Third Reich upon which that conception is 
founded. 
A comprehensive and reflexive analysis of the broader legal theoretical issues 
raised by Nuremberg, and how these relate to the history under scrutiny is 
generally not provided because of a consensus around the received 
ƚŚĞŽƌĞƚŝĐĂů ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚ ŽĨ ůĂǁ ?Ɛ ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ EĂǌŝ ƉĂƐƚ ? ǁŚŝĐŚ ƌĞůŝĞƐ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ
false opposition between the liberal rule of law and Nazi criminality  W 
founded on a moment of rupture around Nuremberg. As a consequence, ICL 
scholarship remains predominantly focused on the most famous of the Nazi 
war crimes trials in the public consciousness, the Nuremberg IMT, its impact 
on the subsequent development of substantive international criminal law,570 
and narrowly centred on the specific jurisprudence of the rules and 
procedures of the trial itself. These texts, with few exceptions, tend to share 
a version of the aim of evaluating the development of international criminal 
law norms and procedures. This often results in both a highly restricted and 
underdeveloped jurisprudential critique of the war crimes trials, and a very 
narrow construction of the history of the Nazi past, which essentially 
replicates that reflected in the proceedings themselves.  
&ŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ? ŝŶĂĐŚĂƉƚĞƌŚĞĂĚĞĚ ‘EĞǁDĞĂŶŝŶŐŽĨ:ƵƐƚŝĐĞ ? ?571 Ehrenfreund 
argues that in the decades subsequent to the proceedings, the term 
EƵƌĞŵďĞƌŐ  ‘ŐƌĞǁ ƚŽ ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚ Ă ĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚ ƚŽ ũƵƐƚŝĐĞ ƚŚĂƚ ǁĂƐ ŐƌĂĚƵĂůůǇ
embraced by half the nations of the world. Nuremberg stood for the highest 
standards of law and due process  W innocent until proven guilty, an attorney 
ĨŽƌ ĞǀĞƌǇ ĐƌŝŵŝŶĂůĚĞĨĞŶĚĂŶƚ ?ĂĨĂŝƌƚƌŝĂůŶŽŵĂƚƚĞƌŚŽǁŐƌĂǀĞƚŚĞĐŚĂƌŐĞ ? ?572 
While this section is a commentary on the power of the symbol of Nuremberg 
in subsequent international war crimes tribunals, it is also to a degree a 
ĐŽŵŵĞŶƚĂƌǇ ŽŶ ŚƌĞŶĨƌĞƵŶĚ ?Ɛ ŽǁŶ ĂƉƉƌĞĐŝĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƚƌŝĂůƐ ? ŵĂŶŝĨĞƐƚĞĚ ŝŶ
ŚŝƐ ĐůŽƐŝŶŐ ĂƐƐĞƌƚŝŽŶ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ ƚŽ ŚŽůĚ ƚŚĞ EƵƌĞŵďĞƌŐ /Dd  ‘ǁĂƐ Ă
ƐƉůĞŶĚŝĚ ǀŝĐƚŽƌǇ ĨŽƌZŽďĞƌƚ:ĂĐŬƐŽŶ ?ĂŶĞǀĞŶŐƌĞĂƚĞƌǀŝĐƚŽƌǇĨŽƌŚƵŵĂŶŝƚǇ ? ?573 
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In this evaluation the philosophical antagonism between the law of the 
righteous and the law of the wrong that infuses the proceedings themselves 
is adopted virtually wholesale. Neither the legal theoretical background to 
the trials nor their representation of Nazism is interrogated. 
The aims of this area of scholarship ĂƌĞ ƚǇƉŝĨŝĞĚ ďǇ ƚŚĞ ŶĞĞĚ ƚŽ  ‘ĂƐƐĞƐ ƚŚĞ
contemporary application of lessons learnt at Nuremberg, and to consider 
how the legacy of the Trial continues to influence the development of 
international criminal law and the concepts of justice and reconciliation ? ?574 
Even where it is recognised that the popular perception of Nuremberg is 
 ‘ƉĞƌŚĂƉƐƚŽŽƐŝŵƉůŝƐƚŝĐ ? ?ƚŚĞƌĞĂƐŽŶŐŝǀĞŶĨŽƌƚŚŝƐ ŝƐďĞĐĂƵƐĞƚŚĞƵŶĚƵĞĨŽĐƵƐ
on its status as the first international criminal tribunal and its contribution to 
the doctrine of individual criminal responsibility fails to account for its 
contribution in other areas of international criminal law such as conspiracy as 
a basis for individual criminal responsibility, and the law of military 
occupation.575 In the context of such a restricted view of the legacy of 
Nuremberg, the scope of any critique of it also suffers. Such a critique often 
amounts ƚŽ Ă ŚĂŶĚĨƵů ŽĨ ŝŶĂĚĞƋƵĂĐŝĞƐ ?  ‘ƚŚĞ ǁŽƌƐƚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞƐĞ ďĞŝŶŐ ǀŝĐƚŽƌƐ ?
justice and the possible application of ex post facto ůĂǁ ? ?576 This is a very 
limited account of Nuremberg and law, indeed, and one which can replicate 
EƵƌĞŵďĞƌŐ ?Ɛ ŽǁŶ valorisation of the return of the rule of law. For example, 
that  ‘ƚŚĞ ŝĚĞĂƐ ƐƉĂǁŶĞĚ Ăƚ EƵƌĞŵďĞƌŐ-new concepts of justice and human 
rights-have spread across much of the world and have become more evident 
ƚŚĂŶĞǀĞƌďĞĨŽƌĞ ? ?577 
^ŝŵŝůĂƌůǇ ?ƐŽŵĞŽĨƚŚĞĂƌƚŝĐůĞƐ ŝŶůƵŵĞŶƚŚĂůĂŶĚDĐŽƌŵĂĐŬ ?ƐĞĚŝƚĞĚǀŽůƵŵĞ
contain fairly uncritical statements such as :  ‘ƚŚĞŵŽƌĂůƚŚƌƵƐƚŽĨEƵƌĞŵďĞƌŐ ?
in terms of upholding the rule of law, needs to be reasserted in the face of 
ĐŽŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞƐƚŽƐŽŵĞŽĨ ŝƚƐŬĞǇƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐ ? ŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽƌĞĚŝƐĐŽǀĞƌ
ƚŚĞ  ‘ĐŝǀŝůŝƐŝŶŐŵĞƐƐĂŐĞ ?ŽĨZŽďĞƌƚ:ĂĐŬƐŽŶ ?578 KƌƚŚĂƚEƵƌĞŵďĞƌŐ ‘ĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚĞĚ
to the development of the human race, by achieving another step in 
becoming more civilised, and thus reaching a higher level in our development 
ĂƐ Ă ƐƉĞĐŝĞƐ ? ?579 These declarations ƌĞƉůŝĐĂƚĞ ƚŚĞ  ‘ĐŝǀŝůŝƐŝŶŐ ? ŵĞƐƐĂŐĞ
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constructed by Nuremberg about its own law, highlighted by Christiane Wilke 
in the context of the Justice case.580 They are only credible where the 
construction of history endorsed, the range of trials being examined, and the 
jurisprudential scope of analysis are so restricted as to exclude critical 
perspectives on the underlying nature of the role of law in the trials  process. 
Even those rare legal scholars who have branched out somewhat in terms of 
the trials they scrutinise, such as Kevin John Heller and Stephan Landsman,581 
are reluctant to address the historical context and specificity of either the 
trials or the history of Nazi Germany, or the legal theoretical issues raised by 
the imposition of  ‘law ? ŽŶ ƚŚĞ  ‘ĐƌŝŵŝŶĂů ? Nazi past. Landsman  ‘ƚƌĂĐĞƐ ƚŚĞ
ǁŽƌůĚ ?Ɛ ŚĂůƚŝŶŐ ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ŽĨ Ă ĐŽƵƌƚƌŽŽŵ ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞ ƚŽƚŚĞEĂǌŝƐ ?ĞĨĨŽƌƚƚŽ
ĚĞƐƚƌŽǇĂůůŽĨƵƌŽƉĞ ?Ɛ:ĞǁƐ ? ?582 in a number of different trials across time and 
ƐƉĂĐĞ ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ĂƐDŝĐŚĂĞůDĂƌƌƵƐŵĂŬĞƐĐůĞĂƌ ŝŶŚŝƐƌĞǀŝĞǁ ? ‘ůĞĨƚŽƵƚŝƐƚŚĞ
complicated political and historical context in which each of these Holocaust-
related trials have taken place, the difficulties faced by the organizers of 
ƚŚĞƐĞ ƉƌŽĐĞĞĚŝŶŐƐ ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ůŝŵŝƚĂƚŝŽŶƐ ŽĨ  “ƚŚĞ ŶŐůŽ-American approach to 
ĂĚũƵĚŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ĂĚǀĞƌƐĂƌŝĂů ƉƌŽĐĞĞĚŝŶŐƐ ? ? ?583 The fact that a text with 
such an apparently ambitious scope avoids the broader historical context of 
the trials and focuses on narrow jurisprudential issues illustrates the extent 
to which ICL scholarship remains wedded to the jurisprudential framework 
constructed at Nuremberg. While Landsman does extend the scope of the 
previous scholarship in some ways, in particular by examining a greater range 
of proceedings, his approach remains in key ways within the existing 
tradition.  
,ĞůůĞƌ ?ƐThe Nuremberg Military Tribunals has a stronger historiographical 
focus. This is in part the result of his recognition of some of the limitations of 
the pre-existing ICL scholarship, especially its continuing neglect of the NMT 
proceedings and the need to place the trials in their wider historical context. 
However, notwithstanding thĞĨĞĂƚƵƌĞƐŽĨ,ĞůůĞƌ ?ƐďŽŽŬǁŚŝĐŚexpand on the 
existing legal literature, its focus remains on the jurisprudence of the 
development of substantive international criminal law, matters of doctrine, 
procedure and evidence. Its limitations in respect of some of the issues raised 
ŚĞƌĞ ĂďŽƵƚ /> ƐĐŚŽůĂƌƐŚŝƉ ŐĞŶĞƌĂůůǇ ĂƌĞ ǁĞůů ƐƵŵŵĞĚ ƵƉ ďǇ &ƌĂƐĞƌ ?Ɛ
ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ƚĞǆƚ ? ǁŚŝĐŚ ŵŝƌƌŽƌƐ ŝŶ ƚĞůůŝŶŐ ǁĂǇƐ DĂƌƌƵƐ ? review of 
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Landsman ?ƐďŽŽŬ. Fraser asserts ƚŚĂƚŝƚ ‘ůĞĂǀĞƐƚŚĞƌĞĂĚĞƌĨƌƵƐƚƌĂƚĞĚ ?ǁĂŶƚŝŶŐ
more  W more histŽƌǇ ?ŵŽƌĞĐŽŶƚĞǆƚ ?ŵŽƌĞ ĚĞƚĂŝůĞĚĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ? ?584  
,ĞůůĞƌ ‘Ɛ ƐƚĂƚĞĚ Ăŝŵ ŝƐ ƚŽ ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞ  ‘Ă ĐŽŵƉƌĞŚĞŶƐŝǀĞũƵƌŝƐƉƌƵĚĞŶƚŝĂů ĂŶĚ
historiĐĂů ĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ EDd ƚƌŝĂůƐ ? ?585 and he takes on the whole of the 
Nuremberg Subsequent Military Tribunals. However, ,ĞůůĞƌ ?Ɛ ŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂů
contextualisation is primarily limited to the geopolitical influences on the 
proceedings and specifically the impact of the Cold War. His real interest in 
this text appears to be how the additional substantive and procedural 
contribution of the NMT proceedings, over and above the IMT, has impacted 
on the development of international criminal law.586 His book displays a much 
greater interest in a fairly narrowly conceived jurisprudential analysis, than in 
broader historical evaluation. He does not address in detail other aspects of 
the historical context or tackle the issue of the construction of Nazi history 
put forward in the proceedings themselves. Consequently, both in the ways it 
represents an exception to ICL scholarship and where it is typical of other 
accounts, Heller ?ƐďŽŽŬ highlights the limitations of the existing literature as 
much as it expands upon it.  
&Žƌ ĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ? ,ĞůůĞƌ ?Ɛ ůŝŵŝƚĞĚ ĨŽĐƵƐ ŝƐ ĂƉƉĂƌĞŶƚ when it comes to his 
evaluation of the success of the NMT proceedings.587 His selection of 
potential success measures is synonymous with the stated aims of the trials: 
achieving retributive justice, educating the German people, creating a 
historical record, and contributing to the development of international 
criminal law. A detailed exploration of the documentary legacy of the NMT, 
or the difficulties with influencing German collective memory and national 
identity, or even of the application of retributive justice to such historical 
events would have presented many opportunities to delve further into 
ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŝŶŐ ůĞŐĂů ĂŶĚ ŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂů ƚŚĞŽƌĞƚŝĐĂů ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐ ? ,ĞůůĞƌ ?Ɛ ĞǀĂůƵĂƚŝŽŶ ?
however, is dominated by a rigorous analysis of the contribution of the NMT 
proceedings to international criminal law, divided into 11 sub-sections 
covering everything from the individual substantive offences and the general 
part of the criminal law, to defences and sentencing. The other success 
measures mentioned are represented by comparatively brief passages, and 
the documentary and didactic measures are combined and confined to a 
single paragraph. 
Recent ICL scholarship on the Nuremberg trials confirms that the 
international legal response to Nazi war crimes remains a significant area of 
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interest for international criminal law. Notwithstanding the tendency to 
mention the symbolic role of Nuremberg in ICL texts  generally, the number of 
new works dedicated to Nuremberg testifies to this. However, the key 
limitations of the discourse, emphasised in Part A of this section, are rarely 
stretched, even by research that explicitly aims to move beyond what has 
gone before, primarily by considering proceedings other than the Nuremberg 
IMT. The accounts within ICL scholarship struggle ƚŽ ŐĞƚ ƉĂƐƚ  ‘EƵƌĞŵďĞƌŐ ?
and remain narrow in legal perspective and historical focus. As a 
consequence they tend to reproduce EƵƌĞŵďĞƌŐ ?Ɛ ŽǁŶ ĐŽŶƚƌĂĚŝĐƚŽƌǇ
jurisprudential foundations and its problematic representation of Nazi 
Germany without subjecting them to appropriate scrutiny. This may be 
contrasted with the historiographical accounts of Nuremberg and other trials, 
considered in Part C. These generally have a much more expansive scope and 
raise interesting philosophical questions about the proceedings and the 
construction of the Third Reich that are as relevant to law as to history. 
C Historiographical Accounts: Challenging the Limited Construction of 
the Past 
There has been a burgeoning of historiographical interest in Nazi war crime 
trials in recent years.588 This has included the emergence of detailed accounts 
of individual trials other than the Nuremberg IMT and consideration of 
thematic issues across trials such as the relationship between history and law 
manifested by the proceedings and their impact on collective memory and 
identity. The key difference I would like to highlight between historical Nazi 
war crimes trials research and the ICL scholarship is that historical accounts 
provide a broader critical analysis both of the trials themselves and of their 
representation of Nazi Germany. Historians do not work within the 
disciplinary framework of international criminal law, or the legal academy 
generally. While they are interested in the laws and procedures used by the 
tribunals, this is in terms of their social and political origins and their impact 
on the history rather than how they contributed to the development of 
international criminal law. The triple limitation of ICL discourse does not 
apply, therefore, to historical scholarship. Apart from having moved earlier 
and further away from the Nuremberg IMT (aided by the absence of a specific 
ĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚƚŽ  ‘ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ?ƚƌŝďƵŶĂůƐ ) ? ŝƚƐ ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚ ŝŶƚƌŝďƵŶĂůũƵƌŝƐƉƌƵĚĞŶĐĞ
is much more contextualised and it is concerned with evaluating how Nazi 
Germany is represented. 
Historiographical approaches to the proceedings develop a more detailed and 
contextualised historical appreciation of the trials than the ICL scholarship 
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discussed above. This is not least because (re)constructing the past is what 
historians are trained to do. With recent developments in the historiography 
of the Third Reich in many areas moving in the direction of a more nuanced 
and complex narrative of the period,589 it is in tandem with this that new 
scholarship about war crimes trials both branches out and supplies us with 
wider context, more detail, and a variety of perspectives. However, while 
historical accounts certainly tackle some of the important substantive and 
procedural legal issues brought to light by the trials, historians have their own 
disciplinary conventions and research interests and do not stray into legal 
theoretical issues too far removed from a conventional historical narrative of 
the trial(s) under scrutiny. For example, historians are unlikely to engage in a 
jurisprudential re-evaluation of the normative foundations of Nuremberg. 
The primary interest of these works is the history rather than the law. Their 
interest in the law is generally shaped by historiographical concerns. This 
manifests itself in an exploration of issues such as the dual aims of the trials - 
their pedagogic purpose and attempt to achieve justice, which is often 
considered in the context of a broader narrative of the public response to the 
trials. Rather than focusing on, for example, the evidential issues with using 
historical sources for legal purposes, historians address the impact of legal 
forms on history. This often results in consideration of the inherent tension 
between the legal and historical aspects of the proceedings, highlighting the 
limits of the law when it aims to achieve multiple objectives and impose 
justice on a history of atrocity. Where the doctrinal focus of much ICL 
scholarship ŵĞĂŶƐ ƚŚĞ ƚƌŝĂůƐ ?representation of Nazi Germany is taken for 
granted, historical accounts often explicitly lay bare the misrepresentation of 
the Nazi past that framed the proceedings, carried through into many of the 
trials processes and (mis)informed the perception of the wider public. 
For example, in her narrative of the Frankfurt-Auschwitz trial Rebecca 
Wittmann is ultimately interested in the political-social-cultural question of 
how the trials impacted on the German public consciousness and aided or 
prevented their coming to terms with their recent past. Her conclusion about 
this is representative, that  ‘ƚŚĞ ƐŝŶĐĞƌĞ ĞĨĨŽƌƚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ public prosecution to 
indict Auschwitz, to teach lessons about the culpability of all involved in the 
ŵƵƌĚĞƌ ŽĨ ŝŶŶŽĐĞŶƚƐ ? ǁĂƐ ŚŝŶĚĞƌĞĚ ďǇ ƚŚĞ ůĂǁ ĂƐ ŝƚǁĂƐĚĞĨŝŶĞĚ ? ?590 This is 
mirrored in Valerie Hébert ?ƐĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞHigh Command case.591 She is 
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interĞƐƚĞĚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ  ‘ĚŝĚ ƚŚĞ ũƵĚŝĐŝĂůĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞŚĞůƉƚŚĞ'ĞƌŵĂŶƐŝŶƚŚĞ
understanding of and reconciliation with their traumatic and contested 
ŚŝƐƚŽƌǇ ? ?,592 concluding ƚŚĂƚ ƵůƚŝŵĂƚĞůǇ  ‘ƚŚĞ EƵƌĞŵďĞƌŐ ƉƌŽũĞĐƚ ĚŝĚ ŶŽƚ
achieve justice, nor did it educate the German people about Nazi crime in any 
ŶƵĂŶĐĞĚŽƌůĂƐƚŝŶŐǁĂǇ ? ?593 
The conflict in the dual purpose of the trials  is often emphasised in historical 
accounts, which in turn led to a failure of their pedagogical aspect: how the 
law impeded the history. Wittmann argues that the jurisprudence of the 
judicial system of the Federal Republic of Germany resulted in problems with 
the use of retroactive legislation, subjective aspects of the law relating to 
ŵƵƌĚĞƌ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞƐƚĂƚƵƚĞŽĨ ůŝŵŝƚĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ǁŚŝĐŚŝŵƉĂĐƚĞĚƚŚĞƚƌŝĂů ?ƐĂďŝůŝƚǇďŽƚŚ
to deliver the desired message to the public and to bring justice to the 
perpetrators.594 Similarly, Hébert argues that, as a result of the broader aims 
of the trial, the selection of its defendants and the conduct of its prosecution, 
ƚŚĞ  ‘ƚƌŝĂů ŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĞƌƐ ŚĂĚ ƐŽƵŐŚƚ ƚŽ ƵƐĞƚŚĞĂĐĐƵƐĞĚĂƐƐǇŵďŽůƐŽĨĂďƌŽĂĚĞƌ
and more pervasive guilt and responsibility than the trial was capable of 
ƉƌŽƐĞĐƵƚŝŶŐ ? ?595 These sorts of arguments are common, and are reflected 
elsewhere in attempts to draw conclusions as to the success or failure of 
proceedings in terms of their claim to achieve both justice and truth.596  
According to Devin Pendas, in the Frankfurt-Auschwitz trial the reliance on 
ƚŚĞ  ‘ŽƌĚŝŶĂƌǇ ?ĐƌŝŵŝŶĂů ůĂǁŵĞĂŶƚƚŚĂƚ  ‘ƚŚĞ ůĂǁĐĂŵĞƵƉĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƚŚĞ ůŝŵŝƚƐŽĨ
ŝƚƐ ĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇ ƚŽ ĚĞĂů ĂĚĞƋƵĂƚĞůǇ ǁŝƚŚ ƐǇƐƚĞŵĂƚŝĐ ŐĞŶŽĐŝĚĞ ? ?597 Hilary Earl 
argues that in the NMT Einsatzgruppen ƚƌŝĂůƚŚĞ ‘ŵŽƌĞƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůƉƌŽƐĞĐƵƚŝŽŶ
ŽĨ ŵƵƌĚĞƌ ? ƚŚĂƚ ĞŵĞƌŐĞĚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƚƌŝĂůƐ ĚĞƐƉŝƚĞƚŚĞƵƐĞŽĨ ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƌĂƚŚĞƌ
ƚŚĂŶĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐ ůĂǁ ?ƌĞƐƵůƚĞĚŝŶ  ‘ĂŶĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŚĂƚďǇŶĞĐĞƐƐŝƚǇŽǀĞƌůŽŽŬĞĚƚŚĞ
ĐŽŵƉůĞǆŝƚŝĞƐ ŽĨ ŐĞŶŽĐŝĚĞ ? ?598 Similarly, DŝĐŚĂĞů DĂƌƌƵƐ ŚŝŐŚůŝŐŚƚƐ  ‘ŚŽǁ
difficult it was to bring the Holocaust into the courtroom in a way that seems 
ĐŽŵŵĞŶƐƵƌĂƚĞ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĂƚ ĐĂƚĂƐƚƌŽƉŚĞ ? ?599 With reference to the Frankfurt-
Auschwitz trial, Pendas claims  ‘ŝŶŝƚƐƌƵƐŚƚŽĚŝƐĐĞƌŶŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů culpability, the 
ƚƌŝĂů ĚŝƐƉůĂĐĞĚ ĂŶĚ ĞůŝŵŝŶĂƚĞĚ ƚŚĞ ĚŝŵĞŶƐŝŽŶ ŽĨ ĐŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞ ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇ ? ?
resulting ŝŶ ũƵƐƚŝĐĞďƵƚŶŽƚƚƌƵƚŚ ?ǁŚŝĐŚ  ‘ƵůƚŝŵĂƚĞůǇƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƐŶĞŝƚŚĞƌƚƌƵƚŚŶŽƌ
ũƵƐƚŝĐĞ ? ?600  
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These comments about the failure of many of the trials in terms of their 
pedagogical aims reflect two important areas of historical interest in this 
category of scholarship. These are the misrepresentation of the Nazi past 
inherent in the conception and execution of the proceedings and the 
limitations of the legal regimes in trying to prosecute Nazi defendants while 
simultaneously giving a history lesson to the wider world. One of the most 
important implications of these recent historical accounts of trials lies in how 
they expose the limited construction of the past put forward in the 
proceedings. This is an almost universal observation, reflected in comments 
ƐƵĐŚĂƐ  ‘ŝŶŵĂŶǇǁĂǇƐ ?ƚŚĞŵŝƐƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨEĂǌŝĐƌŝŵĞƚŚĂƚĐĂŵĞŽƵƚŽĨ
ƚŚĞ ƚƌŝĂů ŝƐ ƚŚĞ ƉƌĞǀĂůĞŶƚ ŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶ ŝŶĨŽƌŵŝŶŐ ƉĞŽƉůĞ ?Ɛ ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐ ŽĨ
the Holocaust ƚŽ ƚŚŝƐĚĂǇ ? ?601 Erich Haberer claims that when such trials are 
ĚĞƉƌŝǀĞĚ  ‘ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂů ĐŽŶƚĞǆƚ ƚŚĂƚ ǁĂƐ ĞƐƐĞŶƚŝĂů ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ĂĐĐƵƌĂƚĞ
representation of the nature and dimensions of the National Socialist 
ĐĂƚĂƐƚƌŽƉŚĞ ? ? ƚŚĞǇ ĐĂŶ ďĞĐŽŵĞ  ‘ĂŶŝŵƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŽĨ ũƵƐƚŝĐĞŽŶŚŝƐƚŽƌǇ ? ?602 Thus, 
in the case of Nuremberg, whatever justice was done in legal terms, it 
resulted in the enduring distortion of history in public perception,603 as well 
as in historical writing and in jurisprudential discourse.  
The disciplinary commitments of historians are evident in how these texts 
approach their Nazi war crimes trial subject-matter. In ICL scholarship 
accounts, the history is subservient to the law. This is specifically law with a 
ƐŵĂůů  ‘ů ? ?ƚŚĞƐƵďƐƚĂŶƚŝǀĞĂŶĚƉƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĂůlaws employed by the tribunals, their 
technical failings and their impact on the development of international 
criminal law. In historical research, these sorts of laws are subservient to the 
wider historical context: their inability to adequately tackle and represent the 
Nazi past, and inform the public consciousness in a way that enables the 
coming to terms with that past. dŚĞŝĚĞĂŽĨ  ‘ũƵƐƚŝĐĞ ? ŝƐƉƌĞǀĂůĞŶƚǁŝƚŚŝŶďŽƚŚ
sets of accounts, but it is generally more broadly contextualised in historical 
narratives, so that it means more than successful prosecutions and 
technically satisfactory laws. It means, as Pendas suggests, achieving truth as 
ǁĞůů ĂƐ ŵŽƌĞ ƉƌŽƐĞĐƵƚŽƌǇ  ‘ƐƵĐĐĞƐƐ ? ?604 but ŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂů  ‘ƚƌƵƚŚ ? ǁĂƐ ƌĂƌĞůǇ
achieved. 
Historical accounts are necessarily limited by this approach in terms of legal 
theory. Historians are not really concerned with how the misrepresentation 
of Nazi Germany within the trials has impacted the jurisprudential concept of 
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law, whether the legitimacy of the allied powers was founded on positivism 
or naturalism, or whether Nazi law is similar to the law of Nuremberg. 
Consequently, historians are also sometimes drawn into the normative 
framework of the trials themselves in their evaluation. This is most apparent 
when drawing conclusions as to the success of trials. These can continue to 
reflect faith in the return of the rule of law in a similar way to that manifested 
in the ICL scholarship. One of the forms of justice Hébert uses to measure 
success in the High Command case is  ‘ƚŚĞ ƌĞŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ŽĨƚŚĞƌƵůĞŽĨ ůĂǁ
through trŝĂůƐ ? ? ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐ  ‘ƚŚĞ ƌĞŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ Ă ŵŽƌĂů ŽƌĚĞƌ ? ? Ăƚ ǁŚŝĐŚ ƐŚĞ
argues it was successful.605 Hébert maintains that:  
Successful prosecution reinforces the rule of law and reintroduces a 
sense of justice. Justice is completed by the imposition of punishment. 
ĚŚĞƌĞŶĐĞ ƚŽ ƉƵŶŝƐŚŵĞŶƚ ƐŝŐŶĂůƐ ƚŚĞ ĚĞƉƚŚ ŽĨ ƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ?Ɛ ĐŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞ
memory of the crime. And memory honors the value of the victim, 
sustaining rejeĐƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƉĞƌƉĞƚƌĂƚŽƌƐ ?ĂĐƚƐ.606  
While this virtuous circle may have superficial validity, it overlooks significant 
issues which have the potential to disrupt its flow. These include the extent 
ƚŽǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞ  ‘ƌƵůĞŽĨ ůĂǁ ? ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞǁĂǇŝƚǁĂƐ ŝŵƉŽƐĞĚ ?ǁĂƐǀĂůŝĚ ?ŵŽƌĞǀĂůŝĚ
than the legal system of the Third Reich; and the assumption that successful 
prosecution instigates justice, collective memory, the value of the victim and 
rejection of the perpetrators. Only in a basic sense does a successful 
prosecution reinforce the rule of law and justŝĐĞ ? ŝƐ ũƵƐƚŝĐĞ  ‘ĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞĚ ? ďǇ
punishment, and does punishment signal collective memory. In order for this 
to have any value, any meaning, it is necessary to interrogate the nature of 
the rule of law upheld (particularly in relation to that against which it is 
juxtaposed), the integrity of the moral system underlying the sense of justice 
ƚŚĂƚ ŝƐ ƌĞŝŶĨŽƌĐĞĚ ĂŶĚ ĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞĚ ? ĂŶĚƚŚĞĐŽŶƚĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ?ƐĐŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞ
memory. This formulation comes close to suggesting that failed prosecution 
by definition undermines both the law and the history, which is highly 
problematic in the context of the discussion of Fraser and Wilke in Section II 
of this chapter. 
This last point is revealed elsewhere too. ,ŝůĂƌǇĂƌůƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐƚŚĂƚ  ‘ƉĞƌŚĂƉƐ
ƚŚĞ ǁŽƌƐƚŽƵƚƌĂŐĞ ?ƉĞƌƉĞƚƌĂƚĞĚ in the trial process she accounts, is the early 
ƌĞůĞĂƐĞ ŽĨ ŵĂŶǇ ŽĨ ƚŚŽƐĞ ĐŽŶǀŝĐƚĞĚ  ‘ƚŽ ůŝǀĞ ŽƵƚ ƚŚĞŝƌ ůŝǀĞƐ ĂƐ ŽƌĚŝŶĂƌǇ
'ĞƌŵĂŶƐ ? ?607 This is considered a failure born of political necessity rather than 
a legal problem,608 which is primarily the case when viewed in terms of the 
ĨĂŝůƵƌĞŽĨƚŚĞƚƌŝĂů ?ƐƉĞĚĂŐŽŐŝĐĂůĂŝŵƐĂŶĚƚŚĞŝŵƉĂĐƚŽĨƚŚĞƌĞƐƵůƚŝŶŐƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů
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context. However, it also touches on other issues to do with the wider legal 
theory of the trials process and the attempt to impose a conception of the 
rule of law on the defendants. The issue of early release can be seen in the 
context of how the whole trial process was run and whether it was ever in a 
position to judge a past in which it had so much invested. When Marrus 
ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌƐ ǀĂƌŝŽƵƐ  ‘ůĞŐĂů ĂŶĚ ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂů ŝŶĂĚĞƋƵĂĐŝĞƐ ? ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƚƌŝĂůƐ ŚĞ
examines, his categories of inadequacy narrow the issues down to fairly 
specific and practical difficulties, while ignoring to some extent the wider 
implications of categories of conceptual inadequacy within the law.609 He 
mentions problems such as the impossibility of prosecuting all of the 
potential perpetrators, disagreements over the jurisdiction of the authorities 
and the misrepresentation of the past, but these all contribute to bigger legal 
theoretical questions about the relationship between law after Auschwitz and 
law before Auschwitz.610 
Drawing a broader perspective on the issues raised by Marrus might mean 
reframing the question as: what does it mean, for the functioning of law and 
ŝƚƐƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉƚŽƚŚĞƉĂƐƚ ?ĨŽƌ ŝƚƚŽďĞ  ‘ŝŶĂĚĞƋƵĂƚĞ ?ƚŽƚŚĞĐƌŝŵĞƐĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĚ
and how can law deal with its inherent limitations in these respects? 
Historical accounts of Nazi war crimes trials lay the groundwork for 
addressing legal theoretical issues such as these. The construction of a 
complex and comprehensive historical narrative of war crimes trials, and the 
Third Reich generally, is a necessary condition for exploring some of the legal 
theoretical issues touched on in this chapter and that are relevant to 
jurisprudence. WĞŶĚĂƐ ĐŝƚĞƐ ƚŚĞ ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞ ŽĨ ƌĞĐĞŶƚ  ‘ĞĨĨŽƌƚƐ Ăƚ Ă ŵŽƌĞ
ƚŚŽƌŽƵŐŚ ? ĞŵƉŝƌŝĐĂůůǇ ŐƌŽƵŶĚĞĚ ? ĂŶĚ ĂƌĐŚŝǀĂůůǇ ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĞĚ ĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ? ŽĨ ǁĂƌ
crimes trials.611 These efforts are the starting point for legal analysis of 
Nuremberg as a point of contact between current law and jurisprudence and 
the Nazi past. However, historians are unlikely to make the philosophical 
leaps necessary to turn a critique of the representation of Nazi Germany at 
Nuremberg into a legal theoretical evaluation of Nazi law.  
Donald ůŽǆŚĂŵ ĂƌŐƵĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ůŽŶŐ-term philosophical developments in the 
law in no way equate to a short-or even medium-term collective 
ĐŽŶƐĐŝŽƵƐŶĞƐƐ ŽĨ ? Žƌ ĐŽŶĨƌŽŶƚĂƚŝŽŶ ǁŝƚŚ ? ŐĞŶŽĐŝĚĞ ? ?612 The point is that the 
development of the doctrines and procedures of international criminal law 
does not equate to a broader, collective coming to terms with, for example, 
the events of the Holocaust. However, these essentially doctrinal 
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developments also do not mean the philosophy of law has come to terms 
with the ,ŽůŽĐĂƵƐƚ ? ŵĞĂŶŝŶŐ ůŽǆŚĂŵ ?Ɛ  ‘ĐŽŶĨƌŽŶƚĂƚŝŽŶ ? ŵƵƐƚ ƚĂŬĞ ƉůĂĐĞ
within the legal academy as well as elsewhere. Historical research into Nazi 
war crimes trials is outward looking as far as legal theory is concerned. It 
raises possibilities to be further explored, even if it does not explore them 
because of its own disciplinary limitations. The contrast with ICL scholarship 
in the same field is that it is generally inward looking. Consequently it not 
only inhibits broader theoretical exploration but also overlooks and 
occasionally replicates the problems of the past. 
IV. Conclusion 
Nuremberg is a significant legal and historical point of contact between the 
Nazi past and the present. It constructed false narratives about the Third 
Reich and specifically Nazi law that resonated in academic and public 
consciousness, through the Hart-Fuller debate and into current 
jurisprudential discourse. It relied on the essential difference of its law 
framers and Nazi law, without exploring the problematic basis of the former 
or understanding the functioning of the latter. It endorsed the idea of 
discontinuity in order to separate the victors from the vanquished and 
postwar Germany from Nazi Germany, the consequence of which has been 
an enduring rupture thesis within areas of the legal academy. Nuremberg is 
also an important point of connection for this dissertation. The 
misrepresentation of Nazi Germany and its legal system in the trials is the 
same misrepresentation that infuses jurisprudential discourse. The normative 
confusion that underpins the trials faces the same difficulties that 
jurisprudence faces in its attempts to explain Nazi law entirely within the 
positivist or naturalist paradigm. The problematic historiography that 
historians have more recently started to revise, with access to new archives 
and interpretive frameworks, was to a large extent constructed at 
Nuremberg. 
This chapter has used Nuremberg to emphasise these connections, to 
highlight the difficulties at the location in time and space where all of thes e 
things come together. It has also used it as a point of departure for a 
comparison of two different but related aspects of academia; ICL scholarship 
and historical Nazi war crime trials research. This comparison revealed that 
both historians and legal scŚŽůĂƌƐ ĐĂƌƌǇ ĚŝƐĐŝƉůŝŶĂƌǇ  ‘ďĂŐŐĂŐĞ ? ? ďƵƚ ƚŚĞ
absence of political, social and historical contextualisation within ICL 
scholarship means that it tends to reproduce rather than critique some of the 
more problematic aspects of Nuremberg. These include the way Nazi 
Germany is narrated and the jurisprudential flaws it exhibits. Because of this, 
and their shared roots in the same historiographical understanding of the 
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Third Reich, ICL scholarship and jurisprudential discourse share many 
characteristics in common when it comes to the representation of Nazi 
Germany.  
Jurisprudence was found to be superficial in its treatment of the Nazi regime. 
ICL scholarship is similarly superficial in that it does not investigate further 
how the Third Reich is represented, rather taking it at face value. Its focus on 
legal doctrine and procedure - the jurisprudence of the trials themselves  W at 
the expense of the wider context, alongside its disinclination to move beyond 
the Nuremberg trials, means that its treatment of the trials is also in some 
respects superficial. Jurisprudence was found to be unhistorical; lacking in 
historical evidence for its claims about Nazism. The examples of ICL 
scholarship discussed in this chapter tend to stick quite rigidly to legal 
questions, and consequently do not take great account of the parallel 
historical research. Jurisprudence regards the Nazi legal system as the 
paradigm of a wicked legal system, while ICL scholarship often uncritically 
accepts the characterisation of Nazi law as non-law and criminality that 
informed Nuremberg, with a concomitant welcoming of the return of law as 
civilisation. There is an underlying narrative of rupture in jurisprudential 
ĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞ ? ǁŚŝĐŚ ŝƐ ƌĞƉůŝĐĂƚĞĚ ŝŶ /> ƐĐŚŽůĂƌƐŚŝƉ ?Ɛ ĨĂŝůƵƌĞ ƚŽ ƐĐƌƵƚŝŶŝƐĞ
EƵƌĞŵďĞƌŐ ?ƐƌŽůe in establishing this narrative. 
The common point of departure for many of the detrimental narratives about 
Nazi Germany in both law and history ensures that those who have criticised 
ƚŚĞůĞŐĂůĂĐĂĚĞŵǇ ?ƐůĂĐŬŽĨĞŶŐĂŐĞŵĞŶƚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞdŚŝƌĚZĞŝĐŚŝŶŐĞŶĞƌĂů terms 
need not necessarily have been more specific.613 It is not limited to 
jurisprudential discourse, but is also discernible elsewhere within the legal 
academy, including in ICL scholarship. It takes on a specific legal theoretical 
form when it comes to questions of the concept of law - the validity question 
and the separability question - but has parallels in other areas. I have argued 
that Nazi Germany is relevant to jurisprudence, that it does matter that 
jurisprudential discourse misrepresents Nazi law.614 One might ask whether it 
is up to scholars researching in international criminal law to follow through 
on all of the theoretical and historical issues raised in this chapter, when they 
are most concerned with how the doctrines and procedures of ICL came 
about, function and can be improved. Apart from the fact that the 
reinforcement of preconceptions about Nazi Germany within this scholarship 
is not of itself meritorious, it also does have relevance for international 
criminal law. Fraser has drawn some important connections between the past 
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and the present in this regard,615 and the idea that international criminal law 
continues to be based on the rupture of the law of Nuremberg from the law 
of a genocidal state has resonance. 
It is ultimately up to legal scholars of various types to respond to the 
challenge presented by historians who produce more comprehensive 
narratives of Nazi war crimes trials but are not concerned with developing 
this into broader legal theoretical analyses. This will probably involve legal 
academics from a more diverse range of specialism, substantive and 
theoretical, writing about the significance of Nazi Germany for their subject. 
Many possible unexplored areas of research are open to scholars willing to 
widen their research focus and cross the disciplinary divide between law and 
history more readily. From a theoretical perspective, it is worth exploring 
ŚŽǁůĂǁĚĞĂůƐǁŝƚŚ  ‘ƉĞƌƉĞƚƌĂƚŽƌƐ ?ĂŶĚƌĞƐƉŽŶĚƐƚŽƚŚĞEĂǌŝƉĂƐƚǁŚĞŶŝƚǁĂƐ
also complicit in the actions of those perpetrators and the shaping of that 
past. This might lead us to ask what it actually means for law to be in this 
tripartite role: assisting in the construction and execution of the Nazi state, 
judging the acts and events of that period in legal proceedings, and 
continuing to be a crucial part of the modern state even as it continues to try 
to escape the shadow of the Nazi regime and the Holocaust. 
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 See, in particular, Fraser,  ‘ǀŝů >Ăǁ ?ǀŝů >ĂǁǇĞƌƐ ? ? ?Ŷ26) and  ‘^ŚĂĚŽǁƐŽĨ>Ăǁ ? ?Ŷ26), as 
well as aspects of Fraser, Law After Auschwitz (n 23) and ĂǀŝďŽƌƐŚĐŚ ?ƐĂƌƚ (n 80). 
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Chapter Seven: Conclusion 
I. The Conundrum of Nazi Law 
Did Nazi Germany have law? To return to the question that opened this 
dissertation is to return to the problem that has historically been at the heart 
of the relationship between jurisprudential discourse and the Nazi past.616 
This is a problem that has persisted since the Hart-Fuller debate brought Nazi 
Germany briefly to the attention of Anglo-American jurisprudence in the late 
1950s, both because of the way it employed Nazi law and its incredible, 
enduring influence on the field in terms of the validity question and the 
separability question. However, while since then jurisprudential discussion of 
these issues has frequently referred to Nazi Germany, it has not been at the 
centre of the debate and the version of it that does make an appearance 
generally is far removed from the historical reality.  
Hart and Fuller were not attempting through their debate to discover the 
precise nature of Nazi legality. This was ancillary to their primary purpose, 
which was to elucidate the conditions of validity for a generic concept of law, 
including the relationship between law and morality, and to support either a 
positivist or natural law conception of such conditions. It did not ultimately 
matter that the concrete case with which they begin ? ƚŚĂƚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ  ‘ŐƌƵĚŐĞ
ŝŶĨŽƌŵĞƌ ? has a connection to Nazi Germany. The Third Reich acts as a stand 
in for a hypothetical wicked legal system, required to be immoral only 
because this tests the point of contention between the two theories, that 
over the separability thesis. Nazi law began jurisprudential life as a limit-case, 
but without having been properly investigated for whether it in fact existed 
at or beyond the limit of the law. 
Consequently, as far as jurisprudence has defined the questiŽŶ  ‘ĚŝĚ EĂǌŝ
'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ŚĂǀĞ ůĂǁ ? ?this dissertation has not sought to answer it. Instead it 
has traced and critiqued how jurisprudence has approached this issue and 
with it how it has represented Nazi Germany generally.617 Neither positivism 
nor natural law is capable in current form of explaining or accommodating 
the Nazi legal system, because of its combination of extreme politicisation 
and its breach of basic forms in the service of higher, moral norms.618 The 
discursive structures of jurisprudential debate in this area are circumscribed 
to the extent that the role of Nazi Germany is embedded and consistently 
and uncritically reproduced. Some legal scholars have challenged the 
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 dŚĞ ǁĂǇ ‘ũƵƌŝƐƉƌƵĚĞŶĐĞ ?ĂŶĚƌĞůĂƚĞĚƚĞƌŵƐĂƌĞƵƐĞĚŝŶƚŚŝƐĚŝƐƐĞƌƚation is explained in 
Section I/ ŽĨ ŚĂƉƚĞƌ KŶĞ ? ĂƐ ŝƐ ƚŚĞ ƵƐĞ ŽĨ ƚĞƌŵƐƚŽĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞEĂǌŝ'ĞƌŵĂŶǇ ?ƐƵĐŚĂƐ ‘EĂǌŝ
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increasingly abstract, elaborate and inward-looking nature of jurisprudence, 
but there have been from within few attempts to re-evaluate the status of 
Nazi Germany. Such as they are, these calls have come from outside of the 
jurisprudential field. KristĞŶ ZƵŶĚůĞ ?Ɛ ƌĞǀŝƐŝŽŶ ŽĨ &ƵůůĞƌ ?Ɛ ŶĂƚƵƌĂů ůĂǁ ƚŚĞŽƌǇ
ultimately suffers from theoretical and historical shortcomings, in part 
because it stays largely within the realm of the existing dis course, albeit 
reintroducing to it limited aspects of the historical Nazi Germany.619 
ZĞĐĞŶƚ ŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂů ƐĐŚŽůĂƌƐŚŝƉ ŚĂƐ ĞǆƉŽƐĞĚ ŚŽǁ  ‘ŶŽƌŵĂů ? ƚŚĞ ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ŽĨ
governance and extermination was, how interconnected the regular law was 
with the institutions and implementation of the Holocaust, and how 
important ideology was to the Nazi legal project.620 Crucially it shows that 
there was law in Nazi Germany. For all its differences and horrific 
consequences, legal rules were created and enforced, respected and 
followed, within and without the Third Reich. They were used in the service 
of the mundane and the genocidal, and sometimes both of these outcomes 
were the same. The existence of legal rules in the early part of the Third Reich 
is not so much in dispute among scholars such as Rundle and Riley, who 
nevertheless question the lawfulness of the regime overall and specifically in 
implementing the Holocaust. /Ŷ Ă ƐŝŵŝůĂƌ ǁĂǇ ƚŽ &ƌĂĞŶŬĞů ?Ɛ ũƵǆƚĂƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ
the dual normative and prerogative aspects of the state, they have accepted 
that aspects of the old legal regime remained, and legislation created even 
for discriminatory purposes might be considered valid.  
The existence of valid law at the alleged margins , beyond the point of 
rupture, is more controversial: where Führer Orders could intervene on an 
arbitrary basis to upset rule of law principles, where judges and the letter of 
the law were overruled by invoking the popular healthy sentiment, or where 
law was used as a weapon to conduct extermination on a grand scale. 
However, this relies on an essential schism - a rupture - that prises the 
Holocaust from the rest of the state and overlooks important legal 
continuities. In Nazi Germany, historical research reveals increasingly often 
the extent to which ƚŚĞ  ‘ĞǆƚƌĞŵĞ ?ǁĂƐƉĂƌƚŽĨƚŚĞ  ‘ŶŽƌŵ ?ĂŶĚvice versa, the 
limit persisted at the centre. This was the same for law which, in any event, 
cannot itself be easily separated from the rest of the state, especially in Nazi 
Germany where its parameters cannot always be rigidly defined.  
The historical picture of the Third Reich challenges jurisprudential discourse 
specifically on a fundamental level, because it refuses to conform to the 
major tenets of either positivism or natural law. Jurisprudence is framed as a 
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 ZƵŶĚůĞ ?ƐǁŽƌŬŝƐĞǀĂůƵĂƚĞĚŝŶ^ĞĐƚŝŽŶƐ///ĂŶĚ/sŽĨŚĂƉƚĞƌ&ŽƵƌ ? 
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 ^ĞĞƌĞƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞůǇƚŚĞĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶŽĨĂŶ^ƚŽŶĞ ?Ɛwork in Section II of Chapter Four and the 
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primarily conceptual and theoretical branch of legal scholarship.621 However, 
to the extent that it seeks to establish a universal concept of law, or evaluate 
the legal (and sometimes moral) quality of legal systems, it must properly 
ƚĂŬĞ ŝŶƚŽ ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚ Ăůů ƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ ŵĂŶŝĨĞƐƚĂƚŝŽŶƐ ŽĨ  ‘ůĂǁ ? ? ŽŶĞ ŽĨ ǁŚŝĐŚ ŝƐ EĂǌŝ
law. The historical research problematizes the dominant treatment because it 
reveals both the continuities between Nazi and other law and the sense that 
the Nazi legal system is more legally complex and morally problematic than 
an archetypal wicked regime. It does not reveal it as lawless (as claimed in 
EĞƵŵĂŶŶ ?ƐBehemoth622) or as entailing distinct and isolated components 
that can be ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚŝŶƚƵƌŶĂƐ ‘ůĂǁ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ŶŽŶ-ůĂǁ ? ?ĂƐĐůĂŝŵĞĚďǇ&ƌĂĞŶŬĞů ?Ɛ
 ‘ĚƵĂůƐƚĂƚĞ ?ĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ) ?623 Rather, it reveals it as a complex system, with a rich 
mixture of legal and non-ůĞŐĂůŵĞĂƐƵƌĞƐĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŶŐďŽƚŚƚŽ  ‘ŶŽƌŵĂůŝƚǇ ?ĂŶĚ
 ‘ŐĞŶŽĐŝĚĞ ? ? ĂŶĚ ǁŚŝĐŚ ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞĚ ƚŚĞĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐŽĨŽƚŚĞƌǁŝƐĞ  ‘ŽƌĚŝŶĂƌǇ ?ŵŽƌĂů
and legal agents. It also posited an alternative legal value system, based on 
ĂŶ ŝĚĞŽůŽŐǇ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ  ‘ƌĂĐŝĂů ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ? ? ǁŚŝĐŚ ƌƵŶƐ ĐŽƵŶƚĞƌ ƚŽ ĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƐ ƚŽ
label it as simply a self-serving, totalitarian, instrumental regime.624 
Under the detailed gaze of historians, therefore, the Nazi legal system 
becomes much more interesting for jurisprudence because the question of 
what Nazi law is does not boil down to its contribution to conceptual validity 
criteria, but opens out into how the historical assortment of traditional 
legislation, Führer orders, emergency decrees, impromptu shootings and 
organised mass gassings that comprised Nazi governing interacted with and 
used the law. Consequently, there is not just one question about whether evil 
legal systems as such are valid but many questions about the legal nature of 
all of the rules, norms and institutions used to govern the Third Reich. Law 
was always present in Nazi Germany somewhere,625 but how can we 
understand and continue to work with law that was capable of being used for 
such egregious purposes. And is it even possible in principle to distinguish 
 ‘ůĂǁ ?ĨƌŽŵ ‘ŶŽŶ-ůĂǁ ?ŝŶĂŶǇŵĞĂŶŝŶŐĨƵůǁĂǇŝŶƐƵĐŚĐŝƌĐƵŵƐƚĂŶĐĞƐ ? 
The Nazi vision of law was undoubtedly and deliberately a huge (and 
catastrophic) departure from liberal legality, but it cannot merely be seen as 
parasitic on it and an instrumentalisation of it. It was an ideological reaction 
against it, but one that cannot be dismissed as so different, so antithetical to 
law as to be irrelevant. David Fraser makes the case of Nazi law as law over 
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 See the brief discussion of the nature of jurisprudence in Section II of Chapter One. 
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 Neumann, Behemoth (n 13). 
623
 Fraenkel, The Dual State (n 13). The interpretations put forward by Neumann and 
Fraenkel are addressed in more detail  in Section III of Chapter One. 
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 See Michael Burleigh and Wolfgang Wipperman, The Racial State: Germany 1933-1945 
(Cambridge University Press, 1991). 
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and over in his scholarship and the analysis of some of his arguments in the 
ĐŽŶƚĞǆƚ ŽĨ ^ƚŽŶĞ ?Ɛ ŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂů ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞŽƌĞƚŝĐĂů ǁƌŝƚŝŶŐ ƐŚŽǁƐ ƚŚĂƚ &ƌĂƐĞƌ ?Ɛ
jurisprudential claims most convincingly account for the historiography.626 
Fraser also interrogates one of the well-springs of the rupture thesis, the 
Nuremberg trials.627 Nuremberg constructed enduring but misleading 
narratives about the Nazi state that influenced historiography, public 
consciousness, and the legal academy through both the Hart-Fuller debate 
ĂŶĚ ƚŽĚĂǇ ?Ɛ /> ƐĐŚŽůĂƌƐŚŝƉ ? dŚĞ ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨƚŚĞ dŚŝƌĚ ZĞŝĐŚ ĂƐ ƚŚĞ
product of a conspiracy of criminal minds continues to resonate through 
aspects of legal scholarship precisely because they exist in disciplinary 
isolation from historical research. This is not, of course, helped by legal 
history itself only recently turning to the subject of Nazi law, to a large extent 
prompted by translated German works.628 
The work of one of these German scholars brings us to another question, 
what to do with Nazi law once we have it. MiĐŚĂĞů^ƚŽůůĞŝƐ ?ĐŽŶƵŶĚƌƵŵĂďŽƵƚ
how to treat the Nazi legal system brings this issue into sharp focus.629 It 
cannot be discounted by either positivism or natural law, but neither can it be 
straightforwardly explained. The easiest thing to do in the face of this is to 
treat it as irrelevant except as a limit case and not explore it in any depth. 
However, this was a case of a modern state succumbing to radical political 
and social - and legal  W change with catastrophic consequences. The 
jurisprudential concept of law ought to accommodate this as something 
other than an aberration and the legal academy generally must see it as more 
than merely criminal behaviour. It was historically more complicated than 
that, a point made throughout this dissertation. Consequently, more research 
is needed on both sides, historical and legal. One important question, for 
jurisprudence as well as legal history, is how to define and understand Nazi 
law as a particular manifestation of law, beyond the validity question rather 
than as the validity question itself. What is it about the structure, the theory, 
the normativity of Nazi law that enabled the state to be put to certain ends 
and what are the implications of this for jurisprudence. We need to know 
more about Nazi law and its wider context, including fascist law. We also 
need to explore the continuities and similarities between law then and law 
now, freely and diligently, and taking heed of their implications. We can no 
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 See Section III of Chapter One. 
629
 This was what to do with  ‘ƚŚĞĞǆŝƐƚĞŶĐĞŽĨ ůĂǁŝŶĂƐǇƐƚĞŵƚŚĂƚis on the whole unlawful 
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longer shut Nazi law away, notwithstanding the political expediency of doing 
so in decades past. 
II. Contribution and Limitations 
This dissertation is intended as a contribution to the emerging 
interdisciplinary literature from legal and historical scholars on the 
relationship between law and Nazi Germany. The general critique of the legal 
ĂĐĂĚĞŵǇ ?Ɛ ĞŶŐĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ dŚŝƌĚ ZĞŝĐŚ ŚĂƐrarelymanifested itself in 
specific and detailed exploration of some of the issues brought into play by 
that critique.630 Concerns about the lack of engagement with historical 
research, jurisprudential endorsement of the rupture thesis and ignorance of 
the Holocaust have often been made in review articles but have rarely moved 
beyond these to contribute to a more substantial body of research. Historians 
have begun to focus more specifically on the legal system in Nazi Germany, 
and scholars from disciplines such as philosophy have begun to explore some 
of the theoretical aspects of Nazi law and society.631 Legal theorists have also 
occasionally engaged with these subjects. One major exception from within 
the legal academy is the work of David Fraser, and I have drawn on this 
where appropriate throughout this dissertation.632 Fraser has written 
extensively, particularly on the role of law in implementing the Holocaust and 
the use of law to prosecute alleged war criminals in relation to the 
Holocaust.633 While commenting and building on this research in places, I 
have primarily sought to expand on other aspects of the relationship 
between law and Nazi Germany and it is in these areas that I believe this 
dissertation has the most to offer to our knowledge and understanding. 
The key points of focus in this dissertation have been twofold. First, an 
investigation of the nature and genesis of the problematic representation of 
Nazi Germany within jurisprudence, how it came about, and what its 
implications are. Second, a detailed exploration of specific recent examples of 
historical research in certain fields related to the Third Reich in order to 
analyse the jurisprudential representation and understand how Nazi law 
functioned within its wider context, as a manifestation of the concept of 
law.634 One of its key contributions therefore is in the focus on how Nazi 
Germany is treated within one particular area of legal scholarship. This 
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provides a specific and concrete illustration of some of the general criticisms 
of the academic legal engagement with the Third Reich. It shows clearly that 
Nazi Germany plays a role within the discourse that is not closely related to 
its historical reality.  
Another contribution is in synthesising a range of very recent historical 
research and using it to challenge how Nazi Germany is represented within 
the legal academy. The emerging English-language scholarship about the Nazi 
legal system provides a clear counterpoint to narratives of rupture, and 
accusations of Nazi law as legal form only and the cynical exploitation and 
instrumentalisation of the rule of law. The innovative use of other historical 
research is also valuable for understanding Nazi law and its relevance for 
legal discourse. Scholarship such as the concentration camp system case 
ƐƚƵĚǇĂŶĚ^ƚŽŶĞ ?Ɛ historical theoretical writing has not been employed in this 
way before, but provides useful insights into both the historical nature of the 
Third Reich and the philosophical legacy of the Holocaust. Stone provides an 
ĂůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞ ƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞ ĨƌŽŵ ǁŚŝĐŚ ƚŽ ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ &ƌĂƐĞƌ ĂŶĚ ZƵŶĚůĞ ?Ɛ
jurisprudential arguments in Chapter Four, and exposes merits in the former 
and problems with the latter that might otherwise not have been obvious. 
The concentration camp research reveals the deep links between different 
aspects of the Nazi state, mundane and genocidal, legal and extra-legal. The 
academic focus, to the extent there has been a focus at all, has often been on 
law and the Holocaust, but this research shows that the Holocaust cannot be 
separated from the institutions, personnel and governance of the wider state, 
and this applies equally to the legal system. 
This dissertation has therefore sought to make and explore some connections 
that have either not been made before, have not been investigated in detail 
or have not been investigated in the same way, in the particular context of 
Nazi Germany. These are connections between legal and historical research, 
between the jurisprudential concept of law and new empirical and 
theoretical, historical research, between jurisprudence and ICL scholarship, 
and between the Hart-Fuller debate and the current discourse. I hope and 
intend that these connections will be examined further in the future and can 
stimulate further connections, particularly across the disciplines of law and 
history. They are, in my view, extremely important for advancing our 
understanding of the role of law in Nazi Germany, and the relevance of this 
for legal theory and discourse. 
However, these connections also highlight some of the limitations of this 
dissertation. Its scope has been limited in a number of ways. The narrow 
focus on a particular aspect of jurisprudence as an area of legal scholarship 
throughout most of it was a necessary choice but one which restricted the 
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analysis of the undoubtedly widespread impact and potential relevance of 
the Third Reich for law. Even when considered as research about legal 
discourse, it was only possible to examine a small part of this. It was further 
limited by the use of exclusively English-language sources, both legal and 
historical. This was a conscious choice, and supported its concentration on 
Anglo-American scholarship in the legal academy, but much more could be 
said about the subject of Nazi law if other historical sources were brought 
into play. 
Also in relation to sources, this dissertation has used almost exclusively 
academic literature in carrying out its aims ? /ƚƐ  ‘ƉƌŝŵĂƌǇ ? ƐŽƵƌĐĞƐ ? ƚŽ ƚŚĞ
extent it is necessary to refer to them as such, are those aspects of discourse 
coming under scrutiny, particularly in relation to their representation of Nazi 
Germany. The clearest examples of these are the Hart-Fuller debate, more 
recent examples from jurisprudential discourse, and pockets of ICL 
scholĂƌƐŚŝƉ ? /ƚƐ  ‘ƐĞĐŽŶĚĂƌǇ ? sources have predominantly consisted of the 
historical research that has been used to critique aspects of legal scholarship. 
It is very difficult to place some of the literature in either camp, especially the 
legal theoretical writing of Fraser and Rundle, discussed mainly in Chapter 
Four. Ultimately the difference between sources used to critique and sources 
that are critiqued, if it exists at all, is that some are more reliably and 
deliberately placed in one category than the other. For example, most 
jurisprudential discourse that makes reference to Nazi Germany does so 
without support from historical evidence, and can be clearly challenged on 
that basis. However, this distinction is not always clear cut and the way 
different scholarship is used can be confusing. 
Maintaining fluidity for academic discourse between primary and secondary 
source status is arguably more reflective of the reality of the dual role it plays 
and provides more scope for analysis. A limitation it disguises is in the 
absence of sources from the Third Reich itself. This dissertation consciously 
focused in all of its facets on academic discourse, but there is inevitably much 
more to explore about Nazi law in particular from historical documents, 
which it was not possible to incorporate. This hints at perhaps the biggest 
difficulty with this research project, which has been reducing its scope to a 
manageable level. It touches on so many broader issues, which could not be 
contained within it. Apart from the question of the general relationship 
between modern law and Nazi Germany, the questions of how law and 
history relate to one another as disciplines and how empirical and 
philosophical methodologies contribute to one another are relevant to the 
themes of this dissertation, but are substantial and enduring and could not be 
tackled adequately here. In particular, I believe there is an interesting 
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comparison to be made between how the Third Reich is used within 
philosophical debates in history and law. 
III. The State of Scholarship: Questions for Further Research 
As this dissertation was being researched and written, the nascent literature 
on law and Nazi Germany grew in a number of directions, most of which I 
have attempted to incorporate into my analysis at various stages. Some of 
the English-language historical research on the Nazi legal system appeared in 
that time, as did some philosophical writing on the role of ideology in Nazi 
law. Additional legal and historical works about Nazi war crimes trials were 
published and highly relevant legal theorists such as Fraser and Rundle 
produced new material.635 While there is not a large and coherent body of 
legal theoretical writing on the subject of Nazi Germany, there are evidently 
emerging pockets of interest and it appears to be a potentially fruitful period 
for this field of research. 
However, the scholarship remains fairly limited. One of the edited collections 
to have been published during the writing of this dissertation summed up the 
situation quite well. Alan Steinweis and Robert Rachlin stated: 
A book about the law in Nazi Germany might strike some readers as an 
exercise in contradiction. They understand the Nazi regime as a tyranny, 
characterized by arbitrary rule, enforced through intimidation and 
terror. The hallmark of Nazi society, as they understand it, was not law, 
but lawlessness. In many respects they are correct. Under Nazi rule, 
Germany largely ceased being a Rechtsstaat  W a nation of laws  W as 
mill ions of people, both German and non-German, were deprived of 
their property, their freedom, and their l ives as the result of measures 
implemented entirely outside of the framework of traditional, codified 
German law. At the same time, however, much of the German legal 
system continued to function in a manner that would have been 
recognizable to observers before 1933.
636
 
This contains the recognition that the fact there was law in Nazi Germany 
might be considered surprising, as this is not usually thought to be the case. It 
simultaneously moves things forward by making reference to the fact that 
there was a Nazi legal system. However, while both historians and lawyers 
contributed to this volume, it is very clearly in its methodology and focus a 
contribution to the legal history of the Third Reich. That important elements 
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 In particular, between 2011 and 2014, Fraser,  ‘^ŚĂĚŽǁƐŽĨ>Ăǁ ? ?Ŷ26); Fraser,  ‘ǀŝů >Ăǁ ?
ǀŝů >ĂǁǇĞƌƐ ? ? ?Ŷ26); ZƵŶĚůĞ ? ‘>ĂǁĂŶĚĂŝůǇ>ŝĨĞ ? ?Ŷ271); Priemel and Stil ler, Reassessing the 
Nuremberg Military Tribunals (n 6); Steinweis and Rachlin, The Law in Nazi Germany (n 67); 
Heller, Nuremberg Military Tribunals (n 516);  ‘ ^ǇŵƉŽƐŝƵŵ ŽŶ EĂǌŝ >Ăǁ ?  ?Ŷ631); and 
ĞŽƐƚĞ ?  ‘,ŝƚůĞƌ ?ƐŽŶƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ? ?Ŷ25). 
636
 ^ƚĞŝŶǁĞŝƐĂŶĚZĂĐŚůŝŶ ? ‘/ŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ? ?Ŷ68) 1-2. 
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of legal theory are not within its scope is revealed by ƚŚĞĨĂĐƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĞĚŝƚŽƌƐ ?
acknowledgement that ƚŚĞ ĐŽůůĞĐƚŝŽŶ ?Ɛ ĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶƐ  ‘ŚĂǀe important 
implications for our own time ?637 is not taken up elsewhere.  
The potential connections between the Nazi use of law and the potential for 
the rule of law to be eroded in modern societies  are mentioned but not 
pursued because of the disciplinary strictures of the volume. The subject-
matter of the contributing essays is thoroughly legal historical in most cases, 
exploring the role of institutions and individuals within the legal system in the 
furtherance of the state, particularly towards genocide.638 Therefore while 
the evidence constructed in its chapters is indispensable for understanding 
how Nazi Germany impinges on this contemporary concern, its systemic 
philosophical implications remain outside of the scope of an essentially 
historiographical approach and methodology.  
The scholarship on Nazi law, therefore, is growing but continues to cut across 
different disciplinary silos, which often do not interact much with one 
another or address the same research interests. Research in this area has 
been significantly enhanced since I began this project but many gaps remain, 
particularly in the area of legal theory. Consequently a number of questions 
for further research emerged from the writing process, on top of those areas 
mentioned at the end of the previous section of this chapter. A wider 
examination of the relationship between legal theory and Nazi Germany 
appears promising given the role the latter plays in jurisprudence. How 
specific is this role to analytical jurisprudence and what is the role of Nazi law 
in more critical aspects of the field? This dissertation has not tackled the 
critical theoretical exploration of the Holocaust and its relationship to law, 
influenced by continental theory and particularly embodied in the writing of 
Giorgio Agamben.639 Including this and related scholarship in a broader 
analysis would raise further interesting issues, particularly in terms of how to 
theorise encounters between the law of the camps and the law of the state. 
In the analysis of the representation of Nazi Germany in jurisprudential 
discourse in Chapter Two, it was noted that some other regimes such as 
those in apartheid South Africa and Stalinist Russia are sometimes mentioned 
as part of the category of wicked legal systems. A broader examination of the 
role of that category within jurisprudence would discern the extent to which 
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 ibid 12. 
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 For example, the complex cooperation of the largely legally trained professional 
bureaucracy, the role of civil  service lawyers, the contribution of the Volksgerichtshof 
 ?WĞŽƉůĞ ?Ɛ ŽƵƌƚ )ƵŶĚĞƌZŽůĂŶĚ&ƌĞŝƐůĞƌ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞƚƌĞĂ ŵent of Jewish lawyers; Steinweis and 
Rachlin, The Law in Nazi Germany (n 67) ch 1, 2, 3 and 5 respectively. 
639
 See fn 84. 
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such systems are automatically subsumed within this category alongside Nazi 
Germany and shed further light on how both positivist and naturalist 
paradigms leverage the concept of wicked law in support of their arguments. 
The brief discussion of the role of perpetrators in the concentration camp 
system in Section III of Chapter Five raises additional issues worth exploring 
when considered alongside the role of ideology in Nazi law and in the regime 
generally in influencing the moral behaviour of legal and other officials. Nazi 
Germany appears to be a fruitful source of evidence about how societal 
norms  W together with their legal manifestations  W impact on the decisions 
that people make, especially when those decisions have such horrific 
consequences.640 
Other areas of legal scholarship with a particular relationship to the Nazi past, 
including international human rights, are worthy of investigation to establish 
whether the same concerns exist there as within jurisprudential discourse. A 
general theorisation of Nazi law, and particularly its relationship to ideology, 
is a project requiring much more attention than I was able to provide it, and 
would both contribute to historical understanding and challenge further the 
imposition of the conceptualisations of law advanced by positivism and 
natural law on the Third Reich. On top of this there remains a significant 
amount of historical research to be done in the English-language, into the 
functioning of Nazi law, its role in the Holocaust and its place in society. On 
both historical and theoretical levels, exploring Nazi law in the context of 
inter-war European fascism would be particularly interesting, bringing Nazi 
Germany out of isolation and enabling the examination of the role law plays 
in such movements and transitions. This would also help us to move beyond 
the rupture thesis. 
IV. Understanding Nazi Law 
Of the areas for potential further research arising from this dissertation, it is 
pertinent to say a little more about the aspects of Nazi law I believe 
jurisprudence must confront following the critique advanced in this 
dissertation. The research presented here provides the foundation for a 
closer analysis of the Nazi legal system in order to establish its legal 
theoretical character and, consequently, how it ought to be understood and 
ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚ ďǇ ĐŽŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇ ũƵƌŝƐƉƌƵĚĞŶĐĞ ? /Ĩ ŝƚ ǁĂƐ ŶŽƚ ŵĞƌĞůǇ Ă  ‘ǁŝĐŬĞĚ
ůĞŐĂůƐǇƐƚĞŵ ? ?ďƵƚǁĂƐƵƐĞĚƚŽĐŽŵŵŝƚƵŶĚŽƵďƚĞĚůǇǁŝĐŬĞĚĂĐƚƐ ?ŝĨŝƚǁĂƐŶŽƚ
a cynically repressive instrument but lacked the characteristics of the rule of 
law; if it could not be said either to exemplify pure positivism partly because 
of its ideological component, and yet that component is radically different 
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 In this area see Pauer-^ƚƵĚĞƌĂŶĚsĞůůĞŵĂŶ ? ‘ŝƐƚŽƌƚŝŽŶƐŽĨEŽƌŵĂƚŝǀŝƚǇ ? ?Ŷ175). 
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from that envisaged by natural law; if it was imbued with ideology but that 
ideology was not entirely coherent or comprehensively elucidated; if the 
,ŽůŽĐĂƵƐƚ ǁĂƐ ďŽƚŚ  ‘ŶŽƌŵĂů ? ĂŶĚ  ‘ůĂǁ-ĨƵůů ? ? ďƵƚ ŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚ ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ƉŽǁĞƌ ?
arbitrary killing and death camps. Then what was Nazi law and what does it 
tell us about the theoretical nature of law in general? 
The historiographical case studies surveyed in Chapter Five begin to reveal a 
number of important things about the Nazi legal system. The significance of 
an anti-Semitic ideology lending an underlying anti-liberal direction and 
normative coherence to Nazi law is threefold:641 it must be considered as 
more than only a pragmatic instrument of repression; it cannot be treated 
simply as a manifestation of positivism or refutation of natural law; and a 
clear connection exists between the use of law in the everyday running of the 
state and its application to the genocidal project of the Holocaust. 
The concentration camp system case study reinforces the last of these points , 
in particular, further.642 In highlighting elements of continuity instead of 
rupture, emphasising the normality and diversity of the character and 
motivation of many camp perpetrators, and revealing the interdependency of 
the development of the relationship between the SS and the judiciary, the 
opposition between ƚŚĞ  ‘ŶŽƌŵĂƚŝǀĞ ? ĂŶĚ  ‘ƉƌĞƌŽŐĂƚŝǀĞ ? ƐƉŚĞƌĞƐof the legal 
system is collapsed. Together these case studies problematize the most 
enlightening naturalist account of Nazi law, put forward by Kristen Rundle.643 
They also point to the aspects of Nazi law that jurisprudence needs to 
confront in order to overcome its current intransigence in respect of the 
Third Reich. These are some of the most challenging qualities of the Nazi legal 
system, both for this thesis and for jurisprudence. 
In order to encourage a jurisprudence built upon its difference from Nazi law 
to confront its complicity and continuity with that law, it is necessary to 
construct a more complete theoretical picture of the legal system. This is 
something that is being made easier by the new legal theoretical and legal 
historical research into Nazi Germany that has been appearing in recent 
years.644 I have suggested that the multi-sourced nature of Nazi law makes it 
difficult to place within a Hartian positivist framework of primary and 
secondary rules. This needs further exploration to understand the 
relationship between the different levels and types of rule, law, regulation 
and decree that existed in the Third Reich. I have argued that Nazi ideology 
provided a foundation that takes Nazi law beyond its characterisation in the 
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 See Section II of Chapter Five on the role of ideology in the Nazi legal system. 
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 See sections III and IV of Chapter Five on the concentra tion camp system. 
643
 ^ĞĞƚŚĞ ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶŽĨZƵŶĚůĞ ?ƐĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚŝŶ^ĞĐƚŝŽŶ/sŽĨŚĂƉƚĞƌ&ŝǀĞŝŶƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ ? 
644
 See the discussion of new scholarship in the previous section, for example. 
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Hart-Fuller debate and subsequent jurisprudential accounts. We need to 
appreciate better how Nazi ideology acted as a moral system inherent within 
the legal system, through the creation, implementation and enforcement of 
laws. We also need to ascertain the role played by law as a vehicle for Nazi 
ideology, a mechanism for dissemination and reinforcing ideological 
imperatives among the population, and how it impacted on the decisions 
made by perpetrators and others living within the system. I have said that the 
Holocaust cannot be separated from the remainder of the Nazi state, and 
indeed is integral with it. Analysing the way law functioned in the key centres 
and institutions of the Holocaust would develop this claim and help dispel the 
notion of rupture between normal and exceptional (genocidal) law. A better 
comprehension of these aspects of the Third Reich would enhance our 
understanding of the many and varied manifestations of the concept of law 
and enable Nazi law a role at the centre of jurisprudential discourse. 
V. A Jurisprudence of Nazi Law 
Anglo-American culture and collective memory certainly do not forget or 
ignore the dark days of National Socialism. Those addressing the dominant 
jurisprudential questions within that culture often do, notwithstanding the 
historical links between the development of academic discourse and public 
consciousness in this area. This ostensible contradiction points to the reasons 
behind the ineffectiveness of mainstream jurisprudence in access ing the 
heart of the Nazi past. If National Socialism is etched so firmly into our 
collective memories because of its sheer moral horror, situation at the centre 
of western civilisation and enduring traumatic presence, it is also because of 
the portrayal of totalitarian, remorseless, criminal evil advanced by the 
Nuremberg Trials. This combination, which makes us so fascinated by the 
Third Reich, has also precluded other perspectives than that of the wicked 
legal system from entering jurisprudential discourse, by the creation at the 
outset of a narrative structured around the substantive exclusion of Nazi 
Germany from our legal world. 
A jurisprudence of Nazi law that overcomes this dominant narrative can only 
be achieved through twin manoeuvres: the recognition that the prevailing 
representation and the discourse that supports it does not account for the 
Third Reich; and an engagement with the historical research that works to 
reconstruct a more accurate picture of the Nazi legal system. A universal , 
analytical concept of law has little meaning if it does not genuinely embrace a 
system such as Nazi Germany. Equally an evaluative concept of law has to 
understand the legal systems it attempts to critique, to tackle its objects as 
they actually are rather than as they are perceived to be. Nazi law is 
therefore not sufficiently well understood within jurisprudence for a 
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jurisprudence of Nazi law to exist within mainstream scholarship, but it is 
hoped that this dissertation will play some part in assisting the process of 
understanding. 
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